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Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

27.05.10, 18:52
Spoko. nie ma tam żadnej rakiety.
Będą, jak Merkel Putina o zgodę poprosi i da mu... klucz do magazynu.
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  • 27.05.10, 18:59
    Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania opracowanych przez Żydów.
  • 27.05.10, 19:10
  • 27.05.10, 19:13
    A Żydzi jak wiadomo chcieli opchnąć bombę atomową apartheidowi z RPA żeby się
    pozbyć Murzynów.
  • 27.05.10, 20:11
    konsta-nty12 napisał:

    > Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania opracowanych przez Żydów
    > .
    I co z tego? Masz tak mały mózg żeby wysunąć hipotezę prosto z notatek doktora
    Mengele - że żydzi są jakąś inną rasą niż my? A jakby to wymyślili polacy,albo
    niemcy,albo hiszpanie,albo anglicy,albo murzyn albo azjata, to co,miałoby to
    jakieś znaczenie?
  • 27.05.10, 20:44
    gambiting napisał:

    > konsta-nty12 napisał:
    >
    > > Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania
    opracowanych przez
    > Żydów
    > > .
    > I co z tego? Masz tak mały mózg żeby wysunąć hipotezę prosto z
    notatek doktora
    > Mengele - że żydzi są jakąś inną rasą niż my? A jakby to wymyślili
    polacy,albo
    > niemcy,albo hiszpanie,albo anglicy,albo murzyn albo azjata, to
    co,miałoby to
    > jakieś znaczenie?

    Podzielił się człowiek informacją. Po co to podniecenie? Słowa Żyd
    nie można wymówić żeby histerii nie wywołać?
  • 28.05.10, 09:32
    xnonorx napisał:

    > gambiting napisał:
    >
    > > konsta-nty12 napisał:
    > >
    > > > Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania
    > opracowanych przez
    > > Żydów
    > > > .
    > > I co z tego? Masz tak mały mózg żeby wysunąć hipotezę prosto z
    > notatek doktora
    > > Mengele - że żydzi są jakąś inną rasą niż my? A jakby to wymyślili
    > polacy,albo
    > > niemcy,albo hiszpanie,albo anglicy,albo murzyn albo azjata, to
    > co,miałoby to
    > > jakieś znaczenie?
    >
    > Podzielił się człowiek informacją. Po co to podniecenie? Słowa Żyd
    > nie można wymówić żeby histerii nie wywołać?
  • 27.05.10, 20:35
    Biedny homofobie, zrób maturę, ale najpierw skończ te 8 klas podstawówki zanim
    sie wypowiesz !
  • 29.05.10, 06:40
    I CZEGO TO DOWODZI?
  • 27.05.10, 18:59
    "Nie przesadzajmy z ich potencjałem"

    Czyli potwierdza, że to atrapy.
  • 27.05.10, 19:02
    Polska trafiła pod kolejną okupację a politycy jedynie potwierdzili że Polskie
    wojsko jest do du_py i nic nie potrafi.
  • 27.05.10, 20:06
    miszczu.pll napisał:

    > Polska trafiła pod kolejną okupację a politycy jedynie potwierdzili że Polskie
    > wojsko jest do du_py i nic nie potrafi.
    Ty chyba nie masz pojęcia co znaczy słowo okupacja. Podpowiem Ci - obecność
    nawet tysiąca żołnierzy obcego państwa na ograniczonym terenie pod naszą
    jurysdykcją NIE jest okupacją.
  • 27.05.10, 19:11
    W tych "relacjach", dotychczasowych, zadowolona byla tylko Rosja-a
    tu obie strony maja cos do powiedzenia.
    Zgodnie z logika ich propagandy: Patrioty zostaly ustawione w celu
    obrony przyjacielskiej Rosji (a nie bronili nas od 39 do 93?).
    I to przedstawianie sie jako ofiara ?
  • 27.05.10, 19:13
    się do wojskowych spraw. Jeśli futerały na rakiety to broń, to broń nas Panie
    Boże!
  • 27.05.10, 19:40
    ZA,NASZYCH W AFGANISTANIE.ZA WYRYPANIE.W IRAKU.FAJNIE I ATRAPĘ DOSTAĆ.A
    ,CHŁOPAKI SE MOŻE W TYM MORĄGU.CO BZYKNĄ.
  • 27.05.10, 20:11
    kufa-62 napisała:

    > ZA,NASZYCH W AFGANISTANIE.ZA WYRYPANIE.W IRAKU.FAJNIE I ATRAPĘ DOSTAĆ.A
    > ,CHŁOPAKI SE MOŻE W TYM MORĄGU.CO BZYKNĄ.
    A może już wytrzeźwiejesz i zaczniesz pisać po ludzku?
  • 28.05.10, 16:32
    MYŚL. MYŚL!TO.MA PODOBNO PRZYSZŁOŚĆ.(ALBO SE JAKA KSIĄŻKA KUP)
  • 27.05.10, 19:48
    ZA,NASZYCH W AFGANISTANIE.ZA WYRYPANIE.W IRAKU.FAJNIE I ATRAPĘ DOSTAĆ.A
    ,CHŁOPAKI SE MOŻE W TYM MORĄGU.CO BZYKNĄ
  • 27.05.10, 20:00
    Tu nie chodzi o te futerały na rakiety tylko żeby ulokować swoje
    wojska na terenie następnego kraju tj Polski.Teraz będzie z
    futerałami kilkaset żołnierzy a za pare lat kilka
    tysięcy.Wyrzuciliśmy wojska Rosyjskie a sprowadziliśmy
    Amerykańskie.Ciekawostka Amerykanie swoje wojska mają rozlokowane w
    ponad 150 panstw na świecie.
  • 27.05.10, 20:13
    mona517 napisał:

    > Tu nie chodzi o te futerały na rakiety tylko żeby ulokować swoje
    > wojska na terenie następnego kraju tj Polski.Teraz będzie z
    > futerałami kilkaset żołnierzy a za pare lat kilka
    > tysięcy.Wyrzuciliśmy wojska Rosyjskie a sprowadziliśmy
    > Amerykańskie.Ciekawostka Amerykanie swoje wojska mają rozlokowane w
    > ponad 150 panstw na świecie.
    No jak już piszesz takie ciekawostki to może dorzuć jakiś wniosek - dobrze to
    czy źle? Ja uważam że lepiej,aby polska trzymała z krajami które są blisko nas
    niż daleko,ale jakoś nie czuje się zaniepokojony obecnością amerykańskiej
    jednostki w Polsce
  • 27.05.10, 21:06
    gambiting napisał:

    > mona517 napisał:
    >
    > > Tu nie chodzi o te futerały na rakiety tylko żeby ulokować swoje
    > > wojska na terenie następnego kraju tj Polski.Teraz będzie z
    > > futerałami kilkaset żołnierzy a za pare lat kilka
    > > tysięcy.Wyrzuciliśmy wojska Rosyjskie a sprowadziliśmy
    > > Amerykańskie.Ciekawostka Amerykanie swoje wojska mają rozlokowane
    w
    > > ponad 150 panstw na świecie.
    > No jak już piszesz takie ciekawostki to może dorzuć jakiś wniosek -
    dobrze to
    > czy źle? Ja uważam że lepiej,aby polska trzymała z krajami które są
    blisko nas
    > niż daleko,ale jakoś nie czuje się zaniepokojony obecnością
    amerykańskiej
    > jednostki w Polsce
    A ja tak .Oznacza to że Yankesi znowu nas wydymają na ciężkie miliny
    za upchnięty nam w przyszłości złom.
  • 27.05.10, 20:23
    Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który zachwyca się
    hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/
  • 27.05.10, 20:35
    mark6 napisał:

    > Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który zachwyca się
    > hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/

    Wkrótce będą uzbrojone i dużo ich będzie. Będzie też nowa tarcza antyrakietowa.
    A to oznacza koniec putinowskich planów terroryzowania i straszenia ościennych
    bezbronnych krajów a także całej Europy.
  • 27.05.10, 20:37
    mark6 napisał:

    > Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który zachwyca się
    > hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/

    Oooo wyraźnie piszesz o sobie. Zalecam zrobienie matury przed komentowaniem
    czegokolwiek biedaku.

  • 27.05.10, 20:58
    Pleciesz na lewo i prawo o zrobieniu matury.Bozia "yntylygencyji"
    nie dała i skończyłeś wykształcenie na zawodówce?
    Daj se spoko i wyluzuj. Jeżeli jednak otwierasz japę to rób to na temat.
  • 27.05.10, 21:07
    mark6 napisał:

    > Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który
    zachwyca się
    > hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/
    Masz 100% racji .
  • 27.05.10, 21:56
    Kaczory wynegocjowaly obecnosc tarczy czyli systemu od ktorego
    zalezaloby bezp. USA wiec nikt nie smialby zagrozic Polsce dodatkowe
    ustalenia:

    USA znacząco pomogą w wyposażeniu w nowoczesne technikę Wojska
    Polskiego[51].
    Ameryka zobowiązała się do ochrony wojskowej Polski, w razie ataku
    militarnego, i nie tylko państw trzecich[51].
    Powstanie rada polsko-amerykańska Grupa Konsultacyjna ds. Współpracy
    Strategicznej analizująca i przeciwdziałająca zagrożeniom z innych
    państw[51].
    Polska armia zakupi od USA do 2018 roku[52] docelowo przynajmniej
    [51] kilkanaście[53] (najprawdopodobniej 19) baterii (ok. 2
    bataliony) Patriot PAC-3, wyposażonych w 1800
    antyrakietowych/przeciwlotniczych pocisków[15].
    Baza systemu antyrakietowego USA powstanie w Redzikowie[54].
    Siły Powietrzne RP zakupią[54] dodatkowe kilkadziesiąt samolotów
    wielozadaniowych (ok. 50) F-16[51].
    Powstanie też druga baza antyrakietowa na terytorium Polski, w
    której będzie stacjonował garnizon amerykańskich żołnierzy liczący
    120 osób[55], wyposażony w kilka[56] baterii Patriot liczących po 96
    pocisków PAC-3[51]. Baza ta będzie istnieć do czasu wyposażenia
    polskich sił zbrojnych w system Patriot[54].
    Polski oddział żołnierzy będą chronić z zewnątrz bazę[54], a jego
    dowódca będzie miał dostęp do całej strefy chronionej[15].
    USA zobowiązują się wspierać, szkolić i rozwijać możliwości obrony
    antyrakietowej, przeciwlotniczej i antyterrorystycznej Polski[19].
    Stany Zjednoczone będą wspierać wspólne prace sektora przemysłowo-
    technologiczno-wojskowego[19].
    USA będą dostarczać Polsce informacje dotyczące zagrożeń
    bezpieczeństwa Polski[19].
  • 27.05.10, 21:01
    To po jaką cholerę oni tu przyjechali?
  • 27.05.10, 21:04
    Bo przypłynąć nie mogli z przyczyn geograficznych, a przylecieć się nie opłacało.
    Pzdr

    --
    Beam me up, Mr. Scott; there's no intelligent life here!
  • 27.05.10, 21:51
    Potencjal obrnny dla nas milaby tarcza!

    Jako urzadzenie broniace rowniez USA amerykanie na broniliby tarczy
    jak swojego bezpieczenstwa i dlatego Rosjanom i Niemcom tak ona sie
    nie podobala bo nie mogliby fikac w Europie Srodkowej.
    natomiast nawet gdybysmy mieli 100baterii Patriotow to Rosjanie
    chcac nas zaatakowac i tak t zrobi atylko bardziej sie sparza.

