dobre miejsce na azyl

IP: *.bielsko.cvx.ppp.tpnet.pl 19.07.02, 00:12
Trzej enkawudziści- główni odpowiedzalni za zbrodnie komunistyczne na
Litwinach, schronili sie w Izraelu. Na wniosek o ekstradycje odpowiadają
zarzutami antysemityzmu.
    • Gość: NKWD Re: dobre miejsce na azyl IP: *.proxy.aol.com 19.07.02, 00:30
      Gość portalu: MeF napisał(a):

      > Trzej enkawudziści- główni odpowiedzalni za zbrodnie komunistyczne na
      > Litwinach, schronili sie w Izraelu. Na wniosek o ekstradycje odpowiadają
      > zarzutami antysemityzmu.
      A Litwini niby barankami byli podczas II W. Sw. ?
      • Gość: jd Re: dobre miejsce na azyl IP: *.proxy.aol.com 19.07.02, 01:33
        nkwd-jojo zydki barankami byli tez?
        • Gość: NKWD Re: dobre miejsce na azyl IP: *.154.76.168.Dial1.NewYork1.Level3.net 19.07.02, 01:38
          Gość portalu: jd napisał(a):

          > nkwd-jojo zydki barankami byli tez?
          Bydlo lomzynskie smierdzace,tez za ludzi na Greenpoint sie uwaza . He he he,a
          nie wie,ze czuc gnojem od niego jest,kiedykolwiek sie poruszy ! TFUJ!
          • Gość: jojo Re: dobre miejsce na azyl IP: *.proxy.aol.com 19.07.02, 02:02
            przyznaje sie ja jojo jestem najwiekszym chujem w calym ukladzie nato
            • Gość: exlaks Re: dobre miejsce na azyl IP: *.proxy.aol.com 19.07.02, 02:16
              Gość portalu: jojo napisał(a):

              > przyznaje sie ja jojo jestem najwiekszym chujem w calym ukladzie nato
              Wloz ta pigulke do dupy swojej,a dowiesz sie bekarcie lomzynski,w jaki sposob z
              dupy matki z Lomzy na swiat wyszles,ze sraczka jej po przepiciu na weselu Bolka
              ze Stacha z Jedwabnego.!
              • Gość: jojo Re: dobre miejsce na azyl IP: *.proxy.aol.com 19.07.02, 02:35
                ja jojo przepraszam wszystkich na tym szanownym forum za moj chamski ryj i
                prymitywizm
    • Gość: MeF Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita IP: *.bielsko.cvx.ppp.tpnet.pl 19.07.02, 18:41
      O głównym żydowskim zbrodniarzu komunistycznym odpowiadającym za tysiące
      litewskich ofiar, można sobie poczytać w dzisiejszej Rzepie
      www.rzeczpospolita.pl
      • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 18:50
        Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA


        By Vladislav M. Zubok

        -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        -


        “The crisis years” of 1960-1962 are remembered as a peak of the
        Cold War, an apogee of the bipolar confrontation. Many consider
        them even more dangerous than the Korean War, when the military
        forces of West and East clashed and almost slipped into a global
        conflict. The early 1960s were all the more frightening since the
        two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were
        engaged in a fierce nuclear arms race, and two more states, Great
        Britain and France, had developed small nuclear arsenals of their
        own. By the end of the period the edge in this race clearly belonged
        to the United States such that, at the height of the Cuban Missile
        Crisis, Washington had at least nine times as many deliverable
        nuclear warheads as Moscow.1 After the summer of 1961 the
        Kennedy administration was perfectly aware of that fact, but,
        nevertheless, sweeping Soviet progress in ICBMs soon eliminated
        the impregnability of “fortress America” forever.

        The loss of strategic invulnerability weighed as heavily on the
        American psyche as had the loss of the atomic monopoly (and
        China) in 1949. And, as before, this agitated state of mind offered
        fertile ground for spy-hysteria. This time, however, it did not reach
        the proportions of McCarthyism, but remained localized in
        government offices where cold warriors, especially true believers
        among them, began to talk again about a “master plan” of the
        Kremlin and the KGB to delude and disrupt the Western alliance in
        preparation for a decisive showdown between the two Cold War
        blocs. Some of them, most prominently James J. Angleton, head of
        the CIA’s counterintelligence department, tenaciously denied the
        reality of the Sino-Soviet split as a “hoax” designed to lull the West
        into complacency. Angleton, along with a Soviet defector, KGB
        major Anatoly Golitsyn, also believed that there was a KGB mole
        inside the CIA’s Soviet Division, and that Soviet intelligence was
        assiduously planting its illegals and agents, primarily displaced
        persons from Eastern Europe and Russia, in various high-placed
        positions in the West. They even claimed that former British
        Labour party leader Hugh Gaitskell had probably been murdered by
        the KGB, that his successor, Harold Wilson, was probably a KGB
        asset, and that the famous double agent Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU
        (Soviet military intelligence) colonel, was also a Soviet plant.2

        The seemingly wild surmises of an American counterintelligence
        officer become more understandable as we learn more about the
        strange “behind the mirror” world of spying, double-agents, and
        deliberate disinformation in which huge and well-funded rival
        intelligence services clashed with no holds barred. Intelligence at
        any time is a necessary and valuable instrument of a state’s foreign
        policy. But in the years of Cold War tension the intelligence
        services were more than just “eyes,” they were powerful weapons in
        propaganda warfare between the ideological blocs. Furthermore, in
        a situation of mutual fear produced by the nuclear deadlock, when
        mammoth armies confronted each other in Europe and around the
        world, intelligence networks were the only mobile force in action,
        the “light infantry” of the Cold War: conducting reconnaissance, but
        also trying to influence the situation in the enemy’s rear by means
        sometimes just short of military ones.

        The plans and instructions related to operational work and
        intelligence sources, in particular involving planting agents abroad
        and using double-agents, justifiably belong to the most zealously
        guarded secrets of intelligence bureaucracies. But recently, thanks
        to the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians have acquired a rare
        chance to peek into the mysteries of one of the two intelligence
        giants of the Cold War—documents of the Committee on State
        Security (KGB). These are not papers of the First Main Directorate
        (PGU), which was responsible for foreign intelligence and which
        continues under the new regime in Russia and, of course, preserves
        its secrecy (although some of its former officers, Oleg Kalugin,
        Leonid Shebarshin, and Vadim Kirpichenko among them, have
        recently written memoirs3). The documents in question were sent
        by the KGB to the Secretariat and the Politburo of the Central
        Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC
        CPSU), whose archives, unlike those of the KGB, have in part at
        least become accessible to scholars and the public.4

        For all their fascination, the internal KGB documents cited in this
        article should also be treated with a good deal of caution. They
        contain references to events, plans, individuals, and explicit or
        implicit relationships that are uncorroborated and should be
        carefully investigated and cross-checked with other evidence before
        their accuracy and significance can be confidently gauged. Many of
        the assertions contained in the documents will require, in particular,
        collation with relevant materials in the archives of other
        governments and intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, and
        analysis by specialists in the history of intelligence. Many names in
        the documents are transliterated from the Russian after being
        transliterated from other languages, and the spelling may not be
        accurate. Moreover, in assessing reports by KGB leaders to
        Khrushchev, readers should recall the tendency of bureaucrats in
        any government to exaggerate capabilities or accomplishments to a
        superior, a provoclivity that may be accentuated when, as in this
        period, there is intense pressure to produce results. Finally, in
        addition to remembering the lack of systematic access to KGB and
        CIA archives, those who evaluate the documents that do become
        available must keep in mind that evidence on crucial matters may
        have been deliberately destroyed, distorted, fabricated, or simply
        never committed to paper. All of these caveats should simply serve
        as reminders that however revealing these materials are, much
        additional research will be needed before a balanced and informed
        evaluation of the role of intelligence agencies and activities in the
        Cold War, on all sides, can be attained.



        The KGB reports to Khrushchev

        On 14 February 1961, Nikita S. Khrushchev received an annual
        report of the KGB marked “Top Secret—Highly Sensitive.”5 Only
        Khrushchev could decide who among the top Soviet leadership
        might see the report, in which the Collegium of the KGB informed
        him as the First Secretary of the CC CPSU and as a Chairman of the
        Council of Ministers of the USSR about the achievements of Soviet
        foreign intelligence during 1960.

        In this period, Khrushchev was told, 375 foreign agents were
        recruited, and 32 officers of the State Security were transferred
        abroad and legalized. The stations abroad obtained, among others,
        position and background papers prepared by Western governments
        for the summit conference in Paris in May 1960, including materials
        on the German and Berlin questions, disarmament, and other issues.
        They also provided the Soviet leadership with “documentary
        evidence about military-political planning of some Western powers
        and the NATO alliance as whole; [...] on the plan of deployment of
        armed forces of these countries through 1960-63; evidence on
        preparation by the USA of an economic blockade of and military
        intervention against Cuba”—the last a possible allusion to
        preparations for the forthcoming April 1961 CIA-supported
        invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs.6

        The sheer numbers conve
        • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 18:52

          The sheer numbers conveyed the vast extent of information with
          which the KGB flooded the tiny group of Soviet leaders. During
          one year alone it prepared and presented 4,144 reports and 68
          weekly and monthly informational bulletins to the Party’s Central
          Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers; 4,370 documentary
          materials were sent to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; 3,470
          materials to Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and the Head of
          the General Staff Alexander Vassilevsky; and 790 materials to other
          ministries and agencies.7

          Soviet foreign intelligence appeared to have been particularly
          successful in “sigint” (signals intelligence) operations. The
          sprawling Service of Radio Interception and Code-Breaking of
          Diplomatic and Agent-Operational Communications of the
          Capitalist Countries, the innermost part of the KGB empire
          (analogous to the U.S. National Security Agency), managed to break
          many diplomatic and intelligence codes. During 1960 it reported
          deciphering 209,000 diplomatic cables sent by representatives of 51
          states, and the most important among them—133,200—were
          reported to the CPSU Central Committee. The Kremlin therefore
          apparently eavesdropped on some of the West’s most classified
          communications.

