Czarny Wrzesien 1970r. "Black September"

IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 27.09.03, 16:40
Tak samo on walczyl o wolnosc Palestyny, ze prawie okupowal Jordanie i tylko
Izrael uratowal rezim Husaina...
I tak samo bylo w 1990, kiedy Saddam inwazjowal do Kuweitu - to Palestynczycy
triumfowali (na krotko) razem z Arafatem...i od tego czasu nie ma jednego
Palestynczyka w Kuwietcie (bylo 300,000)i znowu ten sam Arafat, ten sam los
narodu Palestyny...do kiedy wlasciwie...az zrozumia ze wlasnie On robi
tragedie
Palestyny nie Izrael!

On tez robil z Husainem 30!! razy zawieszenie broni w 1970r. i nigdy nie
utrzymalo sie wiecej niz 1-2 minut.
Taki czlowiek potrzebuje juz isc w zapomienie...On nic nie moze juz zrobic
dla Palestyny.
    • Gość: Józef Zawadzki Panie Mosze, proszę pozolić Palestyńczykom na IP: *.icm.edu.pl 27.09.03, 19:28
      ocenę czy Arafat jest im potrzebny. Nikt oprócz Was Zydów tej "potrzebności" nie kwestionuje. Ale Pan, Panie Mosze chyba nie jest Palestyńczykiem.Zapraszam Pan do watku o kibucach. Prosze niech powspomina Pan o nim. Co robiliście jako dzieci , oprócz zabaw? Pamięta Pan może to wasze pranie mózgu?
      • snajper55 Ty się, Józiu, wypowiadasz o Żydach, to... 27.09.03, 20:13
        Gość portalu: Józef Zawadzki napisał(a):

        > ocenę czy Arafat jest im potrzebny. Nikt oprócz Was Zydów tej "potrzebności"
        > nie kwestionuje. Ale Pan, Panie Mosze chyba nie jest Palestyńczykiem.

        ... Mosze ma takie samo prawo mówić o Arafacie.

        > Zapraszam Pan do watku o kibucach. Prosze niech powspomina Pan o nim. Co robi
        > liście jako dzieci , oprócz zabaw? Pamięta Pan może to wasze pranie mózgu?

        A tobie, Józiu, kto te resztki móżdżku wyprał ? Tylko niepotrzebnie go
        prasował. Że o krochmaleniu nie wspomnę. To pewnie ktoś z rodziny ? Bo
        szaleństwo jest podobno dziedziczne. Twoje jest po mamie, czy po tacie ?

        Snajper.
        • Gość: Józef Zawadzki Pan nie Mosze nie potrzebuje adwokata, zwłaszcza IP: *.icm.edu.pl 27.09.03, 20:28
          takiego matołka jak ty Siwiński Rafale. Mówić każdy może, tylko nie każdy mówi sensownie. Co z resztą tobie posiadaczu niskiego nader cofniętego czółka tłumaczyc.Nie ma po co. Ograniczony juz pozostaniesz. Każdym postem to potwierdzasz. I bierzesz cięgi jak w kaczą d...ę. Miej litość Siwiński nad sobą. Ach racja. Przecierz zdobywasz po raz kolejny szczyt masochizmu. Spoko , zdobedziesz go znowu.
          • oleg3 Re: Pan nie Mosze nie potrzebuje adwokata, zwłasz 27.09.03, 20:40
            Gość portalu: Józef Zawadzki napisał(a):

            [...] Przecierz [...]

            Arcybiskup Życiński napisał w dzisiejszej Rzepie "Znamienna jest pozytywna
            korelacja między agresją sformułowań a liczbą błędów ortograficznych."
          • Gość: Blong wardzinski kupa hipopotama haha IP: *.zabkowska.sdi.tpnet.pl 27.09.03, 20:57
            widac nie rozumiesz co snajper napisal, to ponownie udowadnia, ze masz niskie
            cofniete czolo ty jadro komara, haha
            • Gość: Józef Zawadzki Rafałku Blong snajperze, widzisz jakiś ty głupi. IP: *.icm.edu.pl 27.09.03, 21:05
              Powtarzasz moje określenia perły i ciebie, nie stac cię na oryginalność, no jednym słowem , wiecie Siwiński, kim jesteście.Nie uciekniecie przed czółkiem swoim i zwiazanym z nim matołectwem.
              • Gość: Blong haha wyprany mozdzek neandertalczyka IP: *.zabkowska.sdi.tpnet.pl 27.09.03, 21:08
                z niskim cofnietym czolkiem tak jak zydow widzi i na forum wszedzie jedna i ta
                sama osobe
                przesladuje cie to tez w realu ty kupo hipopotama ?
                to polecam uzyc dzwoneczku co masz u lozka i zadzwonic po doktora by ci dal
                nowy zastrzyk
                haha
    • oleg3 Re: Czarny Wrzesien 1970r. 'Black September' 27.09.03, 20:46
      Pamiętam ten wrzesień. Miałem wtedy 10 lat a ojciec słuchał RWE. Temat
      interesował mnie jak byłem starszy. Arafat planował stworzenie w Jordanii
      swojego państwa i był bliski celu. Ale trafił na godnego przeciwnika. Król
      Husain był sprytnym graczem i dzięki przywiązaniu Beduinów do dynastii
      haszymidzkiej wygrał. Arafat odszedł do Libanu i próbował znowu.
      • Gość: Józef Zawadzki Wow.Oleg. To przecież nie pisze się przez "rz".Dzi IP: *.icm.edu.pl 27.09.03, 20:49
        ki.
      • Gość: Mosze "Fatah Land" IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 27.09.03, 21:51
        oleg3 napisał:

        > Pamiętam ten wrzesień. Miałem wtedy 10 lat a ojciec słuchał RWE. Temat
        > interesował mnie jak byłem starszy. Arafat planował stworzenie w Jordanii
        > swojego państwa i był bliski celu. Ale trafił na godnego przeciwnika. Król
        > Husain był sprytnym graczem i dzięki przywiązaniu Beduinów do dynastii
        > haszymidzkiej wygrał. Arafat odszedł do Libanu i próbował znowu.

