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Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Descision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981

By Mark Kramer

ANDROPOV:

The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal
countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our troops
will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV:

In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our troops to
Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.22


When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the
meeting, the Polish leader complained that "the allies have forced us into an
impasse" and "left us on our own."31 He could not understand why "the
allies do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they
have constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole
Warsaw Pact, not just for Poland." Jaruzelski added that he was "still
hoping for a miracle," but could sense that his "options [were] running
out."32 Implicit in all these comments was Jaruzelski's distinct lack of
confidence that martial law could be imposed without external military
support.

Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski's position in
late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on 10 December,
barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants
in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking—or at least they
believed he was seeking—a military guarantee.

Among those putting forth this view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU
Secretary responsible for intra-bloc affairs, who had been keeping close
track of the situation from Moscow and was the main contact point in December
1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in Poland who needed to convey
information to, or receive instructions from, the CPSU Politburo:

Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this -matter [martial law]
with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with
the resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive
assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of
armed forces on the territory of Poland.33



http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=library.document&topic_id=1409&id=62

Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981, by Mark Kramer
By Mark Kramer


Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Descision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981




By Mark Kramer


The behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the Polish crisis of 1980-
81 remains a source of great controversy.
On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt
that the Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in
1980-81.1 The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combat-ready
troops around Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long
series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed
Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led
invasion, and made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and
multilateral channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to
fear that the Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law.
Whether Soviet leaders actually intended to invade is a very different
matter. All the latest evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet
officials were extremely reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland.
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this new evidence,
persuasive though it seems in retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In
1980-81, Polish leaders were not privy to the internal deliberations of the
Soviet Politburo and could never be fully certain about Soviet intentions.
Hence, they may have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a
solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial law) did not materialize.
Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have wanted to create that impression—
even if they did not intend to follow up on it—because they believed it would
induce the Polish authorities to take action.2 In that respect, the
declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that he
introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and
the "lesser of two evils."3
On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises
serious doubts about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically
about his position in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. First-
hand accounts and newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981
(and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without
external (i.e., Soviet) military assistance or at least a solid guarantee
that Soviet troops would move in if the martial law operation failed. The
documents also suggest that Soviet leaders by then were unwilling to provide
direct military support to Jaruzelski, telling him that it would
be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops into Poland and that he must instead
proceed with martial law on his own. Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet
military assistance, as revealed in the latest evidence, nearly caused him to
postpone the whole operation in the hope that he would then be given a
concrete external assurance.
The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in
December 1981 was first propounded in September 1992 by a retired Soviet
officer, Army-General Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as
Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. In
that capacity, he played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81. Looking
back on the Polish crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed
martial law to forestall a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that,
rather than trying to stave off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did
just the opposite in December 1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of
military assistance [from the USSR] if the situation in Poland becomes
critical."4 The Soviet Politburo, according to Gribkov, promptly turned
down the Polish leader's requests, informing him that "Soviet troops will not
be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after this decision was
conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to reconsider and warned
them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland will be lost to the
Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-minute pleas for a
Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the nervousness and diffidence
that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their ability to carry out the
plans for martial law."5
Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been
gaining a favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even
among some of his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were
willing to accept Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of
two evils" in December 1981.6 Confronted by Gribkov's revelations,
Jaruzelski strenuously denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military
guarantee and argued that Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet
military pressure and intervention in 1981.7 An acrimonious standoff
between the two men ensued.
Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to
bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence
includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and
secret records of meetings and conversations. Until recently,
Edytor zaawansowany
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    Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to
    bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence
    includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and secret
    records of meetings and conversations. Until recently, the new evidence was
    very strong—strong enough to raise serious doubts about Jaruzelski's self-
    exculpatory claims—but it was not yet conclusive. That changed in November
    1997, when I obtained a document that provides much clearer evidence about
    Jaruzelski's behavior in the lead-up to martial law. Combined with all the
    previous disclosures, this document (which I have translated and annotated
    below) offers powerful confirmation of Gribkov's article.
    Before turning to this new document, it is worth reviewing the other
    evidence that corroborates Gribkov's account. Some of the evidence has come
    from unexpected sources, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of
    the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) during the Polish crisis.
    Gorbachev was and is an admirer and close friend of Jaruzelski and has
    described him as "a true hero" who in 1981 "had no choice" and "acted
    correctly."8 In an interview in late 1992, Gorbachev affirmed that he "always
    had complete trust in Jaruzelski" and had "talked to him more openly and
    honestly than I did with some members of the CPSU Politburo."9 Gorbachev also
    has insisted that Jaruzelski's reputation will be secure as "a Polish patriot
    and a man of great honor" who "saved his country."10 Hence, Gorbachev has no
    reason to say anything that would impugn Jaruzelski's honesty. Nor does
    Gorbachev have any reason to defend the reputation of those on the Soviet
    Politburo in 1981 who may have wanted to dispatch Soviet military forces to
    Poland unless Jaruzelski imposed martial law. If anything, Gorbachev might
    have been expected to go out of his way to substantiate Jaruzelski's claims
    about what happened in December 1981.
    Yet in several interviews with Polish journalists in October and
    November 1992, Gorbachev averred that the CPSU Politburo made no threat of
    military intervention in December 1981, contrary to the assertions in
    Jaruzelski's memoirs. Gorbachev also recalled that shortly before martial law
    was introduced, a top Polish official (who Gorbachev deduced was Jaruzelski)
    had placed an urgent phone call to Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU
    Politburo and CPSU Secretariat who chaired the Politburo's special commission
    on the Polish crisis. Gorbachev maintained that Suslov had informed the Polish
    leader that Soviet troops would continue to protect Poland against external
    threats, but would not be used against internal dangers.11 According to
    Gorbachev, Suslov's refusal to provide a military guarantee came as a shock to
    the Polish leader, who tried in vain to persuade Suslov to change his mind.
    On all key points, Gorbachev's testimony closely parallels and
    reinforces Gribkov's account, even though the two men obviously did not consult
    with one another and were unaware of each other's comments until at least
    several weeks afterwards, when a controversy ensued in Poland. The accounts
    overlap both in their broad themes and in many of the details they contain
    (e.g., about Suslov's role). Because Gorbachev and Gribkov were both in a
    position to know first-hand about the events they described, the inadvertent
    similarity of their remarks enhances their credibility.
    The accounts provided by Gorbachev and Gribkov were endorsed by a
    retired general of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), Vitalii Pavlov,
    who was the KGB station chief in Warsaw from 1973 to 1984. In a series of
    interviews with the Polish press in early 1993, and in his memoirs (published
    in Poland in 1994 and in Moscow in 1998), Pavlov argued that Jaruzelski
    desperately wanted an assurance of military intervention in December 1981, but
    that Suslov and other Soviet leaders refused to comply.12 Pavlov claimed that
    Suslov had spoken with Jaruzelski by phone on 12 December and had told the
    Polish leader that "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union was "out
    of the question," adding that "we will help you materially, financially, and
    politically, but not with armed force."13 Pavlov recalled that Yurii
    Andropov, a CPSU Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, sent the same
    message to General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs.
    The main elements of Pavlov's account were substantiated by Kiszczak
    himself, who is a close friend of Jaruzelski. In an interview in 1993,
    Kiszczak confirmed that Pavlov is one of the very few people who can speak
    authoritatively about the KGB's operations and Soviet policy during the Polish
    crisis.14 Elsewhere, Kiszczak acknowledged that Jaruzelski placed an urgent
    phone call to Moscow on 12 December to inquire about military "help from the
    allies." Because Brezhnev declined to take the phone, Jaruzelski ended up
    speaking with Suslov.15 Kiszczak recalled, as Pavlov did, that Suslov
    admonished Jaruzelski not to expect Soviet military support "under any
    circumstances." Although Kiszczak's recollections differ on some points from
    Pavlov's, the similarities between the two are striking.
    These various first-hand accounts have been supplemented over the past
    five to six years by the release of crucial documentation in Russia, Poland,
    and other former Warsaw Pact countries. Although many Soviet and Polish
    documents have not yet been declassified, the items that have emerged lend
    credence to Gribkov's account of what happened in December 1981. Selected
    transcripts from some of the CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980-81 were released
    in late 1992, August 1993, and early 1994.16 A few of these transcripts,
    including one from 10 December 1981, bear directly on the question of
    Jaruzelski's stance in December 1981. Documents from some of the East European
    countries, notably Hungary and East Germany, also shed valuable light on the
    matter.17
    One of the consistent themes in these documents is the lack of
    confidence that Jaruzelski and his close aides had about their ability to
    sustain martial law without external military aid. Even after mid-September
    1981, when Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet obrony kraju, or KOK)
    reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law
    (leaving only the precise date to be determined), Polish leaders remained
    doubtful that they could handle it on their own.18 Although the Polish
    authorities had repeatedly assured the Soviet Union over the previous twelve
    months that they would "resolve the crisis with our own means," they had said
    this in the hope of somehow finding a political solution that would not require
    the opposition to be wiped out (at least not all at once). The imposition of
    martial law, aimed at crushing the opposition, was an entirely different matter.
    Newly released documents indicate that a few days after the KOK's
    watershed meeting in September 1981, "the Polish Communist leaders assessed
    their forces [and] found that their resources would be insufficient for this
    sort of action [i.e., martial law] and that the support of allied forces would
    therefore be needed."19 Because Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, the head of
    the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) from September 1980 to mid-October 1981
    (when he was replaced by Jaruzelski), both realized that "direct intervention
    by [troops from] other socialist countries" would "set back the development of
    socialism by decades" and "would be exploited by the imperialist forces," they
    were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision.
    Although Kania claimed t
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    Although Kania claimed that he would not "exclude the possibility of steps that
    would unavoidably require the intervention of [Poland's] allies," he was still
    hoping that some alternative to martial law could be found.20 Kania's
    continued hesitancy sparked a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on
    17 September, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately
    to "prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland."21 Soon thereafter, on
    18 October, Kania was replaced as PUWP First Secretary by Jaruzelski, under
    Soviet auspices. (By that point, Soviet leaders had correctly surmised that
    Kania was doing his best to avoid imposing martial law.)
    Once Jaruzelski assumed the top party post and began making all the
    final preparations for martial law, his demeanor seems to have changed a good
    deal compared to the previous thirteen months, when he had been working with
    Kania. The evidence suggests that Jaruzelski increasingly sought a concrete
    military guarantee from the Soviet Union, a request that Soviet leaders
    declined to fulfill. His position on this matter was discussed at a Soviet
    Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981 by Andropov and the Soviet defense
    minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov:

    ANDROPOV: The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the
    fraternal countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our
    troops will not be sent to Poland.

    USTINOV: In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our
    troops to Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.22

    To be sure, this passage can lend itself to different interpretations.
    Andropov's and Ustinov's perceptions of Jaruzelski's position may not have been
    fully accurate. Moreover, it is unclear precisely what Ustinov meant when he
    said that "the Poles are not ready to receive our troops." Most likely, he was
    arguing that if Soviet military units entered Poland to support Jaruzelski,
    they would encounter vigorous armed resistance.23
    Even if some ambiguity about this passage remains, Andropov's and
    Ustinov's comments tend to bear out the view that Jaruzelski was requesting
    Soviet military intervention or at least the assurance of military support if
    the martial law operation collapsed. Their remarks also imply that Soviet
    leaders had no intention of sending troops to Poland (either in support of or
    against Jaruzelski) unless some unforeseeable circumstance arose. In both
    respects the transcript bears out a key episode recorded by Gribkov, who
    recalled that just after a Soviet Politburo session in late October 1981, he
    and the Commander-in-Chief of the War-saw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, were
    ordered by Ustinov to inform Jaruzelski that the Poles "had better rely more on
    their own forces to restore order in the country and not hope that some big
    brother will step in and take care of every-thing for them."24 Gribkov's
    recollection of this matter is especially credible because his account of it
    was published well before he could have seen the transcript of the Politburo
    meeting, which was not declassified until more than a year later.
    Further evidence that Jaruzelski was hoping to receive Soviet military
    backing in late 1981 comes from two highly classified documents prepared by the
    Polish General Staff and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of
    November 1981, which reviewed the ongoing preparations for martial law. One of
    the documents, compiled by the Polish General Staff on 23 November, indicated
    that "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the
    transport of our own troops and allied troops [wojsk wlasnych i sojuszniczych]
    can be carried out fully and properly."25 This phrasing does not necessarily
    indicate that the "allied troops" would be intervening in support of the
    martial law operation—after all, the Soviet Politburo had consistently
    emphasized that lines of communication between the USSR's Northern Group of
    Forces and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany must be protected—but it
    certainly is compatible with the notion that Polish leaders would seek external
    military assistance. That notion is borne out even more strongly by another
    document, prepared two days later by the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs,
    which noted that "assistance from Warsaw Pact forces would not be ruled out" if
    the martial law operation produced widespread violent turmoil.26 This
    position was in line with the views expressed earlier in the year by senior
    ministry officials, who argued that martial law would be infeasible unless the
    Polish authorities received external military support.27
    Another indication that Jaruzelski was hoping to gain outside backing
    for the martial law operation came a week later, in early December 1981, when
    he sought an explicit Warsaw Pact statement "condemning the actions of the
    counterrevolution [in Poland] and the interference by NATO in [Poland's]
    internal affairs."28 Jaruzelski was unable to travel to Moscow for a meeting
    of the Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December, but in his place
    he sent his closest aide, the chief of the Polish General Staff, General
    Florian Siwicki. Jaruzelski instructed Siwicki to urge the assembled ministers
    and Warsaw Pact commanders to issue a strong statement "demonstrating to the
    whole world that the Polish Communists are not alone." Drafts of the proposed
    statement referred to "the fulfillment of alliance obligations by the armed
    forces of the Warsaw Pact member states" and pledged "complete support for the
    Polish people" in their "struggle against counterrevolution."29 These
    formulations sparked a protracted discussion, but in the end the meeting failed
    to produce the type of statement Jaruzelski had sought. The Romanian and
    Hungarian defense ministers, Colonel-General Constantin Olteanu and Army-
    General Lajos Csinege, argued that their governments had not given them
    authority to endorse such a statement, and the other ministers decided it would
    be inadvisable to release a document that was not approved unanimously.30
    When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the
    meeting, the Polish leader complained that "the allies have forced us into an
    impasse" and "left us on our own."31 He could not understand why "the allies
    do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they have
    constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole Warsaw
    Pact, not just for Poland." Jaruzelski added that he was "still hoping for a
    miracle," but could sense that his "options [were] running out."32 Implicit
    in all these comments was Jaruzelski's distinct lack of confidence that martial
    law could be imposed without external military support.
    Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski's position in
    late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on 10 December,
    barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants
    in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking—or at least they
    believed he was seeking—a military guarantee. Among those putting forth this
    view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc
    affairs, who had been keeping close track of the situation from Moscow and was
    the main contact point in December 1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in
    Poland who needed to convey information to, or receive instructions from, the
    CPSU Politburo:

    Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this -matter [martial law] with
    his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the
    resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive
    assistance from other countrie
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    Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this -matter [martial law] with
    his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the
    resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive
    assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed
    forces on the territory of Poland.33

    Rusakov noted that "Jaruzelski, in expressing this hope, has been
    citing remarks by Cde. Kulikov, who supposedly said that the USSR and other
    socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed
    forces. However, as far as I know, Cde. Kulikov did not say this directly, but
    merely repeated the words voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our
    determination not to leave Poland in the lurch."34
    If Jaruzelski was indeed citing Kulikov at this point, as Rusakov
    reported, that would be interesting in itself. It is possible that Kulikov did
    in fact say something to Jaruzelski on 8 December—if only inadvertently—that
    seemed (in Jaruzelski's view) to be a pledge of Soviet military assistance if
    the martial law operation collapsed. During at least one previous occasion
    when Kulikov was in Poland in 1981 he brought up this very matter with
    Jaruzelski. In a conversation with East German military officials on 7 April
    1981, Kulikov said he had indicated to Jaruzelski and Kania a few days earlier
    that "unless [the Polish authorities] used the Polish security organs and army
    [to impose martial law], outside support could not be expected because of the
    international complications that would arise." Kulikov said he "emphasized to
    the Polish comrades that they must first seek to resolve their problems on
    their own." However, he was careful to add that "if the Polish authorities
    tried to resolve these problems on their own and were unable to, and were then
    to ask [the Soviet Union] for assistance, that would be a very different
    situation from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed [to Poland] from
    the outset."35 Kulikov probably did not intend these remarks to be regarded
    as an ironclad pledge of a Soviet military guarantee, but he certainly may have
    given Jaruzelski and Kania the impression (whether rightly or wrongly) in April
    1981 that they could count on Soviet military help if the martial law operation
    went awry. Although there is no evidence that Kulikov said something identical
    when he met with Jaruzelski in December 1981, Jaruzelski may have construed
    some of Kulikov's remarks at that time as a reaffirmation of what Kulikov had
    been saying to him earlier in the year. A misunderstanding in a tense
    situation like this would hardly be unusual. (Nor is it inconceivable that
    Kulikov mistakenly went beyond his brief in December 1981 and gave Jaruzelski
    the wrong idea about Soviet policy.)
    Whatever the case may be, Jaruzelski's invocation of Kulikov's remarks
    (as Jaruzelski interpreted them) tends to bear out the hypothesis that—at least
    in Rusakov's view—the Polish leader expected and wanted to receive Soviet
    military backing.
    That same inference can be drawn from a comment by Yurii Andropov at
    the 10 December meeting of the Soviet Politburo. Andropov voiced dismay
    that "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our
    willingness to offer . . . military assistance," and he urged his colleagues to
    resist any temptation to fulfill Jaruzelski's request:

    Although we support the notion of internationalist assistance and are alarmed
    by the situation in Poland, the matter must entirely and unequivocally be
    handled by the Polish comrades themselves. We do not intend to introduce
    troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must adhere to it
    until the end.36
    Andropov's sentiments were echoed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
    Gromyko, who argued that "we must somehow try to dispel the notion that
    Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of [Soviet]
    troops. There cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland. I think we
    can give instructions about this to our ambassador, asking him to visit
    Jaruzelski and communicate it to him."37 Andropov's and Gromyko's statements
    were endorsed by others at the meeting, all of whom agreed that Jaruzelski's
    last-minute effort to receive external military support for the martial law
    operation should not induce the Soviet Politburo to alter its stance.
    Taken together, the documents and memoirs that were just cited provide
    powerful evidence that Jaruzelski was calling for and expecting Soviet troops
    to be sent to Poland in December 1981. Even so, a number of doubts—or at least
    differences of interpretation—could remain. For example, one could argue,
    after poring over these materials, that Soviet leaders might have misperceived
    Jaruzelski's actions, or that Jaruzelski was raising the question of Soviet
    military intervention not because he wanted it to occur, but because he was
    probing Soviet intentions. One also might argue that without precise records
    of what Jaruzelski was doing and saying at the time, it would be impossible to
    reconstruct his motives with any certainty.
    Fortunately, a first-hand, contemporaneous record of Jaruzelski's
    behavior in the last few days before martial law—including his repeated
    requests for Soviet military support and the consternation he felt when those
    requests were turned down—is now finally available. It turns out that Marshal
    Kulikov's personal adjutant, Lieutenant-General Viktor Anoshkin, kept daily
    notes of Kulikov's phone calls, telegrams, conversations, and meetings.38 As
    Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, Kulikov had been a frequent
    envoy to Poland throughout the 1980-81 crisis, performing sensitive missions on
    behalf of the CPSU Politburo. He and Anoshkin had been in Warsaw in late
    November 1981 when the final preparations for martial law were completed, and
    they were again in Poland from 7 to 17 December 1981, when the preparations
    were transformed into action. Anoshkin's records of Kulikov's interactions
    with Jaruzelski in the lead-up to martial law show that Jaruzelski wanted and
    requested Soviet military assistance, and that he was distraught when Soviet
    leaders informed him that no troops would be sent.
    Among other things, Anoshkin's notebook reveals that Jaruzelski spoke
    by phone with Brezhnev early in the morning of 10 December, right after a late-
    night meeting at the Polish General Staff where Jaruzelski and other top Polish
    military commanders unanimously approved a final decision to proceed with
    martial law.39 The Polish leader informed Brezhnev that the decision had been
    adopted, and he then asked "whether Poland can count on [Soviet] military
    assistance if the situation in the country becomes critical." Brezhnev evaded
    a direct response, but just a few hours later Kulikov received specific
    instructions from Ustinov to let Jaruzelski know that "the Poles themselves
    must resolve the Polish question. We are not preparing to send troops onto the
    territory of Poland." When Jaruzelski received this message, he expressed
    concern that "you [the Soviet Union] are distancing yourselves from us," and he
    tried to find out whether the decision could be reversed.40
    The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the
    Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader
    again flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the
    USSR—the additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a
    response to Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed
    Jaruzelski that his request had been turned down, the Polish leader
    exc
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    The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the Soviet
    ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader again
    flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR—the
    additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a response to
    Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed Jaruzelski that his
    request had been turned down, the Polish leader exclaimed: "This is terrible
    news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went
    on—now everything has disappeared." Jaruzelski's comment here, as recorded by
    Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do
    all other documents combined. Any notion that Jaruzelski was simply probing
    Soviet intentions no longer seems tenable.
    Jaruzelski's profound disappointment upon learning that he would not
    receive external military assistance was due to his continued lack of
    confidence that the martial law operation would succeed. According to Kania,
    Jaruzelski had long feared that chaotic turmoil might ensue and that Polish
    units would be unable to cope with violent upheavals on their own.41 He was
    convinced that if opposition forces withstood the "first stage" of the
    crackdown, the whole operation would collapse unless external aid were
    forthcoming. Although Jaruzelski may have "continued to hope for a miracle"
    (as he himself put it in a conversation with Siwicki), he could no longer
    contain his misgivings when the decisive moment arrived in December 1981.
    Having led himself to believe that the "first stage" of the operation would be
    unsuccessful, he desperately hoped that Soviet troops would come bail him out,
    just as Gribkov had claimed.
    When Jaruzelski suddenly realized that "the Poles [would] have to fend
    for themselves," he seemed at a loss about what to do. Rather than steeling
    himself for the impending martial law crackdown, he repeatedly tried to
    persuade Soviet leaders to change their minds. In addition to conveying
    his "great concern" to Kulikov that "no one from the political leadership of
    the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale . . . military
    assistance," Jaruzelski spoke by secure telephone with Andropov, warning him
    that military support was urgently needed. These overtures, however, bore no
    fruit, as Andropov bluntly informed the Polish leader that "there can be no
    consideration at all of sending [Soviet] troops."
    Following this second rebuff, Jaruzelski was more unnerved than ever.
    Soviet officials had already been complaining, at the CPSU Politburo meeting on
    10 December, that Jaruzelski seemed "extremely neurotic and diffident about his
    abilities" and was "back to his vacillations" and "lack of resolution."42
    Those qualities became even more pronounced after the exchanges on 11
    December. At Jaruzelski's behest, Siwicki met with Kulikov on the evening of
    the 11th and warned him that "we cannot embark on any adventurist actions
    [avantyura] if the Soviet comrades will not support us." Siwicki noted that
    Jaruzelski seemed "very upset and very nervous," and
    that "psychologically, . . . Jaruzelski has gone to pieces [rasstroen]."
    Siwicki emphasized that Jaruzelski would rather "postpone the introduction of
    [martial law] by a day" than proceed without Soviet military backing.
    The possibility of delaying the crackdown had already been broached by
    Jaruzelski the previous day in an exchange with Konstantin Rusakov. Rusakov
    informed the Soviet Politburo on 10 December that Jaruzelski was "not
    presenting a clear, straightforward line" about the date of "Operation X," the
    code name in Moscow for the martial law operation:

    No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation
    about "Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12
    December, and then this was changed to the night of the 12th and 13th. And now
    they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th.43

    Actually, Siwicki was proposing to defer the martial law crackdown by
    only a day—indeed, he emphasized several times that a delay of more than a day
    would be infeasible—but Rusakov may have suspected that a daylong postponement
    would be extended indefinitely.
    In any case, Kulikov's discussion with Siwicki reveals that
    Jaruzelski's motivation for a possible delay, of whatever length, was to
    persuade Soviet leaders to send troops to Poland. The implication was that if
    the Soviet Union failed to respond, the whole operation might have to be called
    off. Underscoring this point, Siwicki declared: "[I]f there will be no . . .
    military support from the USSR, our country might be lost for the Warsaw Pact.
    Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step [of
    imposing martial law]." All these statements are essentially identical to
    comments recorded by Gribkov in his 1992 article.44
    In response, Kulikov argued that the martial law operation would
    succeed if Jaruzelski implemented it as planned, and he sought to disabuse
    Siwicki of the idea of postponing the operation. The Soviet marshal pointed
    out that Polish leaders had repeatedly "insisted that Poland is able to resolve
    its problems on its own," and that Soviet officials had accepted and agreed
    with that view. Kulikov expressed dismay that Jaruzelski's position had now
    changed: "Why has this question of military assistance arisen? We already
    went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law." Kulikov added
    that "you carried out a great deal of work in preparing for the introduction of
    martial law" and "you have enough strength" to succeed. "It's now time to
    act," he argued. "The date should not be postponed, and indeed a postponement
    is now impossible." Kulikov also expressed concern that the talk about a
    postponement and about the need for Soviet military support might signify that
    Jaruzelski was backing away from his "final decision" to impose martial
    law. "If that is so," Kulikov declared, "we would like to know about it."
    Siwicki assured Kulikov that "the decision has been made," and that
    Jaruzelski was not going to renege on his plans to introduce martial law. At
    the same time, he emphasized, once again, that "without [military] help from
    outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles," to sustain martial law.
    Siwicki said that both he and Jaruzelski hoped that Soviet leaders would "look
    upon these matters with understanding" and would "consider [our] requests," but
    Kulikov displayed no inclination to consider any changes in the earlier
    arrangements, which stipulated that Polish units would introduce martial law on
    their own. By the time the meeting ended, Siwicki had pledged to embark on "a
    resolute struggle against the counterrevolution," as Soviet leaders had long
    demanded. Even so, Anoshkin could tell that "Siwicki left here dissatisfied
    because he got nothing new and heard nothing new from [Kulikov]."
    The extent of the Polish leaders' continued nervousness and
    dissatisfaction became clear the following day (12 December) as the hour
    approached for the introduction of martial law. Despite what had happened over
    the previous two days, Jaruzelski was still urging the Soviet Union to "provide
    military help." So insistent were Jaruzelski's pleas that Kulikov began to
    suspect that the Polish leader was trying to "make the introduction of martial
    law dependent on the fulfillment of [his demand for Soviet intervention]."
    Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no
    direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law
    operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to be
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    Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no
    direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law
    operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to begin.
    Arrangements had even been made for a high-level Soviet delegation, led by
    Suslov, to fly to Warsaw for urgent consultations at Jaruzelski's request, but
    at the last minute this visit was called off, apparently because Suslov's phone
    conversation with Jaruzelski obviated the need for a direct visit.

