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RELACJA MIEDZY OSZCZEDNOSCIAMI A WZROSTEM PKB

02.12.04, 00:00
christianidentity.members.easyspace.com/bottomline.htm
darr.darek pewno sie doszuka relacji miedzy LOKATY=KREDYTY ale jesli tak,to
tam gdzie sa duze oszczednosci powinny byc wysokie kredyt a tym samym szybki
wzrost doch narodowego.
W przypadku Chin sie to sprawdza,ale w przypadku Japonii i Szwajcarii sie to
nie sprawdza.
Czyz wiec oszczedzanie jest zaleta czy przeszkoda w rozwoju gospodarki
narodowej?
Z tabeli:
USA wzrost GDP 2,8% przy savings as a % of GDP 15%.
Japonia wz.GDP 2,5% -''--''-''-'''-''-'''-'''' 34%
Edytor zaawansowany
  • maksimum 02.12.04, 20:51
    A teraz na spokojnie.
    Jesli oszczednosci stoja w opozycji do wydawania pieniedzy,a zakupy przez
    konsumenta to az 66% amerykanskiego GDP,to jak wplynie zwiekszenie zwiekszenie
    stopy oszczedzania,a oslabienie zakupow???
    Pieniadze beda w banku a dochod narodowy spadnie!
    Bardzo prosta i przejrzysta relacja.
  • andrzej.rzonca_nbp 03.12.04, 17:02
    Wzrost gospodarki nie zależy wyłącznie od jednego czynnika. Stąd też, można
    znaleźć z jednej strony kraje o niskiej stopie oszczędności i szybkim wzroście
    gospodarki, a z drugiej takie, w których stopa oszczędności jest wysoka, a
    rozwój powolny. Nie zmienia to jednak faktu, że oszczędności stanowią bardzo
    ważny determinant długofalowego wzrostu gospodarki. Jak pokazali np. Levine i
    Renelt (A Sensitivity Analisis of Cross-Country Growth Regression, American
    Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, September 1992) stopa oszczęddności jest
    zmienną, której siła i znak wpływu na wzrost gospodarczy najsłabiej zależy od
    specyfikacji modelu.
  • maksimum 03.12.04, 17:32
    Bardzo istotna jest pierwotna akumulacja kapitalu jak i oszczednosci ludzi by
    inni mogli wokorzystac te pieniadze jako kredyty.
    To mialo znaczenie w gospodarkach zamknietych,gdy miedzynarodowy przeplyw
    pieniedzy byl czy do tej pory jest ograniczony.
    Ale tam ,gdzie nie ma problemu z przeplywem pieniedzy,to z oszczednosci
    japonskich i niemieckich korzystaja inwestorzy amerykanscy.
    A gdy tych pieniedzy brak i nadchodzi kryzys,to zawsze mozna liczyc na FED ze
    zwiekszy podaz pieniadza na rynku i obnizy stopy procentowe.
  • harryportier 03.12.04, 20:49
    Maciej - proste pytanie!! GDZIE DZIŚ BYŁOBY USA, GDYBY JEGO O WIELE MĄDRZEJSZE
    WCZEŚNIEJSZE POKOLENIA NIE OSZCZĘDZAŁY Z PRZECIĘTNĄ STOPĄ 7,7% YEAR'S
    DISPOSABLE INCOME PRZEZ OSTATNIE 150 LAT DO 1994 R???
    Cóż, można wziąć anomalię za prawidlowość i jeszcze uznać, że jest to nowa,
    wyższa forma ekonomii hahaha !!! Greenspanomia Was do niczego dobrego nie
    zaprowadzi. BUBBLE TROUBLES - TO WASZ LOS! Aby się rozwijać z prędkością, którą
    tak się tu chwalisz, USA musi wywoływać coraz to nowe bańki spekulacyjne. W
    końcu braknie materii pod te banie. Masz, poczytaj o bańce na REAL ESTATE:
    December 1, 2004 could well go down in history as yet another important
    milestone for America’s bubble-prone economy. No, I am not referring to the
    162-point surge in the Dow Jones Industrial average that occurred on that day.
    Instead, my focus is on two widely overlooked statistical reports put out by US
    government statisticians -- the latest tallies on home prices and personal
    income. Collectively, these reports paint a worrisome picture of an asset
    economy that has now truly gone to excess. As was the case in early 2000 when
    Nasdaq was lurching toward 5000, denial is deep over the potential downside of
    yet another post-bubble shakeout. That’s what worries me the most.
    The just-released report on US house prices for the third quarter of 2004 was a
    shocker -- an 18.5% annualized surge from the second quarter and a 13.0%
    increase from year-earlier levels, according to the tabulation of the Office of
    Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). That represents a stunning
    acceleration from the 9.8% Y-o-Y increase of the second quarter and pushes
    nationwide house price appreciation to a 25-year high. It’s an even larger
    rise in real, or inflation-adjusted, terms. The surge over the past year is
    now running nearly five times the 2.7% annualized increase of the non-housing
    components of the CPI.
    Housing analysts and central bankers often chide those of us who draw macro
    conclusions from a highly fragmented US real estate market. In the housing
    business, where “location” matters, concerns over nationwide trends are often
    dismissed out of hand. In a recent speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
    Greenspan noted while discussing housing prices, “Overall while local economies
    may experience significant speculative price imbalances, a national severe
    price distortion seems most unlikely in the United States, given its size and
    diversity” (see his October 19, 2004 speech, The Mortgage Market and Consumer
    Debt, at America’s Community Bankers Annual Convention, Washington DC). It’s a
    nice theory, but the risk is that it may now be wrong. According to the latest
    OFHEO tally, house-price inflation over the past year has run at double-digit
    rates in 25 out of 50 states plus the District of Columbia. In six states --
    Nevada, Hawaii, California, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Florida --- home prices
    increased by 20%, or more, over the past year. Housing is an asset class that
    is just as prone to excess as are stocks, bonds, currencies, or commodities.
    If it feels like a bubble, acts like a bubble, and looks like a bubble, it
    probably is one.
    Meanwhile, also on December 1, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US
    Department of Commerce released its regular monthly update on personal income.