        On zrobil w Jordanii, "Fatah Land". Tam byly bazy terroru, tam wyladowali
        porwane samoloty, tam wysadzili w powietrze 3 samoloty porwane. Hussain czyl ze
        ma juz inne panstwo w swoim. Arafatowi to bardzo szlo zeby "zagarnic" Jordanie.
        Syria tez byla po stronie Arafata i wyslala 300 czolgow, ktore przekroczyli
        granice do Jordanii. ONZ - jak zawsze nic nie robil, tylko byly rezolucje, a
        tutaj suwerenny rzad zostaje obalony przez terror.
        Tylko kiedy Izraelskie samoloty robily "naloty" na Syryjskie czolgi w Jordanii,
        ktos w Damaszku zrozumial - ze tym razem Izrael nie smieje sie i bedzie pomagal
        Jordanii.
        Od Jordanii Arafat przyszedl do Libanu i zalozyl "Fatah Land" na poludniowym
        Libanie. Znowu zaczeli sie walki i mordy, tym razem tez mordowali Maronitow
        (odlam chrzescijanow) az Ojciec Swiety prosil o pomoc od Izraela.
        • Gość: Mosze Re: 'Fatah Land' IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 07:17
          http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/2587/black.html

          Black September and the Back September Terror Movement

          By the late 1960s a large number of Palestinian guerrilla groups had come into
          being. Libya, Syria, Iraq, the USSR and China sponsored specific groups while
          some groups, including major ones with several thousand members received
          simultaneous Libyan, Iraqi, Syrian and other support. There were groups whose
          members came from Arab countries and fought along side the Palestinians, among
          these were the Fidai’ Front and the Organization of the Arabs of Sinai and
          there were also a number of Marxist-Leninist, Maoist and Arab socialist groups.
          Other groups were extensions of parent organizations, Al Assifa and Force 17,
          for example, were part of Fatah but had special duties and responsibilities.
          Some, especially the PFLP and DFLP, established connections with guerrilla
          organizations throughout the world, including the Baader-Meinhof gang in
          Germany, Action Directe of France, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red
          Army and the less well known guerrillas of the Turkish Liberation Army and
          Colombian, Nicaraguan and Armenian groups. Regardless of origin, sponsorship,
          political direction or connection with international terror groups, all
          guerrilla groups operated under the umbrella of the PLO. Many of these groups
          turned to international terrorism.

          In November 1968 the PFLP, operating under the direction of George Habbash’s
          associate Dr Wadi’ Haddad, better known to Palestinians as ‘The Master’,
          carried out the first of many spectacular plane hijackings: an El Al plane
          flying from Rome to Tel Aviv was directed to Algeria. A month later the PFLP
          attacked an Israeli aircraft at Athens airport. The Israelis refused to accede
          to the demand to release Palestinian fighters in their prisons and retaliated
          by attacking Beirut airport and destroying thirteen parked aircraft. The
          Lebanese were being drawn into the conflict without having any say in the
          matter and within a few years Lebanon become ravaged by war.

          In Jordan, the PLO stronghold, many of the Fatah fighters and most of the
          guerrillas belonging to other groups had moved into the major cities and turned
          themselves into unruly armed gangs beyond the control of the local authorities.
          King Hussein had a difficult time controlling his Bedouin army, and many
          Jordanian politicians called for the reimposition of discipline and the rule of
          law to keep the frequent clashes between the guerrillas and his soldiers under
          control. In Lebanon something similar was happening. The clashes between
          Arafat’s men and the Lebanese security forces caused many deaths, government
          crises and serious divisions within a country whose political structure, based
          as it was on delicate sectarian divisions, could not accommodate too much
          stress.

          Between mid 1968 and the end of 1969 there were no fewer than five hundred
          violent clashes between members of the various Palestinian guerrilla groups and
          the Jordanian army and security forces. Serious incidents included the
          kidnapping of Arab diplomats and unfriendly Jordanian journalists, unprovoked
          attacks on government offices, rape and the humiliation of army and security
          officers. The Palestinians, who were legally entitled to set up road blocks,
          molested women, levied illegal taxes and insulted the Jordanian flag in the
          presence of loyal Jordanians.

          On 6 September 1970 the PFLP, again acting on the instructions of the Master,
          Dr Wadi’ Haddad, carried out one of the most memorable hijackings in history.
          They began with the simultaneous diversion to Jordan of a Swissair DC-8 and a
          TWA Boeing 707, which was followed six days later by the hijacking of a BOAC VC-
          10. The aircraft were forced to land at Dawson Field, 30 miles from Amman,
          which was quickly renamed Revolutionary Airport. Meanwhile another PFLP hijack
          team which had failed to board an El Al plane managed to hijack a Pan American
          Boeing 747 to Cairo and blow it up, while the media recorded the incident for a
          gasping world audience.

          The Jordanians were divided on what to do about the hijackers. Prime Minister
          Abdel Munim Al Rifai’, a staunch PLO supporter who had repeatedly stood by the
          Palestinians while trying to get them to behave, remained adamant that a
          settlement should be negotiated. Other Jordanian politicians, notably former
          Prime Minister Bahjat Talhouni, former deputy Prime Minister Akef Al Fayez and
          the popular politician Ibrahim Ezzedine, supported him. On the other side,
          advocating a crackdown, were Crown Prince Hassan, former Prime Minister Wasfi
          Tel, the dismissed trio of Sharif Nasser bin Jameel, Sharif Zeid bin Shaker and
          the former Minister of the interior Mohammed Rasul Al Kilani, politician Zedi
          Al Rifai (Abdel Munim’s nephew) and most of the senior officers of Hussein’s
          army. Although Hussein was in touch with the United States and Israel and had
          prepared for confrontation to the extent of dismissing several army officers
          with PLO sympathies and organizing a special force to deal with the situation,
          the outcome of the crisis depended on the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, who seemed
          unwilling to discipline Palestinians.

