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Swiblowo, co bedzie juto?

22.01.21, 21:21
Czy masz smialosc sprobowac sprognozowac to, jak odbeda sie jutro protesty w Rosji? Przeciez w odroznieniu od nas wszystkich, jestes wewnatrz tego wszystkiego. To wszystko dzieje sie na Twoich oczach, i nikt oprocz Ciebie nie wie o tym, jakie sa prawdziwe nastroje Rosjan.
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    • swiblowo Re: Swiblowo, co bedzie juto? 22.01.21, 22:35
      Nastroje Rosjan sa takie, ze rekami i nogami отбиваются od depresji. Jest w ludziach jakis... nie marazm, a безысходность что-ли...

      Odnisnie protestow, to za gamoniow uczacych sie w systemie ЭГЕ - tak bardzo chwalonym przez Ciebie onegdaj smile, reki nie daje. Oni ani myslec ani analizowac nie umieja.
      Starsze gamonie - jak Ty na przyklad, jest nadzieja, ze odrozniaja "winien" od "ma". Tez zalezy od tego, ile kto ma.

      No i trzeba sobie zdawac sprawe, ze to jest dalszy ciag rozwalania Sowieckiego Sojuza. Ze daleko nie kazdy pojal w swoim przezartym wodka i ЭГЕ mozgu, ze " nie isc jutro na miting" to = podtrzymywac idea powrotu do suwerennosci tego kraju. No! Ktos im to klarownie wylozyl? Nie. Duzo ludzi stac na samodzielna analize? Nie. А картинка беспредела то видная, не так ли?
    • rosjaiswiat1 Czym jest szalenstwo? 22.01.21, 23:06
      Jak mawial Vaas Montenegro w Far Cry 3:
      "Mowilem ci juz, co to jestszalenstwo? Szalenstwo polega na dokladnym powtorzeniu tego samego dzialania. Raz po raz, w nadziei na zmiane. To jest szalone. Kiedy pierwszy raz to uslyszalem, nie pamietam, kto powiedzial to gowno, ja bum, go zabilem. Chodzi o to, ze mial racje. A potem zaczalem widziec to wszedzie. Wszedzie tam, gdzie sie nie patrzy-te glupoty. Gdziekolwiek spojrzysz, robia dokladnie to samo, w kolko i w kolko, w kolko i w kolko. I mysla: "teraz wszystko sie zmieni. Nie, Nie, Prosze. Teraz bedzie inaczej". Pardon. Nie podoba mi sie, jak ... patrzysz na mnie! Ok? Myslisz, ze mam problem z glowa? Myslisz, ze wieszam makarony na uszy, klamie? Wynocha! Ok? Pierdol sie! ..........

      Ten cytat z gry jak najlepiej odzwieciedla to, co robi Nawalny, i ci kto nim kieruje.

      • kommersant Re: Czym jest szalenstwo? 22.01.21, 23:12
        Jesi ktos zna angielski to polecam wypowiedz znanego blogera Anatolija Karlina który szacuje ze stawi sie około 15 tysiecy osob w tym przewaznie studentów i młodzierzy szkolnej
        www.unz.com/akarlin/
        Plus ça change… Just like three years ago on March 26, 2017, the protest “Freedom to Navalny!” tomorrow is to start on Pushkin Square (see above) and march down the central Tverskaya Boulevard down to Manezh Square, which is right next to the Kremlin.

        I attended that prior protest (as an informal observer, not a participants – though the distinction would have been theoretical had I been arrested), and confirmed for myself that the police estimate of ~7,500 was accurate:

        The regime loyalist I was with estimated there were about 5,000 protesters. A guy with a Ukrainian flag lapel badge whom I asked for his opinion said 10,000. Taking the average estimate from supporters and detractors was a good strategy for estimating crowd size in 2011-12, and coincidentally enough, the resulting figure of 7,500 coincided exactly with the police estimate of 7,000-8,000 protesters. This is not altogether bad, thought quite insubstantial in a city of 12 million.