    The stock market loved the October numbers -- stronger-than expected gains in
    both income (+0.6%) and consumption (+0.7%) that were perceived as signs of
    ongoing resilience of the indefatigable American consumer. I found the report
    appalling. What caught my eye was a further reduction in the already sharply
    depressed personal saving rate -- down to 0.2% in October from 0.3% in
    September. The September numbers were widely thought to have been distorted
    by temporary hurricane-related losses to personal income. Most expected
    personal saving would rebound from this artificially-depressed reading. There
    was no such bounce in October. The consumer saving rate has now basically gone
    to zero.
    Nor is the profligate American consumer the only source of the US saving
    shortfall. A day earlier -- November 30, to be precise -- the government also
    released its third-quarter report on national saving. This broad measure of
    saving -- the combined saving of households, businesses, and the government
    sector -- is most meaningful when expressed on a “net” basis by taking out the
    depreciation that goes toward replacement of worn-out, or obsolete, capacity.
    The resulting concept of net national saving measures the saving left over to
    fund the net growth in productive capacity -- the sustenance of any economy’s
    long-term productivity and growth potential. On this basis, America’s net
    national saving rate fell to just 1.2% in the third quarter of 2004 -- down 0.9
    percentage point from the already depressed second quarter reading and nearly
    back to the record low of 0.4% recorded in the first quarter of 2003. The rest
    of the story is all too familiar: Lacking in domestic saving, the US must then
    import surplus saving from abroad in order to grow -- and to run massive
    current-account and trade deficits to attract that capital. In other words, a
    further sharp reduction in national saving is not exactly a desirable outcome
    for an already unbalanced US economy.
    The key to this puzzle is to recognize that the housing bubble and the saving
    shortfall go hand in hand. The “asset economy” is a conceptual framework that
    brings these two seemingly disparate trends together. As seen through this
    lens, “rational” consumers take their income-based saving rates to zero only if
    asset-based saving provides an offset. As long as asset markets keep rising,
    that makes perfect sense. However, when asset markets correct, this decision
    can backfire. That was the case when the equity bubble popped in 2000 and
    could well be the case following the bursting of today’s rapidly expanding US
    housing bubble. That’s why the latest trends in house prices and saving are so
    disturbing. In my view, they underscore the distinct possibility that
    America’s asset economy is in the midst of yet another bubble-induced blow-off.
    Not surprisingly, these circumstances put the Fed in an especially difficult
    position. That’s because the US monetary authority used up most of its basis
    points in order to contain the damage from the equity bubble. Unfortunately,
    in doing so, the Fed kept interest rates at extraordinarily low levels for far
    too long -- setting the stage for the housing bubble that was to follow. The
    risk all along is that the Fed had only a one-bubble damage containment
    strategy -- leaving itself with little ammunition to deploy in the event of
    another serious problem. While the US central bank has tightened to the tune
    of 100 basis points over the past four months, a federal funds rate of 2%
    hardly offers much leeway for easing should conditions take a turn for the
    worse. Yet there’s an added complication to all this: The housing bubble-
    induced saving shortfall has pushed America’s current account deficit into
    uncharted territory -- raising the risks of a sharp correction in the dollar
    and a related back-up in longer-term interest rates. The last thing America’s
    housing bubble needs is an interest rate shock. That is a classic recipe for a
    sharp decline in US housing prices -- an outcome that might spell curtains for
    an overly-indebted American consumer.
    Ironically, there have been a number of positive developments that have fallen
    into place recently -- an orderly depreciation in the dollar, sharply declining
    oil prices, and grounds for encouragement on the prospects for a soft landing
  • harryportier 03.12.04, 20:55
    Not surprisingly, these circumstances put the Fed in an especially difficult
    position. That’s because the US monetary authority used up most of its basis
    points in order to contain the damage from the equity bubble. Unfortunately,
    in doing so, the Fed kept interest rates at extraordinarily low levels for far
    too long -- setting the stage for the housing bubble that was to follow. The
    risk all along is that the Fed had only a one-bubble damage containment
    strategy -- leaving itself with little ammunition to deploy in the event of
    another serious problem. While the US central bank has tightened to the tune
    of 100 basis points over the past four months, a federal funds rate of 2%
    hardly offers much leeway for easing should conditions take a turn for the
    worse. Yet there’s an added complication to all this: The housing bubble-
    induced saving shortfall has pushed America’s current account deficit into
    uncharted territory -- raising the risks of a sharp correction in the dollar
    and a related back-up in longer-term interest rates. The last thing America’s
    housing bubble needs is an interest rate shock. That is a classic recipe for a
    sharp decline in US housing prices -- an outcome that might spell curtains for
    an overly-indebted American consumer.