    Gdyby byla tarcza to nawet nie smieliby o tym pomyslec


  • 27.05.10, 21:54
    USA znacząco pomogą w wyposażeniu w nowoczesne technikę Wojska
    Polskiego[51].
    Ameryka zobowiązała się do ochrony wojskowej Polski, w razie ataku
    militarnego, i nie tylko państw trzecich[51].
    Powstanie rada polsko-amerykańska Grupa Konsultacyjna ds. Współpracy
    Strategicznej analizująca i przeciwdziałająca zagrożeniom z innych
    państw[51].
    Polska armia zakupi od USA do 2018 roku[52] docelowo przynajmniej
    [51] kilkanaście[53] (najprawdopodobniej 19) baterii (ok. 2
    bataliony) Patriot PAC-3, wyposażonych w 1800
    antyrakietowych/przeciwlotniczych pocisków[15].
    Baza systemu antyrakietowego USA powstanie w Redzikowie[54].
    Siły Powietrzne RP zakupią[54] dodatkowe kilkadziesiąt samolotów
    wielozadaniowych (ok. 50) F-16[51].
    Powstanie też druga baza antyrakietowa na terytorium Polski, w
    której będzie stacjonował garnizon amerykańskich żołnierzy liczący
    120 osób[55], wyposażony w kilka[56] baterii Patriot liczących po 96
    pocisków PAC-3[51]. Baza ta będzie istnieć do czasu wyposażenia
    polskich sił zbrojnych w system Patriot[54].
    Polski oddział żołnierzy będą chronić z zewnątrz bazę[54], a jego
    dowódca będzie miał dostęp do całej strefy chronionej[15].
    USA zobowiązują się wspierać, szkolić i rozwijać możliwości obrony
    antyrakietowej, przeciwlotniczej i antyterrorystycznej Polski[19].
    Stany Zjednoczone będą wspierać wspólne prace sektora przemysłowo-
    technologiczno-wojskowego[19].
    USA będą dostarczać Polsce informacje dotyczące zagrożeń
    bezpieczeństwa Polski[19].
  • 27.05.10, 21:54
    Halicki do Rosjan: są to rakiety bez potencjału, ba! nawet bez
    potencji, ot po prostu impotentne race. Dobzie, dobzie??
  • 27.05.10, 23:47
    www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100524_germany_after_eu_russian_scenario
    oraz

    The CSTO and Russia's Expanding Sphere of Influence
    May 27, 2010 | 1108 GMT
    Text Resize:
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    HE BELARUSIAN PARLIAMENT ratified an agreement on Wednesday that calls for the
    country to participate in the Collective Rapid Response Force (CRRF) of the
    Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Moscow-dominated security
    bloc that consists of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
    Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Belarusian Defense Minister Yuri Zhadobin followed
    this by saying the country would contribute more than 2,000 military personnel
    to the CRRF, including conventional military units, counterterrorism officers
    and a contingent from the intelligence services.

    While 2,000 elite troops dedicated to Belarus’ participation in the CRRF is
    significant, we at STRATFOR are less interested in Minsk’s contributions than we
    are in those of Moscow. What the Belarusian ratification means is that Russia
    can now legally station its own troops, under the guise of the CSTO, on
    Belarusian territory. Even more significant is what the move says about Moscow’s
    strategic position: Russia has evolved over the past 20 years from a collapsed
    and crippled former superpower to a country that is swiftly building much of its
    strategic influence in the countries it used to formally control.