          True, there were clouds on the horizon. The enemy became
          increasingly sophisticated and difficult to penetrate. The Directorate
          of Counterintelligence confronted, according to the annual report,
          “serious difficulties” in 1960. “The adversary goes to great
          lengths,” the KGB complained. “For instance, the Committee
          noticed cases when the enemy’s intelligence officers met their
          agents on a beach and secretly exchanged materials while
          swimming. If it happens on a beach, they would lie close by,
          pretend they do not know each other and dig their materials in the
          sand, and then cautiously extract them.” There were more serious
          challenges than the “beach” method. U.S. intelligence, the KGB
          found, began to use a new type of heavily-protected codes. They
          wrote on a very thin (papirosse-type) paper prepared specifically for
          this purpose. Also a special plane was constructed in the USA to
          bring illegal agents to the USSR. “Since this plane is made of
          rubber-layered tissue,” the report said, “and can conduct flights at
          low altitudes, it has practically no chance, according to our experts,
          of being located by existing radar stations.”8

          With the life of KGB officers and agents in the United States
          becoming increasingly rough due to the effectiveness of J. Edgar
          Hoover’s FBI and harsh restrictions on travel for Soviet journalists
          and diplomats, the Committee tried to exploit the increasing trickle
          of Soviet visitors to the United States to include its operatives and
          agents. Another channel was sending younger KGB officers, Oleg
          Kalugin among them, as graduate and post-graduate students to
          Columbia, Harvard, and other American universities.

          Yet nobody could replace illegals. The KGB in 1960 began to
          move its “sleepers” in other countries to the United States “with the
          aim of planting them in a job in American intelligence or
          intelligence schools.” One priority was “to insert KGB agents as
          professors of Russian, Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian languages
          in the language school of USA military intelligence in Monterey,”
          California.9

          The report distinguished between old and new priorities of Soviet
          foreign intelligence. An old one was to ferret out, in competition
          with the GRU (Glavrazvedupr) or military intelligence, Western
          plans for rearmament and NATO’s level of combat readiness. New
          efforts were targeted, first, at scientific-technical espionage and,
          second, at elaborate propaganda and disinformation campaigns.
          The former had proved to be a stupendous success in the 1940s,
          when the Soviets obtained detailed information on the wartime
          Anglo-American atomic bomb project, and it continued to be
          important as Cold War sanctions and barriers cut the Soviets off
          from Western technologies and industrial machinery.

          During 1960, the KGB’s scientific-technical intelligence service
          reported that it stole, bought, and smuggled from the West 8,029
          classified technologies, blueprints, and schemas, as well as 1,311
          different samples of equipment.10 A special target in this regard
          was, of course, the United States. On 7 April 1960, the Central
          Committee had directed the KGB to prepare a “prospective working
          plan of the intelligence service of the Committee of State Security at
          the Council of Ministers against the United States of America.”11
          The plan, presented on 10 March 1961, postulated a wide array of
          measures.12 Among them were efforts to insinuate agents into U.S.
          scientific-technical centers, universities, industrial corporations, and
          other institutions specializing in missile building, electronics,
          aircraft, and special chemistry. The KGB planned to use “third
          countries” as a springboard for this penetration campaign. Its agents
          in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were to worm
          their way into scientific, industrial, and military research and
          consulting institutions of these countries with access to American
          know-how or subcontracting to U.S. military agencies. Agents
          residing in England, Austria, Belgium, West Germany, and Israel
          were instructed to move to the United States with the goal of finding
          jobs in the military-industrial sector.

          It also planned to organize “on the basis of a well-screened
          network of agents” several brokerage firms in order to obtain
          classified scientific-technical information and “to create conditions
          in a number of countries for buying samples of state-of-the-art
          American equipment.” One such firm was to be opened in the
          United States, one in England, and two in France. The KGB also
          prepared to open in a European country a copying center that would
          specialize copying blueprints and technical documentation in the
          fields of radioelectronics, chemistry, and robotics.13

          Some orthodox anti-communists in the CIA, known as the
          fundamentalists, were tipped off by the Soviet defector Golitsyn
          about an alleged KGB “monster plot” to create a strategic web of
          deception. According to Golitsyn, the KGB’s new chairman,
          Alexander Shelepin, the energetic and imaginative former leader of
          Young Communist League, revealed this plot in May of 1959 to the
          KGB establishment. Golitsyn even maintained, contrary to all
          evidence and logic, that the political and military split between
          China and the USSR after 1959 was a fake, just a facet of
          Shelepin’s diabolical master plan.14

          There was no such “master plan” in the KGB. But under
          Shelepin the Committee indeed hatched several schemes of strategic
          and tactical deception: to conceal Soviet intentions and weak spots
          from the West, as well as to disrupt consensus in Western societies
          and alliances on policies, means, and goals for waging the Cold
          War. In the plan presented to the Central Committee on 10 March
          1961, mentioned above, for example, the KGB proposed “to carry
          out disinformation measures on the information that American
          intelligence obtains about the Soviet Union; to pass along the
          channels of American intelligence disinformation on economic,
          defense, and scientific-technical issues; to disinform the USA
          intelligence regarding real intentions of Soviet intelligence services,
          achieving thereby the dispersion of forces and means of the enemy’s
          intelligence services.”15 The deception went side by side with blunt
          slander campaigns and forger
          • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 18:59

            There was no such “master plan” in the KGB. But under
            Shelepin the Committee indeed hatched several schemes of strategic
            and tactical deception: to conceal Soviet intentions and weak spots
            from the West, as well as to disrupt consensus in Western societies
            and alliances on policies, means, and goals for waging the Cold
            War. In the plan presented to the Central Committee on 10 March
            1961, mentioned above, for example, the KGB proposed “to carry
            out disinformation measures on the information that American
            intelligence obtains about the Soviet Union; to pass along the
            channels of American intelligence disinformation on economic,
            defense, and scientific-technical issues; to disinform the USA
            intelligence regarding real intentions of Soviet intelligence services,
            achieving thereby the dispersion of forces and means of the enemy’s
            intelligence services.”15 The deception went side by side with blunt
            slander campaigns and forgery. In its 1960 report, the KGB took
            pride in operations carried out to compromise “groupings and
            individuals from the imperialist camps most hostile towards the
            USSR.” The Committee publicized in the West 10 documentary
            pieces of dis-information, prepared in the name of state institutions
            and government figures of capitalist countries, and 193 other
            disinformation materials. The KGB took credit for staging a
            number of rallies, marches, and pickets in the United States, Japan,
            England, and other countries. It claimed to be instrumental in
            engineering 86 inquiries of governments and presentations in
            parliaments and 105 interviews of leading figures in these countries.
            In addition it asserted that it had helped organize 442 mass petitions
            to governments, distributed 3.221 million copies of various leaflets,
            and published abroad 126 books and brochures “unmasking
            aggressive policies of the USA” and its allies, as well as 3,097
            articles and pieces in the media. The Committee reported that it had
            instigated all this through 15 newspapers and magazines on the
            KGB payroll.16

            During the early Cold War and later, both U.S. and Soviet
            intelligence services used penetration, deception, and propaganda to
            groom potential allies and neutralize enemies on both sides of the
            Iron Curtain. Each had a record of successes and failures during the
            1950s. The KGB successfully played on French suspicions of West
            German militarism to frustrate ratification of the European Defense
            Community (EDC), the Western plan to create a “European army.”
            The CIA had its own triumph in Iran by overthrowing Prime
            Minister Mossadeq and opening the way for conversion of that
            country into a mainstay of Western defense structures in the Middle
            East for a generation.

            But U.S. intelligence failed during the 1950s to establish a
            network of influence in Eastern Europe, not to mention the Soviet
            Union itself. The KGB even in 1960 acted under the impression
            that it could do better in the United States, using the growing fatigue
            with the Dulles-Eisenhower hard line and growing public support
            for U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. The Committee pledged, in accord
            with its April 1960 instruction, to establish closer contacts with
            liberal Democrats in the U.S. Congress and to encourage them “to
            step up their pressure for improvement of relations between the
            USA and the Soviet Union and for settlement of international
            problems through negotiations.” The KGB concentrated its
            propaganda efforts, it reported, on “left-wing trade unions, Quakers,
            pacifist, youth and other social organizations,” and was even ready
            “to provide those organizations and some trusted individuals with
            the needed financial assistance in a clandestine way.”17

            According to the plan, the KGB proposed to subsidize the
            “American progressive publishing house ‘Liberty Book Club’ in
            order to publish and disseminate in the USA and other capitalist
            countries books prepared at our request.”18 The experiment seemed
            to promise further successes, since the KGB intended to
            internationalize it by opening club affiliates in England, Italy, and
            Japan. In a spirit of innovation, demonstrated in those years, the
            Committee also “studied the possibility of using a major American
            public relations agency for the distribution in the USA of truthful
            information about the Soviet Union.”19 These and similar
            undertakings required a lot of money, and some KGB operatives like
            Konon Molody (Gordon Arnold Lonsdale) were encouraged to
            engage in lucrative businesses in the West and then funnel the
            profits into KGB foreign accounts.20

            A special division of the KGB was busy fabricating
            disinformation on the production in the United States of chemical
            and bacteriological weapons and the development of new means of
            mass destruction. Faked documents, innuendo, and gossip were
            used to undercut U.S. positions and influence among delegations of
            Afro-Asian and Latin American countries in the United Nations and
            “to promote disorganization of the American voting machine in the
            structures of the UN.” There were even attempts to sidetrack tariff
            talks among Western countries and “to use financial difficulties of
            the United States for strengthening of mistrust in the dollar.”