    Ironically, there have been a number of positive developments that have fallen
    into place recently -- an orderly depreciation in the dollar, sharply declining
    oil prices, and grounds for encouragement on the prospects for a soft landing
    in China. But America’s imbalances have taken a turn for the worse, and the
    housing bubble could well be the final straw. Income-short consumers are
    playing this bubble for all it’s worth -- enjoying the psychological benefits
    of the so-called wealth effect and utilizing the technology of refinancing and
    second mortgages to extract purchasing power from this over-valued asset.
    Unfortunately, these trends have led to the virtual elimination of US saving --
    triggering a classic current-account-adjustment dynamic with attendant risks to
    the dollar and interest rates. That makes the downside of this bubble
    potentially far worse than that of the equity bubble. That would be an
    especially worrisome development for the US economy, since household real
    estate holdings of some $14 trillion currently are almost double the aggregate
    size of equity portfolios.

    While it has only been four and a half years since the bursting of the equity
    bubble, memories have already dimmed of that extraordinary speculative excess.
    Yet in retrospect, that may have only been the warm-up for the main event.
    Bubbles have a way of feeding on each other -- ultimately compounding the
    problem and leading to an even more treacherous shakeout. That’s certainly the
    lesson from Japan and could well be the case in the United States. America’s
    housing bubble is now in the danger zone. So is its saving rate, current
    account deficit, and overhang of consumer indebtedness. It’s been a US-centric
    world for so long, that everyone takes it for granted. Yet global rebalancing
    poses challenges for all major countries in the world. Saving-short America
    will not be spared -- especially if it must now come to grips with the biggest
    asset bubble of them all.

    Stephen Roach

    Droga Artura Burnsa stoi przed Greenspanem otworem!!!
  • maksimum 04.12.04, 00:31
    harryportier napisał:

    > Not surprisingly, these circumstances put the Fed in an especially difficult
    > position. That’s because the US monetary authority used up most of its b
    > asis points in order to contain the damage from the equity bubble.
    Unfortunately,
    > in doing so, the Fed kept interest rates at extraordinarily low levels for
    >far too long -- setting the stage for the housing bubble that was to follow.

    Spostrzegawczy zauwazy,ze najwiekszy wzrost w cenach domow nastapil w CIEPLYCH
    stanach poludniowych i to dlatego,ze ludzie z Polnocy USA przenosza sie na
    POludnie.
    W EUropie tego nie zauwazysz,bo POLUDNIE jest biedne i bogaci z EUropy
    wyjezdzaja do USA.

    > The risk all along is that the Fed had only a one-bubble damage containment
    > strategy -- leaving itself with little ammunition to deploy in the event of
    > another serious problem. While the US central bank has tightened to the tune
    > of 100 basis points over the past four months, a federal funds rate of 2%
    > hardly offers much leeway for easing should conditions take a turn for the
    > worse. Yet there’s an added complication to all this: The housing bubble-
    > induced saving shortfall has pushed America’s current account deficit into
    > uncharted territory -- raising the risks of a sharp correction in the dollar
    > and a related back-up in longer-term interest rates.