          The day after the destruction of the hijacked planes King Hussein declared
          martial law, dismissed Rifai’, recalled Field Marshal Habis Al Majali to active
          duty and appointed him commander in chief, and entrusted the formation of a
          military government to the Palestinian born General Mohammed Daoud. Arafat
          stormed around Amman making statements but there were no last minute moves to
          salvage the situation, even after the Arab governments showed little
          inclination to stand in Hussein’s way.

          The fighting began the following day, with a Jordanian artillery barrage
          against the PLO stronghold of Zarqa. Within hours similar attacks were being
          directed against several areas of Amman, including the strategic Jabal Al
          Hussein, and on refugee camps such as Al Wahdat which had raised the flag of
          the Republic of Palestine. Patton tanks from the 60th armored brigade,
          accompanied by armored vehicles, entered Amman from all sides, and attacked the
          headquarters of the Palestinian organizations. Battles took place in Zarqa,
          Sweileh, Salt and Irbid as well. For the first time Arafat used the
          word ‘genocide’ to describe what was happening to the Palestinians, while
          urging his fighters to resist. The Palestinians acquitted themselves well,
          helped by his undoubtedly inspiring personal courage and stead-fastness. But
          Arafat’s first disappointment came when Iraqi army units which he had counted
          on refused to come to his aid and were seen retreating to a distant safe area.
          But Arafat took the Iraqi ‘betrayal’ in his stride.

          On 18 September Arafat’s men were still acquitting themselves well and the
          Jordanian army was failing to make any substantial progress, despite Hussein’s
          expectations of an easy victory. The Arab countries and the Arab League issued
          appeals for a cessation of hostilities but did little else. By the end of the
          day, lack of organization and co-ordination was beginning to show and some
          Palestinian fighting units were running out of ammunition. On September 18, two
          days after the attack began, a small Syrian armored force invaded northern
          Jordan. By early morning on the 19th armoured units of the Palestine Liberation
          Army and regular units of the Syrian army invaded northern Jordan in a drive
          towards Amman. Soon they were joined by two Syrian armored brigades, which were
          reinforced the next day, and swelled to the size of a division. The opening of
          an additional front against Jordan was the desired scenario for the
          Palestinians. The Jordanians were afraid that
          • Gość: Mosze Re: 'Fatah Land' ...(B) IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 07:19
            Black September and the Back September Terror Movement


            On 18 September Arafat’s men were still acquitting themselves well and the
            Jordanian army was failing to make any substantial progress, despite Hussein’s
            expectations of an easy victory. The Arab countries and the Arab League issued
            appeals for a cessation of hostilities but did little else. By the end of the
            day, lack of organization and co-ordination was beginning to show and some
            Palestinian fighting units were running out of ammunition. On September 18, two
            days after the attack began, a small Syrian armored force invaded northern
            Jordan. By early morning on the 19th armoured units of the Palestine Liberation
            Army and regular units of the Syrian army invaded northern Jordan in a drive
            towards Amman. Soon they were joined by two Syrian armored brigades, which were
            reinforced the next day, and swelled to the size of a division. The opening of
            an additional front against Jordan was the desired scenario for the
            Palestinians. The Jordanians were afraid that Syria aspired to exploit the war
            that had broken out in the kingdom in order to occupy it and to realize the
            dream of "Greater Syria." They confronted the Syrians with the 40th armored
            brigade but the Jordanians were pushed back. Arafat the propagandist rose to
            the occasion and declared northern Jordan a liberated area. The Arab League
            called for an extraordinary meeting of heads of state. Israel urged Hussein to
            continue and, in line with the secret agreement between them, code named
            Sandstorm, placed its forces on alert. The United States announced that naval
            units were converging on the eastern Mediterranean to reinforce the Sixth Fleet
            as a precautionary measure. As the Syrian advance gained momentum the Israeli
            airforce buzzed advancing Syrian armoured units in an attempt to slow the
            advance.

            The fighting in the streets of Amman was bloody. Neither side took any
            prisoners; both sides committed atrocities, many innocents were raped and
            killed, and most of the city was ablaze. In other parts of the country,
            besieged refugee camps where PLO fighters had taken refuge were running out of
            food and water. Wherever possible people lived in shelters, while others
            abandoned their villages for the safety of empty spaces. No fewer than five
            thousand soldiers and officers of the Jordanian army defected to the PLO, but
            most did so individually: the fact that there was no defection by whole units
            left the army’s organizational structure intact and enabled it to continue
            fighting, and did little to strengthen the PLO.

            After their initial setback, the Jordanians counter-attacked the invading force
            from Syria and halted its advance. When King Hussein sent his air force against
            it, the Syrian air force commander and Minister of Defence, General Hafez Al
            Assad, refused to use his aircraft and the Syrian ground forces had to
            withdraw. What lay behind the Syrian move was Assad’s calculating conviction
            that the use of his air force would bring the United States and Israel into the
            conflict.

            In the midst of the fighting, on 22 September, an Arab League delegation
            nominated by Nasser in a hurriedly convened meeting in Cairo arrived in Amman.
            It was headed by the Sudanese President, Ja’afar Numeiri, who was accompanied
            by the Tunisian Prime Minister, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence and the
            Egyptian chief of staff. The following day, with Arafat on the move to avoid
            capture but remarkably still in total command of the Palestinian forces, the
            Arab delegates hammered out an agreement with PLO leaders Abu Iyad (Salah
            Khalaf) and Farouk Qaddoumi, who had been taken prisoner by the Jordanians and
            were released by Hussein to act as negotiators. But no sooner had the Arab
            delegates returned to Cairo than Arafat rejected the agreement and renewed his
            calls for the overthrow of the monarchy.