            On the KGB’s list of targets in the propaganda warfare campaign
            were all the predictable suspects: U.S.-led regional alliances
            (NATO, SEATO, and CENTO) and U.S. military bases abroad, all
            denounced as tools for American meddling into the internal affairs
            of host countries. The Committee also contemplated a terrorist
            strike at Radio Liberty and the Soviet Studies Institute in Munich
            “to put out of order their equipment and to destroy their card
            indexes.” Inside the United States this warfare was to be
            spearheaded against the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a
            counterpart of the KGB psychological warfare division, and “the
            reactionary militarist group in U.S. ruling circles - [Nelson]
            ROCKEFELLER, [Lauris] NORSTAD, A. DULLES, E. [J. Edgar]
            HOOVER, as well as their allies in pushing an aggressive course in
            other countries.”21

            One name on the hit list was that of Allen W. Dulles,
            experienced in the espionage trade since the late 1930s and since
            1953 presiding over the Central Intelligence Agency.22 In 1960-
            1961, Dulles became the chief target of the KGB’s vendetta.


            The Hunt for Allen Dulles

            The Dulles brothers had long inspired complex feelings inside
            the Soviet leadership. Time and again Vyacheslav Molotov and
            then Nikita Khrushchev betrayed an apprehension of them bordering
            on respectful awe. Khrushchev, in his typical manner, even engaged
            personally in a semi-public feud with Allen Dulles boasting that he
            read his briefing papers prepared for President Eisenhower and
            found them “boring.” The Soviet leaders had some reasons to
            believe that their sources of “humint”—“human intelligence”
            garnered from agents and illegals—were many times greater than
            those of their American adversary. After a flurry of defectors
            following Stalin’s death, the political and military intelligence
            apparatus had been reorganized, and its discipline and morale
            seemed to be restored. But the lull proved short-lived. From the
            mid-fifties onward Khrushchev’s policies of reducing the KGB
            empire and curbing its operatives’ privileges produced a new spate
            of treason. The response was ruthless: a new head of the First Main
            Directorate (PGU), Alexander Sakharovsky, reportedly took
            draconian measures to root out a plague of “defecting”; he
            personally pushed for operations design
            • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:01

              The response was ruthless: a new head of the First Main
              Directorate (PGU), Alexander Sakharovsky, reportedly took
              draconian measures to root out a plague of “defecting”; he
              personally pushed for operations designed to eliminate post-Stalin
              “traitors” Aleksandr Orlov, Vladimir Petrov, and Piotr Deriabin who
              had fled to the West and cooperated with Western
              counterintelligence.23 (Evidently all three operations failed or were
              abandoned, since none of the three defectors was assassinated.)

              Until the spring of 1960, Soviet foreign intelligence had reasons
              to believe it had a sound edge over its American counterpart.
              During 1960, Soviet operatives, together with “friends” from East
              European security forces, reportedly penetrated Western embassies
              in Eastern Europe on 52 occasions. They succeeded in illegally
              smuggling to the USSR five U.S. intelligence officers. They had a
              high-placed mole in the British counterintelligence MI5—George
              Blake—another one in NATO headquarters in Brussels, and many
              lesser ones.

              But Allen Dulles had struck back with a new technological
              breakthrough: U-2 planes and then reconnaissance satellites to
              overfly and photograph the USSR. Shelepin sounded the alarm and
              in September 1959, during Khrushchev’s visit to the United States,
              he sent a memo to the Department of Defense Industry of the
              Central Committee proposing a program to monitor the U.S. satellite
              “Discoverer.” He proposed to obtain “directly and by agents” the
              data on frequency ranges used by transmitters on these satellites.
              Ivan Serbin, head of the Department, agreed that the issue was grave
              enough and sent Shelepin’s memo for consideration to the
              Commission on military-industrial issues at the Council of
              Ministers.24

              In fact, the U.S. space reconnaissance program produced a minor
              panic among Soviet academics who consulted for the KGB. Two of
              them, Academician L.I. Sedov and doctor of physics and
              mathematics G.S. Narimanov, warned in September 1959 that the
              “Discoverer” satellites could be successfully used by the Americans
              for military and intelligence purposes, “to put out of work our
              defense installations with electronic equipment over a large
              territory.” With the help of satellite equipment, Shelepin reported,
              from a height of 200-300 km it would be possible efficiently to
              photograph stretches of the Earth of 50-90 km in width and 150,000
              km in length.25

              In other words, the KGB alerted the Soviet leaders in a timely
              fashion to the coming intelligence revolution. Khrushchev’s
              reaction to the downing of an American U-2 seven months later, in
              May 1960, was, therefore, anything but surprise. The political
              slight, and even humiliation, that Khrushchev saw in this affair to
              himself and his country provoked his furious response. He
              disrupted the summit in Paris and irreparably ruined his relations
              with Eisenhower.26 But in his opinion the U.S. president, though
              he accepted responsibility for the intelligence flights, merely
              shielded the real culprit: Allen Dulles. So Khrushchev, his
              considerable venom concentrated on the debonair socialite
              spymaster, evidently asked Shelepin to prepare a plan to discredit
              the CIA chief. Three weeks after Khrushchev’s return from Paris,
              Shelepin’s plan was formally approved by the Secretariat of the
              Central Committee.

              The document,27 printed below, offers an extraordinary window
              into the state of mind and the methods of Soviet intelligence at the
              height of the Cold War confrontation with the United States:

              [Handwritten note across top: “To the Secretariat [for signatures]
              (round the clock28 among the secretaries) [—] M. Suslov, N.
              Mukhitdinov, O. Kuusinen”29]

              USSR Top Secret
              Committee of State Security
              Council of Ministers of the USSR
              7 June 1960
              CC CPSU30

              The failure of the intelligence action prepared by the Central
              Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the plane “Lockheed U-2” caused
              an aggravation of existing tensions between the CIA and other USA
              intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
              and also provoked protests by the American public and certain
              members of the Congress, who are demanding investigation of the
              CIA activities.

              The Committee of state security considers it advisable to make
              use of this newly complex situation and to carry out the following
              measures targeted at further discrediting CIA activity and
              compromising its leader Allen DULLES:

              1. In order to activate a campaign by DULLES’ political and
              personal opponents:

              a) to mail to them anonymous letters using the names of CIA
              officials criticizing its activity and the authoritarian leadership of
              DULLES;

              b) to prepare a dossier which will contain publications from the
              foreign press and declarations of officials who criticized the CIA
              and DULLES personally, and to send it, using the name of one of
              members of the Democratic Party, to the Fulbright Committee [the
              Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] which is conducting an
              investigation into CIA activities in relation to the failure of the
              summit;

              c) to send to some members of Congress, to the Fulbright
              Committee, and to the FBI specially prepared memos from two or
              three officials of the State Department with attached private letters,
              received (allegedly) from now deceased American diplomats, which
              would demonstrate CIA involvement in domestic decision-making,
              the persecution of foreign diplomats who took an objective stand,
              and which also would point out that, for narrow bureaucratic
              purposes, the CIA puts deliberately false data into information for
              the State Department;

              d) to study the possibility and, if the opportunity presents itself,
              to prepare and disseminate through appropriate channels a document
              by former USA Secretary of State F. DULLES, which would make
              it clear that he exploited the resources of A. DULLES as leader of
              the CIA to fabricate compromising materials on his private and
              political adversaries;

              e) to prepare, publish and disseminate abroad a satirical
              pamphlet on A. DULLES, using the American writer Albert KAHN
              who currently stays in Moscow to write the pamphlet.31

              2. With the aim of further exposing the activities of American
              intelligence in the eyes of the public and to create preconditions with
              which the FBI and other USA intelligence services could
              substantiate their opinion about the CIA’s inability to conduct
              effective intelligence:

              a) to fabricate the failure of an American agent “Fyodorov,”
              dropped in the Soviet Union by plane in 1952 and used by organs of
              the KGB in an operational game with the adversary.
              To publish in the Soviet press an announcement about the arrest
              of “Fyodorov” as an American agent and, if necessary, to arrange a
              press-conference about this affair;

              b) to agree with Polish friends about the exposure of the
              operational game led by the organs of the KGB along with the MSS
              PPR [Ministry of State Security of the Polish People’s Republic]
              with a “conduit” on the payroll of American intelligence of the
              Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN)- “Melnikovists.” To
              this end to bring back to Poland the Polish MSS agent “Boleslav,”
              planted in the course of this game on the OUN “conduit,” and to
              arrange for him to speak to the press and radio about subversive
              activity by American intelligence against the USSR and PPR. To
              arrange, in addition, for public appearances by six American
              intelligence agents dropped on USSR and PPR territory as couriers
              of the “conduit” in the course of the game;

              c) to suggest
              • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:04

                b) to agree with Polish friends about the exposure of the
                operational game led by the organs of the KGB along with the MSS
                PPR [Ministry of State Security of the Polish People’s Republic]
                with a “conduit” on the payroll of American intelligence of the
                Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN)- “Melnikovists.” To
                this end to bring back to Poland the Polish MSS agent “Boleslav,”
                planted in the course of this game on the OUN “conduit,” and to
                arrange for him to speak to the press and radio about subversive
                activity by American intelligence against the USSR and PPR. To
                arrange, in addition, for public appearances by six American
                intelligence agents dropped on USSR and PPR territory as couriers
                of the “conduit” in the course of the game;

                c) to suggest to the security bodies of the GDR that they arrange
                public trials for the recently arrested agents of American intelligence
                RAUE, KOLZENBURG, GLAND, USCH-INGER and others.
                To arrange for wide coverage of the trials’ materials in the media
                of the GDR and abroad;

                d) to disclose the operational game “Link” that the KGB
                conducts with the adversary and to organize public statements in the
                media aimed at foreign audiences by the agent “Maisky,” a former
                commander of the “security service” of the Foreign [Zakordonnikh
                chastei] OUN (ZCh OUN), who had been transferred to Ukrainian
                territory in 1951 and used by us for this game.
                Along with revelations about the anti-people activity of the ZCh
                OUN, “Maisky” will reveal American and British intelligence’s use
                of the anti-Soviet organizations of Ukrainian emigration in
                subversive work in the Soviet Union;

                e) Since about ten agents of the MSS of the GDR who “defected-
                in-place” to American intelligence have accomplished their missions
                and currently there is no prospect of their being further utilized, it
                should be suggested to our German friends to stage their return on
                the basis of disagreement with USA aggressive policies. In
                particular, this measure should be carried out with the participation
                of our friends’ agent “Edelhardt” who had been assigned by an
                affiliate of American intelligence in West Berlin to gather spy
                information during his tourist trip around the USSR. To organize
                one or two press-conferences on these affairs with a demonstration
                of the spy equipment he received from American intelligence;

                f) to discuss with our Polish and Albanian friends the
                advisability of bringing to the attention of governmental circles and
                of the public of the United States the fact that the security agencies
                of Poland and Albania for a number of years had been deluding
                American intelligence in the operational games “Win” and “John”
                and had obtained millions of dollars, weapons, equipment, etc. from
                it.