    Sharp correction in dollar wlasnie ma miejsce juz od dwoch lat,ale st% nie beda
    rosly znacznie bo zatrzymaloby to wzrost GDP ,a to jest konieczne by utrzymac
    niski unemployment.


    > The last thing America 217;s
    > housing bubble needs is an interest rate shock. That is a classic recipe for
    a sharp decline in US housing prices -- an outcome that might spell curtains
    >for an overly-indebted American consumer.

    Wlasnie dlatego,ze consumer is indebted ceny domow nie spadna.
    To nie rynek rzadzi rzadem lecz rzad rzadzi rynkiem.

    > Ironically, there have been a number of positive developments that have
    >fallen into place recently -- an orderly depreciation in the dollar,

    Spadek dolara byl dobrze zaplanowany i tylko niezauwazalskich zaskoczyl.

    > sharply declining oil prices,

    Przeciez wyzwolenie Iraku mialo na celu zniesienie embarga na iracka rope,a
    wygrana Busha otwiera nowe wiercenia na Alasce!
    TO WSZYSTKO BYLO Z GORY DOBRZE ZAPLANOWANE.

    > and grounds for encouragement on the prospects for a soft landing
    > in China. But America’s imbalances have taken a turn for the worse, and
    > the housing bubble could well be the final straw. Income-short consumers are
    > playing this bubble for all it’s worth -- enjoying the psychological bene
    > fits of the so-called wealth effect and utilizing the technology of
    refinancing and
    > second mortgages to extract purchasing power from this over-valued asset.
    > Unfortunately, these trends have led to the virtual elimination of US saving
    triggering a classic current-account-adjustment dynamic with attendant risks to
    >the dollar and interest rates.

    Pisalem juz o tym wyzej.

    > That makes the downside of this bubble
    > potentially far worse than that of the equity bubble. That would be an
    > especially worrisome development for the US economy, since household real
    > estate holdings of some $14 trillion currently are almost double the
    aggregate size of equity portfolios.
    >
    > While it has only been four and a half years since the bursting of the equity
    > bubble, memories have already dimmed of that extraordinary speculative
    excess.
    > Yet in retrospect, that may have only been the warm-up for the main event.
    > Bubbles have a way of feeding on each other -- ultimately compounding the
    > problem and leading to an even more treacherous shakeout. That’s certainly
    >the lesson from Japan and could well be the case in the United States.

    Ludzie RATUNKU!! Kto by sie uczyl od Japonczykow?

    > AmericaR17;s
    > housing bubble is now in the danger zone. So is its saving rate, current
    > account deficit, and overhang of consumer indebtedness. It’s been a US-c
    > entric world for so long, that everyone takes it for granted. Yet global
    rebalancing
    > poses challenges for all major countries in the world. Saving-short America
    > will not be spared -- especially if it must now come to grips with the
    >biggest asset bubble of them all.
    >
    > Stephen Roach

    Dimwit S.Roach in action.

    > Droga Artura Burnsa stoi przed Greenspanem otworem!!!
  • harryportier 04.12.04, 23:29
    Maciej - Ty jesteś wredny typ - chesz, żebym ja skonał ze śmiechu z bólu
    brzucha!!!Ja już naprawdę nie mogę ze śmiechu...ROTFL to za mało :-)))
    "Przeciez wyzwolenie Iraku mialo na celu zniesienie embarga na iracka rope,a
    > wygrana Busha otwiera nowe wiercenia na Alasce!
    > TO WSZYSTKO BYLO Z GORY DOBRZE ZAPLANOWANE."
    Plan może i był dobry, ale w rzeczywistości to chyba nic nie wyszło - Bush
    mówił o ropie po 20$ i nawet licząc, że USD spadł od tego momentu jakieś 15% to
    w żadnym razie nie jest ówczesnych 20$ - DOBRZE ZAPLANOWAŁ WZROST CEN ROPY DO
    50USD???? Planista prima sort :-)))Jeśli wszystko tak planuje i tylko w
    rzeczywistości wychodzi mu odwrotnie, to ja już robię w gacie ze strachu, bo on
    ma jeszcze wiele równie ciekawych zapowiedzi :-))))

    Nie pisz mi o tym, że cena ropy spada - to zwykły pullback po październikowo-
    listopadowym szczycie. Nim ogłosisz zmianę trendu, poczekaj na drugi sezonowy
    szczyt na ropie, będzie pod koniec maja!!!Pisze to ten, co czasem się bawi na
    tym rynku - podziękuj Bushowi ode mnie - dał mi sporo zarobić swymi planami na
    longach na Brent'a:-))!!

