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Bohater Płk Ryszard Kukliński nie żyje Dodaj do ulubionych

Niestety HOLOTA pokomunistyczna nigdy nie doceni tego wspanialego
Bohatera ktory staral sie uchronic POLSKE przeciwko zdrajcom takim jak
Jaruzelski, Kania czy nawet inna grupa "pseudo PATRIOTOW" jak Michnik
czy ten co sie walesal.

Gdyby wreszcie zaczeli studiowac prawdziwe FAKTY to by zrozumieli ze to
JARUZELSKI staral sie sciagnac wojska zdradzieckie do Polski aby
stlumic "glodowa rewolucje" biednych polakow!

Czytajac wypociny ciemnoty Polskiej nie ma sie co dziwic.

Kuklinski poswiecil swoje zycie aby ocalic Polske i cene ktora za to
zaplacil byla smierc jego dwoch synow ktorzy zgineli w "dziwnych
niewyjasnionych okolicznosciach" a raczej zaranzowanych zabojstwach po
przez sluzby specjalne z bloku wschodniego!

Gdyby nie zdrada Polski po przez Jaruzelskiego Kuklinski by nigdy nie
byl znany.

Karierowicze tacy jak Michnik pisza BZDURY aby zarobic na zycie.
Trezeba miec dostep do faktow aby ocenic prawdziwego Polskiego BOHATERA


"Kuklinski, in order to save Poland, decided to fight a silent war against the
Soviet juggernaut on an invisible front. He would tell the West what was in
store for it—and for Poland—in the event of war with the Soviet Union."

KUKLINSKI byl jednym z NIELICZNYCH BOHATEROW ppowojennych w Polsce.

Kuklinski was active at a far more dangerous time in US-Soviet relations.
During the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had overwhelming strategic
superiority over the USSR; it had a wide margin of security, and it ultimately
forced Moscow to back down. When Kuklinski approached US intelligence, it
seemed to him that the world was becoming more dangerous because of rising
Soviet power and assertiveness and American isolationism. As he told one

The United States began losing interest in Europe. The free world was terrified
by the military power of the USSR and did not prevent the quelling of the
Prague Spring uprising [in August 1968]. On the other hand, Moscow, dizzy from
its worldwide success, accelerated its armament program…. You could smell the
gunpowder in Europe, and the consequences for Poland and the Poles would have
been tragic.36

The information Kuklinski provided to CIA remains classified, but he has
revealed the most important details in a series of interviews.

Even General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the former minister of internal affairs who
supervised the official damage assessment, acknowledged: "When we started to
analyze the range of information he had got hold of, we realized that he knew
so much there was no point in changing anything (in Polish military plans)
because we would have had to change virtually everything."37 Highlights of
these interviews include:38

• Soviet war plans: Kuklinski outlined the Soviet game plan for waging an
offensive war against NATO.

• Wartime command and control arrangements: Kuklinski revealed that, in
wartime, the national armies of the Warsaw Pact (with the exception of Romania)
would come under direct Soviet operational control. Polish commanders would
have been reduced to the status of liaison and logistics officers taking orders
from Soviet superiors.

• Warning of war: Warsaw Pact planning documents and military exercises yielded
insight into how the Soviets would mobilize for war. Kuklinski’s
information "allowed us to develop an intimate understanding of the way they
worked. It was invaluable for warning," according to a US strategic expert.39

• Project Albatross: Kuklinski had knowledge of three highly secret, deep
underground bunkers the Soviets had constructed in Poland, the USSR, and
Bulgaria for wartime command and control. He identified the exact location,
construction, and communications systems used for the Polish complex. According
to President Carter’s National Security Adviser, Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, "Kuklinski’s information permitted us to make counterplans to
disrupt command-and-control facilities rather than only relying on a massive
counterattack on forward positions, which would have hit Poland."40

• Information on some 200 advanced weapon systems and a manual on electronic
warfare: Kuklinski also alerted US intelligence to a massive Soviet denial and
deception program, highlighting the use of dummies and decoys to foil US
satellite surveillance.

Ludzie skladaja uklony Walesie.

Walesa byl NIKIM i zawsze nikim zostanie, nie zaleznie ze dostal Nobel
Peace Prize!

To Kuklinski musial uciekac z Polski bo sie narazil prawdziwym zdrajcom

Aby byc zdrajcom nie trzeba "sprzedawac" dokumentow do CIA, wystarczy
zdradzic Narod Polski starajac sie o wciagniecie wojsk Radzieckich do Polski!

Szkoda ze Jaruzelski i Kania nie dostali wyroku smierci na ktory
zapracowali za ZDRADE Polski blagajac Kulikova o wyslanie wojsk Radzieckich
do Polski !

Kuklinski zrobil to czego mozna sie spodziewac od PRAWDZIWEGO BOHATERA
i nie sprzedal zadnego dokumentu do CIA dla wzbogacenia sie!
Nie bral pieniedzy za staranie sie o uwolnienie Polski od ZDRAJCOW i
agentow Radzieckich!

"Soviet Intransigence

Jaruzelski’s claim to be the savior of Poland stands or falls on his assertion
that he faced a Hobson’s choice between martial law and Soviet military

Unfortunately for him, virtually all the evidence that has appeared since 1991
in Polish, Soviet, and other East European records indicates that the Kremlin
had no intention of intervening—one of the most surprising revelations found in
the Soviet archives.

Worse yet, there is solid information that Jaruzelski actually preferred Soviet
intervention to martial law.

He apparently pleaded with the Soviets to do his dirty work for him, and, when
they refused, he asked for assurances that Moscow would provide military backup
if Polish forces proved incapable of suppressing Solidarity. The Soviets also
refused that request.

Jaruzelski suffered a major (and highly publicized) humiliation during a joint
US-Polish-Soviet conference on the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 held in a Warsaw
suburb in September 1997.

Marshal Viktor Kulikov, former supreme commander of Warsaw Pact forces and
Moscow’s proconsul in Warsaw, denied that the USSR had intended or had
threatened to intervene.

During the next break, participants overhead Jaruzelski shouting at Kulikov in
Russian, "You know what you said to me then. How could you let them do this
to me—in front of the Americans!"23

Minutes of Soviet Politburo meetings support Kulikov. They go even further,
suggesting that the Kremlin was prepared, if necessary, to give up Poland
altogether, even if it meant the end of Communist rule. During a 10 December
session on the eve of martial law, for example, KGB chairman Yuri Andropov (and
Brezhnev’s heir apparent) told his fellow Politburo members:

We do not intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the proper position,
and we must adhere to it until the end. I don’t know how things will turn out
in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control of Solidarity, that’s the
way it will be.24 (emphasis added)

At the same session Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko noted that the Politburo "…
must somehow dispel the notion that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have
about the introduction of troops. There can be no introduction of troops."25

Jaruzelski’s worst fear was not, as he claims, Soviet intervention, it was
nonintervention. "Under these circumstances," a perceptive observer
wrote, "Jaruzelski’s d
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