        To be sure, this was an unsanctioned protest, and as I pointed out earlier, a lot of the risk-averse office plankton who form the bulk of Navalny’s support don’t turn up to such protests. They don’t want to run the risk of getting arrested, not when it could impact on their employment. Still, this is about 3x fewer participants than in the last big protest of the 2012 wave, which was also unsanctioned, the farcical “March of the Millions” of May 6 to which about 25,000 turned up.

        Will there be more or fewer people now?

        Certainly the events preceding this are much more dramatic – the poisoning of Navalny, direct accusations that this was attempted murder on Putler’s part, Navalny’s return to Russia on a sealed airplane, and a corruption investigation now targeting Putin himself (as opposed to his underlings). Certainly it is my impression from Le Reddit that Western normies, buoyed by the removal of Bad Orange Man, are expecting great things from this.

        But in the world of reality, as opposed to wishful rhetoric, the best historical guide to how many people will come to these things is banally how many people say they will come on social media.

        Here are the results for Moscow, which is ultimately the only part of the country that counts so far as “color revolution” risk is concerned.

        Bolotnaya Protest in 2011 (the first one):

        33,000 on Facebook and 18,600 on VK said they’d come. (A further 10,000 and 27,000, respectively, said they are interested and/or might come).
        Actual attendance: ~60,000 (~120% of expressed intent across the two platforms)
        “Он нам не Димон” protest (2017, March):

        The historical pages indicate 5,000 on Facebook (3,900 interested) and 7,100 on VK (2,500 interested).
        Actual attendance: ~7,500 (~60%).
        Constitution Day protest (2017, June):

        4,000 on Facebook (4,000 interested)
        Actual attendance: Couple of thousands? (hard to say as he intentionally “crashed” a concurrent history festival in the center of Moscow)
        Today, on the eve of “Freedom to Navalny!”:

        5,300 say they’re going on Facebook (9,700 interested) and 13,300 on VK (4,400 interested).
        Actual attendance: ?
        Naively extrapolating, this means that we should expect something like 20,000*60% or 120% = 12,000-24,000 people to turn up. There are, of course, divergences from this model that may favor greater turnout, lesser turnout, or have unclear effects.

        Factors expected to decrease turnout:

        The penalties for unsanctioned protests have been progressively stepped up over the past few years, increasing their costs for normies with jobs or at university. Incidentally, this also has the effect of age shifting protests towards young people and, increasingly, schoolchildren.
        The most important difference is that the 2011 protest was legally sanctioned, which is not the case in either the 2017 one or nowso we should really privilege the ratio from 2017 as opposed to the one from 2011.
        There are more Russians on social media – especially Facebook – now than in 2011, though this is partially balanced out by zoomers migrating to strange new platforms.
        Factors expected to increase turnout:

        The YouTube video about Putin’s palaces had already gotten about 3x the pageviews that the hit video on Dmitry Medvedev got in 2017 at the time of the protests (~60 million vs. ~20 million), suggesting greater public interest. However, this effect should be diluted by greater Russian familiarity with Navalny’s YouTube in 2021 (quintupling in subscriber numbers to 5 million), the highly dramatic events surrounding this “expose” of Putin’s corruption, and – especially – the much greater foreign interest expressed in it (it has been prominent on /r/worldnews for many days now).
        Putin’s approval rating was 80% in 2017, versus 65% today (which is far closer to his approval rating in 2011-12, when it neared 60%). Conversely, though, whereas discontent was strongly concentrated in Moscow a decade ago, today it is more dispersed. In fact, with 1,000 prospective attendees on Facebook and 8,300 on VK, almost as many people (~75%) say they will turn up in Saint-Petersburg despite that city having just ~40% of Moscow’s population. (Rage over massive electoral falsifications was the primary driving force of the 2011-12 protest wave in Moscow).
        Russian zoomers are much more oppositionist now than in 2017 (to say nothing of 2011), but they don’t hang out on Facebook or VK, but on newer platforms – most notably, TikTok. As such, attendance figures on boomer (>30 years) social media may not be capturing the protest potential in the youngest cohorts, who are also by far the most oppositionist.
        Factors that have a neutral or unknown effect on turnout:

        Coronavirus continues to rage in Russia, but there are no significant lockdowns and children are imminently returning to schools. So I don’t expect this to have a major effect.
        Although Moscow was hit by a major cold speed the past week (-20C), the next few days are going to be much warmer, even sliding into positive territory. So weather won’t have an effect either.
        Personal observation: Many of the same people from my “Friends” who attended in 2017 are attending now, though sample is very low – it’s not like I have many Navalnycore acquaintances. Notably, one zoomer liberal who attended in 2017 has drifted in a nationalist direction since then, and will not attend now.
        Probably the factors that increase turnout are somewhat stronger than those that decrease, so if I had to pick a number, I’d say 15,000 as opposed to 5,000 will turn up.

        Either way, it’s safe to say that it will still be much fewer than during the Bolotnaya protests of 2011-12. I also expect it to be even more loaded towards students and especially schoolchildren even relative to 2017.

        But, needless to say, this is not “color revolution” territory.

        Lukashenko survived in the aftermath of a completely falsified election with an approval rating of just 30% and with protests of 250,000 in a country with fewer people than Moscow.

        Putin retains an approval rating of 65% in a country where half the population says that Navalny was either poisoned by Western intelligence services or was faking the entire thing vs. just 15% who believe it was Putin’s regime.

        To get a color revolution I have always maintained that you need a split within the elites. A few thousand schoolchildren surrounded by throngs of foreign journalists aren’t going to get that ball rolling.
        • rosjaiswiat1 Co w tym tekscie jest najwazniejsze :-) 22.01.21, 23:35
          kommersant napisal:

          > Jesi ktos zna angielski to polecam wypowiedz znanego blogera Anatolija Karlina

          Z zalinkowanego tekstu nie trudno wyciagnac wniosek, ze ten blogier nalezy do obozu antyputinowskiemu, i jest prozachodni. Ale to jego sprawa,i jesli pominac jego odstepy, w ktorych robi polityczne deklaracje, to tekst mozna nazwac rzeczowy, a juz koncowka jest tym, co warto bylo tego, zeby przeczytac calosc: "To get a color revolution I have always maintained that you need a split within the elites A few thousand schoolchildren surrounded by throngs of foreign journalists aren’t going to get that ball rolling". Czyli to samo w jezyku polskim:"Aby zrobic rewolucje kolorowa, zawsze twierdzilem, potrzebny jest podzial wewnatrz elit.Kilka tysiecy uczniow, otoczonych tlumami zagranicznych dziennikarzy, nie bedzie w stanie tego zrobic.
          • kommersant Re: Co w tym tekscie jest najwazniejsze :-) 23.01.21, 00:10
            No to inny jego test dla ciebie Igor czy on jest antyputinowski. Ja go czytam od lat i to jest rosyjski narodowiec. On naprawde wielokrotnie chwalił Putina i atakował Nawalnego

            Artykuł o tym rzekomym pałacu Putina
            Good taste, not overly tacky (e.g. too much gold like with Trump). I’d probably build something like that as a strongman.

            There’s nothing cardinally new about Navalny’s video.

            The construction of a palace at Gelendzhik in Krasnodar Krai linked to friends of Putin was “leaked” to the world more than a decade by Sergey Kolesnikov, a businessman involved in the project. Incidentally, the first photographs of the palace appeared at the Russian language version of Wikileaks website, a detail that seems to have been written out of contemporary accounts now that Assange has long become unhandshakeworthy while the election of Biden has given the West the impetus to start intensively building up Navalny as the figurehead of the Russian Maidan.
            Why does Putin need a palace? Well, as I noted back in 2019, it seems to be a relatively cheap way to maintain elite discipline while pursuing a sovereign course.