    Anoshkin's notebook continues after 12 December into early 1982,
    reporting on the martial law crackdown and the various units involved. But on
    the specific question of what Jaruzelski was seeking in the lead-up to martial
    law, the crucial entries are the ones Anoshkin jotted down on 11 and 12
    December, as translated below. These notes, combined with the other evidence
    mentioned above, overwhelmingly suggest that Jaruzelski's role in December 1981
    was very different from the portrayal he offers in his memoirs. Far from
    having "saved" Poland from a Soviet invasion, Jaruzelski was desperately
    promoting the very thing he now claims to have prevented.
    None of this is meant to gloss over the excruciating pressure that
    Jaruzelski had been encountering throughout the crisis. From the fall of 1980
    on, Soviet leaders had kept up a relentless campaign of intimidation and
    belligerent reproaches. It would have taken enormous strength and courage to
    withstand that pressure. Kania was not a particularly strong leader, but
    somehow he was continually able to defer the implementation of martial law. He
    repeatedly assured Brezhnev that "decisive measures" would soon be imposed, but
    invariably he refrained from carrying out his pledges. Jaruzelski in some ways
    was a stronger figure than Kania, but, unlike Kania, he was willing in the end
    to comply with Moscow's demands. His compliance initially gave rise to final
    preparations for the "lesser of two evils"—that is, martial law—but when the
    critical moment came in late 1981, he seems to have embraced the "greater of
    two evils," Soviet military intervention. By December 1981 (and perhaps
    earlier), Jaruzelski was pleading with Soviet leaders to send troops into
    Poland to assist with the martial law operation, and by all indications he was
    devastated when his requests were turned down. For Jaruzelski, it seems,
    Soviet interests ultimately took precedence over all else.
    The evidence provided by the Anoshkin notebook and by the other
    materials cited above will serve an especially useful purpose if it prompts
    Jaruzelski and Siwicki to seek the declassification of Polish documents that
    would shed additional light on the events of December 1981. Jaruzelski's and
    Siwicki's own contemporaneous records of their meetings and conversations with
    Soviet officials during that crucial period have not yet been made available
    (assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with). It is at least
    remotely possible that such materials, if they exist, would result in a more
    favorable assessment of the Polish leaders' actions.
    Jaruzelski, in particular, should have a strong incentive to pursue the
    release of new documents, for he is well aware that the issue is of more than
    purely historical or scholarly interest. Since leaving office in December
    1990, Jaruzelski has been viewed with respect, even admiration, by a majority
    of Poles. Although charges were filed against him in the early 1990s for his
    role in imposing martial law, and although he was required to testify a number
    of times before the Polish Sejm's Commission for Constitutional Oversight, the
    last of the charges relating to the 1980-81 crisis were dropped in 1996, when
    the Sejm voted to pardon Jaruzelski and other former leaders who had been due
    to go on trial for violating the constitution.45 (Separate charges were
    retained against Kiszczak and 22 former members of the security forces for one
    specific incident—the deaths of miners in Katowice on 13 December 1981—but all
    the defendants were eventually acquitted.) After the September 1997
    parliamentary elections in Poland, a court in Gdansk proposed to resume its
    proceedings against Jaruzelski and four other former officials, but this case
    pertained only to the shootings of workers in December 1970. No suggestion was
    made of reinstating charges related to the 1981 crackdown.
    No doubt, the lenient treatment of Jaruzelski has been based primarily on a
    widespread belief that he did indeed choose the "lesser of two evils" in
    December 1981 and spared his country great bloodshed and a military
    occupation. That view may yet be borne out. But if, as the evidence above
    suggests, Jaruzelski was actually urging, rather than opposing, Soviet military
    intervention in late 1981, his status in Poland today—not to mention his place
    in history—deserves a full-scale reassessment.


    Mark Kramer is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies,
    Harvard University. He is grateful to Richard T. Davies for his valuable advice.



    1 A preliminary discussion of the new evidence is Mark Kramer, "Poland,
    1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis," Cold War International
    History Project Bulletin No.5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126. A much more
    extensive analysis will be presented in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper.
    2 For example, at a Soviet Politburo meeting in January 1981, Soviet
    defense minister Dmitrii Ustinov argued that "constant pressure on the Polish
    leadership" would not work unless "we make clear that we have forces ready" to
    move in at short notice. Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 22 yanvarya
    1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki delegatsii partiinykh rabotnikov KPSS vo glave L.
    M. Zamyatinym v Pol'shu," 22 January 1981 (Top Secret), in Tsentr Khraneniya
    Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 42, Delo
    (D.), 36, List (L.) 5. Similarly, at a Politburo meeting on 16 April 1981, the
    Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, said it was "necessary to exert
    constant pressure" on the Polish authorities through political contacts and the
    staging of military exercises, though he added that "we should not harass them
    needlessly or increase the level of tension so much that they would just give
    up." Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 g.: O
    razgovore L. I. Brezhneva s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP S. Kanei (po telefonu),"
    16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 1-3.
    3 This has been the basic theme of all of Jaruzelski's comments on
    the subject since late 1991, including his two volumes of memoirs: Stan
    wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); and Les chaines et le refuge (Paris:
    Lattes, 1992). Until 1990, Jaruzelski staunchly denied that the Soviet Union
    had intended to invade Poland in 1981; and even as late as September 1991, in
    an interview in Novoe vremya (Moscow), No. 38 (21 September 1991), pp. 26-30,
    he was evasive about the matter. No doubt, his discretion prior to the breakup
    of the Soviet Union was attributable to his long-standing deference to Soviet
    wishes.
    4 Army-General A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis
    nachala 80-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 9 (September
    1992), p. 52.
    5 Ibid.
    6Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o generalu Jaruzelskim i
    pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw: CBOS, October 1992), pp. 1-4. See also Leonid
    Kornilov, "Dlya bol'shinstva polyakov Yaruzel'skii ostaetsya patriotom,"
    Izvestiya (Moscow), 30 October 1992, p. 5.
    7 "Ironiczny grymas historii," Prawo i zycie (Warsaw), No. 49 (December
    1992), p. 11.
    8"Gorbaczow o sta
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    8"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil
    prawidlowo," Trybuna (Warsaw), 9 November 1992, pp. 1, 2.
    9 Ibid., p. 2.
    10 M. S. Gorbachev, Zhizn' i reformy, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1996),
    vol. 2, pp. 336-351.
    11 "Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce," p. 2. See also "Wywiad z
    Michailem Gorbaczowem: 'Jestem inny, niz probuja mnie przedstawic',"
    Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 23 October 1992, p. 9.
    12 Among the interviews, see "Dostep do wszystkiego," Polityka (Warsaw),
    No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15; and Leon Bojko, "A wejsc nie chcieli?" Gazeta
    wyborcza (Warsaw), 10 February 1993, p. 6. The Polish version of Pavlov's
    memoirs is Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, 1994); the Russian
    version is Rukovoditeli Pol'shi glazami razvedchika (Moscow: Terra, 1998).
    Pavlov published a second volume of memoirs in Russia, which also features some
    coverage of the Polish crisis, Operatsiya "Sneg": Polveka vo vneshnei razvedke
    KGB (Moscow: TOO-Geya, 1996).
    13 Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 185.
    14 "Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak," Polityka (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p.
    15.
    15 Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie
    wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 129-130.
    16 Most, but not all, of the declassified transcripts are stored in Fond 89
    at TsKhSD. My annotated translations of an initial batch (as well as my
    translations of some East German documents) appeared in "Declassified Documents
    on the Polish Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin No.5
    (Spring 1995), pp. 117, 129-139.
    17 A sample of these documents was included in a briefing book edited by
    Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian Ostermann, for the conference
    on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," in
    Jachranka, Poland in November 1997, which was co-organized by the National
    Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the
    Institute for Political Studies (ISP) in Warsaw. Many other documents
    pertaining to the 1980-81 Polish crisis are stored in the Magyar Orszagos
    Leveltar (MOL) in Budapest, the Statni Ustredni Archiv (SUA) in Prague, the
    Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) in Prague, the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien
    und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der
    SED (SAPMDB/ZPA) in Berlin, the Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagen des
    Staatssicherheits-dienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
    Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit Zentralarchiv (BUS-MSZ) in Berlin, the
    Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (MZA) in Potsdam, the Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv
    (TsDA) in Sofia, and the Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist
    Roman (Arh. CCPCR) in Bucharest. A useful selection of relevant documents from
    the former East German archives can be found in Michael Kubina and Manfred
    Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen
    1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).
    18 For a complete record of the KOK meeting on 13 September 1981, see
    the handwritten notes by General Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of
    KOK, "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia
    1981 r.," 13 September 1981, now stored in Centralne Archywum Wojskowe (CAW),
    Posiedzenia Kok, Teczka Sygn. 48. A translation of this document was published
    as an appendix in Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, On The Decision To
    Introduce Martial Law In Poland In 1981: Two Historians Report to the
    Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland,
    Cold War International History Project Working Paper 21 (Washington, DC:
    Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). Tuczapski was the only one at the meeting who was
    permitted to take notes. Until his 10-page account was released at the
    Jachranka conference in November 1997, it was generally thought that no formal
    record of the meeting had been kept. The importance of the KOK meeting was
    first disclosed by Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in his lengthy interview, "Wojna z
    narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 32-33.
    Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff and a top aide to
    Jaruzelski in 1980-81, was part of a small group responsible for planning the
    martial law operation. He also was a crucial intelligence source for the U.S.
    Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), having provided invaluable information to
    the West since the early 1970s about Warsaw Pact military developments. (He
    had to escape from Poland in early November 1981, and now lives in the United
    States.) Several years after the interview with Kuklinski appeared, Stanislaw
    Kania briefly discussed the KOK meeting in his memoirs (after being asked about
    it by the interviewer who compiled the book); see Zatrzymac konfrontacje
    (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 110-111. More recently, it has come to light that
    Kuklinski sent a long cable to the CIA on 15 September 1981—two days after the
    KOK meeting—outlining the plans for martial law and warning that
    Operation "Wiosna" (the codename of the martial law crackdown) would soon
    follow. In May 1997, with help from Richard T. Davies, the former U.S.
    ambassador to Poland, I obtained a copy of the Polish text of Kuklinski's cable
    and then translated it for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference and
    this issue of the Bulletin.
    19 "Jelentes a MSzMP Politikai Bizottsagnak," memorandum from Jozsef
    Garamvolgyi, Hungarian ambassador in Poland, to the Politburo of the Hungarian
    Socialist Workers' Party, 19 September 1981 (Top Secret), in MOL, 288, F.
    11/4400, o.e., fol. 128-134. This document records a conversation with Kania
    and exchanges between Kania and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar.
    20 Ibid., fol. 133-134.
    21 "Oswiadczenie KC KPZR i rzadu ZSRR przedstawione kierownictwu KC
    PZPR i rzadu PRL," Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 18 September 1981, p. 1.
    22 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh
    poezdki K. V. Rusakova v GDR, ChSSR, VNR i BPR," 29 October 1981 (Top Secret),
    in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, Ll. 3-4.
    23 A contingency plan devised in 1980 would have brought up to
    fifteen Soviet divisions into Poland to "provide military assistance."
    Ostensibly, the Soviet troops would have been taking part in military
    exercises, but in reality they would have joined with the Polish army and
    security forces to impose a crackdown. The plan evidently was conceived as
    early as August 1980 (see my translation below of a key Soviet document from 28
    August 1980), and preparations for it gained momentum in early December 1980,
    as is evident from the cable that Kuklinski sent to the United States at that
    point (which I also have translated below). Subsequently, the contingency plan
    was updated and refined, becoming a full-fledged operational plan. In mid-
    1981, according to Vitalii Pavlov (in Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 219),
    the operational plan was largely set aside; but as late as the fall of 1981
    Soviet military planners evidently retained—at least on paper—the option of
    sending Soviet troops into Polish territory under the guise of military
    exercises scheduled for November 1981. The existence of the updated plan was
    divulged to the U.S. government in the fall of 1981 by two high-ranking Polish
    military intelligence officials who defected, Colonel Jerzy Suminski and
    Colonel Wladyslaw Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak,
    who had been head of Polish military intelligence until he became minister of
    internal affairs in 1981, in Beres and Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi,
    pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until
    we
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    Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until well into December
    1981, though he emphasizes that Soviet leaders never decided whether they would
    implement it if martial law collapsed. See "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii
    krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 54-56.
    24 "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p.
    56.
    25 "Notatka w sprawie najwazniejszych przedsiewziec wykonanych w
    Silach Zbrojnych od lipca br. w sferze przygotowan do ewentualnego wprowadzenia
    stanu wojennego," 23 November 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygnatura (Sygn.)
    1813/92/1 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for providing
    me with a copy of this document and the next two documents cited here. See
    Paczkowski's own brief but illuminating discussion in O Stanie Wojennym: W
    Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
    Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 134-152.
    26 "Zalacznik Nr. 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnetrzych,"
    attachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych, "Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w
    kraju wg. stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.," 25 November 1981 (Secret/Special
    Dossier), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (CA/MSW), Sygn.
    228/1B, L. 19.
    27 Comments by Miroslaw Milewski, then-Minister of Internal Affairs,
    transcribed in "Ocena sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej," 12 June 1981 (Top
    Secret), in CAW, Sygn. 2308/IV.
    28 Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh
    godov," pp. 50-51. A more detailed, contemporaneous account of this meeting is
    available in "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des
    Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer
    Vertrages in Moskau," GVS-Nr. A 465 831 (Strictly Secret/Special
    Classification), 5 December 1981, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, East German
    minister of defense, to Erich Honecker, in MZA, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN)
    32641, Bl. 313-316.
    29 See "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik
    vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 1— Vorschlag, der am 03.12.1981 beraten
    wurde" and "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen
    Entwurfstexte: Variante 2—Vorschlag, der am 04.12.1981 beraten wurde," 3
    December 1981 and 4 December 1981, respectively, attached as appendices to
    Hoffmann's report cited in the previous note.
    30 "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des
    Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer
    Vertrages in Moskau." See also Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii
    krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 50-51.
    31 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 378-379. See also the
    comments by Siwicki and Jaruzelski in "Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura
    Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.," 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Zbigniew
    Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-
    1981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 555, 567-568.
    32 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 379.
    33 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu
    o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op.
    66, D. 6, L. 5 (emphasis added).
    34 Ibid. On both 7 and 8 December 1981, Jaruzelski spoke by phone
    with Brezhnev, who assured the Polish leader that "the Soviet Union will not
    leave Poland in the lurch" (Sovetskii Soyuz ne ostavit v bede Pol'shu), a
    formulation that Soviet officials had frequently used during the crisis (along
    with the nearly identical formulation of Sovetskii Soyuz ne dast v obidu
    Pol'shu—that is, "the Soviet Union will stick up for Poland."). On 9 December,
    Jaruzelski and other high-ranking Polish military officers, including all the
    top General Staff officers, deputy defense ministers, military district
    commanders, and service commanders, held a late-night meeting in the Polish
    General Staff building, where they reached a final decision to proceed with
    martial law. Evidently, Brezhnev's rather vague statement of the previous day
    had been viewed—at least temporarily—as a sufficient basis on which to act.
    See Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 387-394; and the entries for 8 and 9
    December 1981 in "Rabochaya tetrad'" No. 5, by Lieutenant-General V. I.
    Anoshkin, adjutant to Marshal Kulikov. (This document will be discussed and
    cited at greater length below.)
    35 Quoted from "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem
    Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des
    Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung
    der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung 'SOJUS 81'," Report
    No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-Potsdam, AZN 32642, Bl. 54.
    36 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 7.
    37 Ibid., Ll. 8-9.
    &nbs



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    Subject: Andropov,Gorbachev,Gromyko,Jaruzelski,Poland 1980-81,Soviet Armed
    Forces,Warsaw Pact,Kulikov,Kania,Anoshkin Bulletin 11 - Cold War Flashpoints
    Pact
    Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID: New Evidence on the 1980-81 Polish
    Crisis
    Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author: Mark Kramer
    Document Origin: CWIHP Bulletin Published: CWIHP Document
    Document Date: 03/01/99 Document ID:
    Document Type: Article Archive:

  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:36
    Commentary on the Anoshkin Notebook, by Wojciech Jaruzelski
    By Wojciech Jaruzelski


    Commentary


    Editor's Note: Earlier this year, CWIHP asked General Wojciech Jaruzelski,
    former Polish Prime Minister and a key participant in the Polish events of 1980-
    81, to comment on Mark Kramer's introduction and translation of the Anoshkin
    notebook. We are pleased to print his commentary below. A few editorial changes
    (indicated by brackets) were necessary due to the fact that General Jaruzelski
    commented on a Polish translation (and differently paginated version) of Mark
    Kramer's article. CWIHP encourages the release of further documents from Polish
    and other archives on the events of 1980-81.

