wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony wojskowe

06.02.05, 15:58
    • patience Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 16:15
      ... pod warunkiem, ze w lufy wsadzi sie kwiatki, rakiety bezzalogowe ziemia -
      ziemia przerobi sie na zalogowe ziemia- alfa centauri, a czolgi przekuje na
      lądowniki. Zołnierzy upić.
      • stormy_weather Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 16:22
        juz to chwytam, ale dusze mam armijca....jaruzel skonczyl z chlaniem..chlali my
        w domu po cichu , ale z wiadra...
        • patience Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 16:29
          To chlejcie dalej. Chlejac z wiadra nikomu krzywdy nie zrobicie. A poza tym nie
          jestem pacyfista ortodoksyjny. Na przyklad nic bym nie miala przeciw jakiejs
          akcji komandoskiej polegajacej na wypadzie do Korei Polnocnej i poderznieciu
          gardla jej wodzowi. Jeszcze przez jakis czas armia moze sie przydac. A potem
          poszukiwaczy przygod mozna wyslac zeby budowali kolonie na Marsie.
          • stormy_weather Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 16:34
            nie wzbudzaj się i nie graj kartą osamy czy zarkaviego...my mamy dusze
            naturalnych militarystow i cywilow nie ruszamy...mamy charakter zolnierzy
            wszyskoch frontow w tym Legii Cudzoziemskiej..po prostu jestesmy kolegami...
            bandyci to nie nasza braża...
            • patience Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 16:38
              www.fortunecity.com/victorian/riley/787/Napoleon/Prussia/Biografy/clausewitz.html

              ?
              • stormy_weather Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 16:47
                zdumiewasz mnie, jak mnie odnalazłas.. ???
                • patience Re: wzyciu narodu najpiekniejsze są garnizony woj 06.02.05, 17:05
                  To jest Aquanet. To tak dziala.
              • drf teoria wojny ...The aim is to disarm the enemy.... 06.02.05, 17:04
                War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit
                the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by
                supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel
                the other to submit to his will: his first object is to throw his adversary, and
                thus to render him incapable of further resistance.

                War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.
                Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend
                against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly
                worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without
                essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say physical force (for
                there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is therefore
                the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate
                object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and
                this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the
                place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not
                properly belonging to war.

                3. Utmost use of force.

                Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming
                and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the
                proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it
                is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the
                errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use
                of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of
                the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without
                reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his
                adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to
                the latter, and both proceed to extremities, to which the only limitations are
                those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.

                This is the way in which the matter must be viewed; and it is to no purpose, and
                even acting against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of
                the real nature of the affair, because the coarseness of its elements excites
                repugnance.

                If the wars of civilised people are less cruel and destructive than those of
                savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of states in
                themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition
                and its relations war arises, and by it war is subjected to conditions, is
                controlled and modified. But these things do not belong to war itself; they are
                only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a
                principle of moderation would be an absurdity.

                The fight between men consists really of two different elements, the hostile
                feeling and the hostile view. In our definition of war, we have chosen as its
                characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It
                is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description,
                bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile
                intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being
                accompanied by any, or at all events, by any extreme hostility of feeling.
                Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilised nations
                those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this
                difference is not inherent in a state of barbarism, and in a state of culture in
                themselves it arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, etc.,
                and therefore is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails
                in the majority. In short, even the most civilised nations may burn with
                passionate hatred of each other.

                We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the war of a civilised
                nation entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the Government, and to
                imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling of
                passion in such a way that at last the physical masses of combatants would no
                longer be required; in reality, their mere relations would suffice—a kind of
                algebraic action.

                Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until the facts of the last war
                taught it better. If war is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the
                feelings. If it does not originate in the feelings, it re-acts more or less upon
                them, and this more or less depends not on the degree of civilisation, but upon
                the importance and duration of the interests involved.

                Therefore, if we find civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death, do
                not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises
                greater influence on their mode of carrying on war, and has taught them more
                effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The
                invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the
                construction of firearms are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the
                adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of war, is in no way
                changed or modified through the progress of civilisation.

                We therefore repeat our proposition, that war is an act of violence, which in
                its application knows no bounds; as one dictates the law to the other, there
                arises a sort of reciprocal action, which in the conception, must lead to an
                extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme with which
                we meet (first reciprocal action).
                ............................... .

                www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/On_War/BK1ch01.html

                BOOK III
                Same Book in Vom Kriege
                OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL
                I Strategy
                II Elements of Strategy
                III Moral Forces
                IV The Chief Moral Powers
                V Military Virtue of an Army
                VI Boldness
                VII Perseverance
                VIII Superiority of Numbers
                IX The Surprise
                X Stratagem
                XI Assembly of Forces in Space
                XII Assembly of Forces in Time
                XIII Strategic Reserve
                XIV Economy of Forces
                XV Geometrical Element
                XVI On the Suspension of the Act in War
                XVII On the Character of Modern War
                XVIII Tension and Rest

