• (gość portalu) Zaloguj się
  • Na podany adres zostanie wysłany e-mail potwierdzający a następnie dalsze powiadomienia

  • Wysłany przez Ciebie post może pojawić się z opóźnieniem do kilku minut.

Odpowiadasz na:

henry.morgenthau_jr.jr  napisał: 

> A South African-born Air Marshal, Harris had been a distinguished pilot 
> during World War I and had held various posts in the 1920s and 1930s 
> including Head of the Air Ministry Plans Branch and Air Officer Commanding 
> RAF Palestine and Trans-Jordan. In 1939 he commanded No 5 Bomber Group , RAF 
> BOmber Command and in 1941, led a RAF delegation to Washington to discuss air 
> co-operation. On his return in 1942 he became Commander in Chief, RAF Bomber 
> Command where he was to inject new confidence and an aggressive spirit into a 
> command that had been experiencing costly and disappointing results. Having 
> rejected a formerly held belief in precision bombing, he immediately stepped-
> up the offensive, acting on a directive which instructed that operations 
> be 'focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular of 
> the industrial workers'. This policy of area bombing because his unfaltering 
> creed in the following months, culminating in the devastating 'Thousand 
> Bomber' raid on Cologne on 30 May 1942. Similar raids on Essen and Bremen met 
> with less success. The accuracy of Bomber Command's raids was improved from 
> August 1942 by the establishment of a photo reconnaissance force, and in 
> September of that year, the first 8000lb blockbuster bomb was dropped on 
> Karlsruhe.
> Harris' entrenched advocacy of strategic area-bombing, as demonstrated by the 
> massive raids on the Ruhr, on Hamburg and Berlin which caused enormous damage 
> tot hese regions, was, however, opposed by his American counterparts of the 
> US 8th Air Force who preferred attacks on specific targets which were crucial 
> to a sector of the German industrial or economic system. These Harris 
> dismissed as 'panacea' targets. He was, nevertheless, in full accord with 
> Spaatz, the American strategic Commander, in totally rejecting Leigh-
> Mallory's transportation plan for Operation Overlord which demanded the 
> diversion of the bombing force from its strategic offensive under the 
> Pointblank directive tot he assault on German communications and supplies in 
> and around the invasion area prior to D-Day itself. He, furthermore, felt an 
> intense personal disregard for Leigh-Mallory who, although Commander in Chief 
> of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, he virtually ignored . Bomber Command, 
> nevertheless, played an invaluable part in the D-Day preparations.
> The peak of Bomber Command's night offensive was achieved on m14-15 February 
> 1945 with the devastating attack on Dresden. 
> A man of entrenched beliefs, Harris had an innate distrust of innovation. He 
> feared, for example, the setting-up of the Pathfinder Force which he felt 
> would create an elite body, detrimental to squadron morale. He maintained 
> that by forcing the Germans to take a defensive stand, numerous Allied lives 
> had been saved. To those he commanded, his resolution was an inspiration; his 
> ruthlessness a total commitment to victory. 
> Wysiłek tysięcy załóg alianckiego lotnictwa nie poszedł na marne.
> Guernica, Wieluń, Warszawa, Rotterdam, Malta, Coventry i Londyn zostały 
> pomszczone.
> Bye !
> Against fascism !
> Z harcerskim pozdrowieniem.
> CZUWAJ !!!

Nie pamiętasz hasła

lub ?


Nie masz jeszcze konta? Zarejestruj się