            The rejection of the agreement was vintage Arafat. Given that the PLO fighters
            were losing some ground and running low on ammunition, it was a supreme act of
            daring which undermined Abu Iyad and Qaddoumi, made him more popular with the
            anti Hussein Palestinians and forced the Arab delegation to return to Amman to
            locate him. Because the Jordanian forces kept him in hiding and on the move,
            the Arab peace-makers resorted to sending messages and signals. Eventually they
            appealed to King Hussein to restrain his fighters in certain areas and made an
            open radio appeal to Arafat to contact them. When he did, they told him that
            Nasser had ordered them not to return to Cairo without him. According to
            Arafat’s version of events, he left disguised as a Kuwaiti sitting on the plane
            next to the Kuwaiti member of the delegation, the Defence Minister Sa’ad Al
            Abdallah. However, many Jordanians continue to claim that no disguise was
            needed, that King Hussein knew of Arafat’s departure and welcomed it as a way
            of ending the fighting. In either case the strutting, fuming Arafat who arrived
            in Cairo was still full of histrionics and initially insisted, against all
            advice, on keeping his sidearm.

            Because his military Prime Minister General Daoud had defected and disappeared
            rather than speak against the Palestinians or respond to the pleas of Nasser,
            on 27 September King Hussein arrived in Cairo. He too wore the uniform of an
            army general and carried a pistol. It took considerable effort to convince the
            two men to join in the deliberations of the Arab League without their weapons.

            As expected, the meeting lacked any form of decorum. Hussein accused Arafat of
            conspiring to overthrow him and produced tapes of radio broadcasts as proof.
            Arafat retaliated by pounding the table, gesticulating and screaming: he
            accused Hussein of being an agent of imperialism and conspiring with the USA
            and Israel against the Palestinians. When it came to invective, Hussein’s
            efforts were no match for the talents Arafat had acquired on the streets of
            Cairo. The Libyan leader General Qaddafi, never one to miss participating in a
            quarrel or to utter singular stupidities, accused Hussein of being a lunatic
            like his father (Hussein’s father, King Tallal, had been forced to abdicate
            because of mental illness). King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, disheartened by the
            vulgar recriminations and incoherent rantings, declared that all Arab leaders
            must obviously be mentally unbalanced.

            It was left to an ailing, tired Nasser, who had suffered several heart attacks
            and had been ordered by his doctors to rest and avoid exertion, to hammer out
            an agreement. At the end, there was a frosty handshake between Arafat and
            Hussein. Just hours later, after saying goodbye to all the departing Arab
            leaders, Nasser suffered another heart attack, collapsed and died. The one man
            with the stature and authority to enforce the agreement was gone. For Hussein
            this represented an opportunity to finish what he had started.

            Hussein had the advantage of a simple plan which called for the ejection of the
            Palestinians from his country. Soon after returning from Cairo he formed a new
            government and appointed a hard-liner, Wasfi Tel, to the premiership. Tel, a
            former British army officer, was a calculating man of method who had the
            distinction of having drawn up the only militarily sound Arab plan in the 1948
            War. Late in 1970 he established contact with the two new Arab leaders at the
            helm in Syria and Egypt, Hafez Al Assad and Anwar Sadat, and determined that
            they would do little to help Arafat. Assad had overthrown the government headed
            by Salab Jedid and was fearful of outside intervention in Jordan, while Sadat,
            who firmly believed that Arab military victory against Israel was unattainable,
            had succeeded Nasser. Both represented more moderate approaches and were
            reluctant to come to th
            • Gość: Mosze Re: 'Fatah Land' ...(C) IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 07:22
              Black September and the Back September Terror Movement

              Hussein had the advantage of a simple plan which called for the ejection of the
              Palestinians from his country. Soon after returning from Cairo he formed a new
              government and appointed a hard-liner, Wasfi Tel, to the premiership. Tel, a
              former British army officer, was a calculating man of method who had the
              distinction of having drawn up the only militarily sound Arab plan in the 1948
              War. Late in 1970 he established contact with the two new Arab leaders at the
              helm in Syria and Egypt, Hafez Al Assad and Anwar Sadat, and determined that
              they would do little to help Arafat. Assad had overthrown the government headed
              by Salab Jedid and was fearful of outside intervention in Jordan, while Sadat,
              who firmly believed that Arab military victory against Israel was unattainable,
              had succeeded Nasser. Both represented more moderate approaches and were
              reluctant to come to the rescue of the Palestinians in the manner of the former
              regimes in these countries. With his Arab flank thus covered, Tel moved in for
              the kill.

              Arafat had returned to Jordan and set up headquarters in Ajlun in the north.
              From there he sent Tel and Hussein repeated messages professing moderation and
              promoting a policy of live and let live. His pleas amounted to too little too
              late, and Tel refused to consider any of his suggestions. Meanwhile Hussein was
              expanding his contacts with the Israelis, and by the beginning of November 1970
              he had held several meetings with them in London and Tehran. The final
              Jordanian move to liquidate the Palestinian resistance took place in July 1971.

              Having thrown Palestinian fighters out of Amman and the major towns in a series
              of deliberate dislodgements, the Jordanians eventually forced them into the
              corner of the country bordering Israel and Syria. In July the Jordanian forces,
              reorganized and with their spirits uplifted by the prospects of victory, hit
              the Palestinians with everything they had. Using tanks, aircraft and heavy
              artillery they pushed Arafat and his fighters into an indefensible triangle.
              The Palestinians were outmanoeuvred and outgunned, and this time the prospect
              of outside military assistance did not exist. Arafat’s screams of genocide drew
              Arab protests and led to the closure of the Iraqi and Syrian borders with
              Jordan and suspension of aid by Kuwait, but these measures could not alter the
              desperate plight of the Palestinian fighters. Two weeks of fighting produced
              another three thousand Palestinian dead. The ferocity of the Jordanian
              onslaught and the savagery of Hussein’s vengeance seeking Bedouin troops forced
              some of the Palestinian fighters to flee across the River Jordan and seek
              asylum in Israel.

              Arafat had no way out of his military and political predicament except to leave
              the country. After several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with Hussein
              through a trusted friend, former general Radi Abdallah, he sent an urgent
              appeal to the leading Palestinian member of Tel’s cabinet, Munib Masri, to
              rescue him. The lat-ter travelled to northern Jordan in the company of the
              Saudi Ambassador to Jordan, Fahd Al Koheimi, and talked Arafat, who was hiding
              in a cave, into returning to Amman to meet King Hussein. But Arafat knew he
              could not face Hussein to negotiate what amounted to terms of surrender. On
              reaching the town of Jarrash in the company of Masri and Al Koheimi he asked to
              be driven in the direction of the Syrian border. After crossing into Syria he
              soon moved to Lebanon with two thousand of his fighters to avoid being under
              the control of President Assad, a man forever opposed to independent PLO action
              and determined to place the Palestinian resistance under his country's control.
              Yasser Arafat may have been defeated but he remained arrogant and unrepentant.