                3. To utilize, provided our Hungarian friends agree, the
                American intelligence documents they obtained in the U.S. mission
                in Budapest [the underlined words were inserted by hand—ed.] to
                compromise the CIA and to aggravate the differences between the
                CIA and other intelligence services by publicizing some of the
                documents or by sending them to the FBI.
                If necessary, the necessary documents should be forged using the
                existing samples.

                4. In order to create mistrust in the USA government toward the
                CIA and to produce an atmosphere of mutual suspicion within the
                CIA staff, to work out and implement an operation creating the
                impression of the presence in the CIA system of KGB agents
                recruited from among rank-and-file American intelligence officers,
                who, following their recruitment, admit their guilt, allegedly on the
                order of Soviet intelligence. To stage for this purpose a relevant
                conversation within range of a [CIA] listening device, as well as the
                loss of an address book by a Soviet intelligence officer with the
                telephone number of a CIA official; to convey specially prepared
                materials to the adversary’s attention through channels exposed to
                him, etc.

                5. To work out and implement measures on blowing the cover of
                several scientific, commercial and other institutions, used by the
                CIA for its spy activities. In particular, to carry out such measures
                with regard to the “National Aeronautics and Space Administration”
                [NASA] and the “Informational Agency” of the USA [U.S.
                Information Agency (USIA)].

                6. In order to disclose the subversive activities of the CIA against
                some governments, political parties and public figures in capitalist
                countries, and to foment mistrust toward Americans in the
                government circles of these countries, to carry out the following:

                a) to stage in Indonesia the loss by American intelligence officer
                PALMER, who is personally acquainted with President SUKARNO
                and exerts a negative influence on him, a briefcase containing
                documents jointly prepared by the MFA [Ministry of Foreign
                Affairs] of the USSR which apparently belong to the CIA station in
                Jakarta and which provide evidence of USA plans to utilize
                American agents and rebel forces to overthrow the government of
                SUKARNO;32

                b) to carry out measures, with regard to the arrest in February of
                this year in the UAR [United Arab Republic] of a group of Israeli
                intelligence agents, to persuade the public in the UAR and Arab
                countries that American intelligence is linked to the activities of
                those agents and coordinates its work in the Arab East with Israeli
                intelligence.
                To compromise, to this end, American intelligence officers
                KEMP and CONNOLLY who work under cover of the UN
                commission observing the armistice in Palestine;

                c) to prepare and implement measures to make public the fact
                that American intelligence made use of the Iranian newspapers
                “Fahrman” and “Etelliat,” specifically mentioning the names of their
                agents (Abbas SHAHENDEH, Jalal NEMATOLLAKHI);

                d) to publish articles in the foreign press showing the
                interference of American intelligence in the domestic affairs of other
                states, using as an example the illegal American police organization
                in Italy, found and liquidated at the end of 1959, that “worked on”
                Italian political parties under the direction of one of the diplomats at
                the American embassy;
                e) to prepare and publicize a document by an American
                intelligence officer in Japan Robert EMMENSE in the form of a
                report to the USA ambassador [to Japan Douglas] MACARTHUR
                [II] into which information will be inserted about a decision
                allegedly taken by American intelligence to relocate “Lockheed U-
                2” planes temporarily to Japan, and then, in secrecy from the
                Japanese government, to return them to their old bases.

                7. To work out measures which, upon implementation, would
                demonstrate the failure of the CIA efforts to actively on a concrete
                factual basis use various émigré centers for subversive work against
                countries in the socialist camp.
                In particular, using the example of the anti-Soviet organization
                “The Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of
                Russia” (SBONR), to discredit in the eyes of American taxpayers
                the activities of American intelligence in funding émigré
                organizations. To bring to light, along with other measures, real or
                forged American intelligence documents on its finances and
                guidance of subversive activities of the SBONR.

                8. With the means available of the KGB to promote inquiries in
                the parliaments of England, France and other countries of their
                governments about their attitude to the hostile actions of USA
                intelligence intended to aggravate international tension.

                9. To arrange public appearances by distinguished publ
                • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:06

                  9. To arrange public appearances by distinguished public and
                  political figures of the East and West with appropriate declarations
                  denouncing the aggressive activity of American intelligence.

                  10. To prepare and publish in the bourgeois press, through
                  available means, a number of articles on the activities of the CIA
                  and its leaders on the following questions:

                  a) about how A. DULLES used his position to promote his own
                  enrichment. In particular, to demonstrate that DULLES gets big
                  bribes from the “Lockheed” corporation for allocating contracts to
                  produce reconnaissance planes. To indicate that the source of this
                  information is the wife of a vice-president of “Lockheed”
                  corporation and well-known American pilot Jacqueline
                  COCHRAN, who allegedly leaked it in France on her way to the
                  USSR in 1959;

                  b) about the CIA’s violation of traditional principles of non-
                  partisanship on the part of the USA intelligence service. To
                  demonstrate that in reality the CIA is the tool of reactionary circles
                  in the Republican Party, that it ignores the Senate, the Congress and
                  public opinion in the country;

                  c) about the unjustifiably large expenditures of the CIA on its
                  staff and its multitudinous agents and about the failure of its efforts
                  to obtain information on the military-economic potential and
                  scientific-technical achievements of the Soviet Union;

                  d) about the unprecedented fact that the American embassy in
                  Budapest is hosting Cardinal MINDSZENTY, furnishing evidence
                  that the Americans are flouting the sovereign rights of the
                  Hungarian People’s Republic and demonstrating the sloppy work of
                  American intelligence that damages American prestige in the eyes of
                  world public opinion;33

                  e) about the CIA’s flawed methods of preparing spy cadres in the
                  [training] schools at Fort Jersey (South Carolina) and in Monterey
                  (California). To draw special attention to futility of efforts by the
                  CIA and by DULLES personally to build a reliable intelligence
                  [network] with emigrants from the USSR and the countries of
                  people’s democracies. To present a list of names of American
                  intelligence officers and agents who have refused to work for
                  DULLES on political, moral and other grounds;

                  f) about utilization by the CIA leadership of senior officials from
                  the State Department, including ambassadors, for subversive and
                  intelligence operations that cause great harm to USA prestige. In
                  particular, to cite the example of DULLES’ use of American
                  ambassador [to South Korea Walter P.] MCCONAUGHY in
                  subversive plans in Cambodia and then in South Korea;

                  g) about the activities of American intelligence in West Berlin in
                  covering officers of West German intelligence services with
                  documents of American citizens.

                  11. To approach the state security leadership in countries of
                  people’s democracy requesting that they use available means to
                  discredit the CIA and to compromise A. DULLES.
                  Asking for your agreement to aforementioned measures,

                  CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE

                  [signature] (A. Shelepin)



                  The signatures of Mikhail Suslov, Nikolai Mukhitdinov, and
                  Otto Kuusinen showed that the responsible members of the
                  Secretariat had approved the document—a process that could not
                  have taken place without Khrushchev’s assent as well. On 3
                  November 1960, Shelepin reported to the Central Committee on the
                  KGB’s progress in carrying out the plan.34 On 25 February 1961,
                  after the Kennedy Administration came to power in Washington, the
                  KGB again returned to the operation against Dulles, an Eisenhower
                  holdover who for the time being remained in his post. The KGB
                  suggested measures “to foment mistrust towards the leadership of
                  American intelligence on the part of the Kennedy administration and
                  the intelligence services of the allies.” Among other things, the
                  KGB intended “to create among Americans an opinion that
                  documentary information leaks directly from the staff of the CIA.”
                  It also plotted “to arrange through a ‘double’ channel, known to the
                  adversary, a transmittal from Washington of a real classified
                  instruction signed by DULLES and obtained by the KGB.” Also
                  proposed were measures “aimed at discrediting the activities of
                  American intelligence directed at the removal from the political
                  arena of politicians and governments, in particular in India and
                  Turkey, who are not welcomed by the USA.”35

                  It would be tempting to try to track down all the “incidents”
                  produced by this elaborate planning. It is obvious, however, that the
                  Kennedy administration was looking for a pretext to replace the old
                  cold warrior atop the CIA, and one presented itself after the April
                  1961 failure of the CIA-trained expedition against the Castro regime
                  at the Bay of Pigs. Soviet intelligence had known about the
                  preparation and evidently Castro’s border troops were all in
                  readiness, tipped off by Moscow (and The New York Times, for that
                  matter) and ready to teach Americans a bloody lesson. Broadly
                  speaking, the KGB in this case won a considerable victory over its
                  overseas enemy. In late September 1961 Dulles announced his
                  retirement, which went into effect two months later.

                  But the battle between the two intelligence giants continued, and
                  between April 1961 and October 1962 Soviet intelligence suffered
                  terrible blows from internal treason: senior GRU officer Oleg
                  Penkovsky served a precious 18 months as a source for the Western
                  intelligence community. In May 1961, KGB officer Yuri Loginov
                  became an agent for U.S. intelligence. In December 1961, Anatoly
                  Golitsyn defected from Helsinki. In June 1962, Yuri Nosenko,
                  deputy head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, internal security
                  and counterintelligence, began passing classified Soviet documents
                  to the CIA (and in February 1964 he, too, would defect). The scale
                  tilted abruptly in the CIA’s favor.