    The fall of the Soviet Union left Russia a shadow of its former (Soviet) self in
    terms of population, economy and general political coherence. One institution
    that particularly suffered was the Russian military. Russia’s military went from
    competing with the United States for influence on a global scale at the height
    of the Soviet Union to shrinking dramatically after its fall, both in terms of
    size and effectiveness. Russian bases evaporated, and strategic assets such as
    weapons, aircraft and infrastructure began to crumble. Russia failed miserably
    in getting its own country in order, suffering two protracted wars in
    secession-minded Chechnya and watching helplessly as NATO engaged in air raids
    on longtime ally Yugoslavia.

    “It has come to the point where Russia is simply running out of places in the
    former Soviet Union upon which to bring its influence to bear.”

    But there has been somewhat of a reversal of these fortunes over the last
    decade, which has seen the vast bulk of U.S. military efforts and resources
    concentrated in the Middle East and South Asia. Despite the current military
    drawdown in the Iraqi theater, the political and security situation in the
    country is still tenuous and beholden to the perpetuation of relative calm and
    stability. U.S. forces continue to surge into Afghanistan, where they will
    remain committed at current levels for at least another year. And that is not
    even considering the constant threat emanating from Iran, the regional power
    that sits between the two countries. If all goes as planned (and that is a big
    if), only in the next few years will the United States begin to rediscover
    excess bandwidth for its ground combat forces. Until that happens, the American
    distraction has opened a window of opportunity for Russia, one Moscow has been
    working feverishly to seize before it closes.

    The 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a turning point for Russia, as Moscow
    saw the most strategic state to its security interests swept under the wave of
    Western-fueled movements that brought a hostile and pro-Western government right
    to its border. After the Orange Revolution, the Kremlin began to focus its
    efforts and resources, buoyed by high energy prices and a political
    consolidation by then-president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on
    pushing back Western influence in the former Soviet Union and substituting it
    with its own.

    To this end, Moscow has seen a series of victories across its former Soviet
    periphery in the past few years. These include the military defeat of
    pro-Western Georgia in the 2008 war, the election of a pro-Russian regime in
    Ukraine, and most recently another color revolution — this time favorable to its
    own interests — in Kyrgyzstan. Through these events and countless others, Moscow
    has positioned itself in its near abroad to sufficiently project power in
    virtually every strategic nook and cranny. It has come to the point where Russia
    is simply running out of places in the former Soviet Union upon which to bring
    its influence to bear.

    Thus, Moscow is moving on to consolidate its gains and focus its attention
    beyond its near abroad — beginning with Poland, a NATO member state wary of
    Russia. In the face of a resurgent Russia, Warsaw has been seeking to strengthen
    its security relationship with the United States. On Wednesday, Poland welcomed
    the deployment of a U.S. Patriot missile battery and a complement of American
    troops. Russia has vocally opposed such a deployment, not so much because of the
    system itself but because of the threat it sees in the corresponding American
    boots on the ground. With the addition of Belarus in the CRRF, Russia has the
    legal right to position itself right on Poland’s doorstep. It is perhaps no
    coincidence that the agreement to include Belarus in the CSTO rapid reaction
    forces, which floated the country’s parliament for more than a year, was signed
    into law the same day.

    Despite the ratification, many of the Russian military’s institutional problems
    remain. But the difference between the Russia of the chaotic 1990s and
    present-day Russia is primarily geopolitical. Only a few years ago, the U.S.
    perception of Russia was that of a broken former power. And while Washington
    thought it had plenty of time before Moscow could even begin to bolster its
    position, the Russians have already regained much of the influence in the bulk
    of their old Soviet territory. That is not to say that the Red Army is about to
    return en masse to the streets of Prague or Budapest any time soon, but the
    Russians have begun to start pushing further out, beginning with the legal right
    to station their troops on the European frontier near Poland.
  • 27.05.10, 23:49
    By George Friedman

    Discussions about Europe currently are focused on the Greek financial crisis and
    its potential effect on the future of the European Union. Discussions these days
    involving military matters and Europe appear insignificant and even
    anachronistic. Certainly, we would agree that the future of the European Union
    towers over all other considerations at the moment, but we would argue that
    scenarios for the future of the European Union exist in which military matters
    are far from archaic.
    Russia and the Polish Patriots