    Rząd USA zaplanował spadek dolara??? Macieju - za dużo X-Files oglądałeś!!!
    Ja wiem że David Duchovny jako agent Moulder jest bardzo sugestywny i wielu
    widzów mu uwierzyło, ale że Ty też :-)))??? Nie spodziewałem się tego po Tobie.
    Wychodzi na to, że nigdzie poza USA idee Oskara Langego o planowaniu
    gospodarczym i genialnym planiście, który z wyprzedzeniem potrafi sterować
    procesami gospodarczymi, [co do których ostatnio badacze stwierdzają, że mają
    multifraktalny charakter i opisują je entropiami Tsallisa (uogólnione zasady
    termodynamiki)] nie mogą się udać.
    USA tak wielkie są, że nawet chaosem potrafią sterować:-)))? Z niepokojem i
    nadzieją oczekuję powtórki zapowiedzi naukowców sowieckich z lat 1950tych o
    sterowaniu pogodą:-))) To jest równie proste jak takie planowanie spadku
    dolara:-)))))
    Jeśli ktoś cokolwiek może w sprawie dolara, to jeszcze Greenspan. Jak podniesie
    stopy, to uczyni lokaty dolarowe znowu atrakcyjnymi i przestaną Wam z bondów
    uciekać, jak to zaczęli robić w tym tygodniu.
    Inflacja 2,0%? Dzisiaj. Ale TIPSy już zapowiadają, że może być dużo wyższa w
    2005:
    Richard Berner (New York)

    TIPS spreads — the difference between yields on conventional Treasury
    securities and those on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities — are flashing
    an inflation warning, in my view one that will challenge Fed officials. As
    inflation indicators, such spreads are fraught with problems of measurement and
    interpretation, and factors other than inflation expectations can widen or
    narrow them. But the message in terms of direction is clear: Inflation
    expectations and inflation itself are edging higher. At work are classic
    cyclical forces, with the dollar’s recent slide a contributing factor.
    Although inflation is rising from a low level, I think gradually rising
    inflation pressures and risks assure further tightening of monetary policy well
    into 2005.
    So-called break-even inflation (BEI) measured by TIPS spreads has increased
    noticeably since mid-September. Measured crudely by the spread between the (on-
    the-run) constant-maturity nominal yields and a constant-maturity TIPS yield,
    BEI at the 10-year maturity has risen by 32 bp to 260 bp and by a much sharper
    56 bp to 275 bp at the 5-year maturity over that period.
    Many factors drive TIPS spreads, including changes in the yield curve,
    reflecting expectations about monetary policy and about inflation and real
    growth that drive policy shifts. In the past, the portion of TIPS spreads not
    explained by these factors has been highly correlated with oil price
    movements. That makes sense because TIPS are indexed to the headline CPI, and
    higher energy prices contribute to headline inflation. As my colleague and
    Morgan Stanley TIPS expert Matthew Hornbach notes, these factors have driven
    the TIPS market in three phases in 2004. First, when oil prices were soaring
    this spring, TIPS spreads widened by almost 50 bp from early March to late
    May. TIPS spreads probably also widened in response to a jump in “core”
    inflation that surprised both bond-market participants and the Fed beginning in
    mid-April. From June though mid-September, TIPS spreads gave up all their
    spring gains as markets began to view the oil price surge as disinflationary;
    tamer inflation and slower growth also reversed expectations for aggressive Fed
    action. However, a third phase in the TIPS saga began in mid September. At
    first, the hurricane-induced jump in oil prices did seem to spur the rise in
    TIPS spreads, but subsequently oil and TIPS parted company. Crude prices have
    plunged by $12/bbl. since October 25, but BEI has risen 15-25 bp over the same
    period. Strikingly, TIPS spreads shrugged off the $6/bbl. plunge in crude
    quotes over the past two days.
    The recent uptick in BEI thus may represent a more fundamental rise in market
    participants’ inflation expectations. After all, the dollar began a renewed,
    sharp decline against most currencies over that time span (5.6% over the past
    six weeks measured by the Fed’s nominal, broad trade-weighted index (TWI)), and
    the sharp move may have triggered fears of an inflationary dollar slide. A
    weaker dollar has contributed modestly to the rise in core inflation over the
    past year, and I believe it will make a similar contribution next year. And
    other fundamentals point towards higher inflation and increased pricing power:
    Margins of slack have narrowed and operating rates have increased significantly
    this year. Unit labor costs have risen after falling for two years. And a
    highly accommodative monetary policy has reacted to, rather than preempted,
    higher inflation.
    Może więc Greenie powie jak Wałęsa: Nie chcem ale muszem i podniesie znowu st%??
    Nastrój na rynku dolara pokazuje, że śrenioterminowe dno jest już całkiem
    blisko - NIKT JUŻ NIE CHCE USD a wszyscy wieszczą jego katastrofę, więc
    korekcyjny odwrót jest wysoce prawdopodobny - a decyzja Greeniego byłaby dobrym
    powodem.