                  The Crisis in Berlin...and in the KGB

                  The disastrous wave of betrayal and defections in the KGB
                  occurred at a moment of maximum international tension between
                  the Moscow and the West, marked by the Berlin and the Cuban
                  crises. This was not simply a coincidence. In the cases of some
                  double-agents and defectors, among them Penkovsky and Nosenko,
                  psychological and ideological, not material motives, prevailed. As
                  Khrushchev raised the ante, bluffing against Washington, some
                  informed members of the Soviet post-Stalin elites felt acutely
                  uncomfortable. Khrushchev seemed unpredictable, mercurial,
                  reckless, and just plain dangerous—not only to the West but to those
                  Soviets growing accustomed to peaceful coexistence and the relative
                  luxuries it allowed for the chosen members of the nomenklatura.
                  The seemingly permanent state of nerve-wracking crisis, coinciding
                  with a drastic expansion of cultural and human contacts across the
                  Iron Curtain and the weakening of Stalinist fundamentalism in the
                  East, strained loyalty to and belief in the regime and system, and in
                  some cases pushed individuals to switch sides.

                  The KGB’s foreign intelligence and other divisions were heavily
                  involved in various ways in the Berlin Crisis. They tested the
                  temperature of U.S. and NATO reactions to Khrushchev’s threat to
                  sign a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic which
                  would give the GDR control over Western access routes to West
                  Berlin. One scoop came when Khrushchev decided to let the East
                  German communists close the sectorial border between the East and
                  West Berlin, a decision resulting in the infamous Wall. On 4-7
                  August 1961, the foreign ministers of four Western countries (the
                  United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany) held sec
                  • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:08



                    The Crisis in Berlin...and in the KGB

                    .....
                    The KGB’s foreign intelligence and other divisions were heavily
                    involved in various ways in the Berlin Crisis. They tested the
                    temperature of U.S. and NATO reactions to Khrushchev’s threat to
                    sign a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic which
                    would give the GDR control over Western access routes to West
                    Berlin. One scoop came when Khrushchev decided to let the East
                    German communists close the sectorial border between the East and
                    West Berlin, a decision resulting in the infamous Wall. On 4-7
                    August 1961, the foreign ministers of four Western countries (the
                    United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany) held secret
                    consultations in Paris. The only question on the agenda was: how to
                    react to the Soviet provocations in Berlin? In the course of these
                    meetings Western representatives expressed an understanding of the
                    defensive nature of Soviet campaign in Germany, and unwillingness
                    to risk a war.36 In less than three weeks the KGB laid on
                    Khrushchev’s desk quite accurate descriptions of the Paris talks,
                    well ahead of its rival, the GRU. The intelligence materials
                    correctly noted that, in contrast to the West Germans, U.S. Secretary
                    of State Dean Rusk supported talks with the Soviet Union aimed at
                    preservation of the status quo ante. However, the KGB and GRU
                    warned that pressure in the alliance was forcing the Americans to
                    consider economic sanctions against the GDR and other socialist
                    countries, as well as to accelerate plans for conventional and nuclear
                    armament of their West European allies, including the West German
                    Bundeswehr.37

                    Another line of KGB involvement in the crisis concerned
                    strategic deception. On 29 July 1961, KGB chief Shelepin sent a
                    memorandum to Khrushchev containing a mind-boggling array of
                    proposals to create “a situation in various areas of the world which
                    would favor dispersion of attention and forces by the USA and their
                    satellites, and would tie them down during the settlement of the
                    question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin.” The
                    multifaceted deception campaign, Shelepin claimed, would “show to
                    the ruling circles of Western powers that unleashing a military
                    conflict over West Berlin can lead to the loss of their position not
                    only in Europe, but also in a number of countries of Latin America,
                    Asia and Africa.”38 Khrushchev sent the memo with his approval
                    to his deputy Frol Kozlov39 and on August 1 it was, with minor
                    revisions, passed as a Central Committee directive. The KGB and
                    the Ministry of Defense were instructed to work out more “specific
                    measures and present them for consideration by the CC CPSU.”40

                    The first part of the deception plan must have pleased
                    Khrushchev, who in January 1961 had pledged, before the
                    communists of the whole world, to assist “movements of national
                    liberation.” Shelepin advocated measures “to activate by the means
                    available to the KGB armed uprisings against pro-Western
                    reactionary governments.” The destabilizing activities started in
                    Nicaragua where the KGB plotted an armed mutiny through an
                    “Internal revolutionary front of resistance” in coordination with
                    Castro’s Cubans and with the “Revolutionary Front Sandino.”
                    Shelepin proposed to “make appropriations from KGB funds in
                    addition to the previous assistance 10,000 American dollars for
                    purchase of arms.” Shelepin planned also the instigation of an
                    “armed uprising” in El Salvador, and a rebellion in Guatemala,
                    where guerrilla forces would be given $15,000 to buy weapons.

                    The campaign extended to Africa, to the colonial and semi-
                    colonial possessions of the British and the Portuguese. The KGB
                    promised to help organize anti-colonial mass uprisings of the
                    African population in British Kenya and Rhodesia and Portuguese
                    Guinea, by arming rebels and training military cadres.

                    Nor did Shelepin forget the Far East. An ardent supporter of
                    Sino-Soviet reconciliation, he played this “Chinese card” once
                    again. He suggested “to bring to attention of the USA through KGB
                    information channels information about existing agreement among
                    the USSR, the PRC [People’s Republic of China], the KPDR
                    [Korean People’s Democratic Republic; North Korea] and the DRV
                    [Democratic Republic of Vietnam; North Vietnam] about joint
                    military actions to liberate South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan
                    in case of the eruption of armed conflict in Germany.” The Soviet
                    General Staff, proposed Shelepin, together with the KGB, “should
                    work out the relevant disinformation materials” and reach agreement
                    “with Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese friends about
                    demonstration of military preparations in those areas.”

                    Next came the bubbling cauldron of the Middle East. Shelepin
                    planned “to cause uncertainty in government circles of the USA,
                    England, Turkey, and Iran about the stability of their positions in the
                    Middle and Near East.” He offered to use old KGB connections
                    with the chairman of Democratic party of Kurdistan, Mulla Mustafa
                    Barzani, “to activate the movement of the Kurdish population of
                    Iraq, Iran, and Turkey for creation of an independent Kurdistan that
                    would include the provinces of aforementioned countries.” Barzani
                    was to be provided with necessary aid in arms and money.41
                    “Given propitious developments,” noted Shelepin with foresight, “it
                    would become advisable to express the solidarity of Soviet people
                    with this movement of the Kurds.”

                    “The movement for the creation of Kurdistan,” he predicted,
                    “will evoke serious concern among Western powers and first of all
                    in England regarding [their access to] oil in Iraq and Iran, and in the
                    United States regarding its military bases in Turkey. All that will
                    create also difficulties for [Iraqi Prime Minister Gen. Abdul Karim]
                    KASSIM who has begun to conduct a pro-Western policy,
                    especially in recent time.”42

                    The second component of the Shelepin grand plan was directed
                    against NATO installations in Western Europe and aimed “to create
                    doubts in the ruling circles of Western powers regarding the
                    effectiveness of military bases located on the territory of the FRG
                    and other NATO countries, as well as in the reliability of their
                    personnel.” To provoke the local population against foreign bases,
                    Shelepin contemplated working with the GDR and Czechoslovakia
                    secret services to carry out “active measures...to demoralize”
                    military servicemen in the FRG (by agents, leaflets, and brochures),
                    and even terrorist attacks on depot and logistics stations in West
                    Germany and France.43

                    One of the more imaginative strands in the web of Soviet
                    strategic deception concerned the number and even existence of new
                    types of arms and missiles. Along with the General Staff, the KGB
                    long practiced a dubious combination of super-secrecy and bluffing,
                    thereby producing a series of panicky assessments in the West about
                    a “bomber gap” and then a “missile gap.” This time Shelepin asked
                    Khrushchev to assign to his organization and the military the task of
                    making the West believe that the Soviets were absolutely prepared to
                    launch an attack in retaliation for Western armed provocations over
                    West Berlin. The disinformation package included the following
                    tasks:

                    — to convince the West that Soviet land forces were now armed
                    with new types of tanks “equipped with tactical nuclear
                    weapons”;

                    — to create a conviction among the enemy “about a considerable
                    increase of readiness of Rocket Fo
                    • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:12
                      — to convince the West that Soviet land forces were now armed
                      with new types of tanks “equipped with tactical nuclear
                      weapons”;

                      — to create a conviction among the enemy “about a considerable
                      increase of readiness of Rocket Forces and of the increased
                      number of launching pads—produced by the supply of solid
                      liquid ballistic missiles of medium range and by the transfer from
                      stationary positions to mobile launching positions on highways
                      and railroads which secure high maneuverability and
                      survivability”;

                      — to spread a false story about the considerable increase in the
                      number of nuclear submarines with solid-fuel “Polaris” missiles;

                      — to bring to Western attention “information about the
                      strengthening of anti-aircraft defense”;

                      — to disorient the enemy regarding the availability in the Soviet
                      Air Forces of “new types of combat-tactical aircraft with ‘air-to-
                      air’ and ‘air-to-ground’ missiles with a large operational
                      range.”44

                      It is not clear when Shelepin learned about Khrushchev’s
                      decision to close the sectoral border between East and West Berlin,
                      but the Wall went up just two weeks after his letter. It seems that
                      the Wall took some heat off the problem. But in October-November
                      1961, the KGB and the military leadership evidently still believed
                      that the signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR was
                      possible and designed its “distraction” measures anticipating that
                      this treaty would be a source of serious tension with the West.
                      Indeed, sharp tension did arise in late October when U.S. tanks
                      confronted two Soviet tank platoons in Berlin near Checkpoint
                      Charlie.

                      On November 10, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky
                      and KGB Deputy Chief Peter Ivashutin asked the Central
                      Committee Secretariat to approve, in addition to the crisis
                      contingency planning by the military forces, deceptive steps
                      “directed at producing in the adversary’s mind a profound
                      conviction that the Soviet Union firmly intends to use force in
                      response to military provocations of Western powers and has at its
                      disposal all necessary combat means.” The KGB took upon itself
                      the task “to inform Western intelligence through unofficial channels
                      that the Soviet Union has taken necessary measures to strengthen its
                      troops in the GDR and to arm them with more modern tactical
                      missiles, newer tanks, and other armaments sufficient for the
                      delivery of a quick and crushing response strike on the adversary.”