    For example, the Polish government recently announced that the United States
    would deploy a battery of Patriot missiles to Poland. The missiles arrived this
    week. When the United States canceled its land-based ballistic missile defense
    system under intense Russian pressure, the Obama administration appeared
    surprised at Poland’s intense displeasure with the decision. Washington
    responded by promising the Patriots instead, the technology the Poles had wanted
    all along. While the Patriot does not enhance America’s ability to protect
    itself against long-range ballistic missiles from, for example, Iran, it does
    give Poland some defense against shorter-ranged ballistic missiles and
    substantial defense against conventional air attack.

    Russia is the only country capable of such attacks on Poland with even the most
    distant potential interest in doing so, and at this point, this is truly an
    abstract threat. In removing a system that was really not a threat to Russian
    interests — U.S. ballistic missile defense at most can handle only a score of
    missiles, meaning it would have a negligible impact on the Russian nuclear
    deterrent — the United States ironically has installed a system that could
    affect Russia. Under the current circumstances, this is not really significant.
    While much is being made of having a few U.S. boots on the ground east of
    Germany within 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) of the Russian Baltic exclave of
    Kaliningrad, a few hundred technicians and guards are simply not an offensive
    threat.

    Still, the Russians — with a long history of seeing improbable threats turning
    into very real ones — tend to take hypothetical limits on their power seriously.
    They also tend to take gestures seriously, knowing that gestures often germinate
    into strategic intent. The Russians obviously oppose this deployment, as the
    Patriots would allow Poland in league with NATO — and perhaps even by itself —
    to achieve local air superiority. There are many crosscurrents in Russian
    policy, however.

    For the moment, the Russians are interested in encouraging better economic
    relations with the West, as they could use technology and investment that would
    make them more than a commodity exporter. Moreover, with the Europeans
    preoccupied with their economic crisis and the United States still bogged down
    in the Middle East and needing Russian support on Iran, Moscow has found little
    outside resistance to its efforts to increase its influence in the former Soviet
    Union. Moscow is not unhappy about the European crisis and wouldn’t want to do
    anything that might engender greater European solidarity. After all, a solid
    economic bloc turning into an increasingly powerful and integrated state would
    pose challenges to Russia in the long run that Moscow is happy to do without.
    The Patriot deployment is a current irritation and a hypothetical military
    problem, but the Russians are not inclined to create a crisis with Europe over
    it — though this doesn’t mean Moscow won’t make countermoves on the margins when
    it senses opportunities.

    For its part, the Obama administration is not focused on Poland at present. It
    is obsessed with internal matters, South Asia and the Middle East. The Patriots
    were shipped based on a promise made months ago to calm Central European nerves
    over the Obama administration’s perceived lack of commitment to the region. In
    the U.S. State and Defense department sections charged with shipping Patriots to
    Poland, the delivery process was almost an afterthought; repeated delays in
    deploying the system highlighted Washington’s lack of strategic intent.

    It is therefore tempting to dismiss the Patriots as of little importance, as
    merely the combination of a hangover from a Cold War mentality and a minor Obama
    administration misstep. Indeed, even a sophisticated observer of the
    international system might barely note it. But we would argue that it is more
    important than it appears precisely because of everything else going on.
    Existential Crisis in the EU

    The European Union is experiencing an existential crisis. This crisis is not
    about Greece, but rather, what it is that members of the European Union owe each
    other and what controls the European Union has over its members. The European
    Union did well during a generation of prosperity. As financial crisis struck,
    better-off members were called on to help worse-off members. Again, this is not
    just about Greece — the 2008 credit crisis in Central Europe was about the same
    thing. The wealthier countries, Germany in particular, are not happy at the
    prospect of spending taxpayer money to assist countries dealing with popped
    credit bubbles.