            In traditional societies, it is mainly the aristocracy’s sense of solidarity, noblesse oblige, feudal bonds, the Mannerbund institute. Though I don’t mean to idealize it. It proved completely maladaptive come the industrial age.

            In totalitarian regimes, chiliastic ideology and repression/terror plays a major role.

            Modern, largely non-ideological populist regimes at odds with GloboHomo – that’s Putin, Orban, etc. – distribute resources or economic “demesnes” to their cronies, creating networks of personal loyalty unbeholden to the global elites – a sort of “counter-elite,” or Dugin’s so-called “patriotic corruption“. One additional “benefit” of such systems is that damning kompromat is available on “defectors” by default. Though obviously this is not the only mechanism. Putinism also has elements of a Mannerbund, as well as more severe punishments.

            China has elements of all the above, but with greater load on legitimizing ideology (it is still a Marxist-Leninist state) and on repression.

            Political elites under free markets are always poorer than economic elites. They resent that. There’s a constant incentive to defect, unless there are countervailing incentives (e.g. material gains) and disincentives (e.g. punishment for “treason”).

            Unofficial wealth is one of the big incentives and is seen from Orban’s Hungary to China (Politburo members are not poor) and Sultan Erdogan – who has constructed a nifty palace for himself too. Remember this?
            There doesn’t seem to be any way out of it. At a high enough level most everyone seems to have assets entirely incommensurate with their very modest official salaries – even people such as PM Mishustin, who made his name combating tax evasion as head of the Russian tax service.

            A major convenience of this system is that the “shadow” nature of this wealth also constitutes ready-made “kompromat” and a built-in “corruption case” against elite defectors.

            But since Putin is the head guy, why would he need a palace? Well, it would be pretty bizarre if senior bureaucrats such as Defense Minister Shoigu had pads like these:
            … while the Tsar himself made do in a commie block.

            Clearly “Putin’s palace” needs to be the biggest and grandest one, with its cost of $1.2B about equaling all of PM Medvedev’s known assets (as per a 2017 Navalny investigation).

            He doesn’t even appear to use it much (or at all?). It’s clearly primarily there as a signal of his apex position in the dominance hierarchy to the rest of the elites.

            Is this a large sum? It might appear to be so to simple people. But in reality, one billion USD is just the equivalent of a large five star hotel. Modern societies are vastly richer than the Sun King’s France, in which the construction of the Palace of Versailles ate up 60% of the budget. This is just 0.5% of the annual Russian federal budget – less still if lower spending is included – and even that is to exaggerate the impact, because it was not built on budget money but through the reciprocal generosity of people whom Putin allowed to get rich in exchange for their implied loyalty, not just personal but geopolitical.

            To illustrate that point, if Putin would have been unable to get the Gelendzhik Palace constructed…
            No genuinely “private” company would agree to embark on such a project given the US sanctions that would have inevitably been brought against its directors and shareholders.

            It’s also not even the case that had Putin not enriched the cronies who built him his palace, the proceeds would have gone to “ordinary” Russians. All market economies concentrate wealth. Those proceeds would have ended up with other people in the construction industry, many of whom would have just used it to build smaller palaces for themselves and send their children to Hogwarts. While the Crimean Bridge would not exist, and indeed the issue would be entirely moot, since Crimea would not be Russian, given Navalny’s reaction to the return of Russian territories was to call for sanctions from his Western friends:

            Then, on Feb. 28, Russia sent troops to Ukraine in precisely such a “little war.” I admit that I underestimated Mr. Putin’s talent for finding enemies, as well as his dedication to ruling as “president for life,” with powers on par with the czars’.