                      Through the same channels KGB intended “to increase the
                      adversary’s belief in the high maneuverability and mobility of Soviet
                      armed forces and their readiness, in case the West unleashes an
                      armed conflict in Germany, to move within a minimal time up to the
                      battle lines of the European theater. To convey as a proof thereof
                      that this summer, during the exercises in the Near-Carpathian and
                      other military districts, some divisions demonstrated an average
                      speed of advancement of about 110-130 km per day.”

                      Along the lines of Shelepin’s proposal, the KGB’s military-
                      industrial consultants suggested other disinformation steps. Perhaps
                      echoing Khrushchev’s boast that his missiles could “hit a fly in the
                      sky,” the Committee proposed to convey to U.S. intelligence the
                      information that during its recent series of atomic tests—in Sept.-
                      Oct. 1961—the Soviet Union successfully “tested a superpowerful
                      thermonuclear warhead, along with a system of detecting and
                      eliminating the adversary’s missiles in the air.”

                      The KGB laboratories fabricated “evidence” for U.S. intelligence
                      about “the solution in the Soviet Union of the problem of
                      constructing simple but powerful and user-convenient atomic
                      engines for submarines which allow in the short run increasing
                      considerably the number of atomic submarines up to fifteen.” (The
                      ever-vigilant Shelepin deleted the number from the text—the super-
                      secretive Soviets excised numbers even in disinformation!)

                      Finally, the KGB received instructions “to promote a legend
                      about the invention in the Soviet Union of an aircraft with a close-
                      circuited nuclear engine and its successful flight tests which
                      demonstrated the engine’s high technical capacities and its safety in
                      exploitation.” “On the basis of the M-50 ‘Myasischev’ aircraft,
                      with consideration of the results of those flight tests,” according to
                      this disinformation, “a strategic bomber with nuclear engines and
                      unlimited range has been designed.”45

                      Even now, reading those documents gives one chills down the
                      spine. Determined to deal with their opponent from a position of
                      strength, and possessing the intoxicating capacity to hide or invent
                      information, to deceive and to bluff, Kremlin leaders went too far, to
                      the very brink where the fine line between deterring an attack and
                      preparing for one blurred altogether. To make matters worse,
                      Khrushchev often held his cards so close to his chest that even his
                      closest subordinates could not guess his true intentions. Inside the
                      KGB there were many levels of knowledge, to be sure, but it seems,
                      for instance, that the famous “Bolshakov channel” and the sensitive
                      information that passed along it to the Kennedy administration
                      during the Berlin crisis were sometimes not reported even to the
                      KGB’s highest hierarchy, only to the CPSU General Secretary.46

                      No wonder that a great number of junior and senior officials in
                      the Soviet military and intelligence elites were scared to death.
                      Some of them were convinced that Khrushchev was crazy and had
                      become a victim of his own “hare-brained schemes.” This scare still
                      waits to be described by a creative quill. But one of its most
                      tangible traces was a stream of well-positioned defectors.

                      In his June 1960 plan to discredit Allen Dulles and the CIA,
                      quoted earlier, Shelepin had envisioned fostering “an atmosphere of
                      mutual suspicion within the CIA staff” by fostering fears of KGB
                      penetration within the agency. In fact, as Shelepin hoped, a
                      paranoid “mole-hunt” in the Western intelligence community did
                      occur, but apparently as a by-product of authentic defections from
                      Soviet intelligence rather than because of Shelepin’s deliberate
                      deception campaign. Major Anatoliy Golitsyn became a pivotal
                      figure in this regard. He was the least informed of the new crop of
                      KGB defectors, but the echoes of Shelepin’s grandiose plans
                      reached his ear. It has been argued, with some justification, that the
                      harm that this stocky Ukrainian defector caused to careers and
                      environment in the CIA could have been done only by a Soviet
                      double-agent. The alliance between Golitsyn and CIA
                      counterintelligence chief James Angleton was indeed more ruinous
                      for American operatives who fell under suspicion in the frantic
                      “mole-hunt” than for real KGB agents.47

                      It is ironic that KGB leadership had no premonition about this at
                      all. There is, indeed, newly available evidence about how painful
                      Golitsyn’s defection was to the KGB. On 28 July 1962, a new KGB
                      chief, Vladimir Semichastny, wrote to Shelepin, now promoted to
                      the Party Secretariat:

                      According to reliable evidence American intelligence is
                      preparing a broad campaign of provocation against the Soviet
                      Union that will involve a traitor of Motherland GOLITSYN and
                      other traitors, along with double-agents and provocateurs.

                      “The Americans count on this provocation,” continued Semichastny
                      while ignoring the irony of his words, “to dispel
                      • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:13
                        “The Americans count on this provocation,” continued Semichastny
                        while ignoring the irony of his words, “to dispel to some extent the
                        impression among the public that the USA is an organizer of world
                        espionage, and to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is conducting
                        active intelligence work in all countries.”

                        The Committee proposed “measures to discredit GOLITSYN” in
                        the eyes of his CIA debriefers by implicating him in a felony.
                        According to the plan, the newspaper Soviet Russia was to publish
                        an article about a trial that allegedly had been held in Leningrad on a
                        case of hard currency smuggling. The KGB would “let Americans
                        know, without mentioning GOLITSYN’s name, that this article has
                        something to so with him.” In case Golitsyn came up “with
                        slanderous declarations,” the KGB planned to arrange more
                        publications about his invented criminal background and to demand,
                        after that, from the U.S. government through official channels the
                        “extradition of GOLITSYN as a criminal.”

                        As a last resort, Semichastny asked for Party sanction “to carry
                        out an operation on his [GOLITSYN’S] removal.”48



                        Scorpions in a bottle

                        Glasnost on Soviet intelligence activities has yet to reach the
                        level achieved by the American side during the congressional
                        hearings of the Church and Pike committees in the mid-1970s. But
                        the documents found recently in the CC CPSU archives do shed
                        considerable light on KGB operations and indicate, without mincing
                        words, how ambitious, various and extensive were KGB activities,
                        especially against the “number one enemy,” the United States.
                        There is little doubt that almost any document on the Soviet side has
                        its U.S. counterpart in Langley still hidden from public view.49 The
                        process of mutual emulation started after the defection of Soviet
                        cypher clerk Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa, Canada, in the summer of
                        1945. Ever since then the American intelligence agencies and the
                        FBI, seconded by Soviet defectors, argued that they needed more
                        discretionary resources and rights to match a well-prepared and
                        ruthless enemy.

                        The KGB documents prove that the enemy was, indeed,
                        ingenious, resourceful, and prepared to go very far. The emphasis
                        on disinformation and on the use of various groups and movements
                        in the “third world” had, of course, been a direct continuation of the
                        OGPU-NKVD tradition in the 1920s-1940s.50 Back then, the
                        Soviet intelligence leaned extensively on the networks of the
                        Comintern and other individuals sympathetic to the Soviet
                        “experiment.” This network suffered from blows and defections as
                        a result of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign and its
                        spectacular unveiling at the February 1956 CPSU Twentieth Party
                        Congress. But the collapse of colonial empires and the surge of
                        radicalism and nationalism in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the
                        Middle East was a bonanza for Soviet intelligence, bent on
                        expanding their contacts in those parts of the world.

                        The KGB, no doubt, fulfilled orders from the top. Khrushchev’s
                        support of “wars of national liberation” was a big step toward the
                        globalization of Soviet foreign policy, and therefore of the Cold
                        War. It is clear from the KGB documents, however, that even at
                        that time of escalating covert superpower rivalry in the Third World,
                        the Kremlin leadership retained clear Realpolitik priorities: with the
                        exception of those posted in Cuba, Soviet intelligence agents in
                        Third World countries were used by the Soviet leadership and its
                        external arm, the KGB’s First Directorate, as pawns in a
                        geostrategic game centered firmly on Berlin.

                        Yet, the KGB had its own distinctive impact on the Cold War.
                        The documents presented in this article challenge the myth that
                        KGB officials (and some American counterparts as well) like to
                        promulgate: that the intelligence services of both sides, by
                        increasing “transparency” about the adversary’s intentions and
                        capabilities, thereby contributed to stability and predictability in a
                        dangerously polarized world. Some intelligence efforts that were
                        genuinely devoted to reconnaissance, and reduced fears of a surprise
                        attack, may well have done so.

                        But the games of deception, disinformation, and distraction
                        designed by the KGB masterminds had a deleterious effect on global
                        stability. They certainly contributed to the perception in
                        Washington of expansive Soviet ambitions. In some cases they even
                        exacerbated the danger of armed conflict. And the elaborate plots to
                        sow the seeds of mistrust between the U.S. leadership and
                        intelligence agencies was dictated by anything but a clear
                        comprehension of how dangerous this kind of conspiracy had
                        become in the nuclear age.

                        The legacy of the covert activities undertaken by the KGB and
                        CIA at this key juncture of the Cold War was ambiguous: besides
                        the function of obtaining and relaying objective information to their
                        respective leaderships, the two rival intelligence organizations
                        behaved, to borrow Oppenheimer’s classic description of the nuclear
                        predicament, like two scorpions in a bottle, prepared to sting each
                        other until death.

                        The fact that the Cold War in the 1970s and the late 1980s
                        looked more like a “long peace” appeared to have limited impact on
                        the mentality of intelligence officials in Washington and Moscow.51
                        By then, the KGB’s First Directorate concentrated even more on
                        technical-scientific espionage, which reflected, on the one hand, a
                        long-standing symbiosis between the Soviet intelligence services
                        and the military-industrial nexus, and, on the other, a distancing
                        from “cloak and dagger” covert activities. Vladimir Kryuchkov,
                        later a KGB chief and conspirator in the August 1991 hardline coup
                        attempt, was to a large extent a product of this specialization in
                        scientific-technical espionage.