    They really don’t want to do that, and if they do, they really want to have
    controls over the ways these other countries spend their money so this
    circumstance doesn’t arise again. Needless to say, Greece — and countries that
    might wind up like Greece — do not want foreign control over their finances.

    If there are no mutual obligations among EU member nations, and the German and
    Greek publics don’t want to bail out or submit, respectively, then the profound
    question is raised of what Europe is going to be — beyond a mere free trade zone
    — after this crisis. This is not simply a question of the euro surviving,
    although that is no trivial matter.

    The euro and the European Union will probably survive this crisis — although
    their mutual failure is not nearly as unthinkable as the Europeans would have
    thought even a few months ago — but this is not the only crisis Europe will
    experience. Something always will be going wrong, and Europe does not have
    institutions that could handle these problems. Events in the past few weeks
    indicate that European countries are not inclined to create such institutions,
    and that public opinion will limit European governments’ ability to create or
    participate in these institutions. Remember, building a super state requires one
    of two things: a war to determine who is in charge or political unanimity to
    forge a treaty. Europe is — vividly — demonstrating the limitations on the
    second strategy.

    Whatever happens in the short run, it is difficult to envision any further
    integration of European institutions. And it is very easy to see how the
    European Union will devolve from its ambitious vision into an alliance of
    convenience built around economic benefits negotiated and renegotiated among the
    partners. It would thus devolve from a union to a treaty, with no interest
    beyond self-interest.
    The German Question Revisited

    We return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status
    of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is
    clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that
    the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless
    Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be
    done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to
    economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over
    time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe.

  • 27.05.10, 23:51
    The German Question Revisited

    We return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status
    of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is
    clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that
    the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless
    Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be
    done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to
    economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over
    time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe.

    If Germany is the key decision maker in Europe, then Germany defines whatever
    policies Europe as a whole undertakes. If Europe fragments, then Germany is the
    only country in Europe with the ability to create alternative coalitions that
    are both powerful and cohesive. That means that if the European Union weakens,
    Germany will have the greatest say in what Europe will become. Right now, the
    Germans are working assiduously to reformulate the European Union and the
    eurozone in a manner more to their liking. But as this requires many partners to
    offer sovereignty to German control — sovereignty they have jealously guarded
    throughout the European project — it is worth exploring alternatives to Germany
    in the European Union.

    For that we first must understand Germany’s limits. The German problem is the
    same problem it has had since unification: It is enormously powerful, but it is
    far from omnipotent. Its very power makes it the focus of other powers, and
    together, these other powers can cripple Germany. Thus, Germany is indispensable
    for any decision within the European Union at present, and it will be the single
    center of power in Europe in the future — but Germany can’t just go it alone.
    Germany needs a coalition, meaning the long-term question is this: If the EU
    were to weaken or even fail, what alternative coalition would Germany seek?

    The casual answer is France, as the two economies are somewhat similar and the
    countries are next-door neighbors. But historically, this similarity in
    structure and location has been a source not of collaboration and fondness but
    of competition and friction. Within the European Union, with its broad
    diversity, Germany and France have been able to put aside their frictions,
    finding a common interest in managing Europe to their mutual advantage. That
    co-management, of course, helped bring us to this current crisis. Moreover, the
    biggest thing that France has that Germany wants is its market; an ideal partner
    for Germany would offer more. By itself at least, France is not a foundation for
    long-term German economic strategy. The historic alternative for Germany has
    been Russia.
    The Russian Option

    A great deal of potential synergy exists between the German and Russian
    economies. Germany imports large amounts of energy and other resources from
    Russia. As mentioned, Russia needs sources of technology and capital to move it
    beyond its current position of mere resource exporter. Germany has a shrinking
    population and needs a source of labor — preferably a source that doesn’t
    actually want to move to Germany. Russia’s Soviet-era economy continues to
    de-industrialize, and while that has a plethora of negative impacts, there is
    one often-overlooked positive: Russia now has more labor than it can effectively
    metabolize in its economy given its capital structure. Germany doesn’t want more
    immigrants but needs access to labor. Russia wants factories in Russia to employ
    its surplus work force, and it wants technology. The logic of the German-Russian
    economic relationship is more obvious than the German-Greek or German-Spanish
    relationship. As for France, it can participate or not (and incidentally, the
    French are joining in on a number of ongoing German-Russian projects).

