Chciałbym polecic poniższy tekst z portalu bne intelligence na temat skutków sankcji nałożonych na Rosję i rosyjskiej odpowiedzi na nie. Z większoscia wniosków pana Chrisa Weafera sie zgadzam i chętnie na ten temat podyskutuje
Lenin famously said “everything is connected to everything else” and with more, possibly “crushing,” sanctions due to be imposed on Russia soon the effect on the Russian economy and capital markets is profound, but not all bad.
Many factors, such as the currency, policy options and economic performance, are connected to sanctions events and threats. Below is a diagram that attempts to show the important connections for investors and companies working in Russia, as well as an attempt to sketch out how the moving parts fit together.
And more sanctions are coming: it is only a matter of when, and in what form, rather than if. The next round could be passed as soon as late November when the 90-day review of Russia’s compliance with the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) sanction is scheduled to take place and, if Moscow is deemed not to be compliant, then President Trump must choose at least three out of the six possible punishments that have been published.
Sanctions have been a matter of fact for all involved with Russia since early 2014 but what is different this time is the relative calm while waiting for the next wave to hit. There have been no threats of major retaliation from the Duma and the ruble has pulled back to the mid-sixties against the dollar and appears parked there until the next sanctions are announced and the impact assessed. President Putin’s comment to his US counter-part is simply to “get on with it”
It is fair to say that one reason for the relative calm is a sense that conditions do not exist for the worst-case threats, such as blocking Russia using the US dollar and US financial system for transactions, being put in place and that Moscow is relatively immune from more of the same sort sanctions that it has been hit with over the past five years, including the escalation since the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) legislation was signed by President Trump on August 2 last year.
There is a sense that Russia has not only adapted well to the sanctions but has actually used the fact of the sanctions to push through much needed monetary and fiscal changes that would otherwise have been avoided or taken much longer. Therefore, the argument goes, more sanctions will only accelerate that process.
Such thinking is clearly wishful and wrong. Sanctions are always damaging in some respect and, in the case of Russia, have resulted in a big slowdown of inward investment in recent years. Big corporations and investors that do not need to be in Russia, i.e. who are not already well established and making money in the country, have generally adopted a prudent stay away stance and have no intention of straying from that anytime soon.
But it is equally wrong to say that sanctions have not been a positive driver of change in Russia. The government would certainly have had more options to ride out the oil price collapse in 2015 and 2016