    By Wojciech Jaruzelski


    The limitations of time, as well as an eye ailment, make it difficult for me at
    this time to comment fully and essentially on Mr. Mark Kramer's article
    entitled, Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition Martial Law in
    Poland all the more since General Florian Siwicki and I are simultaneously
    preparing materials in relation to General Anoshkin's working notebook. These
    materials will contain concrete, factually argued comments dealing also with
    some questions not dealt with or discussed at length in this letter.
    Trusting in the professional competence of Mr. Kramer, I wish to avoid the
    inevitable polemics should his text be published in its present form. Polemics
    as such, of course, are not a bad thing, they can even be useful and desirable,
    but it would not be good if I had to present publicly specific criticisms
    questioning not only the logic, but also the veracity, of many statements,
    facts, and quotations cited in the above mentioned text. I believe Mr. Kramer
    wrote the text under the pressure of a deadline and that is why he was unable
    to consult other supplementary and verifiable documents. He was unable at the
    same time to confront and appraise in a more profound way the credibility of
    the sources he summoned. As a result, his outlook on a very complicated weave
    of facts, events, and processes at the time through the prism of only a few and
    selectively revealed sources is by its nature restrictive, simplified, and on a
    series of issues completely pointless. Unfortunately, the summary judgments in
    Mr. Kramer's text go quite far. If this was simply a historical debate about
    the distant past, I would not see it as a serious problem. In this case,
    however, the matter refers to a "hot" topic that is still, and lately even more
    so, the object of political games and confrontations.
    Moving to matters of substance, I will limit myself to commenting on just
    some. First, let me deal with those that have to do with manifest facts as
    well as with elementary logic. From the sources quoted by Mr. Kramer, it is
    allegedly clear that during those few days of December 1981 he describes I was
    supposedly depressed, "unnerved," "extremely neurotic and diffident about [my]
    abilities," vacillating, "psychologically...gone to pieces." Consequently, not
    seeing any possibility of implementing martial law with my own forces,
    I "desperately implore[d], want[ed], ask[ed]" for foreign troops to be brought
    into Poland. I would like to put aside the moral and political aspects of such
    a statement, which, for me as a Pole, a front-line soldier, and a commander of
    many years are, to put it simply, offensive. I would like to put aside
    the "poetic" moods from which I allegedly suffered. There is no question that
    deciding to implement martial law was an unusually and dramatically difficult
    step, and it was extremely hard on me. But there are scores, even hundreds, of
    people with whom I met and talked directly at the time, and nobody can say that
    I lacked in decisiveness or self-control. Let me describe one event to
    illustrate this. In the afternoon hours on December 13, that is, after the
    decision had already been made, I met (and proof of that can be found in
    newspapers) with a delegation (consisting of several score people) of the
    Housing Cooperative Congress, which was taking place in Warsaw at the time. I
    wonder what those people would have said about my behavior at the time. I am
    supposed to have been "crushed by the refusal" [i.e., of Suslov to guarantee
    Soviet intervention — trans.]. Nothing of the sort was in fact the case—I was
    relaxed and calm. Besides, the course of the whole operation confirms this.
    At this point, one question comes to mind: In whose interests was it to
    portray my mood in such an extremely deformed way? What about the entry in
    Anoshkin's "notebook" that says, "The Commander-in-Chief of Unified Armed
    Forces had his hands tied by Moscow"? Perhaps historians should analyze this
    track.
    The core of the "vivisection" of the state of my soul conducted by Mr. Kramer
    in his article is to show my thinking to have been as follows: First, that the
    reaction and resistance of the opposition and of the majority of the society
    would be so strong that we would not be able to deal with it using our own
    forces; and second, that the Polish Army was not sufficiently reliable or loyal.
    Neither the former nor the latter makes any sense, which was very convincingly
    proved by real life. In another place describing Anoshkin's "notebook," I will
    prove this point in a more concrete way. Before that, however, I would like to
    ask a question that has been stubbornly on my mind since I read Mr. Kramer's
    article. If Jaruzelski indeed was almost panic-stricken, full of fear,
    apprehension, and doubts whether we would be able to impose martial law by
    ourselves, why then did he not abandon the idea of imposing it in the first
    place? Or did he, by imposing martial law, entangle himself in a hopeless,
    suicidal mess that would end in unavoidable ruin?! As everyone knows, neither
    the former nor the latter happened.
    Another piece of information cited by Mr. Kramer is the supposed readiness
    expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law
    back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant
    not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies
    that any such considerations took place. After all one of the key conditions
    for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed,
    was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents
    could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main
    authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity).
    I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd
    notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions
    of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the
    workday. It was never considered, not even for a moment. Such an entry
    completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of
    the person who wrote such a thing in the said "notebook," or passed such
    information to their political superiors.
    On page 5 [page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this
    Bulletin—ed.] of Mr. Kramer's article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii
    Gribkov "played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81." It is not my
    intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the
    context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than
    amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other
    Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanislaw Antos, who at the time was
    Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in
    which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on
    vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of m
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:38
    However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the
    imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov
    himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen.
    Stanislaw Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified
    Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981.
    For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about
    the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister
    Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back
    to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns
    out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact.
    Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in
    1992 by Istoricheskii Zhurnal are almost literally identical with some phrases
    from Anoshkin's "notebook." It looks as though many roads lead to that very
    same "source."
    The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer's article is strangely one-sided. Why
    does he not mention Gen. Siwicki's polemical response to the above-mentioned
    article by Gribkov, which was published in Polska Zbrojna on 22 December 1992?
    Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different
    ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under
    overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about
    the "sergeant's widow who whipped herself."
    On page [6] of his article, Mr. Kramer talks about a document which allegedly
    constitutes "powerful" evidence. He means Anoshkin's "notebook." Treating
    the "notebook" in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something
    about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds.
    After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained there—
    claiming that we allegedly demanded military aid—were not presented by
    the "Russian side" during the Jachranka conference.1 This made it impossible
    for the [Polish] "government side" to take a stance concerning them and to
    directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear
    if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be
    published.2 As a result, the "notebook"—which, as it turns out, is being
    prepared for publication as a separate brochure—has become an independent fact,
    removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but
    a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.
    I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues.
    Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of
    documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the
    Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and
    protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records,
    particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for
    the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic
    consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not
    registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals [gryf] or marked by page
    numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts
    with Kulikov's arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is
    from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation
    with me the night of the 8th, which Baibakov reported about on December 10
    during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist
    Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what
    is peculiar is that there is not even one word in Baibakov's report about the
    Polish side waiting for military help. Maybe that is the reason why there is
    no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin's
    notebook.
    As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed
    description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other
    hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only
    want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from
    December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal
    Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16
    about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion,
    which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov
    spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish person he talked to? Was he
    the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded
    and interpreted?
    I am sorry to say that regardless of what might generously be described as
    the "defects" of the notebook, Mr. Kramer's interpretations sometimes go well
    beyond what can be deduced from an entry. Take, for example, the alleged
    answer given by Rusakov to Ambassador Aristov. [In the notebook entry for
    December 11] that answer is written across the margin. It goes: "This is
    terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of
    troops went on —now everything has disappeared." [In his introduction on page
    9], Mr. Kramer omits the last words of this entry, which say, "What is
    Jaruzelski's situation now?!" But these words make it obvious that somebody
    else has uttered this statement, not me. Here Mr. Kramer's intentions become
    obvious. He says: "Jaruzelski's comment here as recorded by Anoshkin, says
    more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other
    documents combined. (my emphasis — W.J.)." Thus this carefully prepared
    quotation, in fact "robbed" of the element clearly indicating that it was not
    me who said those words, becomes to the author more important "than all other
    documents." This is scandalous manipulation.
    Besides, what does the talk of "a year-and-a-half of chattering" mean when my
    reactions (if someone is skeptical, please consult Kuklinski's report in an
    interview for the Paris Kultura, April 1987) and many public statements, as
    well as statements [made] during the top-secret meetings when I talked about
    the necessity to solve Polish problems by ourselves, with our own means, are
    known? And as far as Aristov is concerned, I know one thing—that he judged the
    situation in Poland very seriously, much like Kulikov. He was constantly
    passing signals, as well as complaints and warnings, about the Kremlin's
    dissatisfaction to the Polish leadership, many of which he must have co-
    authored (this was apparently the case with the famous letter from the CPSU
    Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party
    (PUWP) in June 1981, which was in fact to open the way to a kind of political
    coup). I know from Stanislaw Kania that Aristov even went so far as to call
    me "general-liberal."
    On page [6] some alleged opinions of Gorbachev's are also quoted. Mr. Kramer
    writes in particular about how in October and November 1992 Gorbachev gave
    several interviews to Polish journalists. [. . .] The focus is on an interview
    for the Warsaw newspaper Rzeczpospolita [The Republic]. Mr. Kramer, who
    usually uses plenty of quotations, this time when talking about Gorbachev,
    chooses to relate his alleged statements using mainly his own words, even
    venturing to say what Gorbachev allegedly "meant." Since I do not have the
    said interview in Rzeczpospolita handy, I cannot take a firm stance. I will
    try to do this later. However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev
    said officially. He was invited as a witness by the Commission of
    Constitutional Oversig
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:43
    However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev said officially. He was
    invited as a witness by the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm
    [Parliament] of the Republic of Poland, but he could not come personally and
    sent a letter, dated 31 August 1995, instead. He wrote:

    It was obvious to me as a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU
    Central Committee that Gen. Jaruzelski as the First Secretary of the PUWP
    Central Committee took all the measures that were available to him in order to
    lead Poland out of the economic and political crisis in a peaceful way and
    aimed at excluding any possibility of using troops of member countries of the
    Warsaw Pact to interfere in internal affairs of his country (my emphasis —
    W.J.). It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the imposition of martial
    law in Poland was conditioned not only by the growing social and political
    internal crisis, but also by an increased tension in Polish-Soviet relations
    closely related to this crisis. Under such conditions, Gen. Jaruzelski was
    forced to take upon himself this altogether difficult decision, which at the
    time was, in my opinion, the choice of a lesser evil. [. . .] The Soviet
    leadership was frantically looking for a solution between two equally
    unacceptable solutions: To make peace with the chaos spreading in Poland
    threatening the breakdown of the whole socialist bloc, or to react to the
    events in Poland with military force. However, I want to repeat that the view
    was that both solutions were unacceptable. At the same time, our troops and
    tank columns were there along the Polish border, along with the sufficiently
    strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland itself. All could have been
    used in extreme circumstances.

    Gorbachev wrote in a similar tone a letter to Maciej P=BBa=F3y=BDski, the
    Speaker of the Sejm (published in Gazeta Wyborcza on 5 December 1997). And all
    this is what has been stated not secretly, not privately, but officially by a
    man who not only was a member of the highest Soviet leadership, but also a
    member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in
    Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish
    border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also
    did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR
    and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the
    opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover,
    according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any
    pressure put on Poland ("davleniia ne bylo"). However, other Soviet
    politicians and military officials talk about what really happened and quote
    actual facts (I will refer to some of those sources in the piece I mentioned
    before).
    On page [6] Kramer also refers to a book by Vitalii Pavlov (Bylem rezydentem
    KGB w Polsce [I Was a KGB Resident in Poland]). I read the Polish edition
    carefully. Pavlov, who understands and reads Polish, authorized the
    translation. (I know the person who picked up the manuscript after it had been
    authorized.) There is absolutely no mention there that I was desperately
    trying to obtain some guarantee of military intervention and that
    Suslov "refused." Actually, before the so-called Suslov Archive (1993) or
    Pavlov's book (1994) were published in Poland, I spoke (Gazeta Wyborcza, 12
    December 1992) about my conversation with Suslov on the morning of 12 December
    1981. I quote:

    JARUZELSKI: We were always pressured by the external factor, but I never put
    it forward [as the main thing]. An examination of conscience must always begin
    with oneself. Only the people who gave up power are being judged today, but it
    is the authorities as well as the opposition who should be pouring ash on their
    heads. With the international situation becoming ignited, our Polish brawl
    meant playing with fire. Our conversations with the representatives of the
    Kremlin were often a way for them to check the effectiveness of their pressure
    and, for us a way to check their inclinations for intervention. In a way, it
    was mutual testing, a mutual game. We kept getting the impression that they
    were keeping some cards hidden.
    (Jaruzelski met on 12 December 1981 at 9 am with Generals Czeslaw Kiszczak,
    Florian Siwicki, and Michal Janiszewski.)
    JARUZELSKI: In my office we assessed the situation. It had reached the
    brink. We knew that if the Gdansk debate [brought] no glimmer of hope then we
    [would] have to choose the lesser evil. Siwicki, who was still under the
    depressing impression of talks in Moscow on December 4, asked, "And what is the
    guarantee that even if we go ahead they are not going to come in?" With the
    generals present I tried to call Brezhnev. Mikhail Suslov came on the phone.
    He wasn't very easy to communicate with; he must have already been very sick.
    I asked whether it would be our internal affair if we imposed martial law. He
    said, "Yes." "And if the situation becomes more complicated?" I asked (I
    remembered the words Brezhnev never took back: 'Esli bud'et uslozhniatsia,
    veid'em' [If it turns out to be necessary, we will go in] as well as the
    constantly repeated 'my Pol'shi ne ostavim v b'ede' [We will not leave Poland
    in the lurch]). The gist of Suslov's answer was, "But you have always said
    that you can manage by yourselves."
    That was a lot, but of course, it was not everything. In Bratislava in August
    1968 there were even kisses, yet, as we all know, everything ended very
    quickly. Therefore, we had to pay attention above all to numerous worrisome
    facts and signals.

    In relation to the above, it is worth quoting a passage from the book by
    Pavlov, which for some strange reason was omitted by Mr. Kramer. When writing
    about my phone conversation with Suslov, Pavlov claims that Suslov "confirmed
    then that the Soviet Union will not directly interfere in Polish affairs and
    will under no circumstance send troops to Poland, which, it seemed, put
    Jaruzelski at ease." In saying that it "put me at ease," Pavlov admits that
    there were indeed reasons to feel uneasy.
    On page [6] Kramer writes with reference to the same book by Pavlov, that
    Andropov sent the same message to Kiszczak (i.e. that the direct military aid
    from the USSR is out of the question). Mr. Kramer must not have read the book
    carefully. There is no mention there of "sending a message." However, there
    is a description of a visit to Moscow in September 1981 by Gen. Kiszczak, the
    newly nominated Minister of Internal Affairs. During that visit, Andropov
    allegedly informed him of the above. Gen. Kiszczak denies this categorically.
    I believe him, but the facts are most important. First, after his return from
    Moscow, Kiszczak did not pass any message of such great importance to me or to
    Kania. Second, Pavlov claims that he was present during the conversation
    between Andropov and Kiszczak. However, although he met with Kania often (he
    had had close relations with him for a long time, since Kania for many years
    was a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the issues of the
    Ministry of Internal Affairs), and met with me several times, he never
    mentioned a word about that matter. And the scale of the matter was such that
    it required asking our opinion about what Andropov [allegedly] said to
    Kiszczak. He [Pavlov] never brought up this topic, which he himself in fact
    confirms by not mentioning it in his book.
    On page [6] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in "[mid-September]
    1981, [. . .] Poland's Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final
    decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law." The documents
    are all there to see (they were discu
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:45
    On page [6] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in "[mid-September]
    1981, [. . .] Poland's Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final
    decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law." The documents
    are all there to see (they were discussed and assessed in great detail during
    the meetings of the Commission for Constitutional Oversight, and there are
    minutes of those meetings), showing that materials concerning martial law were
    already being prepared in the mid-sixties. The practical verification of some
    solutions was conducted during a large-scale military exercise under the code
    name of "Kraj-73" ("Country-73"). The intensification and concretization of
    work took place in the fall of 1980, when a special task-group led by then-
    premier, Jozef Pinkowski, was formed. Later, there were further developments
    in the following stages. For example, on 27 March 1981, S. Kania and I signed
    a document called "The Fundamental Idea of Martial Law." There is also a
    protocol of the meeting of the National Defense Committee from 13 September
    1981 (the last meeting before martial law was imposed). One can read what
    Kania said and what I said. Typically, whenever I referred there to
    the "imposition of martial law" (four times), I always preceded it with the
    word "potential" [ewentualne]. Moreover, when the protocol summarizes my
    statement, it says that "he pointed out the particular importance and necessity
    of solving internal problems by ourselves, with the political and economic
    support from neighboring socialist countries." So where does "Jaruzelski's
    demand" come from? Is the image [of a decision] personified exclusively in
    myself necessary, and if so, then to whom? I speak of this not to avoid
    responsibility. I have always openly declared that I accept the
    responsibility. But I do think that a historian should have more finesse in
    forming ad hominem attacks.
    Moreover, on page [7], there is additional confusion. It is said that our own
    forces may not be enough to impose martial law "and that the support of allied
    forces would therefore be needed." Then follows a statement that does not
    accord well with the previous one: "Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania . . . both
    realized that 'direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries'
    would 'set back the development of socialism by decades' and 'would be
    exploited by the imperialist forces.'" Therefore "they were extremely
    diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision." Such hesitation
    resulted in "a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17,
    which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to 'prevent the
    imminent loss of socialism in Poland.'" Again, if we are to talk about strict
    historical accuracy, the letter was from the CPSU Central Committee and the
    government of the USSR to the PUWP Central Committee and the government of
    Poland, and concerned mainly the anti-Soviet campaign in Poland. On what
    grounds is the claim about the National Defense Committee's statement made? On
    September 13, the Committee made no decisions about martial law (there is a
    protocol). However, the whole process of preparations for this eventuality
    with all the hesitations lasted, as I said before, from at least the fall of
    1980 until 12 December 1981. And finally, how is one to understand that
    Jaruzelski thought at the time that an intervention would "set back the
    development of socialism by decades," and three months later "he desperately
    hoped for it." What brought on this change? Particularly since the prognosis
    for successful imposition of martial law was much better in December than in
    September.
    On page [7] Mark Kramer also claims that Jaruzelski replaced Kania "under
    Soviet auspices." I regret that
    Mr. Kramer, who after all participated in the Jachranka conference, makes such
    a generalization. He probably heard me quote from an East German document
    (acquired by the [Sejm] Commission for Constitutional Oversight) that records a
    conversation between Honecker and Rusakov which took place 21 October 1981. (I
    was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP on October
    18). Rusakov informed Honecker that I had all kinds of doubts and did not want
    to accept the position. Soviet suggestions turned out to be ineffective. I
    agreed only as a result of the insistence of Polish comrades. Prof. Jerzy
    Holzer has confirmed this, adding that it was the "good" Polish comrades who
    mattered. I also said that it was Kazimierz Barcikowski, always fought against
    by the conservative forces in the party and by the allies at the time, who
    recommended me for that function. It is interesting that when referring to a
    statement made by Andropov at the previously mentioned CPSU Politburo meeting
    on 29 October 1981, Mr. Kramer does not notice that it was at that time that
    Andropov said, "Barcikowski and Kubiak are big obstacles in the Politburo."
    Finally, does the word "auspices" not sound offensive with respect to the CC
    PUWP members of the time? It is true that four of them were against my
    candidacy, but 179 supported me in a secret ballot. Were they all "agents of
    the Kremlin"?
    On page [7] Mark Kramer also informs us that during the above-mentioned October
    29 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Andropov said, "the Polish leaders are
    talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries." But which
    leaders? It is a fact known from former Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak
    documents that there were people in the leadership of the party who held very
    different views and who enjoyed a very different degree of trust from the
    allies at the time. During that meeting Brezhnev also made the following
    statement: "I don't believe that Com. Jaruzelski will do anything
    constructive. I think he is not bold enough." But Mr. Kramer does not notice
    any of that. Following the words "Polish leaders," just a few lines below he
    deduces that it was Jaruzelski who "was requesting military intervention from
    the Soviet Union." It seems that there is a great need to put me
    in the worst possible light. But it should have been
    done in a less obvious way. On what grounds does the plural "Polish leaders"
    immediately change into the
    name "Jaruzelski?"
    On page [8] we find the following quotation from Andropov's statement of
    December 10: "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent
    on our willingness to offer … military assistance." I must here confirm a very
    unpleasant, even ugly thing. That quotation has been made up. The actual
    statement went exactly as follows: "Jaruzelski states economic demands
    strongly and makes our economic aid a condition for conducting Operation X; I
    would even go further to say that he brings up, but not directly, the question
    of military aid." Andropov does not refer to any conversation with me. The
    only Pole he mentions as somebody he talked to is Miroslaw Milewski. What he
    says conflicts with what Anoshkin's "notebook" says about Milewski. There we
    find no "but," no "not directly," but simply: "Can we count on military aid
    put before economic aid[?]" And as far as the "not directly" is concerned,
    Gen. Siwicki has written about it long ago in the above mentioned article in
    Polska Zbrojna.
    On page [9] of the article, we find [one] evident lie.
    I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what
    grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure
    phone?" [. . .] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted
    no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-
    mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit
    that there are no documents, declarations, or
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:50
    On page [9] of the article, we find [one] evident lie.
    I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what
    grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure
    phone?" [. . .] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted
    no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-
    mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit
    that there are no documents, declarations, or statements from which it could be
    deduced that I indeed had such conversations. Gen. Siwicki also firmly states
    that this
    is the first time he has heard of a conversation with Andropov. If there are
    references to my alleged
    opinions and assessments stated during the meeting
    of December 10, there is no indication where they came from. The only
    reference to a direct conversation with me can be found in the above-mentioned
    report of Baibakov. However, Brezhnev, who of course talked to me on the phone
    on December 7, does not say anything about
    that conversation, and certainly not that I asked for
    military aid.
    It is a pity that when quoting different voices from the Soviet Politburo
    meeting of December 10, Mr. Kramer omits such statements as the following by
    Rusakov: "Jaruzelski is leading us by the nose" (Russian: "Vodit nas za
    nos."); or by Suslov: "Jaruzelski is showing a certain cunning. Through his
    requests to the Soviet Union he wants to create an alibi for himself. Of
    course, it is perfectly obvious that we are not able to actually fulfill those
    requests, and Jaruzelski will later say 'but I addressed the Soviet Union,
    asked for help, and they did not give me any.' At the same time, the Poles are
    clearly stating that they are against bringing the troops in. If the army
    enters Poland, it will be a catastrophe." There were many other shocking
    statements made there, some of them reminding one of a surrealistic spectacle.
    But all this "does not fit" the picture, a picture in which a de facto
    accusatory statement against me is being concluded.
    On page [7] a General Staff document dated 23 November 1981 is quoted. In the
    document we read: "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure
    that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [. . .] can be carried
    out." On that basis, Mr. Kramer claims that it "certainly is compatible with
    the notion that the Polish leaders would seek external military assistance."
    On the contrary, it is an argument to the advantage of the so-called authors of
    martial law. I must explain some obvious things here, unfortunately. Anyone
    who lived in Poland at that time remembers the fears that any little damage to
    the interest of the Warsaw Pact might become a pretext for intervention.
    Possible difficulties in military transport would, after all, be a classic
    violation of the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of the
    bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our minds. Let the fact that
    I stated, publicly in the Sejm as well as during a Central Committee plenary
    meeting, that the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth functioning
    of this transportation infrastructure attest to how important and sensitive
    this point was. Imputing that a concern that this transportation should
    function smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law) meant
    looking for help from the outside is not only absurd, but politically and
    strategically infantile.
    On pages [7-8] is another example of how Mr. Kramer is being led up a "blind
    alley." He is, as far as I am aware, a historian by profession and therefore I
    assume that he will read the addendum I have enclosed in the proper spirit. It
    will become clear to him from it how thin the different arguments are of people
    wishing at any cost to accuse the so-called authors of martial law, if they are
    reduced to using such "evidence."
    On page [11] Mr. Kramer also suggests that Gen. Siwicki and I attempt to make
    secret Polish documents public. There are already many documents (particularly
    protocols from the PUWP Politburo meetings, different materials from other
    institutions and bodies) that have been made public in different ways, but Mr.
    Kramer is clearly not interested in them. On the other hand, it is true that
    there is no access to many documents, particularly those of the Ministry of
    National Defense. Perhaps Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski did not have time to inform
    Mr. Kramer that several times I addressed the organizers of the Jachranka
    conference and asked for access to be made possible in Polish institutions. I
    even wrote statements which were intended to help in those efforts.
    Unfortunately, in many cases these efforts ended unsuccessfully (it is true
    that I did not at the time foresee the possibility that after the conclusion of
    such an important international conference some kind of "work notebook" would
    be "pulled out of a pocket" and become a "decisive" source for Mr. Kramer).
    However very distasteful—to use just such a term—is this statement about our
    notes (Gen. Siwicki's and mine)—"assuming they still exist and have not been
    tampered with." So only Polish generals would falsify things, while Soviet
    notes are above any suspicion? I would like to ask here whether we really can
    treat them [i.e., the Anoshkin notes] as reliable "evidence" (Mr. Kramer calls
    it "decisive") for describing events of great political, historical, and moral
    importance? At the same time, considering the threats and announcements coming
    even from the highest offices and leading political circles, should one treat
    the suggestions of an American historian as a welcome gesture in this
    campaign? I trust that this was not Mr. Kramer's intention. All the more so,
    since when he wrote his article he did not know many of the circumstances,
    facts, and arguments I have presented here.
    I understand that Mr. Kramer's article is based exclusively on words written
    then as well as years later. But this is only a partial base. I do not deny
    the necessity and importance of his research. But to make the picture
    objective, one needs to look also at evident facts, phenomena, and symptoms
    from the time in question. Many of them have been presented by many witnesses
    who testified before the Commission of Constitutional Oversight under the rules
    of the Penal Code. I did not notice even a trace of those testimonies in Mr.
    Kramer's article. But the most important thing is to avoid a situation of "if
    the facts indicate something different, then too bad for the facts."
    Therefore, counting on the support of Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, an outstanding
    specialist in contemporary history, I would like to ask Mr. Kramer to
    reevaluate the text of the inaugural brochure, the main substance of which is
    to be Anoshkin's "working notebook." Gen. Siwicki, myself, and other people
    have a number of important comments about it, which we will present at a later
    point. I am ready for conversations which will lead to better mutual
    understanding, will confront and verify views, and above all, which will bring
    us closer to the very complex truth.
    To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years
    were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all
    kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not talking of Mr.
    Kramer, of course, since I don't know his views—are suddenly turning into
    defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and
    constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems
    exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the
    Polish People's Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I
    always have
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:52
    To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years
    were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all
    kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not talking of Mr.
    Kramer, of course, since I don't know his views—are suddenly turning into
    defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and
    constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems
    exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the
    Polish People's Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I
    always have said and to this day keep saying openly that the Soviet Union was
    our ally within the "sick" reality of those years and with all the heavy load
    of limited sovereignty. To the Soviet Union we owe what is actually the most
    advantageous configuration of Polish territory in history (although I admit
    that such a configuration suited Soviet interests). For many years, the Soviet
    Union was the sole guarantor of that territory. I respect and like the
    Russians. I think that the relations between our countries which are now equal
    should be good and mutually advantageous. Also, when I look back at those
    years I try to keep a rational distance, since as a politician and a general I
    know the ruthless logic of that divided world. I used to say that if I had
    been a Soviet marshal or general I would have perceived Poland as a territory
    endangering the bloc, with all the consequences of that for us, of course. We
    were fully aware of that situation, which was assessed similarly in the
    American documents disclosed at Jachranka. All this required from us, the
    Polish authorities, the appropriate measures and countermeasures. Their
    effectiveness was proved by life itself. We imposed and carried out martial
    law alone, and then, walking along a rough road, reached the Round Table [of
    1989] and the groundbreaking changes which became an impulse and model for
    other countries of the region.