  • maksimum 05.12.04, 01:12
    harryportier napisał:

    > Maciej - Ty jesteś wredny typ - chesz, żebym ja skonał ze śmiechu z bólu
    > brzucha!!!Ja już naprawdę nie mogę ze śmiechu...ROTFL to za mało :-)))
    > "Przeciez wyzwolenie Iraku mialo na celu zniesienie embarga na iracka rope,a
    > > wygrana Busha otwiera nowe wiercenia na Alasce!
    > > TO WSZYSTKO BYLO Z GORY DOBRZE ZAPLANOWANE."
    > Plan może i był dobry, ale w rzeczywistości to chyba nic nie wyszło - Bush
    > mówił o ropie po 20$ i nawet licząc, że USD spadł od tego momentu jakieś 15%
    >to w żadnym razie nie jest ówczesnych 20$

    www.globalinsight.com/publicDownload/genericContent/06-21-04_brochure.pdf
    Nie czytasz innych moich postow i nie jestes uswiadomiony.
    Ropa bedzie po 20 pare dolarow i to calkiem niedlugo.


    >- DOBRZE ZAPLANOWAŁ WZROST CEN ROPY DO
    > 50USD???? Planista prima sort :-)))Jeśli wszystko tak planuje i tylko w
    > rzeczywistości wychodzi mu odwrotnie, to ja już robię w gacie ze strachu, bo
    on ma jeszcze wiele równie ciekawych zapowiedzi :-))))
    > Nie pisz mi o tym, że cena ropy spada - to zwykły pullback po październikowo-
    > listopadowym szczycie. Nim ogłosisz zmianę trendu, poczekaj na drugi sezonowy
    > szczyt na ropie, będzie pod koniec maja!!!Pisze to ten, co czasem się bawi na
    > tym rynku - podziękuj Bushowi ode mnie - dał mi sporo zarobić swymi planami
    >na longach na Brent'a:-))!!
    >
    > Rząd USA zaplanował spadek dolara??? Macieju - za dużo X-Files oglądałeś!!!
    > Ja wiem że David Duchovny jako agent Moulder jest bardzo sugestywny i wielu
    > widzów mu uwierzyło, ale że Ty też :-)))??? Nie spodziewałem się tego po
    >Tobie.

    Ciesze sie ,ze Tobie podobaja sie produkcje amerykanskie,ale ja tego nie
    ogladam.

    > Wychodzi na to, że nigdzie poza USA idee Oskara Langego o planowaniu
    > gospodarczym i genialnym planiście, który z wyprzedzeniem potrafi sterować
    > procesami gospodarczymi, [co do których ostatnio badacze stwierdzają, że mają
    > multifraktalny charakter i opisują je entropiami Tsallisa (uogólnione zasady
    > termodynamiki)] nie mogą się udać.

    Jaki % akcji musisz miec,zeby kierowc przedsiebiorstwem?
    Bo jesli USA to ponad 20% swiatowego GDP a z Chinami ponad 30% ,TO KTO KIERUJE
    TYM SWIATOWYM PRZEDSIEBIORSTWEM PT:WOLNY RYNEK??

    > USA tak wielkie są, że nawet chaosem potrafią sterować:-)))?

    Chaos wprowadzaja Rosjanie i EU,bo Japonia juz swoje nauki pobrala,a porzadek
    zaprowadzaja USA i Chiny.

    > Z niepokojem i
    > nadzieją oczekuję powtórki zapowiedzi naukowców sowieckich z lat 1950tych o
    > sterowaniu pogodą:-))) To jest równie proste jak takie planowanie spadku
    > dolara:-)))))
    > Jeśli ktoś cokolwiek może w sprawie dolara, to jeszcze Greenspan. Jak
    podniesie
    > stopy, to uczyni lokaty dolarowe znowu atrakcyjnymi i przestaną Wam z bondów
    > uciekać, jak to zaczęli robić w tym tygodniu.

    Znowu bys chcial zarobic,ale nie zaszkodzi zapytac madrego o droge.