                BOOK IV
                Same Book in Vom Kriege
                THE COMBAT
                I Introductory
                II Character of a Modern Battle
                III The Combat in General
                IV The Combat in General (continuation)
                V On the Signification of the Combat
                VI Duration of Combat
                VII Decision of the Combat
                VIII Mutual Understanding as to a Battle
                IX The Battle
                X Effects of Victory
                XI The Use of the Battle
                XII Strategic Means of Utilising Victory
                XIII Retreat After a Lost Battle
                XIV Night Fighting

                BOOK V
                Same Book in Vom Kriege
                MILITARY FORCES
                I General Scheme
                II Theatre of War, Army, Campaign
                III Relation of Power
                IV Relation of the Three Arms
                V Order of Battle of an Army
                VI General Disposition of an Army
                VII Advanced Guard and Out-Posts
                VIII Mode of Action of Advanced Corps
                IX Camps
                X Marches
                XI Marches (continued)
                XII Marches (continued)
                XIII Cantonments
                XIV Subsistence
                XV Base of Operations
                XVI Lines of Communication
                XVII On Country and Ground
                XVIII Command of Ground

                BOOK VI
                Same Book in Vom Kriege
                DEFENCE
                I Offence and Defence
                II The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Tactics
                III The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive
                to Each Other in Strategy
                IV Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defence
                V Character of Strategic Defensive
                VI Extent of the Means of Defence
                VII Mutual Action and Reaction of Attack and Defence
                VIII Methods of Resistance
                IX Defensive Battle
                X Fortresses
                XI Fortresses (continuation)
                XII Defensive Position
                XIII Strong Positions and Entrenched Camps
                XIV Flank Positions
                XV Defence of
                • patience The aim is to stop the war through the means of w 06.02.05, 17:11
                  The aim is to stop the war through the means of war.
                  wink
                  www.kimsoft.com/polwar.htm
                  Sun Tzu Wu (=Sun Tzu) was a native of the Ch`i State. His ART OF WAR brought
                  him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu. Ho Lu said to him: "I have
                  carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of managing
                  soldiers to a slight test?" Sun Tzu replied: "You may." Ho Lu asked: "May the
                  test be applied to women?" The answer was again in the affirmative, so
                  arrangements were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace.

                  Sun Tzu divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King's favorite
                  concubines at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their
                  hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between
                  front and back, right h and and left hand?" The girls replied: Yes.

                  Sun Tzu went on: "When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight ahead. When I
                  say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand. When I say "Right turn,"
                  you must face towards your right hand. When I say "About turn," you must face
                  right roun d towards your back." Again the girls assented. The words of command
                  having been thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to
                  begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn."
                  But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said: "If words of command are
                  not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the
                  general is to blame."

                  www.kimsoft.com/polwar03.htm
                  ;-D

                • drf Passage of Rivers.... 06.02.05, 17:11
                  XV Defence of Mountains
                  XVI Defence of Mountains (continued)
                  XVII Defence of Mountains (continued)
                  XVIII Defence of Streams and Rivers
                  XIX Defence of Streams and Rivers (continued)
                  XX A. Defence of Swamps
                  B. Inundations
                  XXI Defence of Forests
                  XXII The Cordon
                  XXIII Key of the Country
                  XXIV Operating Against a Flank
                  XXV Retreat into the Interior of the Country
                  XXVI Arming the Nation
                  XXVII Defence of a Theatre of War
                  XXVIII Defence of a Theatre of War (continued)
                  XXIX Defence of a Theatre of War (continued)
                  Successive Resistance
                  XXX Defence of a Theatre of War (continued)
                  When No Decision is Sought For

                  SKETCHES FOR BOOK VII
                  Same Book in Vom Kriege
                  THE ATTACK
                  I The Attack in Relation to the Defence
                  II Nature of the Strategical Attack
                  III Of the Objects of Strategical Attack
                  IV Decreasing Force of the Attack
                  V Culminating Point of the Attack
                  VI Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies
                  VII The Offensive Battle
                  VIII Passage of Rivers
                  IX Attack of Defensive Positions
                  X Attack of an Entrenched Camp
                  XI Attack of a Mountain Range
                  XII Attack of Cordon Lines
                  XIII Maneuvering
                  XIV Attack of Morasses, Inundations, Woods
                  XV Attack of a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision
                  XVI Attack of a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision
                  XVII Attack of Fortresses
                  XVIII Attack of Convoys
                  XIX Attack of the Enemy's Army in its Cantonments
                  XX Diversion
                  XXI Invasion

                  SKETCHES FOR BOOK VIII
                  Same Book in Vom Kriege
                  PLAN OF WAR
                  I Introduction
                  II Absolute and Real War
                  III A. Interdependence of the Parts in a War
                  B. Of the Magnitude of the Object of the War
                  and the Efforts to be Made
                  IV Ends in War More Precisely Defined—Overthrow of the Enemy
                  V Ends in War More Precisely Defined (continuation)
                  —Limited Object
                  VI A. Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object
                  B. War as an Instrument of Policy
                  VII Limited Object—Offensive War
                  VIII Limited Object—Defence
                  IX Plan of War when the Destruction of
                  the Enemy is the Object

                  ............................... .....

                  fascynujaca literatura
                  i bardzo... bardzo wspolczesna ...

                  (.)

                  JoD
                  • canaris.jr Re: Passage of Rivers.... 06.02.05, 17:15
                    super !! jak znalazleś kod do mojego biura...
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