    Wojciech Jaruzelski
    Warsaw, 27 April 1998



    Appendix


    The supposition that Poland was interested in so-called "fraternal aid" is
    disgraceful and absurd. People included in the Preliminary Summons, the
    witnesses, and some historians have explained this in detail. However, some
    members of the Commission (Parliament member Jacek Taylor in particular) during
    the Commission's deliberations referred to a "document" from the MSW (Ministry
    of Internal Affairs) files which can presently be found in the Sejm archives
    (file 228/IB). The document is called An Assessment of the Current Situation
    in the Country on 25 November 1981."3 The following passage can be found in
    appendix No. 2 to that Assessment of the Situation:

    Implementation of martial law may result in the following developments:
    Scenario 1: Political organizations submit to the requirements of martial
    law. At the same time, there is a possibility of small-scale strikes and
    limited hostile propaganda.
    Scenario 2: Massive strikes are organized in some parts of the country without
    workers leaving the workplace.
    Scenario 3: A general occupation strike, with workplaces taken over; some
    workers go out in the streets; there are street demonstrations and attacks
    occur on buildings housing party offices and state administration, on police
    stations, etc. Strong intervention of police and armed forces takes place.
    Aid from Warsaw Pact troops is not out of the question.

    People who attempt to use this [document] as evidence against those included in
    the Preliminary Summons are misusing it. The reasons I say this are as
    follows. First, [the document was] in a file in which only loose, preliminary
    materials can be found. Secondly, the said Assessment of the Current Situation
    is really only a draft, without any filing number, without any annotations, and
    was not signed by anybody or distributed anywhere. There is also another
    telling factor, one that remains conveniently not mentioned, which proves the
    ill will of the people who insist on the basis of such material the contention
    that Poland allegedly expected so-called "aid." This is the fact that in the
    same file—about which there was no mention—there is another, later document,
    called An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country and Proposals for
    Solutions, dated 5 December 1981. There is not even one word concerning any
    kind of "aid" there. However, unlike the earlier document of November 25,
    there are many hand-written comments and corrections of Czeslaw Kiszczak, who
    was at the time the Minister of Internal Affairs. And although that document
    has not been signed or distributed either, the very fact that the Minister made
    many annotations on it makes it more trustworthy. But in spite of that it
    remains unmentioned.
    It is necessary to add here that although the Commission had access to an
    enormous amount of different material and documents, no traces of expectations
    or requests for this so-called "military aid" have been found. On the
    contrary, the claim that we need to solve our Polish problems on our own
    appears repeatedly in many secret as well as public statements made by the
    representatives of the PPR government at the time. Therefore, using the
    said "Assessment of the Situation" of 25 November 1981 as an argument is
    evident manipulation. Perhaps it was hoped that nobody would be inclined to
    go through the pile of files where less important, loose materials were kept.
    The selective character of omissions described above can be further illustrated
    by the following fact. Solidarity activists have been claiming that all kinds
    of anti-Soviet excesses, such as the desecration of monuments and graves of
    soldiers were provocations organized by the State Security. But surprisingly
    enough, in the Assessment of the Situation of November 25 (appendix no. 1), is
    the information that from the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (18
    October 1981) until the time the said Assessment was written, 26 criminal
    investigations concerning the above mentioned acts were started. At that time
    eighteen people had been found who had vandalized monuments in Jedrzejow and
    one person who had desecrated the graves of Soviet soldiers in Gryfin.
    Remembering these facts is not convenient now. Nor is remembering (in
    accordance with the described Assessment) that on November 25, eleven public
    buildings were under occupation, and a note made of plans to occupy another
    fourteen.

    [Translated from Polish by Anna Zielinska-Elliott and Jan Chowaniec.]


    Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski served as prime minister of Polish People's Republic
    from 1981-1985.


    1 Editor's note: For the Jachranka conference, see Malcolm Byrne's introduction
    to this Bulletin section and Ray Garthoff's report in CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March
    1997), pp. 229-232
    2 Editor's note: The conference organizers are planning to publish the
    Jachranka proceedings; transcription of the audio tapes of the conference is in
    progress.
    3 Editor's note: On this document, see also the article by Pawel Machcewicz in
    this Bulletin."

    Subject: Archives,Gorbachev,Jaruzelski,Poland 1980-81,Sources,Warsaw
    Pact,Kulikov,Kuklinski,Anoshkin,Kania Bulletin 11 - Cold War Flashpoints Pact
    Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID: New Evidence on the 1980-81 Polish
    Crisis
    Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author: Wojciech Jaruzelski
    Document Origin: CWIHP Bulletin Published: CWIHP Document
    Document Date: 03/01/99 Document ID:
    Document Type: Article Archive:
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 22:58
    Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis, 1980-81, by Mark Kramer
    By Mark Kramer

    Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis, 1980-81

    By Mark Kramer

    From the early 1970s until November 1981, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski was a
    crucial intelligence source for the United States. Having become profoundly
    disillusioned with Communism and the Soviet Union's heavy-handed presence in
    Poland, Kuklinski began supplying the United States with highly sensitive
    information about Soviet-bloc military planning and weapons developments.
    Altogether, he smuggled out photographs and transcribed copies of more than
    30,000 pages of classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents, including war
    plans, military maps, mobilization schedules, allied command procedures,
    summaries of exercises, technical data on weapons, blueprints of command
    bunkers, electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and allied
    nuclear doctrine. To ensure that his motives would not be questioned,
    Kuklinski refused to take any payment for his work. For roughly a decade, his
    efforts gave the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) an unparalleled look
    inside the Warsaw Pact.1
    Kuklinski was in an especially important position when a prolonged crisis swept
    over Poland in 1980-81. Not only was he an aide to the Polish national defense
    minister (and later prime minister and Communist Party leader), Army-Gen.
    Wojciech Jaruzelski; he also was one of a handful of senior officers on the
    Polish General Staff who helped draw up plans for the imposition of martial
    law. The Polish General Staff's formal role in planning the military aspects
    of martial law began on 22 October 1980, when Jaruzelski ordered the chief of
    the General Staff, Gen. Florian Siwicki, to set up an elite planning unit.
    This unit, which worked closely with a martial law planning staff at the Polish
    Internal Affairs Ministry, consisted predominantly of general officers,
    including all of Siwicki's deputies. Kuklinski, as the head of the General
    Planning Department and deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish
    General Staff, was a key member of the martial law planning unit from the very
    start. Among other tasks, he served as a liaison with Marshal Viktor Kulikov,
    the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces, and with other
    high-ranking Soviet military officers from the Pact's Joint Command. Kuklinski
    also was frequently responsible for drafting operational plans, helping to
    design exercises, and compiling notes of secret meetings and discussions.
    These functions proved invaluable when he sought to transmit detailed
    information to the United States.
    Until November 1981, when Kuklinski was forced to escape from Poland to avert
    arrest, his reports were indispensable for the CIA's efforts to monitor the
    Polish crisis. Kuklinski was not the only senior Polish military officer who
    was working for the CIA at the time—it is known that at least four others,
    including two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officers, Col. Jerzy
    Szuminski and Col. Wladyslaw Ostaszewicz; a military adviser to Jaruzelski,
    Gen. Leon Dubicki; and a Polish military liaison in West Germany, Col. Antoni
    Tykocinski, were all supplying information to the United States—but no one was
    more crucial than Kuklinski.2 His voluminous dispatches and transfers of
    documents allowed the CIA to keep close track of the martial law planning, the
    status of the Polish army, and the dynamics of Soviet-Polish relations in 1980-
    81.
    During the crisis, Kuklinski transmitted daily reports and operated with
    relatively few hindrances (albeit at great risk) until September 1981, when the
    Polish internal affairs minister, Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, was informed that
    Solidarity had learned many of the details of the planning for martial law,
    including the codename of the opening phase of the operation. That
    codename, "Wiosna" (Spring), denoted the part of the operation that involved
    mass arrests of Solidarity activists and dissident intellectuals all around the
    country.3 (The codename was promptly changed to "Wrzos," meaning "Heather.")
    Because the codename had been a very tightly-held secret—only a small number of
    people from the General Staff and the Internal Affairs Ministry were permitted
    to know it—Kiszczak immediately realized that a serious leak had occurred. He
    launched an investigation into the matter, which naturally focused on Kuklinski
    among others. Kuklinski managed to evade detection for another several weeks,
    but he had to exercise greater caution and to scale back the frequency of his
    reports.
    By the beginning of November, the finger of suspicion increasingly pointed at
    him. On 2 November, the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) warned the
    Polish authorities that the U.S. government had obtained the full plans for
    martial law.4 It is not known how the KGB learned of this matter—whether it
    was through signals intelligence, a mole within the CIA, a leak from another
    NATO intelligence service, or some other means—but the disclosure clearly came
    as a great jolt to Jaruzelski and Siwicki.5 A much more intensive
    investigation began, which was bound to focus on Kuklinski. He and another
    deputy chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, Col. Franciszek
    Puchala, were the only ones who had had regular access to the full plans for
    martial law. Moreover, one of the speeches that Kuklinski had prepared for
    Siwicki, which Siwicki later amended by deleting a sentence about the possible
    use of deadly force, had been transferred by Kuklinski to the United States
    before the offending sentence had been removed. The discovery of the original
    draft, with the sentence still in it, would be a telltale sign that Kuklinski
    was the source.6
    Facing imminent arrest in early November, Kuklinski finally decided he had no
    alternative but to escape as soon as possible. The precise way he and his
    family were spirited out of Poland has never been disclosed—one of the chief
    participants in the exfiltration described it as a "real cloak-and-dagger
    affair"—but it is clear that the operation was a great success.7 Kuklinski,
    his wife, and his two sons left Poland on 7 November 1981 and by the 8th were
    safely in West Germany. On 11 November, the colonel was flown on a military
    aircraft to the United States, where he has lived ever since.8 At least two
    attempts are thought to have been made by Soviet-bloc agents against
    Kuklinski's life after he left Poland.9 What has troubled him far more,
    however, are the tragic deaths of his two sons, both of whom were killed in
    1994 in mysterious circumstances.10 To this day, Kuklinski is extremely
    reluctant to disclose his place of residence.
    A few hints of Kuklinski's role in 1980-81 surfaced in the West in the early to
    mid-1980s (most notably when a Polish government press spokesman, Jerzy Urban,
    suddenly mentioned at a news conference that the U.S. government had known in
    advance about the martial law operation and had failed to warn Solidarity), but
    it was not until April 1987 that Kuklinski's name and exploits became publicly
    known. In a remarkable, 53-page interview that appeared in the Paris-based
    monthly journal Kultura, Kuklinski provided a fascinating account of what he
    had witnessed in 1980-81.11 This interview remains a vital source for anyone
    interested in the Polish crisis.
    Despite the wide-ranging nature of the Kultura interview, Kuklinski refrained
    at that time from disclosing that he had been working for the CIA since the
    early 1970s, not just in 1980 and 1981. Details about his earlier work first
    came to light in September 1992, when a reporter for The Washington Post,
    Benjamin Weiser, published the first of two important
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:02
    Despite the wide-ranging nature of the Kultura interview, Kuklinski refrained
    at that time from disclosing that he had been working for the CIA since the
    early 1970s, not just in 1980 and 1981. Details about his earlier work first
    came to light in September 1992, when a reporter for The Washington Post,
    Benjamin Weiser, published the first of two important articles on Kuklinski,
    based on some 50 hours of interviews with the colonel as well as many hours of
    interviews with some of Kuklinski's former colleagues, including Kiszczak and
    Jaruzelski.12 The two articles make a valuable supplement to the Kultura
    interview. (Weiser, who later left the Post to join The New York Times, has
    been working on a book about Kuklinski.) Further documents and information
    about Kuklinski's career and legal case, including interviews with him, have
    been published in Poland in three recent Polish-language books, and a fourth
    collection of newly released documents is due out soon.13
    Back in Poland, nothing was said in public about Kuklinski for many years. In
    May 1984, after a secret court-martial in absentia, the Warsaw Military
    District Court sentenced Kuklinski to death on charges of high treason and
    stripped him of his citizenship and military rank. In March 1990, the District
    Court commuted his death sentence to a prison term of 25 years (under an
    amnesty bill adopted in December 1989, shortly after a non-Communist government
    came to power in Warsaw), but the guilty verdict remained in effect for another
    five years. In May 1990, the Polish justice minister, Aleksander Bentkowski,
    who for many years had served under Communist governments, rejected an appeal
    of Kuklinski's conviction. Even though the founding leader of Solidarity, Lech
    Walesa, was elected president of Poland in December 1990, he, too, refused to
    exonerate Kuklinski of the charges.
    Not until March 1995 did the Polish Supreme Court finally annul the prison
    sentence and send the case back for review. In passing down its verdict, the
    Court excoriated the District Court's "blatant violations of legal procedures,"
    and left no doubt about one of the factors that influenced the decision to
    annul the sentence:

    One must take into account the widely-known fact that the sovereignty of Poland
    was severely diminished [during the Communist era] and that there was an
    imminent threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union and other contiguous member-
    states of the Warsaw Pact. One also must take into account the fact that R.
    Kuklinski was fully informed then about the situation and, through his
    desperate actions, tried to head off the impending threat of invasion by
    conveying this information to the leaders of states that are strong enough to
    alter the world's fate. . . . The security of the [Polish] state
    unquestionably takes precedence over the disclosure of a secret, especially if
    the disclosure is intended to serve a higher cause.14

    Col. Kuklinski's actions, the Court added, "were in the interest of [Polish]
    sovereignty and independence."
    Over the next two years, while the final review of Kuklinski's case was under
    way, some former Communist officials, especially Jaruzelski, led a bitter
    campaign to prevent the colonel from being fully exonerated. (Ironically, in
    1996 Jaruzelski himself, the chief overseer of martial law, was absolved by the
    Polish parliament of all charges brought against him in the early 1990s for his
    role in 1980-81.15 ) Despite Jaruzelski's recalcitrance, Kuklinski cleared his
    final legal hurdle in September 1997, when, with the grudging approval of
    Walesa's successor, Aleksander Kwasniewski (a former high-ranking Polish
    Communist official), the Chief Military Procurator of the Warsaw Military
    District revoked the charges against Kuklinski, allowing him to return home as
    a free man. All his rights of citizenship and his military rank were
    restored. The basis for the Military Procurator's decision was that
    Kuklinski "acted out of a higher necessity"
    (w stanie wyzszej koniecznosci), and that his "cooperation with the American
    intelligence service" was "intended to benefit the nation."16
    Even after the Military Procurator's decision, Jaruzelski and his supporters
    kept up a rearguard action against Kuklinski. Their efforts were not enough,
    however, to deter Kuklinski from making an emotional visit back to Poland in
    April and May 1998. In Krakow, he was awarded honorary citizenship for his
    contribution to the restoration of Polish independence.17 In many other stops
    around the country he was hailed as a "true patriot." Prime Minister Jerzy
    Buzek met with Kuklinski for two hours and declared afterwards that the
    colonel's "decisions spared our country great bloodshed."18 The visit sparked
    complaints in some quarters, notably from Adam Michnik, who in recent years has
    become a frequent supporter of Jaruzelski.19 Jaruzelski himself lamented that
    the "praise for Kuklinski's actions automatically places the moral blame on
    myself and other generals."20 Public ambivalence about Kuklinski, which had
    been relatively widespread in the early 1990s, has steadily abated (though it
    has not wholly disappeared).21 Overall, then, the visit marked a decisive
    vindication for a man who only recently had been under sentence of death in his
    homeland.
    * * *
    Almost all of the materials that Kuklinski supplied to the U.S. government,
    including thousands of photographed documents and a vast quantity of his own
    reports, are still sealed in classified CIA files. Efforts to pry loose those
    materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have run into
    frustrating bureaucratic obstacles. However, some of the reports that
    Kuklinski sent in 1980 and 1981 were released in the early 1990s so that he
    could use them in preparing for the judicial review of his case in Poland.
    Three of those dispatches are featured below in chronological order. Each is
    preceded by an introduction that provides a brief context for understanding
    what the report covers and what its significance is. Although these three
    items are only a minuscule fraction of the materials that Kuklinski provided to
    the CIA, they give some idea of the extraordinary contribution he made to
    Western intelligence analysis during the Polish Crisis.




    REPORT No. 1: Early December 1980 —
    Warning of Soviet Intervention


    This first report, headed "Very Urgent!," was sent in early December 1980 under
    the codename Jack Strong. It had a profound impact on U.S. policy.
    Kuklinski's message seemed to corroborate a number of other indications in
    early December 1980 that the Soviet Union was about to undertake a large-scale
    military intervention in Poland. On 3 December, a day-and-a-half before
    Kuklinski's report arrived at CIA headquarters, President Jimmy Carter had sent
    an urgent communication via the Hot Line to the General Secretary of the
    Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid I. Brezhnev. Carter
    promised that the United States would "not exploit the events in Poland" and
    would not "threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region," but
    warned that East-West relations "would be most adversely affected" if the
    Soviet Army tried "to impose a solution upon the Polish nation."22
    Kuklinski's report reinforced the sense of foreboding that had prompted
    Carter's use of the Hot Line, and it convinced U.S. officials that very little
    time was left before Soviet troops moved en masse into Poland.
    There is no question that events in the latter half of November 1980 and the
    first few days of December had provided grounds for concern in the West about
    the prospect of Soviet military action. Tensions in Poland had steadily
    increased in mid- to late November, culminating in a two-hour warning str
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:06
    Tensions in Poland had steadily increased in mid- to late November, culminating
    in a two-hour warning strike on 25 November by Polish railway workers, who
    threatened to call a general strike unless their demands were met. These
    developments provoked alarm in Moscow about the security of the USSR's lines of
    communication through Poland with the nearly 400,000 Soviet troops based in the
    German Democratic Republic (GDR).23 Unease about Poland was even more acute
    in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the media in late November had
    stepped up their condemnations of the "counterrevolutionary forces
    who are endangering Poland's socialist order."24 On
    29 November, the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
    Army-Gen. Evgenii Ivanovskii, suddenly informed members of the Western Military
    Liaison Missions in East Germany that they would be prohibited from traveling
    into territory along the GDR-Polish border.25 A few days later, on 3
    December, rumors surfaced that an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders
    would be held in Moscow on the 5th. This news, coming right after the
    conclusion of a meeting in Bucharest of the Warsaw Pact's Council of Defense
    Ministers (on 1-2 December), raised further apprehension among Western leaders
    about the possible use of Soviet troops.
    Anxiety in the West continued to grow over the next few days as unconfirmed
    (and, it turned out, largely inaccurate) reports filtered in about a huge
    buildup of Soviet forces around Poland's borders. Dense clouds over Poland and
    the western Soviet Union prevented U.S. reconnaissance satellites from focusing
    in on Soviet tank and mechanized divisions based there.26 Not until the
    latter half of December, when the cloud cover temporarily receded, were U.S.
    satellites able to provide good coverage of Soviet forces in the western USSR.
    Before the photoreconnaissance became available, many high-ranking U.S.
    intelligence officials simply assumed that reports of a massive mobilization
    were accurate. That assumption seemed to be vindicated when reports also began
    streaming in about last-minute preparations by Soviet troops to set up
    emergency medical tents and stockpiles of ammunition.27
    Against this backdrop, Kuklinski's dispatch was bound to spark great anxiety
    when it arrived at the CIA's headquarters in the early morning hours of 5
    December. The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, promptly informed Zbigniew
    Brzezinski, the national security adviser, that "eighteen Soviet divisions"
    would move into Poland
    on 8 December. Brzezinski immediately relayed the information to Carter. At a
    meeting of top U.S. officials the following day, Turner repeated his
    warning.28 Although his estimate on 6 December of the number of Soviet
    divisions that would enter Poland "from the east" was slightly lower than it
    had been the previous day (fifteen versus eighteen), he averred that "more
    [Soviet] divisions will follow" the initial fifteen. On 7 December, Turner
    conveyed an even gloomier assessment, claiming that "all the preparations for a
    [Soviet] invasion of Poland were completed" two days earlier, and that a
    final "decision to invade" on the night of 7-8 December had been adopted
    by Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders on the 5th.29 Turner made these predictions
    without any confirmation from U.S. reconnaissance satellites about a purported
    buildup of Soviet forces around Poland.
    Under the circumstances, Turner's assumptions may have seemed reasonable, but a
    close analysis of the period from mid-November to early December 1980 suggests
    that he and most other U.S. officials misperceived Soviet intentions. A
    careful analysis also suggests that Kuklinski's message, written in great haste
    and with only partial information, unavoidably left out certain key points that
    bore directly on the question of Soviet intentions. U.S. intelligence
    officials who apprised political leaders of Kuklinski's message were remiss in
    failing to highlight the great uncertainty that remained about Soviet policy.
    (The uncertainty was especially pronounced in early December 1980 because so
    little was known at that point about the actual state of readiness of Soviet
    forces in the western USSR.)
    Newly declassified materials confirm that in the latter half of November 1980,
    the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were preparing to hold Soyuz-80
    military "exercises" in Poland in early to mid-December.30 The new archival
    evidence also suggests that these "exercises" were intended mainly as a cover
    for the Polish authorities to impose martial law. Documents from the East
    German military archive reveal that four Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak
    divisions, and one East German division were supposed to join four Polish army
    divisions and the Polish security forces in introducing military rule.31 If
    these operations proved insufficient, another fourteen Warsaw Pact divisions
    (eleven Soviet and three East German) were supposed to move in as
    reinforcements, according to the documents. It is not clear when and how the
    second stage of Soyuz-80 would have begun—or where the Soviet forces would have
    come from—but the option of a second stage was clearly specified in the plans.
    This general scenario was consistent with a document prepared by the Soviet
    Politburo's Commission on Poland (the so-called Suslov Commission) in late
    August 1980.32 That document, subsequently approved by the full CPSU
    Politburo, authorized the Soviet defense ministry to bring four Soviet tank and
    mechanized divisions in the three military districts adjoining Poland up to
    full combat readiness "in case military assistance is provided to Poland." It
    also authorized the defense ministry to plan for—though not yet to carry out—
    the "call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000
    additional vehicles" to fill out at least "another five to seven [Soviet]
    divisions" that would be mobilized "if the situation in Poland deteriorates
    further." The number of additional reservists and vehicles was large enough to
    fill out as many as eleven extra Soviet divisions, if necessary, rather than
    just five to seven.
    If final approval had been given for the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" to begin as
    scheduled on 8 December, enough Soviet forces were in place to carry out the
    first stage of the operation, but not the second. In mid- to late December
    1980, U.S. intelligence sources (photoreconnaissance satellites and electronic
    intercepts) revealed that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the
    western USSR had been brought up to full combat readiness.33 These units
    constituted three of the four Soviet divisions slated to enter Poland on 8
    December in the first stage of Soyuz-80. The fourth Soviet division, according
    to East German military documents, was to be an airborne division.34 (Soviet
    airborne divisions were always maintained at full readiness. The unit in
    question was based in the Baltic Military District.) There is no evidence that
    any of the additional eleven Soviet tank and mechanized divisions were ever
    mobilized. Although planning for the mobilization of these divisions had been
    under way since late August—something that presumably would have enabled Soviet
    military officials to proceed with the mobilization quite expeditiously if so
    ordered—the number of Soviet divisions actually available for immediate
    deployment was extremely limited.
    Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on
    8 December was very different from the impression one might have gained from
    Kuklinski's dispatch (not to mention from Turner's briefings). Kuklinski was
    not present when Soviet and Polish military commanders discussed the "exercise"
    scenario at a secret meeting in Moscow on 1 December . Instead, he
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:12
    Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on 8 December was very different
    from the impression one might have gained from Kuklinski's dispatch (not to
    mention from Turner's briefings). Kuklinski was not present when Soviet and
    Polish military commanders discussed the "exercise" scenario at a secret
    meeting in Moscow on 1 December .