              Black September Organization

              On 28 November 1971, an organization which was to leave an indelible mark on
              the history of political terror and the modern Middle East committed its first
              murder. Four armed Palestinians, operating in broad daylight and without the
              benefit of masks, shot dead the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wash Tel, as he
              returned to Cairo’s Sheraton Hotel from an Arab League meeting. The
              assassination itself was followed by a gruesome ritual as one of the killers
              knelt down, lapped up and drank some of Tel’s flowing blood and shouted several
              times that he and his accomplices belonged to Black September. The following
              month the group tried to assassinate Jordan’s Ambassador to London, Zeid Al
              Rifai’, a leading politician who had supported King Hussein’s crackdown on the
              Palestinians. There was no let-up, and in February 1972 members of Black
              September blew up a West German electrical installation and a Dutch gas plant.

              These four acts of terrorism revealed a great deal about the organization
              behind them. Black September's fearless members were willing to defy major Arab
              governments, including the very important Egyptian one. The attempt to
              assassinate Rifai’ in London demonstrated that they had international
              connections. The attacks against the West German and Dutch installations
              indicated that the plans of the new terror group went beyond eliminating
              individuals and included a threat to the economic infrastructure of the West on
              its home ground.

              The reaction to the attacks followed clear-cut lines. Because they acted as a
              safety valve for Palestinian frustration, the majority of Palestinians
              applauded them. Most of the Arab states either sanctioned Black September or
              looked the other way, and this was confirmed in a dramatic way when the the
              Egyptians released Tel’s assassins on phoney technical grounds. The West took
              hurried steps to protect its airports and industrial complexes and began to
              draw up protective measures. And Israel, utterly stunned by the Palestinians’
              ability to rise from the ashes, resorted to increased aerial attacks on PLO
              bases and began developing plans for responding to the new threat on a global
              basis.

              In 1972, what amounted to a full-fledged war of terror between the Palestinians
              and Israel complemented the escalating situation on the ground. In January, PLO
              raids from Lebanon against northern Israel prompted an Israeli incursion into
              that country and aerial attacks against PLO bases there as well as the first
              attack against Syria since the 1967 War. The Syrian aerial response came close
              to starting a full-scale war. Later PLO cross border activities resulted in
              similar land, air and sea clashes and further Israeli incursions which
              occasionally involved thousands of men. The Palestinian issue was alive, the
              raids against Israel and Black September terror tactics were successful; the
              United Nations and the rest of the world were left in no doubt that the defeat
              in Jordan had not finished off the PLO or Arafat’s leadership.

              Countering and containing the acts of terror was what pre-occupied everyone,
              rather than the message which Black September sent out. In May 1972 there was
              another hijacking, of a Belgian Sabena plane flying from Vienna to Tel Aviv.
              Later that month, using their international connections and relying for
              assistance on members of the Japanese Red Army, the PFLP carried out an attack
              on Lod airport in Israel which left twenty-four dead. On 9 July, the Israelis
              hit back by assassinating PFLP spokesman Ghassan Kanafani and his niece in
              Beirut. Two days later, a bomb at a Tel Aviv bus terminal wounded eleven
              people. On the 19th, a letter bomb came close to killing Kanafani’s second-in-
              command, Bassam Abu Sharif. On the 25th, Black September attacked an oil
              refinery in Trieste in north-eastern Italy. The cycle of violence had to end
              with war or escalate into some sensele
              • Gość: Mosze Re: 'Fatah Land' ...(D) IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 07:24
                Black September and the Back September Terror Movement


                Countering and containing the acts of terror was what pre-occupied everyone,
                rather than the message which Black September sent out. In May 1972 there was
                another hijacking, of a Belgian Sabena plane flying from Vienna to Tel Aviv.
                Later that month, using their international connections and relying for
                assistance on members of the Japanese Red Army, the PFLP carried out an attack
                on Lod airport in Israel which left twenty-four dead. On 9 July, the Israelis
                hit back by assassinating PFLP spokesman Ghassan Kanafani and his niece in
                Beirut. Two days later, a bomb at a Tel Aviv bus terminal wounded eleven
                people. On the 19th, a letter bomb came close to killing Kanafani’s second-in-
                command, Bassam Abu Sharif. On the 25th, Black September attacked an oil
                refinery in Trieste in north-eastern Italy. The cycle of violence had to end
                with war or escalate into some senseless act of outrageous proportions, and it
                did.

                On 5 September 1972, during the Olympic Games, the Munich Massacre entered the
                vocabulary of the world. This Black September operation, code named Ikrit and
                Byram after two villages in Galilee razed by the Israelis, generated shock
                waves which no one could ignore. Two Israeli athletes were killed when hooded
                Palestinians raided the Olympic grounds and took another eleven as hostages.
                Later, in a twenty-three-hour drama, a German attempt to lure the kidnappers
                failed and in the ensuing shoot-out nine more Israeli athletes, five of the
                eight gunmen and a German policeman perished. The three surviving kidnappers
                were captured by the Germans but freed later after the hijacking of a Lufthansa
                plane. The hijacking of this plane from Beirut turned out to be set up by the
                Germans and the Palestinians so as to give the Germans a reason to release the
                terrorists as the Germans wanted to wash their hands of the entire affair.
                Pictures of the hooded gunmen were flashed all over the world; they became the
                masked face of Palestinian resistance, the face of terror.

                These statistics were nothing compared with the world wide impact of Munich.
                The victims were athletes participating in the most international event of them
                all, and the media coverage was greater than that for the hijackings. The world
                could not overlook the challenge of Munich. The world was disgusted by the
                actions of the Palestinians and there was a public outcry against Palestinian
                terror.