            As a citizen and patriot, I cannot support actions against Russia that would worsen conditions for our people. Still, I recommend two options that, if successfully implemented, I believe would be welcomed by most Russians. …

            Such sanctions should primarily target Mr. Putin’s inner circle, the Kremlin mafia who pillage the nation’s wealth, including Gennady N. Timchenko, head of the Volga Group; Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, influential businessmen and former judo sparring partners of Mr. Putin; Yuri V. Kovalchuk, a financier believed to be Mr. Putin’s banker; Vladimir I. Yakunin, president of Russian Railways; the oligarchs Roman A. Abramovich and Alisher B. Usmanov; and Igor I. Sechin and Aleksei B. Miller, the heads of Rosneft and Gazprom, respectively.

            The sanctions must also hit the oligarchs whose media outlets parrot the regime lines, and target Mr. Putin’s entire “war cabinet”: the TV spin doctors, compliant Duma members and apparatchiks of Mr. Putin’s United Russia Party.

            Now in fairness it is logical for Western elites to support a quiescent Russian regime whose economic functionaries are clean and not at all corrupt and completely intertwined with the Western world-economy in which the rules of the game are set by the US Treasury and who own the politicians making impossible any deviation from the party line set by the State Department for its vassals. But it would be pretty stupid for Russians to once again step on the same rake that they did in 1917 and 1991 just on account of spite over Putin’s 5 star hotel.

            I do not think there will be a Maidan or anything even close for reasons I will detail in the next post. In fact I expect the protests tomorrow and henceforth to be a damp squib. But on the off chance I am wrong, Russians will only prove themselves morons.


            Polecam ci Igor cały tekst szczególnie koncowke. Autor wielokrotnie wysmiewał w swoich tekstach przez lata liberałow i chwalił Putina. Szkoda ze wyniosłes wrazenie ze on jest antyputinowski- on zyczliwie nazywa Putina Putlerem i chwalił wielokrotnie chociazby za to. Chwalił go za zajecie Krymu i raczej krytykował za za małą agresywnosc Rosji w wyniku kolorowej rewolucji na Ukrainie. Jego zdaniem Rosja powinna zajac nie tylko Kreml ale cały Donbas i Ługansk wbrew protestom Zachodu. Wiec naprawde mysle Igor ze wyniosłes złe wrazenie z lektury tego tekstu bo autor zdecydowanie bardziej popiera Putlera niz Nawalnego.

            • rosjaiswiat1 Re: Co w tym tekscie jest najwazniejsze :-) 23.01.21, 00:22
              kommersant napisał(a):

              > No to inny jego test dla ciebie Igor czy on jest antyputinowski. Ja go czytam o
              > d lat i to jest rosyjski narodowiec. On naprawde wielokrotnie chwalił Putina i
              > atakował Nawalnego

              Byc moze zbyt pobieznie przelecialem tekst. Uderzylo mnie w nim dwa fragmenty. Jeden dotyczy "Putlera":
              Certainly the events preceding this are much more dramatic – the poisoning of Navalny, direct accusations that this was attempted murder on Putler’s part, Navalny’s return to Russia on a sealed airplane, and a corruption investigation now targeting Putin himself (as opposed to his underlings). "
              A drugi o Lukaszence:
              "Lukashenko survived in the aftermath of a completely falsified election with an approval rating of just 30% and with protests of 250,000 in ..."

              Teraz przeczytalem uwazniej, i drugi zalinkowany przez Ciebie tekst, i musze uznac, ze zle osadzil tego blogiera. Chociaz i putinofilom go nazwac trudno smile
      • rosjaiswiat1 Re: Swiblowo, co bedzie juto? 23.01.21, 13:18
        monalisa2016 napisał(a):

        > Tja, jednak doszlo do demonstracji.