    Instead, he had to rely on what he could hurriedly learn afterwards from a few
    documents (maps and charts) and from comments by the "very restricted group of
    people" who had seen the full plans, especially the officers who had traveled
    to Moscow.

    Kuklinski's dispatch accurately reported the projected size of the full
    operation (both the first and the second stages), but it did not mention that
    only four of the projected fifteen Soviet divisions would be used in the first
    stage. This omission obviously was crucial. Although Kuklinski can hardly be
    faulted, in the face of such extreme uncertainty and time pressure, for having
    inadvertently left out a key part of the scenario, the difference between his
    version and the real plan can hardly be overstated. Rather than being a
    single, massive operation, the projected "exercises" were in fact divided into
    two stages: a limited first stage, and, if necessary, a much larger second
    stage. There is no doubt, based on the East German documents, the Suslov
    Commission's memorandum, and the evidence from
    U.S. intelligence sources, that the number of Soviet divisions slated to take
    part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger
    number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least
    fifteen) represented the combined total of forces in both the first and the
    second stages.
    As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four
    Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place.
    This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—
    an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not
    possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with
    the "maneuvers" unless the Polish authorities were ready to use the outside
    military support to impose martial law. Soviet leaders never regarded the
    entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Poland as being the same type of operation
    conducted against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When Soviet and East European
    troops intervened on a massive scale in Czechoslovakia, they did so to halt the
    Prague Spring and remove the regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. At no point
    before the invasion were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubcek or the
    other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist
    Czechoslovak troops to help pinpoint entry routes and deployment sites for
    incoming Soviet forces. In 1980, by contrast, plans for the Soyuz "maneuvers"
    were coordinated very carefully with the Polish authorities, and Polish
    officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units.35
    Moscow's aim in November-December 1980 was not to move against Stanislaw Kania,
    First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and Jaruzelski, but
    to offer them support. Soviet leaders did their best, using a mix of coercion
    and inducements, to ensure that the two Polish officials would seize this
    opportunity to impose martial law; but the fate of Soyuz-80 ultimately depended
    on whether Kania and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could crush Solidarity
    without sparking a civil war.
    The Soviet Union's desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as a
    disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders, who tended
    to espouse a more belligerent position. On 26 November 1980, the East German
    leader, Erich Honecker, wrote a letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate
    adoption of "collective [military] measures to help the Polish friends overcome
    the crisis."36 Honecker emphasized his "extraordinary fears" about what would
    happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and its allies failed to send in
    troops. "Any delay in acting against the counterrevolutionaries," he
    warned, "would mean death—the death of socialist Poland." To bolster his case,
    the East German leader authorized a hasty search for possible hardline
    alternatives to Kania and Jaruzelski. On 30 November , the East German defense
    minister, Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that certain "leading
    comrades from the
    [Polish United Workers' Party] have expressed the view that a [violent]
    confrontation with the counterrevolution can no longer be avoided and [that]
    they expect to receive help from outside."37 Evidently, Honecker helped
    encourage the leading Polish hardliner, Stefan Olszowski, to travel secretly to
    Moscow on 4 December for an emergency consultation. The East German General
    Secretary clearly was hoping that if he could come up with a suitable
    alternative in Warsaw, Soviet leaders would agree to install a new Polish
    regime once Soyuz-80 began. Honecker's perspective was fully shared in Sofia
    and Prague.
    In the end, however, the only thing that mattered was what Brezhnev and the
    rest of the Soviet Politburo wanted. The final decision ultimately was
    theirs. Even though they heeded the concerns expressed by the other Warsaw
    Pact states, they were convinced that military action would be worthwhile only
    if the Polish authorities were ready and able to take full advantage of it. Up
    to the last moment, Honecker was hoping that Soviet leaders would change their
    minds. On 6 and 7 December, East German military commanders ordered units of
    the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee, or NVA) to be ready to move
    into Poland at a moment's notice, just in case Soviet leaders decided that the
    intervention should proceed as originally planned.38 To Honecker's dismay,
    these preparations were all for naught. The Soviet Politburo had firmly
    decided by then that no Warsaw Pact troops should enter Poland unless a more
    propitious opportunity arose.
    None of this is to suggest that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to
    chance. By actively preparing for the "exercise" scenario, they were seeking
    to force Kania's and Jaruzelski's hand, giving the Polish leaders little option
    but to move ahead with a crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was
    thought, would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for
    martial law. (It is even conceivable, albeit unlikely, that Soviet leaders were
    never actually intending to send troops to Poland and, instead, were simply
    using the preparations for Soyuz-80 as a means of pressuring Kania to implement
    martial law.39 )
    Whatever the Soviet Union's precise intentions may have been, it soon became
    clear that the fierce pressure from outside in November-December 1980 would not
    in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of
    martial law. Kania and Jaruzelski constantly stressed the need for more time
    when they spoke with Soviet leaders in the latter half of November, both
    directly and through Marshal Kulikov, who served as an envoy for the CPSU
    Politburo. Kania continued to emphasize the desirability
    of seeking an "honorable compromise," rather than resorting immediately to
    violent repression.40 Although
    he did not rule out the eventual "use of force" and formed a new high-level
    staff to speed up the preparations for martial law, he was convinced that
    a "political solution" was still feasible.
    Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been
    willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of
    Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units locate the
    best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gesture
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:16
    Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on
    8 December was very different from the impression one might have gained from
    Kuklinski's dispatch (not to mention from Turner's briefings). Kuklinski was
    not present when Soviet and Polish military commanders discussed the "exercise"
    scenario at a secret meeting in Moscow on 1 December . Instead, he had to rely
    on what he could hurriedly learn afterwards from a few documents (maps and
    charts) and from comments by the "very restricted group of people" who had seen
    the full plans, especially the officers who had traveled to Moscow.
    Kuklinski's dispatch accurately reported the projected size of the full
    operation (both the first and the second stages), but it did not mention that
    only four of the projected fifteen Soviet divisions would be used in the first
    stage. This omission obviously was crucial. Although Kuklinski can hardly be
    faulted, in the face of such extreme uncertainty and time pressure, for having
    inadvertently left out a key part of the scenario, the difference between his
    version and the real plan can hardly be overstated. Rather than being a
    single, massive operation, the projected "exercises" were in fact divided into
    two stages: a limited first stage, and, if necessary, a much larger second
    stage. There is no doubt, based on the East German documents, the Suslov
    Commission's memorandum, and the evidence from
    U.S. intelligence sources, that the number of Soviet divisions slated to take
    part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger
    number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least
    fifteen) represented the combined total of forces in both the first and the
    second stages.
    As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four
    Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place.
    This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—
    an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not
    possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with
    the "maneuvers" unless the Polish authorities were ready to use the outside
    military support to impose martial law. Soviet leaders never regarded the
    entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Poland as being the same type of operation
    conducted against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When Soviet and East European
    troops intervened on a massive scale in Czechoslovakia, they did so to halt the
    Prague Spring and remove the regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. At no point
    before the invasion were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubcek or the
    other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist
    Czechoslovak troops to help pinpoint entry routes and deployment sites for
    incoming Soviet forces. In 1980, by contrast, plans for the Soyuz "maneuvers"
    were coordinated very carefully with the Polish authorities, and Polish
    officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units.35
    Moscow's aim in November-December 1980 was not to move against Stanislaw Kania,
    First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and Jaruzelski, but
    to offer them support. Soviet leaders did their best, using a mix of coercion
    and inducements, to ensure that the two Polish officials would seize this
    opportunity to impose martial law; but the fate of Soyuz-80 ultimately depended
    on whether Kania and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could crush Solidarity
    without sparking a civil war.
    The Soviet Union's desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as a
    disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders, who tended
    to espouse a more belligerent position. On 26 November 1980, the East German
    leader, Erich Honecker, wrote a letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate
    adoption of "collective [military] measures to help the Polish friends overcome
    the crisis."36 Honecker emphasized his "extraordinary fears" about what would
    happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and its allies failed to send in
    troops. "Any delay in acting against the counterrevolutionaries," he
    warned, "would mean death—the death of socialist Poland." To bolster his case,
    the East German leader authorized a hasty search for possible hardline
    alternatives to Kania and Jaruzelski. On 30 November , the East German defense
    minister, Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that certain "leading
    comrades from the
    [Polish United Workers' Party] have expressed the view that a [violent]
    confrontation with the counterrevolution can no longer be avoided and [that]
    they expect to receive help from outside."37 Evidently, Honecker helped
    encourage the leading Polish hardliner, Stefan Olszowski, to travel secretly to
    Moscow on 4 December for an emergency consultation. The East German General
    Secretary clearly was hoping that if he could come up with a suitable
    alternative in Warsaw, Soviet leaders would agree to install a new Polish
    regime once Soyuz-80 began. Honecker's perspective was fully shared in Sofia
    and Prague.
    In the end, however, the only thing that mattered was what Brezhnev and the
    rest of the Soviet Politburo wanted. The final decision ultimately was
    theirs. Even though they heeded the concerns expressed by the other Warsaw
    Pact states, they were convinced that military action would be worthwhile only
    if the Polish authorities were ready and able to take full advantage of it. Up
    to the last moment, Honecker was hoping that Soviet leaders would change their
    minds. On 6 and 7 December, East German military commanders ordered units of
    the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee, or NVA) to be ready to move
    into Poland at a moment's notice, just in case Soviet leaders decided that the
    intervention should proceed as originally planned.38 To Honecker's dismay,
    these preparations were all for naught. The Soviet Politburo had firmly
    decided by then that no Warsaw Pact troops should enter Poland unless a more
    propitious opportunity arose.
    None of this is to suggest that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to
    chance. By actively preparing for the "exercise" scenario, they were seeking
    to force Kania's and Jaruzelski's hand, giving the Polish leaders little option
    but to move ahead with a crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was
    thought, would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for
    martial law. (It is even conceivable, albeit unlikely, that Soviet leaders were
    never actually intending to send troops to Poland and, instead, were simply
    using the preparations for Soyuz-80 as a means of pressuring Kania to implement
    martial law.39 )
    Whatever the Soviet Union's precise intentions may have been, it soon became
    clear that the fierce pressure from outside in November-December 1980 would not
    in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of
    martial law. Kania and Jaruzelski constantly stressed the need for more time
    when they spoke with Soviet leaders in the latter half of November, both
    directly and through Marshal Kulikov, who served as an envoy for the CPSU
    Politburo. Kania continued to emphasize the desirability
    of seeking an "honorable compromise," rather than resorting immediately to
    violent repression.40 Although
    he did not rule out the eventual "use of force" and formed a new high-level
    staff to speed up the preparations for martial law, he was convinced that
    a "political solution" was still feasible.
    Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been
    willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of
    Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units locate the
    best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gestures,
    K
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:20
    Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been
    willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of
    Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units locate the
    best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland.

    Despite these gestures, Kania and Jaruzelski had never been enthusiastic about
    the maneuvers, and they decided that they had to make their views clear after
    two senior Polish officers, Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski, the first deputy chief of
    the Polish General Staff, and Col. Franciszek Puchala, a deputy head of the
    General Staff's Operations Directorate, traveled to Moscow on 1 December to
    receive "instructions" from the Soviet High Command.41 The information that
    Hupalowski and Puchala brought back to Poland, which indicated that an
    immediate, full-scale crackdown was an integral part of the scenario, was
    enough to spur Kania and Jaruzelski to warn Soviet
    leaders that any attempt to bring Warsaw Pact forces into Poland would greatly
    exacerbate the situation and risk widespread violence. They promised that if
    they were given a bit more time, they would be able to resolve the crisis on
    their own.
    Kania's and Jaruzelski's wariness about Soyuz-80
    was determined mainly by three factors: first, their awareness that
    preparations for an internal crackdown
    were still too rudimentary to give any assurance of success without the risk of
    large-scale bloodshed; second, their belief that the use of any Warsaw Pact
    troops for policing functions in Poland would stir widespread public outrage
    and resistance; and third, their specific concern (for obvious historical
    reasons) about the proposed use of East German troops. This last point was
    something on which almost all Polish officials, including most of the "healthy
    forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners), could agree. Even some of the hardline
    Polish military officers who were secretly encouraging the Soviet Union to send
    troops to crush Solidarity were averse to any notion that East German divisions
    should take part as well. In a typical case, a Polish army officer told Soviet
    officials in early December 1980 that "Poland can now be saved only by
    the introduction of Soviet troops," but he then warned that he himself "would
    be the first to take up arms against
    [East] German or Czech troops if they are sent in. They merely wish us harm
    and secretly revel in all our misfortunes. Only your [Soviet] troops should be
    involved in this."42
    Once Kania and Jaruzelski had made clear that the entry of Warsaw Pact troops
    into Poland would risk a "bloody confrontation that would roil the whole
    socialist world," and once they had pledged to take "decisive action"
    against "hostile" and "anti-socialist" elements in the near future, Soviet
    leaders were willing to defer the provision of outside military assistance, at
    least for the time being.43 Although Kania and Jaruzelski both claim in their
    memoirs that Brezhnev agreed to call off the entry of Warsaw Pact troops only
    after the hastily arranged meeting of East-bloc leaders in Moscow on 5
    December, newly declassified documents undercut that assertion.44 Numerous
    documents, including the top-secret transcript of the 5 December meeting (which
    was unavailable when Kania and Jaruzelski compiled their memoirs), indicate
    that the decision to leave troops out of the Soyuz-80 exercises must have been
    approved well before the Moscow meeting, perhaps as early as 2 December.45 (A
    speech that Kania delivered at a PUWP Central Committee plenum on 2 December
    suggests that he already had been assured that Warsaw Pact forces would not be
    moving
    into Poland on the 8th.) Although Kania faced serious
    criticism in Moscow on 5 December, the transcript of
    the meeting leaves little doubt that he and the other participants already knew
    that the Soviet Union would
    give the Polish leaders more time to take care of the crisis "with their own
    forces."46 Kania himself emphasized this point the following day (on 6
    December) when he gave the PUWP Politburo an overview of the Moscow meeting.
    Among other things, he reported that all the participating states had expressed
    confidence that the Polish authorities could "manage the situation on their
    own" (ze sytuacje opanujemy wlasnymi silami).47
    Thus, Kuklinski's dispatch outlined a scenario that, by the time it was
    reviewed by U.S. officials, had already been put on hold. Soyuz-80 secretly
    began on 8 December, but only as a command-staff exercise (CPX), rather than
    as full-fledged troop maneuvers.48 The CPX continued rather aimlessly for
    several weeks, long after its value
    had been exhausted. Although the four Soviet divisions, one East German
    division, and two Czechoslovak
    divisions remained at full alert until late December 1980, the prospect of
    bringing them into Poland had been postponed indefinitely.


    Document No. 1


    VERY URGENT!

    At a meeting with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in accordance
    with orders from Gen. Jaruzelski's Defense Ministry, Gen. Hupalowski and Col.
    Puchala endorsed a plan to admit into Poland (under the pretext of maneuvers)
    the Soviet Army (SA), the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA), and the
    Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA). Documents and reproduced portions of the
    plans [for joint intervention] were presented to show that the following forces
    are to be sent into Poland: three armies comprising 15 SA divisions, one army
    comprising two CLA divisions, and the staff of one army and one division from
    the NVA. In total, the intervening group initially will consist of 18
    divisions.
    (A state of readiness to cross the Polish borders was set for 8 December.) At
    present, representatives from the "fraternal armies," dressed in civilian
    clothing, are undertaking reconnaissance of invasion routes as well as the
    distances and terrain for future operations. The scenario of operations for
    the intervening armies envisages a regrouping of armies to all major Polish
    Army bases
    to conduct maneuvers with live ammunition. Then, depending on how things
    develop, all major Polish cities, especially industrial cities, are to be
    sealed off.
    According to the plan of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Polish Army
    will remain within its permanent units while its "allies" are regrouping on
    Polish territory. The only exceptions will be supervisory officers and
    military traffic control units, which will ensure a collision-free regrouping
    of the SA, CLA, and NVA armies from the border to the territories of future
    operations. Four Polish divisions (the 5th and 2nd Tank Divisions and the 4th
    and 12th Mechanized Divisions) will be called into operation at a later point.
    Finally, I very much regret to say that although everyone who has seen the
    plans (a very restricted group of people) is very depressed and crestfallen, no
    one is even contemplating putting up active resistance against the Warsaw Pact
    action.49 There are even those (Jasinski,49a Puchala) who say that the very
    presence of such
    enormous military forces on the territory of Poland
    may calm the nation.

    JACK STRONG



    REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981
    A "Hopeless" Situation


    This next report, addressed to Kuklinski's closest contact at the CIA, who used
    the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included
    on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was
    initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the
    letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his
    nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.
    The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw
    Pact's Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end
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    REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981
    A "Hopeless" Situation


    This next report, addressed to Kuklinski's closest contact at the CIA, who used
    the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included
    on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was
    initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the
    letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his
    nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.
    The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw
    Pact's Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end
    on 31 March, had been extended to 7 April at the request of the Polish
    authorities. Jaruzelski and Kania also had secretly urged that the exercises
    be continued after 7 April so that the PUWP leaders could "strengthen their
    position, give inspiration to the progressive forces [i.e., orthodox
    Communists] in Poland, make Solidarity and KOR [Committee for the Defense of
    Workers] realize that the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to provide help of
    all kinds to Poland, and thereby exert pressure on the
    leaders of Solidarity."50 Soviet military commanders
    turned down the request, arguing that it was merely "further proof that the
    Polish leaders believe others
    should do their work for them."51
    While the Soyuz-81 exercises were still under way, Kania and Jaruzelski had met
    secretly in Brest on the Polish-Soviet border with Andropov and Ustinov on
    3-4 April. The two Polish leaders were extremely apprehensive before the
    meeting, but they left with much greater confidence that they would be given
    more time to resolve the crisis on their own. A week after the Brest talks,
    Marshal Kulikov sought to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski to get them to sign
    the implementation directives for martial law (which would effectively set a
    date for the operation to begin), but the Polish leaders first postponed the
    meeting and then told Kulikov on 13 April that they would have to wait before
    signing the documents. For
    the time being, the Polish authorities had gained a
    further respite.
    Soviet leaders, for their part, realized by mid-April that they would have to
    ease up a bit in their relentless pressure on Kania and Jaruzelski. Brezhnev
    summed up this view at a CPSU Politburo meeting on 16 April when he affirmed
    that "we shouldn't badger [the Polish leaders], and we should avoid making them
    so nervous that they simply throw up their hands in despair."52 When Suslov
    and another key member of the Suslov Commission, Konstantin Rusakov, visited
    Warsaw on 23-24 April, they "attacked the [Polish leaders'] indecisiveness"
    and "sharply criticized their actions," but also sought to "support and
    encourage them" and to ensure that "they will have a distinct degree of trust
    in us."53 Although Brezhnev and his colleagues realized that "the current
    lull is only a temporary henomenon" and although they were determined
    to "exert constant pressure" on Kania and Jaruzelski, the Soviet leaders were
    also convinced that "we must now maintain a more equable tone in our relations
    with our [Polish] friends."
    Thus, the pessimistic outlook of Kuklinski's message on 26 April was not so
    much a reflection of the immediate political climate as it was a venting of
    frustration about
    two things:
    First, the Warsaw Pact states were continuing to exert enormous pressure on the
    Polish army. In his report, Kuklinski indicated that he and other General
    Staff officers had recently returned from Bulgaria, where they had been
    attending a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Military Council on 21-23 April.54
    Marshal Kulikov, his chief deputy,
    Army-Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, and other Warsaw Pact military leaders reemphasized
    at this session that they were as determined as ever to keep Poland and the
    Polish army fully within the socialist commonwealth.
    Second, the progress toward martial law seemed inexorable. By mid-April 1981,
    the conceptual phase of the martial law planning was over, and work was
    proceeding apace on the practical steps needed to implement the plans.55
    Kuklinski could see that in the seeming absence of an opportunity for the
    Polish army to defy the Soviet Union,
    the imposition of martial law was drawing ever nearer.



    Document No. 2


    WARSAW, 26 April 1981

    Dear Daniel!56

    After returning from Sofia with several officers from the General Staff,57 we
    discussed the current situation in Poland, a situation that, from the military
    point of view, is hopeless. In this extremely gloomy atmosphere, one of the
    most committed officers openly said that Poland had to undertake far-reaching
    political reforms. Gen. XXX58 bitterly accused "the Americans [of having]
    sold us out to Russia. Without the Americans' silent assent, the 'comrades'
    would not dare to act this way." We are now very desperate, but we have not
    lost hope that Gen. XXX is wrong! Appropriate use must be made of the flood of
    information he is sending to you.

    We Poles realize that we must fight for our own freedom, if necessary making
    the ultimate sacrifice. I remained convinced that the support your country has
    been giving to all who are fighting for that freedom will bring us closer to
    our goal.

    Thank you for your most recent, pleasant letter.

    With heartfelt greetings. Yours, PV



    REPORT No. 3: 15 September 1981—
    Plans for Martial Law



    This third message recounts a landmark meeting of Poland's Homeland Defense
    Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju, or KOK) on 13 September 1981. The KOK
    consisted of high-ranking military and political officials and was chaired by
    Jaruzelski in his capacity as prime minister. During the 1980-81 crisis, the
    KOK took on a supreme decision-making role, overseeing all the planning for
    martial law. On 13 September 1981, the KOK made a firm decision to press ahead
    with the martial law operation, leaving only the precise timetable to be
    determined. The great importance of this secret meeting was first revealed by
    Kuklinski in his 1987 interview, and it was then briefly discussed by Kania in
    his book-length interview (published in 1991) and by Jaruzelski in his two
    volumes of memoirs.59 Kuklinski's report says that notetaking was forbidden
    at the KOK meeting, but that is not quite true. One of the participants, Gen.
    Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, was responsible for taking notes of
    the session. His eight pages of handwritten notes, classified top-secret, were
    released from the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) in
    Warsaw in 1997.60
    Kuklinski was not present at the KOK meeting, but he was briefed about it
    immediately afterwards. Although Tuczapski's notes (which are not a verbatim
    record, but merely summaries of remarks) do not record Kiszczak's agitated
    comments about the leak of the martial law plans to Solidarity, all evidence
    suggests that Kiszczak did in fact deal with that issue at length in his
    opening speech, as Kuklinski indicates. It is unclear precisely how the Polish
    security forces discovered the leak, but it has long been known that the
    Internal Affairs Ministry had a dedicated campaign under way to infiltrate
    Solidarity. The aim was not only to compromise the organization and discredit
    its leaders, but also to gather intelligence about its plans and
    activities.61 Kuklinski himself has recently described the infiltration
    programs about which he knew first-hand in 1980 and 1981.62 These programs
    were aimed mainly at recruiting informers and agents provocateurs in Solidarity.
    Kuklinski's dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security
    was tightened within the General Staff's martial law planning unit, and an
    investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was o
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    Kuklinski's dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security
    was tightened within the General Staff's martial law planning unit, and an
    investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was one of a very small group of
    suspects, he had to curtail his activities and avoid doing anything that might
    arouse suspicion. It is interesting, however, that even at this perilous
    juncture, he showed no sign of wanting to leave Poland. Clearly, he regarded
    his work there as too crucial to abandon.
    At the same time, the report suggests that Kuklinski was surprised by the CIA's
    decision to transfer this highly sensitive information to Solidarity at a
    moment when no crackdown appeared imminent. Because the disclosure of secret
    codenames risked exposing Kuklinski, it seemed to be a rather short-sighted
    step that might undermine his whole mission. Kuklinski obviously realized that
    Solidarity needed to be warned in general terms about the planning for martial
    law, but he knew that the receipt of highly detailed information, especially
    codenames, would be reported immediately to the PUWP leadership by infiltrators
    within Solidarity. The colonel seemed to be hoping that the CIA would be more
    discreet in the future, at least until a more precise timetable for martial law
    had been set.