                        The paranoia of Kryuchkov, who to this day believes that the
                        West was nurturing a “fifth column” to demoralize and subvert
                        Soviet society, as well as that of his CIA counterpart Angleton, was
                        underpinned and “substantiated” by the shady games and counter-
                        games in which the two intelligence services had engaged all during
                        the Cold War. The alleged existence of American “agents of
                        influence” inside Soviet society and even government—a key tenet
                        of Kryuchkov’s homilies for vigilance—had been, indeed, a matter
                        of pride for the CIA since the 1970s and can now, to a very limited
                        extent, even be documented from U.S. government sources.52

                        But the paranoia, even when it fed on realities, remained for the
                        most part a self-deception. The KGB’s methods and proclivity for
                        Jesuitical twists of imagination distorted the minds of Kryuchkov
                        and many others. While the whole atmosphere of the Cold War
                        existed, this mind-frame was contagious and spread like cancer.

                        There was always a sound and pragmatic side to intelligence: the
                        collection and analysis of information. There were failures and
                        errors in this work, but, in general, the record shows considerable
                        accuracy and consistent objectivity, at least as far as the specific
                        actions and motives were concerned. But the darker side of
                        intelligence activity, linked to the Cold War mentality and actions,
                        always co-existed with the former, sometimes casting a long
                        shadow. The resources spent on intelligence operations related to
                        psychological warfare and deception had a dynamic of diminishing
                        returns: the disruption caused by them in the enemy’s camp rarely
                        justified the money and efforts spent on them.



                        1. [Ed. note: It is clear that the Unite
                        • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:15



                          1. [Ed. note: It is clear that the United States enjoyed massive
                          numerical superiority in strategic nuclear weapons over the USSR at
                          the time of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but the precise
                          ratio of deliverable nuclear weapons has not been definitely
                          ascertained. Several accounts have used a ratio of 17-1, e.g., Robert
                          S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First
                          Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 44-45. A
                          recent accounting of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals during the
                          Cold War, based in part on statistics recently declassified by the
                          U.S. Department of Energy, implied a ratio of closer to nine-to-one
                          at the time. It showed that in 1962 the United States had a total
                          stockpile of 27,100 warheads, including 3,451 mounted on strategic
                          delivery vehicles, and the USSR possessed a total stockpile of 3,100
                          warheads, including 481 strategic weapons. (Robert S. Norris and
                          William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Notebook: Estimated U.S. and
                          Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-94,” The Bulletin of the
                          Atomic Scientists 50:6 (Nov-Dec. 1994), 58-59.) However, the
                          table did not reflect disparities in strategic delivery vehicles, such as
                          intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched
                          ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which overwhelmingly favored the
                          United States.]
                          2. See Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The
                          CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991),
                          and David Wise, Mole-Hunt: How the Search for a Phantom
                          Traitor Shattered the CIA (New York: Random House, 1992; Avon,
                          1994).
                          3. See Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, The First Directorate:
                          My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (New
                          York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Leonid Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy
                          [Arm of Moscow] (Moscow: Center-100, 1992), and Iz Zhizni
                          Nachalnika Razvedki [From the Life of the Head of Intelligence]
                          (Moscow: International Relations, 1994); and Vadim Kirpichenko,
                          Iz arkhiva razvedchika [From the Archive of an intelligence officer]
                          (Moscow: International Relations, 1993).
                          4. The author encountered the KGB documents used in this article
                          while conducting research in Moscow in late 1992, for a book on
                          Soviet leaders and the Cold War, in the Center for the Storage of
                          Contemporary Documentation (known by its Russian acronym,
                          TsKhSD, for Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii),
                          located at Il’inka 12 in Staraya Ploschad’ (Old Square). This is the
                          archive containing the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central
                          Committee. The author was also, at the time, researching the 1960-
                          62 period for his paper on U.S.-Soviet crises for the Conference on
                          New Evidence on Cold War History organized by the Cold War
                          International History Project and held in Moscow in January 1993
                          in cooperation with TsKhSD and the Russian Academy of Sciences’
                          Institute of Universal History. At that conference, some of the KGB
                          documents cited in this article were described in a paper (“The
                          Mentality of Soviet Society and the Cold War”) by Russian historian
                          Vitaly S. Lelchuk (Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy
                          of Sciences), sparking a general discussion of the intelligence
                          service’s role in the Kremlin’s handling of the U-2 affair.
                          Although the KGB archives for this period remain closed to
                          scholars, with the limited exception of an arrangement with Crown
                          Publishers to publish a series of books on selected topics, scholars
                          have been able to conduct research on an increasingly regular basis
                          in the archives of the CPSU CC (TsKhSD and the Russian Center
                          for the Storage and Study of Recent Documents (RTsKhIDNI)), the
                          Russian Foreign Ministry (MID) archives, and the State Archive of
                          the Russian Federation (GARF). Moreover, the promulgation of
                          several Russian laws and regulations mandating a 30-year-rule for
                          most archival files, including Politburo records, inspires hope that a
                          more thorough analysis of Khrushchev’s foreign and intelligence
                          policies is becoming possible. For details on the Russian archival
                          scene, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress
                          and Pitfalls,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 3
                          (Fall 1993), 1, 18-39. For more on the KGB archives, see the report
                          by Arseny Roginski and Nikita Okhotin, circulated in 1992 and
                          slated for publication as a CWIHP Working Paper; Amy Knight,
                          “The Fate of the KGB Archives,” Slavic Review 52:3 (Fall 1993),
                          582-6; and Yevgenia Albats, The State Within a State: The KGB
                          and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present and Future (New York:
                          Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1994).
                          5. KGB to Nikita Khrushchev, “Report for 1960,” 14 February
                          1961, in CC CPSU Secretariat’s “special dossier” [osobaya papka],
                          hereafter abbreviated as “St.”, protocol no. 179/42c, 21 March
                          1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 74, ll. [pages] 144-58.
                          6. Ibid., 1.147.
                          7. Ibid.
                          8. Ibid., l. 154.
                          9. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October
                          1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 133-142, esp. 141-142.
                          10. KGB to Khrushchev, “Report for 1960,” 14 February 1961,
                          cited above.
                          11. The 7 April 1960 directive was cited in KGB to CC CPSU, 10
                          March 1961, St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, Fond 4, opis
                          13, delo 85, l. 133. The original directive was not located.
                          12. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, cited above.
                          13. Ibid., ll. 136-137.
                          14. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 107 ff.
                          15. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, cited above, 1. 140.
                          16. KGB to Khrushchev, “Report for 1960,” 14 February 1961, St.
                          179/42c, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 74, 1.149.
                          17. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October,
                          TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, 1.137.
                          18. Ibid.
                          19. Ibid.
                          20. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The
                          Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev
                          (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 440.
                          21. The above two paragraphs are based on KGB to CC CPSU, 10
                          March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961-TsKhSD, fond 4, opis
                          13, delo 85, ll. 138-139. [Ed. note: Nelson Rockefeller, a member
                          of the country’s wealthiest families, Governor of New York State,
                          and briefly a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination
                          in 1960, had been a Special Assistant to Eisenhower on Cold War
                          psychological warfare strategy; Gen. Lauris Norstad was the
                          Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); A. Dulles headed
                          the CIA and J. Edgar Hoover was FBI director.]
                          22. [Ed. note: On the career of Allen W. Dulles, see the profile in
                          H.W. Brands, Cold Warriors: Eisenhower’s Generation and
                          American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press,
                          1988), 48-68; the new biography by Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy:
                          The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994) and a
                          forthcoming biography by James L. Srodes; and a five-volume
                          internal CIA history of his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence:
                          Wayne G. Jackson, Allen Welsh Dulles As Director of Central
                          Intelligence, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961, declassified
                          with deletions in 1994, copy available from the CIA History Office
                          and on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.]
                          23. Oleg Kalugin, “Vozhdi Razvedki” [“Chiefs of Intelligence”],
                          Moscow News 2 (10 January 1993), 9; see also Kalugin, The First
                          Directorate, 93-98. [Ed. note: Orlov defected from the NKVD in
                          1938 and in 1954 published an exposé that undoubtedly infuriated
                          Moscow: The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (London: Jarrolds,
                          1954). Petrov and Deriabin both defected in 1954. Andrew and
                          Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, 164, 427, 675 n. 9.]
                          24. Shelepin (KGB) to CC CPSU, 26 September 1959, and
                          • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:16