                The Birth of Black September

                Immediately after their ejection from northern Jordan and before their move to
                Lebanon, in August and September 1971, the PLO had met in Damascus to lick its
                wounds and decide on a course of action. The recollections of a member of the
                PFLP command who participated in the meetings, and the length of time it took
                to reach a decision, attest to the lack of agreement on what was needed to keep
                the flame of resistance alive. Moderate Khalid Al Hassan, who had acted as de
                facto foreign affairs spokesman for the PLO, was firmly opposed to the use of
                terror tactics. Arguing against him were Abu Iyad, Abu Jihad, Kamal Adwan, Mi
                Hassan Salameh (Abu Hassan), George Habbash of the PFLP and the DFLP
                representatives. Arafat straddled the fence but was dead set against any such
                acts taking place under the name of the PLO and in fact, Arafat suggested the
                use of a new name but the final decision to create the Black September Movement
                it is reported that Arafat did not vote.

                Black September thus came into being. It was a conglomeration of the leading
                Palestinian resistance groups, and the PFLP in particular provided it with all
                the expertise at its disposal and volunteers.

                It was the strength of Palestinian feeling which cornered Arafat into accepting
                the idea of a terror organization; the master of consensus, whose leadership of
                the Palestinians during the war in Jordan had diminished him, could not do
                otherwise and survive. What followed the creation of Black September showed him
                at his disorganized worst. The killing of Wasfi Tel in Cairo was carried out
                under the direction of Ali Hassan Salameh, a handsome, ambitious, whisky
                drinking young skirt chaser who had been trained in guerrilla tactics in Egypt.
                Despite the protest resignation of Khalid Al Hassan, this event had broad based
                Palestinian approval.

                Black September had no single leader. Salameh was determined to endear himself
                to Arafat and became something akin to an adopted son, but Abu Iyad and
                Mohammed Yusuf Al Najjar were also determined to leave their mark. Najjar was
                not after personal glory, but Salameh and Abu Iyad were, and the latter in
                particular was determined to erase the stigma attached to him by Arafat for
                reaching an agreement during the fighting in Jordan which proved unacceptable
                to the PLO and its leader. This produced rivalry both for the leadership of
                Black September and for credit for the various operations. For example,
                insiders confirm that Trieste was definitely Salameh’s work, but, despite
                accusations against him which ultimately cost him his life, Munich was the
                responsibility of Abu Iyad, and many of the hijackings which followed were the
                work of the PFLP assuming the name of Black September.

                Even after more than twenty years no evidence has been uncovered to suggest
                that Arafat was personally involved, or that he approved any one single
                operation. But he was in a position to stop the operations, at least most of
                them, and that he did not do. Nor was he averse to seeing the various members
                of Fatah and the PLO compete with each other as to who conducted the more
                successful acts of terror: it weakened them and made them more dependent on
                him. Certainly he knew who the culpable trio were and was content to see them
                burn themselves and reap the benefits. By being aware and not acting against
                the attacks committed in the name of Black September across the board, he gave
                them his approval.

                In particular Arafat's close association with Salameh, a seriously flawed show-
                off who wore unbuttoned silk shirts and tailored suits, surrounded himself with
                eighteen guards at a time and listened to Elvis Presley’s ‘Love Me Tender’
                every day, suggests a wish to control events without direct involvement.

                The Death of Black September

                On 1 March 1973, an eight man Black September hit squad shot their way into the
                Saudi Embassy in Khartoum where a farewell party was being held for American
                chargé d’affaires J. Curtis Moore. They took the guests hostage and made the
                usual demands for the freeing of prisoners in several countries. It was an
                affront to Sudan’s President Ja’afar Numeiri, the man who had saved Arafat
                during the fighting in Amman, an insult to the Saudis, who had continued to
                fund the PLO, and a direct threat to American diplomats. The negotiations with
                the semi-literate terrorists got nowhere and the grisly episode ended with the
                cold-blooded murder in the embassy basement of Moore, the American Ambassador,
                Cleo Noel, and the Belgian chargé d’affaires, Guy Eid.

                The terrorists were in radio contact and receiving instructions from Beirut
                during the day long siege but the Israeli claim that Arafat personally gave
                them orders, has never been verified and consequent events suggest it was
                untrue. The Israelis failed to produce the tapes of Arafat issuing
                instructions; the American monitoring of the operation produced nothing to
                incriminate him. Arafat despatched an emissary to the Sudan to mend relations
                with that country. The brutality of the attack disgusted the world. Public
                opinion had turned even more against the Palestinians and Arafat was on the
                defensive.

                The Israelis were not going to take Palestinian terrorist attacks lying down
                and went on the offensive. Following the
                • Gość: Mosze Re: 'Fatah Land' ...(E) IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 07:26
                  Black September and the Back September Terror Movement


                  The Israelis were not going to take Palestinian terrorist attacks lying down
                  and went on the offensive. Following the Munich massacre the Israelis sent out
                  hit squads to take out those involved, the Israelis managed to assassinate two
                  out of the three Palestinians that survived the shoot out at Munich and the
                  Israelis also managed to liquidate at least a dozen others involved in the
                  planning. Israeli actions reached a climax in March 1973 in the form of
                  Operation Spring of Youth, the assassination by an Israeli hit squad in Beirut
                  of PLO terrorist leaders Kamal Adwan, Mohammed Yusuf Al Najjar and Kamal
                  Nassar.

                  All of this was now too much for Arafat, his top terrorists were dropping like
                  flies and all the attacks had achieved was a popular distaste towards the PLO
                  and the Palestinians. Arafat decided it was time to quietly halt terror attacks
                  against the West and so Black September for the most part vanished quietly into
                  the night but its members continue to be hunted down.

                  Even though the West was to be spared Palestinian terror the Middle East was
                  not to be so fortunate and Lebanon was to suffer more than any other country at
                  the hands of the Palestinians whose actions and those of their allies resulted
                  in fifteen year war and the destruction of the Lebanese state.