    Document No. 3


    WARSAW
    2030, 15 September 1981

    At an extraordinary session of the KOK on Sunday, which Kania attended for the
    first time, no final decision was made about the imposition of martial law.
    Almost all of the participants supported it. It seems that the tenor of the
    meeting surprised Kania. Although he did not question that such a development
    was inevitable, he reportedly said, in these precise words, that "a
    confrontation with the class enemy is unavoidable. This involves first a
    struggle using political means, but if that should fail, repression may be
    adopted." Note-taking was forbidden at the session. During the KOK's meeting,
    Kiszczak declared that Solidarity knew the details of our plans, including
    Operation "Wiosna"63 and its secret codename. I should emphasize that this is
    a codename— the secret title of the operation—and not the codeword needed to
    put it into effect. The officials responsible for implementing the plans don't
    know the codename; hence, it will be easy to compile a group of suspects. (The
    MSW64 was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have
    already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in
    operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer
    visited Szklarski65 and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future
    leaks. At present, Jasinski66 has taken command of planning at the national
    level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been
    working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC
    official,67 with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski
    from MSW,68 on a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of
    martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give
    a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this
    telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between
    Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial
    plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an
    announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television.
    Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of
    around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off
    the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the
    MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made
    about "improving the deployment of armies," that is, redeploying entire
    divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about
    larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of
    divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with
    the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take
    roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of
    Warsaw.
    Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports
    about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am
    conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The
    nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not
    object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve
    those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am
    prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something
    is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.

    Long live free Poland!
    Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!

    JACK STRONG



    Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the director of the
    Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies,
    Harvard University.

    1Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources
    adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas
    J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of
    Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski
    and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for
    working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist)
    officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story.
    For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, "Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy
    karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-
    2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, "Zagadka Kuklinskiego,"
    Przeglad Tygodniowy (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully
    checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception,
    to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully
    vetted for
    its accuracy.
    2For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the United
    States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy
    Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991),
    pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before
    the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious
    circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica smierc Leona Dubickiego,"
    Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.
    3See "Komenda Stoleczna: Plany przedsiewziec dotyczacych drugiego etapu
    akcji 'Jodla'," October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw
    Wewnetrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom
    (T.) IV.
    4See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in "Pulkownik
    Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December
    1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od
    srodka," Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.
    5In "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the
    head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski,
    claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably
    meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset
    and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was
    in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain.
    6See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,"
    pp. 13-14.
    7The quotation comes from Francis Meehan,
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    7The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980
    to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.
    8Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview in October
    1997, excerpts of which were broadcast on Polish radio in November 1997 on the
    program "Trojka pod Ksiezycem," which I heard while riding to Warsaw's Okecie
    airport after having attended a conference in Jachranka on "Poland 1980-1982:
    Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized by the National Security
    Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of
    Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
    9These incidents, one in Washington and the other in Chicago, were described by
    Andrzej Krajewski and Sylwia Wysocka in "Trojka pod Ksiezycem."
    10His younger son, Boguslaw, an avid yachtsman, was lost at sea in early
    January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was
    ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident
    during the 4th of July weekend.
    11"Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 3-55.
    12Weiser's first article was "Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War
    Plans," Washington Post 27 September 1992, pp. A1, A38, and the second was "A
    Question of Loyalty," Washington Post Magazine, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-
    29.
    13Maciej Lukasiewicz, ed., Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawa
    pulkownika Kuklinskiego (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona
    Jurczenko, Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pulkowniku Ryszardie Kuklinskim (Warsaw:
    KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., Pulkownik Kuklinski: Wywiady, Opinie,
    Dokumenty (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although Kuklinski is still reluctant to be
    interviewed, several lengthy interviews have appeared in recent years; see
    especially the interview cited above, "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," pp.
    1, 12-14.
    14The full text of the Court's verdict is reproduced in "Rewizje
    nadzwyczajna," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 7 April 1995, p. 17.
    15"Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD
    przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 14
    February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several
    months later. The parliament's action did not cover the separate charges
    brought against Jaruzelski for his role in the bloody crackdown of December
    1970. A trial resumed in mid-1998 of Jaruzelski and eleven other senior
    officials charged with the massacres.
    See "Proces-Grudzien '70, krotka: Rozpoczal sie proces oskarzonych ws.
    Grudnia '70," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw),
    16 June 1998, p. 2.
    16"Umorzono sledztwo przeciw plk. Kuklinskiemu," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 23
    September 1997, p. 1.
    17Jerzy Sadecki, "Kuklinski na Wawelu: Honorowy
    Obywatel Stolecznego Krolewskiego Miasta Krakowa," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 29
    April 1998, p. 2; and Jerzy
    Sadecki, "Honorowe obywatelstwo dla Ryszarda Kuklinskiego: Zwykly zolnierz
    Rzeczypospolitej," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 30 April 1998, p. 2.
    18"Juz nie chce stad wyjezdzac: Uratowal przed rozlewem krwi—oswiadczyl
    premier," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.
    19Adam Michnik, "Pulapka politycznej beatyfikacji," Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw),
    10-11 May 1998, pp. 10-11.
    20"Jaruzelski: Przyjazd Kuklinskiego nie budzi moich zastrzezen,"
    Rzcezpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.
    21Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw:
    CBOS, May 1998), pp. 1-3.
    22For the genesis and full text of Carter's message, see the reproduced entries
    from the diary of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the
    Carter administration, in "White House Diary, 1980," Orbis, Vol. 32, No. 1
    (Winter 1988), pp. 33-38. See also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Power and
    Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, rev. ed. (New
    York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1985), pp. 495-498; and Jimmy Carter,
    Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 583-585.
    23At the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December 1980, Brezhnev remarked that "the
    situation with the lines of communication [in Poland], especially with the
    railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would experience an
    economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were paralyzed. This would
    also be a great blow to the economic interests of other socialist states. Let
    me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate it if the security
    interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered by difficulties with the
    transportation system. An elaborate plan must be devised to use the [Polish]
    army and security forces to assert control over the transportation facilities
    and the main lines of communication [in Poland], and this plan must be
    implemented. Even before martial law is declared, it would be worthwhile to
    set up military command posts and to initiate military patrols along the
    railroads." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender
    Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember
    1980 in Moskau," 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien
    und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales
    Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, (Berlin) J IV, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Michael
    Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED
    contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 173.
    24See, among many examples, "Unuberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen
    Feind," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 1 December 1980, p. 3; "Walesa uber
    Zusammenarbeit mit KOR," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 27 November 1980, p.
    5; Jan Lipavsky, "Konfrontace: Od naseho varsavskeho zpravodaje," Rude pravo
    (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; "V boji o socialisticky charakter obnovy
    zeme," Rude pravo (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; and "Strana se upevnuje v
    akcji," Rude Pravo, 1 December 1980, p. 6.
    25Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East
    Germany on 4 December 1980 by Army-Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then
    appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the post that Zaitsev
    had held. See "Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewurdigt: Herzliche
    Begegnung mit Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat,"
    Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 5 December 1980, pp. 1-2.
    26The problems posed by cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, From the
    Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the
    Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. A Special
    Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid
    determination that only three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the
    western USSR were on full alert. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
    National Foreign Assessment Center, "Approaching the Brink: Moscow and the
    Polish Crisis, November–December 1980," Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret),
    January 1981, pp. 2–5.
    27See Brzezinski, "White House Diary, 1980," p. 45.
    28Ibid., pp. 37-39.
    29Ibid., pp. 40-41.
    30The emphasis here is on the word "preparing." It is unclear whether Soviet
    leaders were actually intending to bring troops into Poland, or were perhaps
    simply using the preparations as a means of spurring the Polish authorities to
    accelerate their plans for martial law. I will return briefly to this point
    below.
    31See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in
    Militarisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date
    is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1
    or 2 December. See also "Erlauterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly
    Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/
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    31See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in
    Militarisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date
    is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1
    or 2 December. See also "Erlauterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly
    Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date
    is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on
    either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).
    32See my article about, and translation of, the Commission's document in this
    same issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin.
    33 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment
    Center, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), pp.
    1-5 and CIA, "Approaching the Brink," p. 5.
    34 "Einweisung," Bl. 16.
    35 "Wesentlicher Inhalt der Meldung des Chefs des Militarbezirkes V, General-
    major Gehmert, uber die Ergebnisse der Rekognoszierung auf dem Territorium der
    Volksrepublik Polen zur Durchfuhrung der gemeinsamen Ubung," Report No. A-575-
    702 (Top Secret), 16 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, chief-of-
    staff of the East German National People's Army, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 23-
    27.
    36 "Anlage Nr. 2," 26 November 1980 (Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868,
    Bl. 5-6. My translation of, and commentary on, this letter appeared in "The
    Warsaw Pact and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: Honecker's Call for Military
    Intervention," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 5
    (Spring 1995), p. 124.
    37 "Werter Genosse Honecker!" letter from Hoffmann to Honecker, 30 November
    1980 (Top Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 4-5.
    38 "Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers fur Nationale Verteidigung uber die
    Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung einer gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmassnahme der der
    Vereinten Streitkrafte vom 06.12.1980," Nr. A-265-992 (Top Secret), 6 December
    1980, from Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 32-
    37; "Anordnung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des
    Hauptstabes zur Gewahrleistung des Passierens der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR
    Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme an einer
    auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenubung vom
    06.12.1980," No. A-477-624 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz
    Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 38-41; "Schreiben des Stellvertreters des
    Ministers und Chef des Haupstabes, Generaloberst Streletz, an den Chef
    Verwaltung Aufklarung," No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Col.-
    Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other
    documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos
    durchgreifen", pp. 197-208.
    39 No matter how much new evidence eventually becomes available, this matter
    may never be conclusively resolved. One item that suggests Soviet leaders may
    not have been intending to send troops into Poland is the huge turnover that
    occurred within the Soviet High Command in early December 1980. Most of the
    officers who would have been overseeing a large-scale operation in Poland were
    suddenly replaced. These included the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground
    forces, the commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany, the commander
    of the USSR's Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), the commander of the
    Belorussian Military District, and the commander of the Baltic Military
    District. This reshuffling would have been highly unusual if Soviet leaders
    knew they were about to embark on a potentially dangerous military operation.
    The reshuffling evidently was connected with changes in Soviet command-and-
    control procedures (including the establishment of new Theater Commands), but
    it clearly could have had a detrimental effect on near-term military
    contingencies in Poland. See Jack Sullivan and Tom Symonds, Soviet Theaters,
    High Commands and Commanders (Fort Meade, MD: Air Force Intelligence Service,
    1986); Michael J. Deane, et al., "The Soviet Command Structure in
    Transformation," Strategic Review, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 55-70; and
    Gregory C. Baird, "The Soviet Theater Command —An Update," Naval War College
    Review, Vol. 34, No. 6 (November-December 1981), pp. 90-94.
    40 "Protokol Nr. 51 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 26 listopada 1980
    r.," 26 November 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne
    Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc" 1980-1981 (London: Aneks,
    1992), pp. 180-188.
    41 For more on this, see Kuklinski's comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od
    srodka," pp. 21-22.
    42 "O vyskazaniyakh turistov iz PNR v svyazi s resheniyami VII Plenuma TsK PORP
    i vstrechei partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh deyatelei stran-uchastnits
    Varshavskogo Dogovora," Memorandum No. 135-s (Secret), 9 December 1980, from V.
    D. Dobrotvor, head of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism, in
    Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Kyiv,
    Fond (F.) 1, Opis' (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.), Listy (Ll.) 170-172.
    43 The quoted passage is from Kania's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5
    December, "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten
    der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,"
    p. 143.
    44 Wojciech Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Lattes, 1992), pp. 237-
    241; and Stanislaw Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 90-
    93.
    45 "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der
    Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," pp.
    140-196.
    46 Ibid.
    47 "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980
    r.," 6 December 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura
    Politycznego, p. 189.
    48 Army-Gen. A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala
    1980-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 54-55.
    49 This is an important statement because it confirms that the Polish General
    Staff had no plans to resist Soviet military intervention. That does not mean
    all troops from the Polish army would have simply stood by while Soviet units
    moved in, but it does indicate that the highest-ranking Polish commanders were
    not going to oppose the Soviet Union.
    49a Gen. Antoni Jasinski, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff for
    organization, played a crucial role in supervising the planning of martial law,
    as did the deputy chief of the General Staff for operations, Gen. Jerzy Skalski.
    50 "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der
    Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am
    07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-
    strategischen Kommandostabsubung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret),
    9 April 1981, in MZA-P, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.
    51 Ibid.
    52 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov.
    Brezhnva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu)," 16
    April 1981 (Top Secret), in Center for Preservation of Contemporary
    Documentation [TsKhSD], F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, L. 3.
    53 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh
    peregovorov delegatsii KPSS s rukovodstvom PORP," in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D.
    42, Ll. 2-4.
    54 "V Ob'edinennykh vooruzhenykh silakh gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo
    Dogovora," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 24 April 1981, p. 1.
    55 The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to
    four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet
    officials: "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:33
    55 The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to
    four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet
    officials: "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze
    wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), "Centralny plan
    dzialania organow politycznych w=BBadzy i administracji panstwowej na wypadek
    koniecznosci wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego," 27 March 1981 (Top
    Secret), "Ramowy plan dzialania sil zbrojnych," 27 March 1981 (Top
    Secret), "Ramowy plan przedsiewziec gospodarczych," 2 April 1981 (Top Secret),
    all in Centralne Archywum Wojskore [CAW], Warsaw, 1813/92, Sygn. 2304/IV.
    56 Daniel was the codename of Kuklinski's main contact at
    the CIA.
    57 A long-planned session of the Warsaw Pact's Military Council was held in
    Bulgaria on 21-23 April 1981.
    58 Kuklinski himself redacted the surname of this Polish general. It may have
    referred to Gen. Leon Dubicki, who was an adviser to Jaruzelski at the time.
    59 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 32-34; Kania, Zatrzymac
    konfrontacje, pp. 110-111; Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge, pp. 384-385;
    and Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 269-
    271.
    60 "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981
    r.," 13 September 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Protokoly z posiedzen Komitetu
    Obrony Kraju, Teczka Sygn. 48. I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for giving
    me a copy of these notes.
    61 See "Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe
    voevodstvo PNR," Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I.
    Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU's Yaroslavl oblast committee, in
    TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 85, Ll. 298-301; and "Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des
    Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR,
    Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politbhros
    und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei," 20 November
    1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Kubina and
    Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen", p. 105.
    62 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," p. 26.
    63 "Wiosna" (Spring) was the codename for the opening stage of the martial law
    operation. It involved mass arrests of leading Solidarity officials and
    dissident intellectuals.
    64 The acronym for Ministerstwo spraw wewnetrznych (Ministry of Internal
    Affairs).
    65 Gen. Waclaw Szklarski, the head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish
    General Staff, was Kuklinski's commanding officer.
    66 Presumably this official would have been from the PUWP CC Propaganda
    Department, which had been actively taking part in the initial martial law
    planning.
    67 Col. Bronislaw Pawlikowski, the head of a directorate in the Polish Internal
    Affairs Ministry, was one of the main liaisons with Kuklinski and other
    officers on the Polish General Staff.
    He played an especially important role in designing the mass-arrest operation."




    Print this document | Email a friend

    Subject:
    Brezhnev,Brzezinski,Carter,Dubcek,Espionage,Honnecker,Jaruzelski,KGB,Kuklinski,K
    ulikov,Poland 1980-81,Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring),Warsaw
    Pact,CIA Bulletin 11 - Cold War Flashpoints Pact
    Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID: New Evidence on the 1980-81 Polish
    Crisis
    Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author: Mark Kramer
    Document Origin: CWIHP Bulletin Published: CWIHP Document
    Document Date: 03/01/99 Document ID:
    Document Type: Article with Documents Archive:



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  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:51
    CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract) and Text of Oral Message from Brezhnev to
    Jaruzelski, 21 November 1981

    To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

    Proletarians of all countries, unite!

    Communist Party of the Soviet Union
    CENTRAL COMMITTEE

    TOP SECRET

    No. P37/21
    To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromykov, Suslov, Ustinov,
    Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Baibakov, Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov.
    Extract from Protocol No. 37 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
    on 21 November 1981

    On the reception in the USSR of a party-state delegation from the PPR and an
    oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade W. Jaruzelski.
    1. To affirm the text of an oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev,
    who instructed the Soviet ambassador in Poland to transmit it to Comrade W.
    Jaruzelski (see attached).
    2. To acknowledge the desirability of receiving in the USSR a party-
    state delegation from the PPR headed by Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 14-15 December
    1981.
    To affirm the composition of the Soviet delegation at the talks with
    the Polish delegation: Comrades L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delegation), M. A.
    Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U.
    Chernenko, and K. V. Rusakov.
    3. By 1 December the CPSU CC Department, the USSR Foreign Ministry,
    the Defense Ministry, the USSR KGB, and USSR Gosplan are to prepare all
    necessary materials for the talks with the Polish party-state delegations,
    including a draft communiqu=E9 for the press.
    The CPSU CC Department and the USSR Foreign Ministry are to set forth
    recommendations concerning organizational measures connected with the reception
    of a Polish delegation in the USSR.
    CC SECRETARY



    Regarding point 21 of Prot. No.
    37
    Secret
    WARSAW
    SOVIET AMBASSADOR
    Pay a visit to Comrade W. Jaruzelski and, citing your instructions,
    transmit to him the following oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev:
    "Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski!
    "We have attentively considered your proposal to visit Moscow at the
    head of a party-state delegation that would include the heads of the parties
    allied with the PZPR, and we agree with it. As far as the timeframe is
    concerned, the visit might take place on 14-15 December, assuming of course
    that this is suitable for you.
    "In the meantime, because several weeks still remain before the
    meeting, I decided to transmit to you through Comrade Aristov some thoughts
    about urgent matters pertaining to the situation in Poland, which remains a
    cause of serious anxiety for us.
    "I am revealing no secrets when I say that we greeted your election as
    PZPR CC First Secretary with great hopes. We were aware that earlier in the
    struggle against the anti-socialist forces you, as the chairman of the Council
    of Ministers, were inhibited by the political indecisiveness of the party
    leadership. Now this obstacle has been eliminated. The 4th plenum of the PZPR
    CC directly linked the decision to change the First Secretary with the
    necessity for urgent measures to salvage socialism in Poland.
    "When I congratulated you over the phone, I was pleased to hear that
    one of the reasons you had agreed to take on the responsible post of PZPR
    leader at such a critical juncture was the confidence you felt we had in you.
    I mentioned this to my comrades, and our hope strengthened even more that in
    you we had finally found someone who thinks as we do and who will be an ally in
    one of the most trying phases of the struggle against imperialism, as is now
    occurring in Poland.
    "You'll recall that during the phone conversation I expressed my hope
    that people now, both in Poland and abroad, would sense that things in your
    country were finally headed on a different course. We spoke then about the
    essential preconditions for a turnabout in the situation, and you agreed that
    you needed to choose reliable assistants from among the ranks of staunch and
    devoted Communists and to spur the whole party into motion, having instilled it
    with the spirit of struggle and then, without losing any time, resorting to
    active measures against the counterrevolution.
    "It's obvious that the fundamental question now is the struggle for the
    hearts and minds of the masses. However, one gets the impression that a
    turnaround on this matter has so far not been achieved. The anti-socialist
    forces not only are gaining sway in many large industrial enterprises, but are
    also continuing to spread their influence among ever wider segments of the
    population. Worse yet, the leaders of 'Solidarity' and the
    counterrevolutionaries are still appearing before various audiences and making
    openly inflammatory speeches aimed at stirring up nationalist passions and
    directed against the PZPR and against socialism. The direct consequence of
    this hostile activity is the dangerous growth of anti-Sovietism in Poland.
    "It seems to us that you now must mobilize the entire party in the
    struggle to win the hearts and minds of people by coming forth with a precise
    and clear program for resolving the crisis, a program that will convince
    everyone of its appropriateness. In other words, you must seek anew to gain
    the confidence of ordinary workers, as was done by the Communists during the
    years of the founding of popular rule. Of great importance in this effort will
    be regular meetings by leading officials from the PZPR aktiv with labor
    collectives, especially collectives at large state enterprises, which the enemy
    has succeeded in transforming into its bastions. This is so not just in the
    capital. And, of course, the struggle for the hearts and minds of the masses
    will not achieve the necessary results if the current party leadership is not
    supported by the mass media and if the adversary, as before, is given
    unhindered opportunity to disseminate his hostile propaganda.
    "I'd now like to broach another matter. Recently in Poland a lot has
    been written about your meeting with Glemp and Walesa. Some call it historic
    and see in it the beginning of a turn away from chaos toward social
    tranquility. As we know, the results of the meeting were positively evaluated
    by the Politburo and the PPR government.3
    "We understand, of course, that by proposing at this meeting, in the
    form of a critical question, the creation of a 'Front of National Accord,' you
    are pursuing a number of tactical objectives, above all the widening of public
    support for the regime and the fragmentation of the top levels
    of 'Solidarity.' But how far can one really go with such agreements without
    the threat of losing control over the situation? Indeed, aren't the class
    enemies trying to instill the 'Front of National Accord' with political content
    that would bolster their idea of, at a minimum, attaining a division of power
    among the PZPR, 'Solidarity,' and the church, with the result that socialism
    would collapse. It is also clear that they are exploiting their current
    influence among the masses to establish a huge advantage in the upcoming
    elections for the national councils, thus continuing their path toward the
    legal seizure of power in the country.
    "This, it seems to me, implies that it will be fundamentally important
    for the leading role of the PZPR to be greatly strengthened in the 'Front of
    National Accord,' as well as for the participants in the Front to recognize the
    PPR Constitution, socialism, and Poland's international alliances. Will these
    things be done in the Statutes and other documents of the Front, and more
    important will they be guaranteed in practice? What do you propose to do about
    the elections for local organs of power,
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:55
    What do you propose to do about the elections for local organs of power,
    bearing in mind the risk of the party's destruction?
    "In this connection another urgent matter arises. During many of our
    discussions we have emphasized the same theme over and over: We are not
    opposed to agreements. But such agreements must not make concessions to the
    enemies of socialism. And the key thing is that the agreements must not become
    ends in themselves. Along with measures you take to gain support among the
    popular masses and the different political forces, you must also take decisive
    actions against the sworn enemies of the popular order. You agreed with this
    way of framing the question and spoke yourself about your intention of
    struggling for the hearts and minds of the workers while at the same time
    attacking the class enemy.
    "But now the impression emerges that you're focusing only on the first
    part of this two-part formula. We know that there are still people in the
    leadership of your party who are still pinning all their hopes on a
    continuation of the bankrupt course of Kania. It would be dangerous to succumb
    to their entreaties. It is now absolutely clear that without a resolute
    struggle against the class enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in
    Poland. The essential question is not whether there will be a confrontation or
    not, but who will begin it and by what means it will be carried out, as well as
    who will seize the initiative.
    "I'd like to emphasize that when we speak about a confrontation, we
    believe it is contingent on a struggle to lure back to the side of the PZPR the
    workers and toiling masses who have fallen under the influence of 'Solidarity'
    and who now occupy a passive position and bide their time, waiting for things
    to sort themselves out at the top.4
    "You and I, Wojciech Wladyslawovich, have both experienced war and we
    know that the strategy of fighting is crucially dependent on the question of
    time. This is directly related to the adverse situation that has now emerged
    in Poland. The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who long ago were already
    gradually, and in some places openly, preparing for a decisive onslaught, are
    now seeking to time it for the moment when they will have an overwhelming
    advantage. In particular, they are placing great stakes on the fact that a new
    group of recruits will be entering the army who have been worked on
    by 'Solidarity.'5 Doesn't this suggest to you that a failure to take harsh
    measures against the counterrevolution right away will cost you invaluable time?
    "The key question is how to isolate the sworn enemies of socialism.
    Until that is done, nothing will change. Moreover, such an overtly
    counterrevolutionary organization as the 'Confederation for an Independent
    Poland' (KPN) is enlisting new supporters and is able to function legally.
    It's obvious that this has been possible because the party is in fact losing
    control over the judicial organs, as is evident from the whole episode with the
    trial of Moczulski and the other leaders of KPN.
    "I want to share with you some thoughts about one further matter of
    great urgency. It's obvious that any actions in defense of socialism demand in
    the first instance a vigorous struggle for the Marxist-Leninist character of
    the PZPR and an increase in its combat readiness. After the 4th plenum of the
    PZPR CC, signs began to appear that the party organizations were springing back
    to life. It is important to step up this work and to prevent the local
    Communists from falling back into their state of passivity and hopelessness.
    And for this what is needed most of all is for the members of the party to be
    able to believe that words and deeds will no longer diverge, and that the
    leadership is intent on firmly and consistently implementing decisions that
    have been adopted.
    "The strengthening of the PZPR depends also on a clear-cut line with
    regard to different currents of thought among its ranks. In your country some
    have argued that there now exist three basic directions in the party--the left,
    the right, and the center--and they have recommended the severance of all ties
    with the leftists and rightists, leaving them completely isolated by the force
    of the blows. This is a dangerous recommendation. Who is it, after all, that
    is being branded "leftists" or "hardliners"? Why, the Communists who have long
    been supportive of Marxist-Leninist positions, while in no way dismissing the
    need to rectify mistakes and distortions that have been committed. And who are
    the so-called rightists? These are the people who espouse revisionist views
    and ultimately become members of 'Solidarity.' It is clear that any sort of
    actions against staunch Communists would be suicide for the PZPR as a Communist
    party. And it is just as clear that until you get rid of the revisionists,
    including the ones in the party leadership who are trying to uphold the
    previous capitulationist line, they will weigh on you like a heavy burden.
    "I believe these considerations provide the key to a solution of the
    mounting problems with personnel. I am convinced that by working with your
    comrades who are oriented toward the "leftists," and by giving them your
    support, you will find that it is precisely these people who provide a sound
    basis for the struggle to overcome the crisis.
    "Esteemed Wojciech Wladyslawovich! Having raised, for your benefit,
    several matters that are troubling us, and having offered you my views, I
    naturally have left aside a number of problems that can be considered during a
    face-to-face meeting.6
    L. BREZHNEV"
    Confirm transmittal by telegram.
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 14.02.03, 23:58
    CPSU CC Politburo transcript, 10 December 1981