    Therefore, if we simply focus on economics, and we assume that the European
    Union cannot survive as an integrated system (a logical but not yet proven
    outcome), and we further assume that Germany is both the leading power of Europe
    and incapable of operating outside of a coalition, then we would argue that a
    German coalition with Russia is the most logical outcome of an EU decline.

    This would leave many countries extremely uneasy. The first is Poland, caught as
    it is between Russia and Germany. The second is the United States, since
    Washington would see a Russo-German economic bloc as a more significant
    challenger than the European Union ever was for two reasons. First, it would be
    a more coherent relationship — forging common policies among two states with
    broadly parallel interests is far simpler and faster than doing so among 27.
    Second, and more important, where the European Union could not develop a
    military dimension due to internal dissensions, the emergence of a
    politico-military dimension to a Russo-German economic bloc is far less
    difficult to imagine. It would be built around the fact that both Germans and
    Russians resent and fear American power and assertiveness, and that the
    Americans have for years been courting allies who lie between the two powers.
    Germany and Russia would both view themselves defending against American pressure.

    And this brings us back to the Patriot missiles. Regardless of the bureaucratic
    backwater this transfer might have emerged out of, or the political disinterest
    that generated the plan, the Patriot stationing fits neatly into a slowly
    maturing military relationship between Poland and the United States. A few
    months ago, the Poles and Americans conducted military exercises in the Baltic
    states, an incredibly sensitive region for the Russians. The Polish air force
    now flies some of the most modern U.S.-built F-16s in the world; this, plus
    Patriots, could seriously challenge the Russians. A Polish general commands a
    sector in Afghanistan, something not lost upon the Russians. By a host of
    processes, a close U.S.-Polish relationship is emerging.

    The current economic problems may lead to a fundamental weakening of the
    European Union. Germany is economically powerful but needs economic coalition
    partners that contribute to German well-being rather than merely draw on it. A
    Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the
    Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former
    would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military,
    and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics. The
    Russian-German bloc would attempt to bring others into its coalition, as would
    the Polish-U.S. bloc. Both would compete in Central Europe — and for France.
    During this process, the politics of NATO would shift from humdrum to absolutely
    riveting.

    And thus, the Greek crisis and the Patriots might intersect, or in our view,
    will certainly in due course intersect. Though neither is of lasting importance
    in and of themselves, the two together point to a new logic in Europe. What
    appears impossible now in Europe might not be unthinkable in a few years. With
    Greece symbolizing the weakening of the European Union and the Patriots
    representing the remilitarization of at least part of Europe, ostensibly
    unconnected tendencies might well intersect.
  • 28.05.10, 09:38
    "For $1 trillion we have bought time, nothing more..."
    (16.05.2005 - ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet)


    www.gadlerner.it/wp-content/themes/gad/thumb.php?src=http://www.gadlerner.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/europa-in-mutande.jpg&h=380&w=240&zc=1&q=80
  • 28.05.10, 10:12
    i co to niby ma byc?
    podnieca cie widok pol-nagich urzednikow w srednim wieku?
  • 28.05.10, 11:52
    rocco-siffredi napisał:

    > i co to niby ma byc?
    > podnieca cie widok pol-nagich urzednikow w srednim wieku?
  • 28.05.10, 20:52
    czyli raczej nic do powiedzenia nie masz poza gadaniem bzdur

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