                  [Home]-[Top]-[Site search]-[Site map]-[The Lebanese War]
                  • wrzesien70 Re: 'szaron jest swinia 28.09.03, 07:44
                    zydku napisz cos o tej swini szaronie.siejesz tu ta swoja propagande, a i tak
                    maja cie gdzies mosku gebelsiku.
                    • wrzesien70 Re: 'mosiek masz prezent na swoj nowy rok 28.09.03, 08:10
                      Żydowski policjant Carl Perechodnik, który zginął pod koniec wojny, zapisał w
                      swym pamiętniku: "Nie ma żadnego usprawiedliwienia dla policjantów żydowskich w
                      Warszawie (...). Skamieniały im serca, obce stały się wszelkie ludzkie uczucia.
                      Łapali ludzi, na rękach znosili z mieszkań niemowlęta, przy okazji rabowali.
                      Nic też dziwnego, że Żydzi nienawidzili swojej policji bardziej niż Niemców,
                      bardziej niż Ukraińców" (C. Perechodnik: "Czy ja jestem mordercą?", Warszawa
                      1993, s. 112-113).

                      • snajper55 Do wrześniowego polaczka. 28.09.03, 20:14
                        wrzesien70 napisał:

                        > Żydowski policjant Carl Perechodnik, który zginął pod koniec wojny, zapisał w
                        > swym pamiętniku: "Nie ma żadnego usprawiedliwienia dla policjantów żydowskich
                        > w Warszawie(...) Skamieniały im serca, obce stały się wszelkie ludzkie uczucia
                        > Łapali ludzi, na rękach znosili z mieszkań niemowlęta, przy okazji rabowali.
                        > Nic też dziwnego, że Żydzi nienawidzili swojej policji bardziej niż Niemców,
                        > bardziej niż Ukraińców" (C. Perechodnik: "Czy ja jestem mordercą?", Warszawa
                        > 1993, s. 112-113).

                        No i co z tego ? Sądzisz, że polscy policjanci byli lepsi ?

                        Snajper.
                        • pan.scan -----> Snajper 28.09.03, 20:30
                          witaj. Wrzuć do wyszukiwarki Perechodnik a potem Ringelblum - to nazwiska
                          podane dziś przez naszego nowego kolegę(?) "wrzesień70". Powoływał się na
                          nie "eres". Zwróć uwagę na dyskutujących z nim. O głupotę eresa
                          - uchowaj Boże -nie posądzam.
                          Pozdrawiam
                          S.
                          • wrzesien70 Re: -----> Snajper 29.09.03, 00:56
                            pan.scan napisała:

                            > witaj. Wrzuć do wyszukiwarki Perechodnik a potem Ringelblum - to nazwiska
                            > podane dziś przez naszego nowego kolegę(?) "wrzesień70". Powoływał się na
                            > nie "eres". Zwróć uwagę na dyskutujących z nim. O głupotę eresa
                            > - uchowaj Boże -nie posądzam.
                            > Pozdrawiam
                            > S.
                            Ringelblum Emanuel (1900-1944), polski historyk żydowski, działacz społeczny i
                            polityczny. Zajmował się dziejami Żydów polskich do końca XVIII w. oraz
                            historią książki i drukarstwa żydowskiego. Podczas okupacji niemieckiej członek
                            władz podziemnych warszawskiego getta, współorganizator pomocy społecznej.

                            Autor Kroniki getta warszawskiego wrzesień 1939 - styczeń 1943 (1983).
                            Inicjator konspiracyjnego Archiwum Getta, gromadzącego wszelkie informacje oraz
                            dokumenty urzędowe dotyczące Żydów w gettach Warszawy i innych miast

                            W czym masz problem, chyba nie posadzisz Ringelbluma o antysemityzm.
                            eres jest madry bo cytuje to co sie nalezy.
                            a czarny september cytuje to co jest nie na raczke, tylko , ze tez z
                            Ringelbluma, a wiec juz zarzut o antysemityzm odpada.
                            trzeba ta zabe zjesc.
                            • snajper55 Re: -----> Snajper 29.09.03, 01:10
                              wrzesien70 napisał:

                              > pan.scan napisała:
                              >
                              > > witaj. Wrzuć do wyszukiwarki Perechodnik a potem Ringelblum - to nazwiska
                              > > podane dziś przez naszego nowego kolegę(?) "wrzesień70". Powoływał się na
                              > > nie "eres". Zwróć uwagę na dyskutujących z nim. O głupotę eresa
                              > > - uchowaj Boże -nie posądzam.
                              > > Pozdrawiam
                              > > S.
                              > Ringelblum Emanuel (1900-1944), polski historyk żydowski, działacz społeczny
                              i
                              > polityczny. Zajmował się dziejami Żydów polskich do końca XVIII w. oraz
                              > historią książki i drukarstwa żydowskiego. Podczas okupacji niemieckiej
                              członek
                              >
                              > władz podziemnych warszawskiego getta, współorganizator pomocy społecznej.
                              >
                              > Autor Kroniki getta warszawskiego wrzesień 1939 - styczeń 1943 (1983).
                              > Inicjator konspiracyjnego Archiwum Getta, gromadzącego wszelkie informacje
                              oraz
                              >
                              > dokumenty urzędowe dotyczące Żydów w gettach Warszawy i innych miast
                              >
                              > W czym masz problem, chyba nie posadzisz Ringelbluma o antysemityzm.
                              > eres jest madry bo cytuje to co sie nalezy.
                              > a czarny september cytuje to co jest nie na raczke, tylko , ze tez z
                              > Ringelbluma, a wiec juz zarzut o antysemityzm odpada.
                              > trzeba ta zabe zjesc.

                              A konkretnie, to o jakiej żabie piszesz ?

                              Snajper.
                              • pan.scan --------->Tej z Belgii. 29.09.03, 07:53
                                Gini czyli "patriotyczne serduszko". Obecnie "wrzesien70".