        I co z tego? To ze dojdzie do demonstracje nie bylo dwoch zdan. Jest istotnym na ile liczne te demonstracje beda. Stalo sie tak, jak i przypuszczalem - demonstracje pokazali to, ze realnie za Nawalnym stoi garstka ludzi Jak podaja sami organizatory, w Moskwie na protesty zjawilo sie 2 tysiecy ludzi. Czyli mozna ta liczbe smialo podzielic na dwa, i wyjdzie wtedy ile realnie w Moskwie, liczacej ponad 12 mln ludzi, wyszlo demostntrowac. Wiec to byla nie demonstracja sily Nawalnego, a demonstracja jego slabosci.

        https://storage.yandexcloud.net/vesma.today/uploads/common/2021/01/23/photo_2021-01-23_13-49-13%20%282%29-4a605502b8e7.jpg
        • eva15 Re: Swiblowo, co bedzie juto? 23.01.21, 13:56
          RT robi live przekaz i wyraźnie tu widać, że jest więcej niż 2 tys. ludzi, pewnie jest ok. 3-4 tys. Ale to i tak nic na tak wielką metropolię z ponad 12 mln ludzi.

          P.S. Przed chwilą pokazywano faceta, który wystylizował się na bawoła, tyle że nie z amerykańską a z rosyjską flagą.
          • walter622 4 tys. w Moskwie 23.01.21, 15:57
            eva15 napisała:

            > RT robi live przekaz i wyraźnie tu widać, że jest więcej niż 2 tys. ludzi, pewn
            > ie jest ok. 3-4 tys. Ale to i tak nic na tak wielką metropolię z ponad 12 mln l
            > udzi.
            >
            „Około 4 tysięcy ludzi zebrało się na Placu Puszkinskim w związku z nieuprawnionym wydarzeniem” - poinformowała policja.

            news.mail.ru/incident/44981536/
            Frekwencja najwyraźniej nie dopisała. 4 tys. w Moskwie to bardzo, bardzo mało.
            Tylu to tam się zbiera ciekawskich na otwarcie nowego sklepu. Mało, tym bardziej uwzględniając starania organizatorów przyciągnięcia jak
            największej ilości osób na dzisiejsze demonstracje. Jest to wyjątkowo poważna porażka Nawalnego, początkująca jego niebyt.

            www.youtube.com/watch?v=WScY9-YSROk

            • eva15 Re: 4 tys. w Moskwie 23.01.21, 16:04
              Trudno o jednoznaczną ocenę, jest wszak zima, no i panuje pandemia. Latem może być znacznie więcej ludzi.
              Niebezpieczne jest także to, że oni koordynują działania w całej Rosji, protesty były praktycznie we wszystkich dużych miastach.
              • rosjaiswiat1 Re: 4 tys. w Moskwie 23.01.21, 16:42
                eva15 napisała:

                > Trudno o jednoznaczną ocenę, jest wszak zima, no i panuje pandemia.

                A o tym organizatory nic nie wiedzieli?

                > Latem może być znacznie więcej ludzi.

                O ile wiecej? O 10 tysiecy, o sto? Na bolotna wychodzili ca 200 000 i nic sie nie stalo.

                > Niebezpieczne jest także to, że oni koordynują działania w całej Rosji, protest
                > y były praktycznie we wszystkich dużych miastach.

                To akurat nie jest czyms naprawde szczegolnie grozne. I doskonale obrazuje, jak duzy potecjal protestacyjny jest w Rosji.

                W innym watku, odpisujac na post Waltera, napisalem - "Taki Nawalny jest idealnym "liderem" opozycji. Krzyku duzo, a realnego zagrozenia zadnego............"
        • monalisa2016 Re: Swiblowo, co bedzie juto? 23.01.21, 14:35
          Nie graja tu roli ile tysiacy bierze udzial w demonstracji, tu widzi sie dosc dokladnie ze zasiane ziarno dosc dobrze kielkuje mimo ze zapuszkowano bliskich wspolpracownikow Nawalnego. Takie demonstracje odbywaja sie dzis w wielu rosyjskich miastach, mowiac szczerze deep state w Rosji ma wiele zwolennikow, "wczoraj byly Stany, dzis Rosja" a co jutro, my? Policja, omon (rosyjska gwardia narodowa) w akcji i nie potrafia szybko spacyfikowac demonstracji, Putin musi ich wyslac po nauki do Francji, do Niemiec, do Holandii, do ... by sie nauczyli wreszcie czegos. smile

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