    > Inflacja 2,0%? Dzisiaj. Ale TIPSy już zapowiadają, że może być dużo wyższa w
    > 2005:
    > Richard Berner (New York)
    >
    > TIPS spreads — the difference between yields on conventional Treasury
    > securities and those on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities — are fla
    > shing
    > an inflation warning, in my view one that will challenge Fed officials. As
    > inflation indicators, such spreads are fraught with problems of measurement
    and interpretation, and factors other than inflation expectations can widen or
    > narrow them. But the message in terms of direction is clear: Inflation
    > expectations and inflation itself are edging higher. At work are classic
    > cyclical forces, with the dollar’s recent slide a contributing factor.
    > Although inflation is rising from a low level, I think gradually rising
    > inflation pressures and risks assure further tightening of monetary policy
    wellinto 2005.
    > So-called break-even inflation (BEI) measured by TIPS spreads has increased
    > noticeably since mid-September. Measured crudely by the spread between the
    (on the-run) constant-maturity nominal yields and a constant-maturity TIPS
    yield, BEI at the 10-year maturity has risen by 32 bp to 260 bp and by a much
    sharper 56 bp to 275 bp at the 5-year maturity over that period.
    > Many factors drive TIPS spreads, including changes in the yield curve,
    > reflecting expectations about monetary policy and about inflation and real
    > growth that drive policy shifts. In the past, the portion of TIPS spreads
    not explained by these factors has been highly correlated with oil price
    > movements. That makes sense because TIPS are indexed to the headline CPI,
    and higher energy prices contribute to headline inflation. As my colleague and
    > Morgan Stanley TIPS expert Matthew Hornbach notes, these factors have driven
    > the TIPS market in three phases in 2004. First, when oil prices were soaring
    > this spring, TIPS spreads widened by almost 50 bp from early March to late
    > May. TIPS spreads probably also widened in response to a jump in “core&#
    > 8221;
    > inflation that surprised both bond-market participants and the Fed beginning
    in mid-April. From June though mid-September, TIPS spreads gave up all their
    > spring gains as markets began to view the oil price surge as disinflationary;
    > tamer inflation and slower growth also reversed expectations for aggressive
    Fed action. However, a third phase in the TIPS saga began in mid September.
    At first, the hurricane-induced jump in oil prices did seem to spur the rise in
    > TIPS spreads, but subsequently oil and TIPS parted company. Crude prices
    have plunged by $12/bbl. since October 25, but BEI has risen 15-25 bp over the
    same period. Strikingly, TIPS spreads shrugged off the $6/bbl. plunge in crude
    > quotes over the past two days.
    > The recent uptick in BEI thus may represent a more fundamental rise in market
    > participants’ inflation expectations. After all, the dollar began a rene
    > wed,sharp decline against most currencies over that time span (5.6% over the
    past six weeks measured by the Fed’s nominal, broad trade-weighted index (TWI)
    > ), and
    > the sharp move may have triggered fears of an inflationary dollar slide. A
    > weaker dollar has contributed modestly to the rise in core inflation over the
    > past year, and I believe it will make a similar contribution next year. And
    > other fundamentals point towards higher inflation and increased pricing
    power:Margins of slack have narrowed and operating rates have increased
    significantly
    > this year. Unit labor costs have risen after falling for two years. And a
    > highly accommodative monetary policy has reacted to, rather than preempted,
    > higher inflation.
    > Może więc Greenie powie jak Wałęsa: Nie chcem ale muszem i podniesie znowu
    st%?
    > Nastrój na rynku dolara pokazuje, że śrenioterminowe dno jest już całkiem
    > blisko - NIKT JUŻ NIE CHCE USD a wszyscy wieszczą jego katastrofę, więc
    > korekcyjny odwrót jest wysoce prawdopodobny - a decyzja Greeniego byłaby
    >dobrym powodem.

    Od poczatku pierwszej kadencji Busha prowadzi on polityke slabego dolara i co
    by mu teraz do glowy przyszlo i pod czyim naciskiem zeby te polityke zmienic??
    WSZYSCY WIEDZA,ze EU chce mocnego dolara,ale nam to strzyka.
    To tak jak w dobrym filmie kowbojskim,ktos musi pasc,ale wiadomo,ze nie beda to
    Stany!
  • maksimum 04.12.04, 00:12
    harryportier napisał:

    > Maciej - proste pytanie!! GDZIE DZIŚ BYŁOBY USA, GDYBY JEGO O WIELE
    MĄDRZEJSZE
    > WCZEŚNIEJSZE POKOLENIA NIE OSZCZĘDZAŁY Z PRZECIĘTNĄ STOPĄ 7,7% YEAR'S
    > DISPOSABLE INCOME PRZEZ OSTATNIE 150 LAT DO 1994 R???

    Madrzejsze? To dlaczego 150 lat temu nie wynaleziono
    telefonu,samolotu,TV,komputera,ze o podrozy na Ksiezyc nie wspomne?