                                snajper55 napisał:

                                > A konkretnie, to o jakiej żabie piszesz ?
                                > Snajper.
                        • wrzesien70 Re: Do wrześniowego polaczka. 29.09.03, 01:14
                          snajper55 napisał:

                          > wrzesien70 napisał:
                          >
                          > > Żydowski policjant Carl Perechodnik, który zginął pod koniec wojny, zapisa
                          > ł w
                          > > swym pamiętniku: "Nie ma żadnego usprawiedliwienia dla policjantów żydowsk
                          > ich
                          > > w Warszawie(...) Skamieniały im serca, obce stały się wszelkie ludzkie ucz
                          > ucia
                          > > Łapali ludzi, na rękach znosili z mieszkań niemowlęta, przy okazji rabowal
                          > i.
                          > > Nic też dziwnego, że Żydzi nienawidzili swojej policji bardziej niż Niemcó
                          > w,
                          > > bardziej niż Ukraińców" (C. Perechodnik: "Czy ja jestem mordercą?", Warsza
                          > wa
                          > > 1993, s. 112-113).
                          >
                          > No i co z tego ? Sądzisz, że polscy policjanci byli lepsi ?
                          >
                          > Snajper.
                          Naziści są zadowoleni, że eksterminacja Żydów jest realizowana z całą niezbędną
                          efektywnością. Czyn ten jest dokonywany przez żydowskich siepaczy (Jewish
                          slaughterers). (...) To żydowska policja jest najokrutniejsza wobec skazanych
                          (...) Nazi są usatysfakcjonowani robotą żydowskiej policji, tej plagi
                          żydowskiego organizmu (...) Wczoraj, trzeciego sierpnia, oni wyrżnęli ulice
                          Zamenhofa i Pawią. (...) SS-owscy mordercy stali na straży podczas gdy żydowska
                          policja pracowała na dziedzińcach. To była rzeź w odpowiednim stylu - oni nie
                          mieli litości nawet dla dzieci i niemowląt (podkr. - J.R.N.). Wszystkich z
                          nich, wszystkich bez wyjątku, zabrano do wrót śmierci" (por. "Scroll of Agency:
                          The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan", New York 1973, s. 384, 386, 389, 399). Na
                          s. 231 swej książki Kaplan cytuje jakże gorzki ówczesny dowcip żydowski. Miał
                          on formę krótkiej modlitwy: "Pozwól nam wpaść w ręce agentów gojów, tylko nie
                          pozwól nam wpaść w ręce żydowskiego agenta!". Podobne w wymowie są zapiski
                          Aleksandra Bibersteina, dyrektora żydowskiego szpitala zakaźnego w krakowskim
                          getcie. W swoich wspomnieniach o żydowskiej służbie porządkowej OD
                          (Ordnungsidienst) Biberstein pisał m. in.: "Przez cały czas okupacji
                          Ordnungsdienst był narzędziem w ręku gestapo, na jego polecenie odemani (tj.
                          członkowie Ordnungsdienst - J.R.N.) wykonywali bez zastrzeżeń najpodlejsze
                          czynności, prześcigając często bezwzględnością Niemców" (A.
                          Bilberstein: "Zagłada Żydów w Krakowie", Kraków 1985, s. 165).

                          Autor pamiętnika z getta warszawskiego Henryk Makower pisał o jakże niegodnym
                          zachowaniu żydowskiej Służby Porządkowej w czasie blokad domów w
                          getcie: "Blokady wyzwoliły wśród SP (Służby Porządkowej - J.R.N.) całą masę
                          łajdactwa i draństwa. Opornych bito pałkami, nie gorzej od Niemców. Do tego
                          dołączyło się rabowanie opuszczonych mieszkań pod jakimś pretekstem, np. żeby
                          nie zostawiać rzeczy Niemcom. Wielu "porządnych

                          Ja tam nic nie sadze , a kto to jest polaczek wg ciebie?
                          • Gość: Mosze Co wlasciwie chcesz pokazac...?? IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 29.09.03, 07:47
                            Ze w tych czarnych dniach, ludzie chcieli zyc i dlatego to kazdy mordowal....
                            Nieraz sa tragiczne wypadki na stadionach pilki noznej, tam tez zostaja
                            zadeptani. Instyktownie kazde stworzenie chce zyc i kiedy grozi zaglada to
                            kazdy mysli tylko o SIEBIE.
                          • snajper55 Re: Do wrześniowego polaczka. 29.09.03, 10:21
                            wrzesien70 napisał:

                            > Ja tam nic nie sadze , a kto to jest polaczek wg ciebie?

                            To taki głupek, co Żydów nazywa żydkami.

                            Snajper.
    • Gość: Mosze Re: Czarny Wrzesien 1970r. 'Black September' IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 19:22
      Co mozna robic zeby nie powtorzyl sie jeszcze raz "Czarny Wrzesien"
      • Gość: Blong Re: Czarny Wrzesien 1970r. 'Black September' IP: *.zabkowska.sdi.tpnet.pl 28.09.03, 19:36
        jak najszybciej pozwolic na powstanie panstwa palestyna, przestac uprawiac
        terroryzm panstwowy i poprawic stosunki z sasiadami
        • Gość: Mosze Re: Czarny Wrzesien 1970r. 'Black September' IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 19:55
          To moze napiszesz kilka slow do prezydenta Palestyny, jesli chcesz jego maila
          to podam, moze wlasciwie uslyszy twoja rade....
          bo teraz cos ze sluchem i widzeniem u niego nie tak....
          • Gość: Blong Re: Czarny Wrzesien 1970r. 'Black September' IP: *.zabkowska.sdi.tpnet.pl 28.09.03, 20:06
            jesli mnie pamiec nie myli to problem z utworzeniem panstwa palestyna ma juz 55
            lati izrael a nie arafat
            tez sobie nie przypominam zeby palestynskie samoloty atakowaly politykow w
            izraelu, morduja tam roznego rodzaju zbrodniarze palestynscy ale nie
            palestynskie wladze
            • Gość: Mosze Archiwium mordow... IP: *.red.bezeqint.net 28.09.03, 21:57
              Zobacz ten link, ile razy na dzien sa starcia...

              www.yeshanews.org/archive.php
              • Gość: Blong ty o kozie IP: *.zabkowska.sdi.tpnet.pl 28.09.03, 22:01
                ja o wozie
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