    Top Secret

    Single Copy

    (Working Notes)

    SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

    10 December 1981

    Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.
    Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A.
    P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P.
    N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I.
    Dolgikh, K. V. Rusakov.
    I. On the question of the situation in Poland
    BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on our agenda. But I think that
    the session of the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we have
    specially dispatched Comrades [Head of Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw
    Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov to Poland to meet with the
    Polish comrades and go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On 8
    December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with information about the discussions he
    held in Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade Baibakov communicated from
    Warsaw that he had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. From these
    meetings and subsequent discussions held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent
    that the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of
    additional supplies and materials from the USSR and other socialist countries
    in the first quarter of the coming year.7 This will include iron ore, non-
    ferrous metals, fertilizer, oil, tires, grain, etc.
    In making this request, as you see, the Polish comrades have in mind
    that shipments of goods from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be maintained at
    the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov assured his interlocutors that all their
    requests would be considered in Moscow.
    Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct Comrades Tikhonov,
    Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying this matter,
    taking account of the exchange of opinions, but without waiting for a final
    agreement.
    And now let's hear what Comrade Baibakov has to say.
    BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the Politburo's instructions, I traveled
    to Warsaw. I met there with all the comrades whom it was necessary for me to
    see about the matters specified in my instructions.
    First of all I had a discussion with the deputy chairman of the Council
    of Ministers, Comrade Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish comrades
    raised the question of economic assistance. I sent an encrypted cable back
    here outlining the Polish request.
    One must say that the list of goods included in the assistance from us
    to the PPR comes to 350 items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This includes
    such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand
    tons of iron ore, and many other goods. The requests made by the Polish
    comrades, combined with what we had already been thinking about giving Poland
    in 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish People's Republic will
    be approximately 4.4 billion rubles.
    The time is now approaching when Poland will have to pay for its
    credits from West European countries. For this, Poland will be required to pay
    a minimum of 2.8 million rubles' worth of hard currency. When I was told by
    the Polish comrades that they are requesting the amount that all this
    assistance comes to, I raised the question of how to establish mutual economic
    ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Polish industry is not even
    coming close to fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the country's
    basic means of earning hard currency, has been severely disrupted, and remedial
    measures have not been implemented as strikes continue. And even now, when
    there are no strikes, the mining of coal remains at a very low level.
    Or, for example, let's say that production is going on among the
    peasantry, with grain, meat products, vegetables, etc. But they aren't giving
    any of it to the state; they're just playing a waiting game. At the private
    markets the level of agricultural trade is sufficiently high and is being
    carried out at very inflated prices.
    I said directly to the Polish comrades that they must adopt more
    decisive measures if such a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch
    something in the nature of a requisitioning of farm produce.8
    If we speak, for example, about reserves of grain, then Poland this
    year has accumulated more than 2 million tons. The population is not going
    hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the markets and buy up all they products
    they need. And there are ample supplies of them.
    As is known, by the Politburo's decision and at the request of the
    Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand
    tons of meat. Of these promised 30 thousand tons, 15 thousand have already
    been shipped abroad. It should be added that the produce, in this case meat,
    is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport
    iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. During the transport of this produce
    to the Polish stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. Poles have
    been expressing highly obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet
    people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even
    begin to keep count of all the insults that have been directed against us.
    Viewing the situation from the standpoint of the balance of payments,
    the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to
    Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, then all Polish vessels in
    the waters of other states or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the
    countries to which Poland owes debts, will be seized. For this reason the
    Poles have given instructions to the captains of ships to refrain from entering
    ports and to stay in neutral waters.
    Now I will offer several words about my discussion with Comrade
    Jaruzelski. He reaffirmed the request made earlier by Obodowski regarding the
    delivery of goods. Then in the evening I again went to Jaruzelski's office,
    accompanied by our ambassador and Comrade Kulikov. Also taking part in this
    discussion were Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who handles these matters.
    Jaruzelski was in a highly agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply
    disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop
    Glemp, who, as is known, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish
    authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly responded that in the event of untoward
    activities by "Solidarity," they will detain all hostile elements.
    As far as the party organizations are concerned, they are ruined and
    inactive in the outlying regions. And with regard to the party as a whole,
    Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer exists. The country is being
    destroyed, and the outlying regions are not receiving any sort of
    reinforcement, because the Central Committee and government are not giving firm
    and clear-cut instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been transformed into a man
    who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities.
    RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has correctly described the situation
    regarding the Polish economy. What, then, should we be doing now? It seems to
    me that we should deliver to Poland the goods provided for under the economic
    agreements, but that these deliveries should not exceed the quantity of goods
    we delivered in the first quarter of last year.
    BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this much now?
    BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given only by drawing on state
    reserves or at the expense of deliveries to the internal market.
    RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries
    from the provin
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:00
    RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries from
    the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov9 reported, the secretaries of
    the provincial committees are completely baffled by Jaruzelski's speech, which
    did not present a clear, straightforward line. No one knows what will happen
    over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At
    first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was
    changed to the night of 12-13. And now they're already saying it won't be
    until around the 20th. What is envisaged is that the chairman of the State
    Council, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television and declare the
    introduction of martial law. At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on
    the introduction of martial law can be implemented only after it is considered
    by the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15
    December. Thus, everything has become very complicated. The agenda of the
    Sejm has already been published, and it makes no mention of the introduction of
    martial law. But even if the government does intend to introduce martial
    law, "Solidarity" knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing
    all necessary measures to cope with that.
    Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to deliver an address to the
    Polish nation. But in his address he won't be speaking about the party.
    Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments. Jaruzelski has talked
    about the need to proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that existed
    under Pilsudski.10 He indicated that the Poles will accept this more readily
    than something else.
    As far as officials like Olszowski are concerned, they recently have
    begun to act more decisively; and one might add that at the session of the
    Politburo where the decision was made to introduce martial law and adopt more
    resolute measures against extremist figures in "Solidarity," the vote was
    unanimous and no one expressed a word of opposition.11 At the same time,
    Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about this matter with his allies.
    He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up
    by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive assistance from other
    countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the
    territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is basing this hope on the speech by Comrade
    Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would
    indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I
    know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words
    voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in
    the lurch.
    If we consider what is going on in the provinces, one must candidly say
    that the strength of the party organizations there has been completely
    dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative apparatus there is still
    functioning, but in effect all power has now been transferred to the hands
    of "Solidarity." In his recent statements, Jaruzelski is apparently trying to
    pull the wool over our eyes, because his words fail to reflect a proper
    analysis. If the Polish comrades don't quickly get organized, prepare
    themselves, and resist the onslaught of "Solidarity," they will have no success
    at all in improving the situation in Poland.
    ANDROPOV. From the discussions with Jaruzelski it's clear that they
    have not yet reached a firm consensus about the introduction of martial law.
    Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR CC Politburo on the need to introduce
    martial law, we still haven't seen concrete measures on the part of the
    leadership. The extremists in "Solidarity" are attacking the Polish leadership
    by the throat. The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its
    position, which in essence is now completely supportive of "Solidarity."
    Of course in these circumstances the Polish comrades must act swiftly
    in launching "Operation X" and carrying it out. At the same time, Jaruzelski
    declares that we will resort to "Operation X" when "Solidarity" forces us to do
    so. This is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the latest session of
    the PZPR CC Politburo and the decision it adopted to introduce martial law had
    suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act more decisively. All the
    members of the Politburo expressed support for decisive action. This decision
    put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now compelled to find some way of
    extricating himself. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what
    measures they intended and when it would be done. He replied that he simply
    doesn't know about "Operation X" and about the concrete timeframe in which it
    would be carried out. Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is concealing
    from his comrades the plan of concrete action, or he is simply abandoning the
    idea of carrying out this step.
    I'd now like to mention that Jaruzelski has been more than persistent
    in setting forth economic demands from us and has made the implementation
    of "Operation X" contingent on our willingness to offer economic assistance;
    and I would say even more than that, he is raising the question, albeit
    indirectly, of receiving military assistance as well.
    Now, if you look at the list of goods we are providing to the Polish
    comrades, we can candidly say that serious doubts arise about the necessity of
    supplying these products. For example, what is the connection between the
    success of "Operation X" and the delivery of fertilizer and certain other
    goods? In connection with this I would say that our position, as it was
    formulated earlier during the previous session of the Politburo and was
    expressed even earlier on several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely
    correct, and we must not depart from it at all.12 In other words, we support
    the position of internationalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the
    situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as "Operation X" is concerned, that
    must entirely and unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades themselves.
    Whatever they decide is what will be. We will not insist on any specific
    course, and we will not dissuade them from pursuing what they decide.
    As far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be
    difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been
    proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. But again I want to say that
    the mere posing of the question of the apportionment of goods supplied as
    economic assistance is an insolent way to approach things, and it is being done
    purely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they'll be
    able to lay all the blame on us. If Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about
    the introduction of troops, then I believe he did this incorrectly. We can't
    risk such a step. We don't intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is
    the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end. I don't know how
    things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control
    of "Solidarity," that's the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries
    pounce on the Soviet Union, and you know they have already reached agreement on
    a variety of economic and political sanctions, that will be very burdensome for
    us. We must be concerned above all with our own country and about the
    strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.
    In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland
    was formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the
    resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has
    taken place during the session of the Po
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:03
    In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland was
    formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the resolutions
    adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has taken place
    during the session of the Politburo. All of this must serve as the basis of
    the policy we must uphold vis-a-vis Poland.
    As concerns the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the
    GDR that run through Poland, then we of course must do something to provide for
    their safekeeping.
    GROMYKO. Today we've had a very spirited review of the situation in
    Poland. You might even say this review was more spirited than any we've had
    before. This is because at the moment we ourselves don't know what direction
    the events in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself senses that power
    is slipping from its grasp. Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their
    ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no such opportunity, there
    are no longer any neutrals. The position is defined sufficiently
    clearly: "Solidarity" has proven to be a patently counterrevolutionary
    organization which aspires to come to power and which has openly declared its
    intention to seize power. The Polish leadership must decide the question:
    Either it relinquishes its positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, or
    it adopts decisive measures by introducing martial law, isolating the
    extremists of "Solidarity," and restoring public order. There is no other
    alternative.
    What should our position be toward the Polish events? I fully agree
    with what was already said here by the comrades. We can say to the Poles that
    we view the Polish events with understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for
    us to alter this measured formulation in any way. At the same time we must
    somehow try to dispel the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland
    have about the introduction of troops. There cannot be any introduction of
    troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our
    ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate this to him.
    Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of the PZPR CC Politburo with
    regard to the introduction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to his
    vacillating position. At first he had somewhat stiffened his spine, but now,
    once again, he's begun to soften. Everything is still in force that was said
    to them previously. If in the struggle against counterrevolution and
    afterwards they show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist Poland will
    remain. The introduction of martial law, of course, would be the best way to
    convey the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the
    counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they intend to carry out are
    indeed implemented, then I think we could expect positive results.
    Now, with regard to the creation of a new party, as Jaruzelski
    proposed, I think we must directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to
    create any sort of new party, since this would merely signal a retreat on the
    part of the Polish leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR is in fact
    not a militant political organization, but simply an organization that has
    committed mistakes. It would underscore the very weakness of the party and
    would play into the hands of the "Solidarity" extremists. Then even the
    population of Poland, which retains definite sympathy for the PZPR as a guiding
    force, would be completely disabused of such sentiments.
    I believe that we must not now permit any sort of harsh instructions,
    which would force them to adopt one course or another. I think we have chosen
    the correct position here: The restoration of order in Poland is a matter for
    the Polish United Workers' Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We
    already said to our Polish friends and will say again in the future that they
    must pursue a steadfast course without slackening in the least.
    Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to "Solidarity," the West in all
    likelihood will not give them credits and will not offer any other kind of
    help. They are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too,
    have to bear in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was correct in proposing
    that we instruct a group of comrades to examine this question, taking account
    of our capabilities to extend substantial economic assistance to the PPR.
    USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of course, is very bad. The
    situation is worsening day by day. Among the leadership, especially in the
    Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And all of this has taken its toll
    on the state of affairs. Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo
    was a decision unanimously approved to introduce martial law. And now all
    hopes are riding on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying out this
    decision? As yet, no one can openly speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We
    just don't know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He candidly said that
    even we [the Poles] don't know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man who
    has been effectively responsible for discharging the duties of the Polish
    defense minister doesn't know what will happen and what sort of actions will be
    taken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister.
    With regard to what Comrade Kulikov allegedly said about the
    introduction of troops into Poland, I can say in full responsbility that
    Kulikov never said this. He simply repeated what was said by us and by Leonid
    Ilyich that we would not leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well
    knows that the Poles themselves requested us not to introduce troops.
    As far as our garrisons in Poland are concerned, we are fortifying
    them. I myself am also inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on a
    confrontation and only if, perhaps, "Solidarity" seizes them by the throat will
    they come forth.
    The problem is that the Polish leaders do not appear resolute. As was
    rightly said here by the comrades, we must not force them to adopt any specific
    decisions; we will simply carry out the policy on which we have agreed. For
    our part, we must be ready ourselves and must not display any sort of actions
    not provided for by our decisions.
    SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the other comrades' speeches, we
    all have the same view of the situation in Poland. During the whole prolonged
    stretch of events in Poland, we have displayed steadfastness and composure.
    Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. We said this in public
    to our people, and our people supported the policy of the Communist Party.
    We've done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for
    us to change our position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so.
    We have carried out via the UN such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate
    peace. What a great effect we have had from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the
    FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This has enabled
    all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union staunchly and
    consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible for
    us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start
    of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what
    actions they must pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward
    more decisive actions. But we will, as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard
    their actions with understanding.
    As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of
    slyness. He wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests,
    which he presents to the Soviet Union
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:06
    As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He
    wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests, which he
    presents to the Soviet Union. These requests, naturally, are beyond our
    physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well, look here, I
    turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn't receive it.
    At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the
    introduction of troops. If troops are introduced, that will mean a
    catastrophe. I think we have reached a unanimous view here on this matter, and
    there can be no consideration at all of introducing troops.
    As far as the provision of assistance to Poland is concerned, we have
    given that country more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we adopted a
    decision to ship 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons
    have already been delivered. I don't know whether we'll be able to ship the
    full 30 thousand tons, but in any event we apparently are obliged by this
    decision to give a further definite number of tons of meat as assistance.
    With regard to the PZPR and the creation of a new party to replace it,
    I believe it would be inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who spoke here
    were correct in arguing that this would be a completely unhelpful action.
    GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line
    of our party toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the
    proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot
    agree with that. There can be no talk at all of introducing troops. We will
    have to look at economic questions and at what can be given to the Poles.
    SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the intrigues of "Solidarity" and
    other counterrevolutionary forces.
    CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the comrades have said here. It is
    clear that the line of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the Polish
    events, as formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the
    decisions of the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of change.
    I believe that today we could adopt the following decision:
    1. Take under advisement the information provided by Comrade Baibakov.
    2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, abide by the general political
    line on this matter laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the
    instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 December 1981 and the exchange of
    opinions that occurred at the CC Politburo's session on 10 December 1981.
    3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to
    continue studying questions of economic assistance to Poland, taking account of
    the exchange of opinions at the session of the CC Politburo.
    BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel about this?
    EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very properly formulated all the
    proposals, and now it is time to adopt them.
    The decree is adopted.


  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:08
    CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract),

    "On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal
    countries,"

    13 December 1981

    Proletarians of all countries, unite!

    Communist Party of the Soviet Union
    CENTRAL COMMITTEE

    TOP SECRET

    No. P40/26
    TO: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov,
    Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamyatin
    Extract from Protocol No. 40 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
    on 13 December 1981

    On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal
    countries.
    To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassadors in Bulgaria,
    Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba, Vietnam, and
    Laos (see attached).
    CC SECRETARY
    Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40


    Secret
    SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, ULAN-BATOR, PRAGUE, HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE
    SOVIET AMBASSADOR
    CC: WARSAW -- SOVIET AMBASSADOR
    Pay a call on T. Zhivkov (J. Kadar, E. Honecker, Yu. Tsedenbal, G.
    Husak, F. Castro, Li Duan, K. Phomvihan) and, referring to the CPSU CC's
    instructions, transmit the following:
    "As our friends know, the Polish leadership has introduced martial law
    in the country, announced the formation of a Military Council of National
    Salvation, and detained the most extremist elements of 'Solidarity,'
    the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland,' and other anti-socialist groups.
    "A good impression has been created by W. Jaruzelski's address to the
    people, in which, in our view, all the basic questions were given appropriate
    emphasis. In particular, what is especially important is that the address
    reaffirmed the leading role of the PZPR and the commitment of the PPR to the
    socialist obligations stipulated by the Warsaw Pact.
    "To ensure the success of the operation, the Polish comrades observed
    strict secrecy. Only a narrow circle around Jaruzelski knew about the
    action.13 Thanks to this our friends have succeeded in catching the enemy
    completely unawares, and the operation so far has been implemented
    satisfactorily.
    "On the very eve of implementation of the projected operation, W.
    Jaruzelski communicated about it to Moscow.14 We informed him that the Soviet
    leadership looked with understanding upon the decision of the Polish comrades.
    In so doing we ensured that the Polish comrades would resolve these matters
    solely by internal means.
    "In our preliminary evaluation, the measures taken by the Polish
    friends are an active step to repulse counterrevolution, and in this sense they
    correspond with the general line of all the fraternal countries.
    "In these circumstances the question arises about offering political
    and moral support to the Polish friends and also about giving additional
    economic assistance. The Soviet leadership, as previously, will act on the
    Polish question in close contact with the fraternal countries."
    Confirm transmittal by telegram.
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:10
    CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt),
    14 January 1982

    SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

    14 January 1982

    Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

    Also taking part: C[omra]des. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, V. V.
    Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, N. A.
    Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov, B.
    N. Ponomarev, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov
    2. On the Results of the Negotiations with the PZPR CC Politburo Member and
    Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic Cde. J. Czyrek

    BREZHNEV. I think we all agree that Mikhail Andreevich [Suslov]'s and
    Andrei Andreevich [Gromyko]'s discussions with Cde. Czyrek were useful.
    Western officials, especially the Americans, are exerting enormous pressure on
    Poland. In such circumstances, it is important to offer constant political
    support for our friends and to bolster their spirits. One cannot permit their
    spirits to sag or to allow them to relinquish what they have achieved with such
    difficulty.

    Martial law in the PPR has already lasted a month. As Jaruzelski says,
    the counterrevolution is now crushed. However, the tasks ahead are more
    complicated.

    After introducing relative stability in the country, the Polish
    comrades must now, one might say, resolve the strategic problems of what to do
    with the trade unions, how to revive the economy, how to change the
    consciousness of the masses, etc.

    The most important question is the situation in the PZPR. Our friends
    are trying to find a solution. No doubt, Jaruzelski does not intend to disband
    the party or to change its name, but he can exploit martial law to carry out a
    sweeping purge. This might yield good results.
    In general one gets the impression that the general as a political
    actor is very strong and is able, on most occasions, to find proper solutions.
    Sometimes it seems that he is too cautious and acts more often than necessary
    with an eye to the West and the Church. But in the current situation such
    gestures will only ruin things. Along with firm, hardline measures on matters
    of principle, one also needs flexibility and circumspection. It's good that
    Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian experience in struggling against
    counterrevolution.
    All of us clearly understand that the decisive precondition for the
    full stabilization of things in Poland is a revival of the economy. In
    Czechoslovakia after 1968 political efforts made headway precisely because the
    counterrevolution had not affected the economic sphere. In Poland just the
    opposite is true.
    In this connection a difficult question stands before us. We already
    are stretched to the limit in our capacity to help the Poles, and they are
    making still more requests. Perhaps we can do a bit more, but we certainly
    can't give a lot more.
    Still, we must of course answer Jaruzelski's letter,15 explaining in a
    comradely way what we can and cannot do. By all means we must precisely carry
    out our agreed deliveries in the first quarter, which for the Poles will be the
    most difficult winter months.
    Quite another matter are projects for political prestige, which should
    not impose great strains on our economy. For example, we can lend assistance
    in building the Warsaw subway. We should meet this request, having made our
    participation a matter of public knowledge.
    Incidentally, the food situation in Poland is not so bad. There is
    enough bread in the country, and they must find a way to motivate the
    peasasntry and to get them to work, arranging, as we sometimes say, a merger of
    the city and village.
    The Polish leadership continues to count on help from the West. Well,
    in principle we can't be against that, although, to be honest, it's doubtful
    that Western countries are about to start providing material assistance to a
    military regime. They undoubtedly will try to extract concessions, which means
    we must be especially vigilant.
    Jaruzelski is raising another question, of whether he should accept
    help from the Chinese. Well, why not? In the process China will be
    disassociating itself from the USA and its economic sanctions.
    In conclusion, one might say that the Polish question will be at the
    center of international politics for a long time to come. That is why our
    Polish commission has continued to work as actively as it has been up to now.