                            24. Shelepin (KGB) to CC CPSU, 26 September 1959, and Serbin
                            to Commission on Military-industrial issues, 6 October 1959, both
                            in St. 122/7, 14 October 1959, fond 4, opis 13, delo 57, ll. 56-62.
                            25. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 26 September 1959, in ibid., ll. 60-61.
                            26. See Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev,
                            and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper, 1986).
                            27. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 7 June 1960, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13,
                            delo 65, ll. 12-37 in Special Dossier of the Secretariat of the Central
                            Committee 153/30c from 14.VI.60 (14 June 1960). The 7 June
                            1960 KGB document’s existence first became public knowledge in
                            January 1993 when it was described by Russian historian Vitaly S.
                            Lelchuk to the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on Cold War
                            History; the document was also referred to in Vitaly S. Lelchuk and
                            Yefim I. Pivovar, “Mentalitet Sovietskogo Obshchestva i
                            Kholodnaya Voina” [“The Mentality of Soviet Society and the Cold
                            War”], Otechestvennaya Istoria [Fatherland History] 6 (Nov.-Dec.
                            1993), 70-71.
                            28. That formula meant that the decision was already taken at the
                            top and an agreement of the rest of the Central Committee
                            Secretaries was just a mere formality. In other cases, when no clear
                            consensus existed or a leader was not sure himself, he put it to a
                            vote of the Politburo or the Secretariat.
                            29. Mikhail Suslov, Nikolai Mukhitdinov, and Otto Kuusinen were
                            three full members (Secretaries) of the CC CPSU Secretariat.
                            30. This document was sent by the KGB to the Secretariat, the
                            technical body of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which
                            usually dealt with more routine issues than the Politburo.
                            31. [Ed. note: This evidently refers to the American writer Albert
                            E. Kahn (1912-1979), a journalist and author sympathetic to
                            socialism who had been blacklisted during the McCarthy era and
                            who (after recovering his passport, which the government had taken
                            from him for several years) spent the first half of 1960 in Moscow
                            working on a book on the Bolshoi ballerina Galina Ulanova
                            (subsequently published as Days With Ulanova (New York: Simon
                            & Schuster, 1962). Contacted by CWIHP in Helena, Montana,
                            where he is the state director of the Montana Nature Conservancy,
                            Kahn’s son Brian Kahn stated that to his knowledge his father was
                            never approached to write a publication ridiculing Allen W. Dulles
                            and never did so; and that, while sympathetic to socialism and the
                            USSR, he would not have written anything at the direction of Soviet
                            intelligence. “[My father] would write a pamphlet on a political
                            issue that he believed in; but he wouldn’t do it at the request of
                            anybody,” said Brian Kahn. “He would never do it if he were aware
                            that he was being manipulated; that he would offend his sense of
                            integrity as a writer.” Brian Kahn said his father once met in the
                            Kremlin with Nikita Khrushchev and proposed collaborating with
                            him on an autobiography, but that the Soviet leader did not pursue
                            the idea, which Kahn later implemented with Pablo Casals (Joys
                            and Sorrows (Simon & Schuster, 1970)). Albert Kahn also
                            authored, among other books, Sabotage! The Secret War Against
                            America (Little, Brown, 1942), an expose of pro-fascist activities in
                            the United States; The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against
                            the Soviet Union (Little, Brown, 1946), an account of Western
                            actions against the USSR highly sympathetic to Moscow; High
                            Treason (Lear, 1950); Smetana and the Beetles (Random House,
                            1967), a satirical pamphlet about Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana
                            Alliluyeva; and The Matusow Affair (Moyer Bell Ltd., 1987), a
                            posthumously-published account of a McCarthy-era case.]
                            32. The KGB in this case wanted to kill two birds with one stone.
                            Fears that Americans could influence a “third world” communist
                            leader were pervasive and not without foundation. In 1979 similar
                            fears about Hafizullah Amin, leader of the Afghan “revolution,”
                            probably helped convince Politburo member Yuri Andropov, former
                            KGB chief, of the necessity of Soviet military intervention to “save”
                            this country.
                            33. Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Roman Catholic Primate, was
                            arrested by the Hungarian communist regime in 1948 and sentenced
                            to life imprisonment on treason and currency charges in 1949
                            (reduced to house arrest in 1955). During the Hungarian October
                            revolution of 1956 he was freed, but, after the Soviet intervention,
                            the U.S. embassy in Budapest gave him political asylum until his
                            death in 1971.
                            34. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 3 November 1960, in St.-199/10c, 3
                            October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 23-27.
                            35. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 25 February 1961, in ibid., ll.28-29.
                            36. See memorandum of conversation, “Tripartite Meeting on
                            Berlin and Germany” (D. Rusk, Lord Home, M. Couve de
                            Murville), 5 August 1961, Berlin Crisis collection, National Security
                            Archive, Washington, DC.
                            37. Lt.-Gen. A. Rogov to Marshal Malinovsky, 24 August 1961,
                            TsKhSD, fond 5, opis 30, delo 365, ll. 142-153. The texts of
                            preceding reports of the KGB with parallel intelligence were not
                            available in the archives.
                            38. Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29 July 1961, in St. - 191/75gc 1
                            August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 81, ll. 130-134, quoted
                            passages on l. 130.
                            39. Handwritten notation on cover letter from Shelepin to
                            Khrushchev, 29 July 1961.
                            40. CC CPSU directive, St.-191/75gc, 1 August 1961, TsKhSD,
                            fond 4, opis 13, delo 81, ll. 128-129.
                            41. [Ed. note: U.S. officials had noted with concern the possibility
                            that Barzani might be useful to Moscow. In an October 1958 cable
                            to the State Department three months after a military coup brought
                            Kassim to power, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar J.
                            Gallman, stated that “Communists also have potential for attack [on
                            Iraqi Prime Minister Kassim-ed.] on another point through returned
                            Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani. He spent last eleven years
                            in exile in Soviet Union. His appeal to majority of Iraqi Kurds is
                            strong and his ability [to] disrupt stability almost endless. Thus we
                            believe that today greatest potential threat to stability and even
                            existence of Qassim’s [Kassim’s] regime lies in hands of
                            Communists.” See Gallman to Department of State, 14 October
                            1958, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
                            States, 1958-1960, Vol. XII (Washington, DC: Government Printing
                            Office, 1993), 344-46. Barzani’s alleged ties to the KGB are
                            discussed in Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold
                            L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of
                            an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little, Brown,
                            and Co., 1994), 259-64.]
                            42. Shelepin also proposed an initiative to entice Egyptian President
                            Gamal Abdul Nasser, a Third World leader avidly courted by both
                            East and West, into throwing his support behind the Kurds.
                            Shelepin suggested informing Nasser “through unofficial channels”
                            that, in the event of a Kurdish victory, Moscow “might take a
                            benign look at the integration of the non-Kurdish part of Iraqi
                            territory with the UAR”—the United Arab Republic, a short-lived
                            union of Egypt and Syria reflecting Nasser’s pan-Arab
                            nationalism—“on the condition of NASSER’s support for the
                            creation of an independent Kurdistan.” Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29
                            July 1961, in St.-191/75gc, 1 August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis
                            13, delo 81, ll. 131-32. When a Kurdish rebellion indeed broke out
                            in northern Iraq in September 1961, the KGB quickly responded
                            with additional proposals to exploit the situation. KGB Deputy
                            Chairman Peter Ivashutin proposed—“In accord with the decision of
                            the CC CPSU...o
                            • szef3 Re: dzisiejsza Rzeczpospolita 19.07.02, 19:17

                              43. In particular, Shelepin envisioned operations to set ablaze a
                              British Air Force fuel depot near Arzberg in West Germany, and to
                              stage an explosion at a U.S. military-logistics base in Chinon,
                              France. Ibid., 1.133.
                              44. Ibid., ll. 133-134.
                              45. The above five paragraphs are based on Ivashutin and
                              Malinovsky to CC CPSU, 10 November 1961, in St. 2/35c, 14
                              November 1961, TsKhSD, fond 14, opis 14, delo 1, ll. 10-14.
                              46. Georgi Bolshakov was a GRU officer who acted under the
                              cover of a press secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington in
                              1961-62. He often met with Robert Kennedy, the President’s
                              brother, delivering Khrushchev’s personal messages, mostly orally.
                              See Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and
                              Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).
                              47. See Mangold, Cold Warrior, and Wise, Mole-Hunt, passim.
                              48. Semichastny to Shelepin, 28 July 1962, in St. 33/26c, 31
                              August 1962, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 14, delo 13, ll. 1-6.
                              49. [Ed. note: Since 1991, CIA directors in the Bush and Clinton
                              administrations have promised to declassify records pertaining to
                              covert operations during the early Cold War, including those relating
                              to the Italian elections (1948), coups in Iran (1953) and Guatemala
                              (1954), the Bay of Pigs (1961), and others. To date, only one recent
                              large-scale declassification of a U.S. covert operation has become
                              known: the release of documents regarding operations in Indonesia
                              against the Sukarno government, included in the Foreign Relations
                              of the United States (FRUS) volume for Indonesia, 1958-1960,
                              published by the Department of State in 1994. (See Jim Mann,
                              “CIA’s Covert Indonesian Operation in the 1950s Acknowledged by
                              U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, 29 October 1994, 5.) Press reports
                              indicate that government officials have blocked the declassification
                              (For publication in FRUS) of documents disclosing two other CIA
                              covert operations from this period, one to finance pro-American
                              Japanese politicians and the other, during the Kennedy
                              administration, to overthrow a leftist government in British Guyana.
                              See Tim Weiner, “C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right
                              in 50’s and 60’s,” New York Times, 9 October 1994; Tim Weiner,
                              “A Kennedy-C.I.A. Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton,” New York
                              Times, 30 October 1994; and Tim Weiner, “Keeping the Secrets
                              That Everyone Knows,” New York Times (Week-in-Review
                              section), 30 October 1994.]
                              50. The OGPU (Obyeddinenoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye
                              Upravlenie, for Unified State Political Directorate), successor to the
                              short-lived GPU, lasted from 1923 to 1934, when it was converted
                              into the GUGB (Main Administration of State Security) and
                              integrated into the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal
                              Affairs). The NVKD in 1946 became the Ministry of Internal
                              Affairs (MVD).
                              51. On the mentality of Soviet leaders in the Cold War, see
                              Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine V. Pleshakov, Inside the
                              Kremlin’s Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
                              forthcoming in 1995). For the “long peace” thesis, including the
                              argument that intelligence activities contributed to stability during
                              the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries
                              into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University
                              Press, 1987), 215-45.
                              52. In a December 1976 briefing, CIA representatives informed the
                              incoming Carter Administration National Security Council staff
                              officials Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron of “current Soviet
                              agents and the nature of the materials they provide us with.
                              Brzezinski and Aaron seemed quite impressed, though Brzezinski
                              wondered whether such agents could not be used to pull off a rather
                              massive disinformation operation against the U.S. [Bill] Wells
                              [from the CIA] explained why this is not likely.”
                              Brzezinski, soon to become Carter’s national security advisor,
                              “said he would like to be briefed in detail on ‘agents of influence’
                              that belong to us abroad.” He explained that “he did not want to be
                              surprised in meeting with or dealing with foreign VIPs, if in fact
                              those VIPs were our agents of influence.” CIA, Memorandum for
                              the Record on a meeting with [prospective] National Security
                              Adviser Brzezinski, 30 December 1976. The document was
                              declassified by the CIA in January 1994 and is available on file at
                              the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.



                              Vladislav M. Zubok is a visiting scholar at the National Security
                              Archive in Washington, D.C. He has written numerous articles on
                              Cold War and nuclear history, and his book Inside the Kremlin’s
                              Cold War, co-authored with Constantine V. Pleshakov, will be
                              published next year by Harvard University Press.
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