    > Cóż, można wziąć anomalię za prawidlowość i jeszcze uznać, że jest to nowa,
    > wyższa forma ekonomii hahaha !!!

    Gdyby ekonomia byla tak prosta i niezmienna jak 2+2 to KAZDy bys ja rozumial.

    > Greenspanomia Was do niczego dobrego nie
    > zaprowadzi. BUBBLE TROUBLES - TO WASZ LOS! Aby się rozwijać z prędkością,
    którą
    > tak się tu chwalisz, USA musi wywoływać coraz to nowe bańki spekulacyjne. W
    > końcu braknie materii pod te banie. Masz, poczytaj o bańce na REAL ESTATE:

    S.Roach to zwykly nieudacznik i on przemawia TYLKO do amatorow!!!

    > OFHEO tally, house-price inflation over the past year has run at double-digit
    > rates in 25 out of 50 states plus the District of Columbia. In six states --
    > Nevada, Hawaii, California, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Florida --- home
    prices increased by 20%, or more, over the past year. Housing is an asset
    class that
    > is just as prone to excess as are stocks, bonds, currencies, or commodities.
    > If it feels like a bubble, acts like a bubble, and looks like a bubble, it
    > probably is one.

    Inflacja jest ok 2% przy czym ceny niemal wszystkich towarow spadaja,a rosna
    TYLKO ceny real estate o czym juz wielokrotnie pisalem.

    > Meanwhile, also on December 1, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US
    > Department of Commerce released its regular monthly update on personal
    income.
    > The stock market loved the October numbers -- stronger-than expected gains in
    > both income (+0.6%) and consumption (+0.7%) that were perceived as signs of
    > ongoing resilience of the indefatigable American consumer. I found the
    report
    > appalling. What caught my eye was a further reduction in the already sharply
    > depressed personal saving rate -- down to 0.2% in October from 0.3% in
    > September. The September numbers were widely thought to have been distorted
    > by temporary hurricane-related losses to personal income. Most expected
    > personal saving would rebound from this artificially-depressed reading.
    There was no such bounce in October. The consumer saving rate has now
    >basically gone to zero.

    Zgadza sie i GDP rosnie w tempie 4%,bo korzysta sie z oszczednosci Niemcow i
    Japonczykow i kto sie pod reke nawinie.
    EKONOMIA STAJE SIE GLOBALNA I JAK SOBIE WYOBRAZISZ SWIAT JAKO JEDEN KRAJ,TO
    OSZCZEDNOSCI=KREDYTY.Nie zawsze,nie wszedzie ale prawie.

    > Nor is the profligate American consumer the only source of the US saving
    > shortfall. A day earlier -- November 30, to be precise -- the government
    also
    > released its third-quarter report on national saving. This broad measure of
    > saving -- the combined saving of households, businesses, and the government
    > sector -- is most meaningful when expressed on a “net” basis by taking out
    the depreciation that goes toward replacement of worn-out, or obsolete,
    capacity.
    > The resulting concept of net national saving measures the saving left over to
    > fund the net growth in productive capacity -- the sustenance of any economyR
    > 17;s long-term productivity and growth potential. On this basis, America’s ne
    > t national saving rate fell to just 1.2% in the third quarter of 2004 -- down
    0.9 percentage point from the already depressed second quarter reading and
    >nearly back to the record low of 0.4% recorded in the first quarter of 2003.

    > The rest of the story is all too familiar: Lacking in domestic saving, the US
    must then import surplus saving from abroad in order to grow -- and to run
    >massive current-account and trade deficits to attract that capital.

    A nie mowilem!
  • andrzej.rzonca_nbp 09.12.04, 08:21
    Po pierwsze, istnieje silna zależność między stopą inwestycji a krajowymi
    oszczędnościami. Innymi słowy, niedostatek krajowych oszczędności – przy danej
    opłacalności inwestycji – nie jest neutralizowany przez wzrost napływu kapitału
    z zagranicy. Wynika to z faktu, iż ludzie, dobrze znający lokalny rynek, wolą
    inwestować u siebie niż za granicą, nawet jeżeli za granicą mogliby z
    zainwestowanych pieniędzy uzyskać większy dochód.Zależność ta jest nazywana
    paradoksem Feldsteina-Horioki.
    Po drugie, trzeba pamiętać, że wzrost PKB, jeżeli jest on napędzany przez
    oszczędności z zagranicy, nie jest równoznaczny z takim samym wzrostem dochodu
    społeczeństwa danego kraju. Trafia do niego wynagrodzenie za pracę, natomiast
    wynagrodzenie za kapitał trafia do właścicieli kapitału, czyli inwestorów
    zagranicznych.

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