  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:13
    CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to Poland (1980-81), 23 September 1982

    SPECIAL DOSSIER

    Secret16
    I N F O R M A T I O N
    about Soviet assistance to Poland in freely convertible currency in 1980-1981*
    I. Credits Provided Millions of $
    1. For the purchase of sugar 30
    By order of the USSR Council
    of Ministers on 1 August 1980
    No. 1518 rs (P207 from 1.8.1980)
    2. For the settlement of accounts 250
    with capitalist countries.
    By order of the USSR Council of
    Ministers on 23 August 1980, No.
    1192-rs (P201/30 from 23.VI.80)
    3. For the establishment of a consor- 70
    tium of banks to help the PPR.
    Decision of the CPSU CC on 6 June
    1980. No. P199/2
    4. For the settlement of accounts 150
    with capitalist countries
    By order of the USSR Council of
    Ministers on 11 November 1980
    No. 1019-247 (P224/70
    from 11.XI.1980)
    5. For the purchase of grain 190
    and food stuffs.
    By order of the USSR Council
    of Ministers
    No. 1019-347 (P224/70
    from 11.XI.1980)

    Total 690
    II. Deferred Payments
    1. Deferral of payments to 219
    Soviet banks. Decision of the
    CPSU CC on 6 June 1980
    (P199/II from 6.6.1980)
    2. Deferral of payments to 280
    Soviet banks. By order of the
    USSR Council of Ministers on
    11 September 1980
    No. 1840 rs (P214/XI
    from 11.XI.1980)
    3. Deferral of payments to 280
    Soviet banks. By order of the
    USSR Council of Ministers on
    11 November 1980
    No. 1019-347 (P224/70
    from 11.XI.1980)
    4. Deferral of payments on the basic debt
    up to 1,000
    from all credits extended previously.
    By order of the USSR Council of Ministers
    on 16 August 1981.
    No. 1630 rs (P23/14 from 16.8.81)

    Total 1,779
    III. Grant Aid
    1. Joint grant aid from the USSR, 465
    Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR,
    and Czechoslovakia supplied via a
    reduction of oil deliveries to the
    CMEA countries.
    Decision of the CPSU CC on
    28 November 1980
    No. P227/21
    Total 2,934

    *) According to data from USSR Gosplan

    TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

    1. Translator's Note: The notion of a "creeping counterrevolution" was first
    devised by East German and Soviet officials during the 1968 crisis over the
    Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia.
    2. Translator's Note: Notes from this meeting are available in both Russian
    and Polish archives; see, e.g., Fond (F.) No. 5, Opis' (Op.) No. 84, Delo (D.)
    No. 596, Listy (Ll.) 33-35, Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii
    (TsKhSD).
    3. Translator's Note: Brezhnev presumably refers here to the PZPR Politburo.
    4. Translator's Note: A page was missing at this point in the documents
    originally supplied to the Polish government and published in Rzeczpospolita.
    Fortunately, the missing page (no. 5 in the document) was included in the copy
    of the document stored in the Moscow archives.
    5. Translator's Note: Misgivings about the influence of Solidarity on the new
    group of Polish army draftees were expressed frequently in 1981 in top-secret
    Soviet assessments of the reliability of the Polish army. See, e.g., "O
    nastroeniyakh sredi soldat i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF
    PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," Cable No. 183 (Top
    Secret), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in
    TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19; and also "O politicheskoi situatsii i
    nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo regiona PNR (Politpis'mo)," Cable No. 179
    (TOP SECRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Krakow,
    to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22.
    6. Translator's Note: It is not wholly clear what Brezhnev had in mind here,
    but he may have been alluding to some of the preparations for martial law.
    7. Translator's Note: It is curious why in this secret forum Brezhnev used
    dollars (instead of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for measuring the
    size of Poland's request.
    8. Translator's Note: The term Baibakov uses here, prodrazverstka (a
    contraction of prodovol'stvennaya razverstka), refers to the policy introduced
    by Lenin during the period of "War Communism" to force peasants to turn over
    their produce to the state. The policy led to great bloodshed, upheaval, and
    starvation.
    9. Translator's Note: Either because of a mistake by Rusakov or because of a
    typographical error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov's surname as
    Arestov. The error was corrected in the Polish translation.
    10. Translator's Note: Marshal Josef Pilsudski was the military ruler of
    Poland during the interwar period, presiding over a regime that became
    increasingly tyrannical.
    11. Translator's Note: The Russian word Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous
    vote, edinoglasno, is stronger than another word, edinodushno, which also is
    translated as "unanimous." Rusakov's statement indicates that no abstentions
    or dissenting votes were cast. It should be noted, however, that most
    subsequent speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the word edinodushno when
    referring to the PZPR Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno.
    12. Translator's Note: The transcript of "the previous session of the
    Politburo" (apparently of 8 December) has not yet been released.
    13. Translator's Note: This statement is confirmed by the lack of concrete
    discussion of the matter at PZPR Politburo meetings throughout the crisis; see
    the transcripts in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego:
    PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981 (London: Aneks, 1992). The extreme secrecy of
    the planning also is emphasized in the interview with Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna
    z narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), esp. 11-13,
    33-35.
    14. Translator's Note: The text of this communication (by most accountsa phone
    conversation Jaruzelski had with Suslov and/or Brezhnev) reportedly exists in
    the Russian Presidential Archive, but has not yet been released.
    15. Translator's Note: Brezhnev later in the meeting described Jaruzelski's
    letter of 3 January 1982: "...Jaruzelski expresses deep gratitude for the
    fraternal help provided by the Soviet Union to the Polish People's Republic.
    At the same time, he requests that the Soviet side reaffirm the volume of
    deliveries for 1982 contained in the draft protocol on the coordination of both
    sides' plans for 1981-1985 for oil, gasoline, and oil products. The volume of
    oil deliveries in 1982 are being kept at the level of 13 million tons, and oil
    products at 2.94 million tons; and deliveries of combustibles are being
    retained at the maximum level in the first quarter of 1982.
    "Further on Cde. Jaruzelski informs us that he appealed to the General
    Secretaries of the Communist Party Central Committees of Hungary, the GDR,
    Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia with a request to provide Poland with
    basic agricultural and industrial goods."
    16. Translator's Note: The classification was upgraded to "top secret"
    (sovershenno sekretno) by a handwritten notation of sov. next to the original
    sekretno. A stamped imprint just under the classification said that this was
    CPSU CC Document No. 2931, prepared on 23 September 1982, and that it should be
    returned to the CPSU CC General Department.
    "



  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:18
    SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO


    10 December 1981


    Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

    Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A.
    P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P.
    N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I.
    Dolgikh, K. V. Rusakov.

    I. On the question of the situation in Poland

    BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on our agenda. But I think that
    the session of the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we have
    specially dispatched Comrades [Head of Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw
    Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov to Poland to meet with the
    Polish comrades and go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On 8
    December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with information about the discussions he
    held in Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade Baibakov communicated from
    Warsaw that he had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. From these
    meetings and subsequent discussions held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent
    that the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of
    additional supplies and materials from the USSR and other socialist countries
    in the first quarter of the coming year.1 This will include iron ore, non-
    ferrous metals, fertilizer, oil, tires, grain, etc.
    In making this request, as you see, the Polish comrades have in mind
    that shipments of goods from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be maintained at
    the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov assured his interlocutors that all their
    requests would be considered in Moscow.
    Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct Comrades Tikhonov,
    Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying this matter,
    taking account of the exchange of opinions, but without waiting for a final
    agreement.
    And now let's hear what Comrade Baibakov has to say.

    BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the Politburo's instructions, I traveled
    to Warsaw. I met there with all the comrades whom it was necessary for me to
    see about the matters specified in my instructions.
    First of all I had a discussion with the deputy chairman of the Council
    of Ministers, Comrade Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish comrades
    raised the question of economic assistance. I sent an encrypted cable back
    here outlining the Polish request.
    One must say that the list of goods included in the assistance from us
    to the PPR comes to 350 items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This includes
    such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand
    tons of iron ore, and many other goods. The requests made by the Polish
    comrades, combined with what we had already been thinking about giving Poland
    in 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish People's Republic will
    be approximately 4.4 billion rubles.
    The time is now approaching when Poland will have to pay for its
    credits from West European countries. For this, Poland will be required to pay
    a minimum of 2.8 million rubles' worth of hard currency. When I was told by
    the Polish comrades that they are requesting the amount that all this
    assistance comes to, I raised the question of how to establish mutual economic
    ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Polish industry is not even
    coming close to fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the country's
    basic means of earning hard currency, has been severely disrupted, and remedial
    measures have not been implemented as strikes continue. And even now, when
    there are no strikes, the mining of coal remains at a very low level.
    Or, for example, let's say that production is going on among the
    peasantry, with grain, meat products, vegetables, etc. But they aren't giving
    any of it to the state; they're just playing a waiting game. At the private
    markets the level of agricultural trade is sufficiently high and is being
    carried out at very inflated prices.
    I said directly to the Polish comrades that they must adopt more
    decisive measures if such a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch
    something in the nature of a requisitioning of farm produce.2
    If we speak, for example, about reserves of grain, then Poland this
    year has accumulated more than 2 million tons. The population is not going
    hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the markets and buy up all they products
    they need. And there are ample supplies of them.
    As is known, by the Politburo's decision and at the request of the
    Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand
    tons of meat. Of these promised 30 thousand tons, 15 thousand have already
    been shipped abroad. It should be added that the produce, in this case meat,
    is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport
    iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. During the transport of this produce
    to the Polish stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. Poles have
    been expressing highly obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet
    people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even
    begin to keep count of all the insults that have been directed against us.
    Viewing the situation from the standpoint of the balance of payments,
    the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to
    Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, then all Polish vessels in
    the waters of other states or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the
    countries to which Poland owes debts, will be seized. For this reason the
    Poles have given instructions to the captains of ships to refrain from entering
    ports and to stay in neutral waters.
    Now I will offer several words about my discussion with Comrade
    Jaruzelski. He reaffirmed the request made earlier by Obodowski regarding the
    delivery of goods. Then in the evening I again went to Jaruzelski's office,
    accompanied by our ambassador and Comrade Kulikov. Also taking part in this
    discussion were Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who handles these matters.
    Jaruzelski was in a highly agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply
    disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop
    Glemp, who, as is known, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish
    authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly responded that in the event of untoward
    activities by "Solidarity," they will detain all hostile elements.
    As far as the party organizations are concerned, they are ruined and
    inactive in the outlying regions. And with regard to the party as a whole,
    Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer exists. The country is being
    destroyed, and the outlying regions are not receiving any sort of
    reinforcement, because the Central Committee and government are not giving firm
    and clear-cut instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been transformed into a man
    who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities.

    RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has correctly described the situation
    regarding the Polish economy. What, then, should we be doing now? It seems to
    me that we should deliver to Poland the goods provided for under the economic
    agreements, but that these deliveries should not exceed the quantity of goods
    we delivered in the first quarter of last year.

    BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this much now?

    BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given only by drawing on state
    reserves or at the expense of deliveries to the internal market.

    RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries
    from the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov3 reported, the secretaries
    of the provi
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:20
    RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries from
    the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov3 reported, the secretaries of
    the provincial committees are completely baffled by Jaruzelski's speech, which
    did not present a clear, straightforward line. No one knows what will happen
    over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At
    first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was
    changed to the night of 12-13. And now they're already saying it won't be
    until around the 20th. What is envisaged is that the chairman of the State
    Council, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television and declare the
    introduction of martial law. At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on
    the introduction of martial law can be implemented only after it is considered
    by the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15
    December. Thus, everything has become very complicated. The agenda of the
    Sejm has already been published, and it makes no mention of the introduction of
    martial law. But even if the government does intend to introduce martial
    law, "Solidarity" knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing
    all necessary measures to cope with that.
    Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to deliver an address to the
    Polish nation. But in his address he won't be speaking about the party.
    Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments. Jaruzelski has talked
    about the need to proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that existed
    under Pilsudski.4 He indicated that the Poles will accept this more readily
    than something else.
    As far as officials like Olszowski are concerned, they recently have
    begun to act more decisively; and one might add that at the session of the
    Politburo where the decision was made to introduce martial law and adopt more
    resolute measures against extremist figures in "Solidarity," the vote was
    unanimous and no one expressed a word of opposition.5 At the same time,
    Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about this matter with his allies.
    He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up
    by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive assistance from other
    countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the
    territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is basing this hope on the speech by Comrade
    Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would
    indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I
    know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words
    voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in
    the lurch.
    If we consider what is going on in the provinces, one must candidly say
    that the strength of the party organizations there has been completely
    dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative apparatus there is still
    functioning, but in effect all power has now been transferred to the hands
    of "Solidarity." In his recent statements, Jaruzelski is apparently trying to
    pull the wool over our eyes, because his words fail to reflect a proper
    analysis. If the Polish comrades don't quickly get organized, prepare
    themselves, and resist the onslaught of "Solidarity," they will have no success
    at all in improving the situation in Poland.

    ANDROPOV. From the discussions with Jaruzelski it's clear that they
    have not yet reached a firm consensus about the introduction of martial law.
    Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR CC Politburo on the need to introduce
    martial law, we still haven't seen concrete measures on the part of the
    leadership. The extremists in "Solidarity" are attacking the Polish leadership
    by the throat. The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its
    position, which in essence is now completely supportive of "Solidarity."
    Of course in these circumstances the Polish comrades must act swiftly
    in launching "Operation X" and carrying it out. At the same time, Jaruzelski
    declares that we will resort to "Operation X" when "Solidarity" forces us to do
    so. This is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the latest session of
    the PZPR CC Politburo and the decision it adopted to introduce martial law had
    suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act more decisively. All the
    members of the Politburo expressed support for decisive action. This decision
    put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now compelled to find some way of
    extricating himself. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what
    measures they intended and when it would be done. He replied that he simply
    doesn't know about "Operation X" and about the concrete timeframe in which it
    would be carried out. Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is concealing
    from his comrades the plan of concrete action, or he is simply abandoning the
    idea of carrying out this step.
    I'd now like to mention that Jaruzelski has been more than persistent
    in setting forth economic demands from us and has made the implementation
    of "Operation X" contingent on our willingness to offer economic assistance;
    and I would say even more than that, he is raising the question, albeit
    indirectly, of receiving military assistance as well.
    Now, if you look at the list of goods we are providing to the Polish
    comrades, we can candidly say that serious doubts arise about the necessity of
    supplying these products. For example, what is the connection between the
    success of "Operation X" and the delivery of fertilizer and certain other
    goods? In connection with this I would say that our position, as it was
    formulated earlier during the previous session of the Politburo and was
    expressed even earlier on several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely
    correct, and we must not depart from it at all.6 In other words, we support
    the position of internationalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the
    situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as "Operation X" is concerned, that
    must entirely and unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades themselves.
    Whatever they decide is what will be. We will not insist on any specific
    course, and we will not dissuade them from pursuing what they decide.
    As far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be
    difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been
    proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. But again I want to say that
    the mere posing of the question of the apportionment of goods supplied as
    economic assistance is an insolent way to approach things, and it is being done
    purely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they'll be
    able to lay all the blame on us. If Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about
    the introduction of troops, then I believe he did this incorrectly. We can't
    risk such a step. We don't intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is
    the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end. I don't know how
    things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control
    of "Solidarity," that's the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries
    pounce on the Soviet Union, and you know they have already reached agreement on
    a variety of economic and political sanctions, that will be very burdensome for
    us. We must be concerned above all with our own country and about the
    strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.
    In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland
    was formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the
    resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has
    taken place during the session of the Pol
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:23
    In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland was
    formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the resolutions
    adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has taken place
    during the session of the Politburo. All of this must serve as the basis of
    the policy we must uphold vis-a-vis Poland.
    As concerns the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the
    GDR that run through Poland, then we of course must do something to provide for
    their safekeeping.

    GROMYKO. Today we've had a very spirited review of the situation in
    Poland. You might even say this review was more spirited than any we've had
    before. This is because at the moment we ourselves don't know what direction
    the events in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself senses that power
    is slipping from its grasp. Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their
    ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no such opportunity, there
    are no longer any neutrals. The position is defined sufficiently
    clearly: "Solidarity" has proven to be a patently counterrevolutionary
    organization which aspires to come to power and which has openly declared its
    intention to seize power. The Polish leadership must decide the question:
    Either it relinquishes its positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, or
    it adopts decisive measures by introducing martial law, isolating the
    extremists of "Solidarity," and restoring public order. There is no other
    alternative.
    What should our position be toward the Polish events? I fully agree
    with what was already said here by the comrades. We can say to the Poles that
    we view the Polish events with understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for
    us to alter this measured formulation in any way. At the same time we must
    somehow try to dispel the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland
    have about the introduction of troops. There cannot be any introduction of
    troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our
    ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate this to him.
    Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of the PZPR CC Politburo with
    regard to the introduction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to his
    vacillating position. At first he had somewhat stiffened his spine, but now,
    once again, he's begun to soften. Everything is still in force that was said
    to them previously. If in the struggle against counterrevolution and
    afterwards they show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist Poland will
    remain. The introduction of martial law, of course, would be the best way to
    convey the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the
    counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they intend to carry out are
    indeed implemented, then I think we could expect positive results.
    Now, with regard to the creation of a new party, as Jaruzelski
    proposed, I think we must directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to
    create any sort of new party, since this would merely signal a retreat on the
    part of the Polish leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR is in fact
    not a militant political organization, but simply an organization that has
    committed mistakes. It would underscore the very weakness of the party and
    would play into the hands of the "Solidarity" extremists. Then even the
    population of Poland, which retains definite sympathy for the PZPR as a guiding
    force, would be completely disabused of such sentiments.
    I believe that we must not now permit any sort of harsh instructions,
    which would force them to adopt one course or another. I think we have chosen
    the correct position here: The restoration of order in Poland is a matter for
    the Polish United Workers' Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We
    already said to our Polish friends and will say again in the future that they
    must pursue a steadfast course without slackening in the least.
    Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to "Solidarity," the West in all
    likelihood will not give them credits and will not offer any other kind of
    help. They are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too,
    have to bear in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was correct in proposing
    that we instruct a group of comrades to examine this question, taking account
    of our capabilities to extend substantial economic assistance to the PPR.

    USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of course, is very bad. The
    situation is worsening day by day. Among the leadership, especially in the
    Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And all of this has taken its toll
    on the state of affairs. Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo
    was a decision unanimously approved to introduce martial law. And now all
    hopes are riding on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying out this
    decision? As yet, no one can openly speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We
    just don't know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He candidly said that
    even we [the Poles] don't know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man who
    has been effectively responsible for discharging the duties of the Polish
    defense minister doesn't know what will happen and what sort of actions will be
    taken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister.
    With regard to what Comrade Kulikov allegedly said about the
    introduction of troops into Poland, I can say in full responsbility that
    Kulikov never said this. He simply repeated what was said by us and by Leonid
    Ilyich that we would not leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well
    knows that the Poles themselves requested us not to introduce troops.
    As far as our garrisons in Poland are concerned, we are fortifying
    them. I myself am also inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on a
    confrontation and only if, perhaps, "Solidarity" seizes them by the throat will
    they come forth.
    The problem is that the Polish leaders do not appear resolute. As was
    rightly said here by the comrades, we must not force them to adopt any specific
    decisions; we will simply carry out the policy on which we have agreed. For
    our part, we must be ready ourselves and must not display any sort of actions
    not provided for by our decisions.

    SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the other comrades' speeches, we
    all have the same view of the situation in Poland. During the whole prolonged
    stretch of events in Poland, we have displayed steadfastness and composure.
    Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. We said this in public
    to our people, and our people supported the policy of the Communist Party.
    We've done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for
    us to change our position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so.
    We have carried out via the UN such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate
    peace. What a great effect we have had from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the
    FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This has enabled
    all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union staunchly and
    consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible for
    us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start
    of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what
    actions they must pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward
    more decisive actions. But we will, as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard
    their actions with understanding.
    As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of
    slyness. He wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests,
    which he presents to the Soviet
  • Gość: FAKTS IP: *.30.171.152.Dial1.Honolulu1.Level3.net 15.02.03, 00:26
    As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He
    wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests, which he
    presents to the Soviet Union. These requests, naturally, are beyond our
    physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well, look here, I
    turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn't receive it.
    At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the
    introduction of troops. If troops are introduced, that will mean a
    catastrophe. I think we have reached a unanimous view here on this matter, and
    there can be no consideration at all of introducing troops.
    As far as the provision of assistance to Poland is concerned, we have
    given that country more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we adopted a
    decision to ship 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons
    have already been delivered. I don't know whether we'll be able to ship the
    full 30 thousand tons, but in any event we apparently are obliged by this
    decision to give a further definite number of tons of meat as assistance.
    With regard to the PZPR and the creation of a new party to replace it,
    I believe it would be inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who spoke here
    were correct in arguing that this would be a completely unhelpful action.

    GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line
    of our party toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the
    proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot
    agree with that. There can be no talk at all of introducing troops. We will
    have to look at economic questions and at what can be given to the Poles.

    SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the intrigues of "Solidarity" and
    other counterrevolutionary forces.

    CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the comrades have said here. It is
    clear that the line of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the Polish
    events, as formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the
    decisions of the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of change.
    I believe that today we could adopt the following decision:
    1. Take under advisement the information provided by Comrade Baibakov.
    2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, abide by the general political
    line on this matter laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the
    instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 December 1981 and the exchange of
    opinions that occurred at the CC Politburo's session on 10 December 1981.
    3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to
    continue studying questions of economic assistance to Poland, taking account of
    the exchange of opinions at the session of the CC Politburo.

    BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel about this?

    EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very properly formulated all the
    proposals, and now it is time to adopt them.
    The decree is adopted.




    1. Translator's Note: It is curious why in this secret forum Brezhnev used
    dollars (instead of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for measuring the
    size of Poland's request.
    2. Translator's Note: The term Baibakov uses here, prodrazverstka (a
    contraction of prodovol'stvennaya razverstka), refers to the policy introduced
    by Lenin during the period of "War Communism" to force peasants to turn over
    their produce to the state. The policy led to great bloodshed, upheaval, and
    starvation.
    3. Translator's Note: Either because of a mistake by Rusakov or because of a
    typographical error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov's surname as
    Arestov. The error was corrected in the Polish translation.
    4. Translator's Note: Marshal Josef Pilsudski was the military ruler of
    Poland during the interwar period, presiding over a regime that became
    increasingly tyrannical.
    5. Translator's Note: The Russian word Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous
    vote, edinoglasno, is stronger than another word, edinodushno, which also is
    translated as "unanimous." Rusakov's statement indicates that no abstentions
    or dissenting votes were cast. It should be noted, however, that most
    subsequent speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the word edinodushno when
    referring to the PZPR Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno.
    6. Translator's Note: The transcript of "the previous session of the
    Politburo" (apparently of 8 December) has not yet been released."

    Subject: Brezhnev,Poland 1980-81 Bulletin 5 - Cold War Crises Pact
    Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID:
    Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author:
    Document Origin: USSR Published:
    Document Date: 12/01/81 Document ID:
    Document Type: Memorandum of Conversation Archive: TsKhSD


    Christian Ostermann, Director
    Nancy L Meyers, Project Associate
    Mircea Munteanu, Project Assistant
    Richard Thomas, Production Editor

    Cold War International History Project
    Woodrow Wilson Center
    One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
    1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20004-3027
    Email: coldwar1@wwic.si.edu
    Tel: 202/691-4110


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