OFIARY ZACHODU !

    • gelatik Re: OFIARY ZACHODU ! 17.12.02, 12:51
      • Gość: diabeł Western State Terrorism IP: webcacheP* / *.visp.energis.pl 17.12.02, 19:30
        “Neither Jewish morality nor Jewish tradition can be used to disallow terror as
        a means of war... We are very far from any moral hesitations when concerned
        with the national struggle. First and foremost, terror is for us a part of the
        political war appropriate for the circumstances of today...”

        — Yitzhak Shamir
        Israeli Prime Minister, Zionist terrorist
        in an August 1943 article titled “Terror”, written for Hazit
        the journal of Lehi, the terrorist organization he belonged to

        Western State Terrorism
        www.americanstateterrorism.com/books/WesternStateTerrorism.html
        Edited by Alexander George; with essays by Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman,
        Gerry O’Sullivan and others
        Routledge, 1991, New York; in Britain: Polity Press, Basil Blackwell, 1991,
        Cambridge, Oxford; ISBN 0-745-609-317
        Other ISBNs for Western State Terrorism:
        0415904722; 0415904730; LC 91002715; 0745606725

        This very important book is out of print, and there is no mention of it at all
        on the websites of its own publishers. As of this writing there is relatively
        little reference to it even on the Web in general.

        Excerpts from Western State Terrorism:
        Chapter 2

        International Terrorism:Image and Reality

        by Noam Chomsky



        There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal
        approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing
        the concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some
        system of power. In each case it is clear how to proceed. Pursuing the literal
        approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek
        instances of the phenomenon — concentrating on the major examples, if we are
        serious — and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach
        dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the
        responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist
        acts as “terrorist” just in the cases where they can be attributed (whether
        plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored,
        suppressed, or termed “retaliation” or “self-defence.”

        It comes as no surprise that the propagandistic approach is adopted by
        governments generally, and by their instruments in totalitarian states. More
        interesting is the fact that the same is largely true of the media and
        scholarship in the Western industrial democracies, as has been documented in
        extensive detail.1 “We must recognize,” Michael Stohl observes, “that by
        convention — and it must be emphasized only by convention — great power use and
        the threat of the use of force is normally described as coercive diplomacy and
        not as a form of terrorism,” though it commonly involves “the threat and often
        the use of violence for what would be described as terroristic purposes were it
        not great powers who were pursuing the very same tactic.”2 Only one
        qualification must be added: the term “great powers” must be restricted to
        favored states; in the Western conventions under discussion, the Soviet Union
        is granted no such rhetorical license, and indeed can be charged and convicted
        on the flimsiest of evidence.

        Terrorism became a major public issue in the 1980s. The Reagan administration
        took office announcing its dedication to stamping out what the [jellybean-
        munching] president called “the evil scourge of terrorism,” a plague spread
        by “depraved opponents of civilization itself” in “a return to barbarism in the
        modern age” (Secretary of State George Shultz). The campaign focused on a
        particularly virulent form of the plague: state-directed international
        terrorism. The central thesis attributed responsibility to a Soviet-
        based “worldwide terror network aimed at the destabilization of Western
        democratic society,” in the words of Claire Sterling, whose highly-praised book
        The Terror Network became the Bible of the administration and the founding
        document of the new discipline of terrorology. It was taken to have
        provided “ample evidence” that terrorism occurs “almost exclusively in
        democratic or relatively democratic societies” (Walter Laqueur), leaving little
        doubt about the origins of the plague. The book was soon exposed as a worthless
        propaganda tract, but the thesis remained intact, dominating mainstream
        reporting, commentary, and scholarship.

        By the mid-1980s, concern over international terrorism reached the level of
        virtual frenzy. Middle-East/Mediterranean terrorism was selected by editors as
        the lead story of 1985 in an AP poll, and a year later the tourism industry in
        Europe was badly hit as Americans stayed away in fear of Arab terrorists
        infesting European cities. The plague then subsided, the monster having been
        tamed by the cool courage of the cowboy, according to the approved version.

        Shifting to the literal approach, we first define the concept of terrorism, and
        then investigate its application, letting the chips fall where they may. Let us
        see where this course takes.


        • Gość: diabeł Western State Terrorism IP: webcacheP* / *.visp.energis.pl 17.12.02, 19:35
          1 The Concept of Terrorism

          Concepts of political discourse are hardly models of clarity, but there is
          general agreement as to what constitutes terrorism. As a point of departure we
          may take the official United States Code:

          “act of terrorism” means an activity that — (A) involves a violent act or an
          act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the
          United States or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
          within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears
          to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
          influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
          affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.3

          The concept is not precisely delimited. First, the boundary between
          international terrorism and aggression is not always clear. On this matter, let
          us give the benefit of the doubt to the United States and its clients: if they
          reject the charge of aggression in the case of some act of international
          violence, we will take it to fall under the lesser crime of terrorism. There is
          also disagreement over the distinction between terrorism and retaliation or
          legitimate resistance, to which we return.

          US sources also provide more succinct definitions of “terrorism.” A US Army
          manual on countering terrorism defines it as “the calculated use of violence or
          threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological
          in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.”
          Still simpler is the characterization in a Pentagon-commissioned study by noted
          terrorologist Robert Kupperman, which speaks of the threat or use of force “to
          achieve political objectives without the full-scale commitment of resources.” 4

          Kupperman, however, is not discussing terrorism, rather, low intensity conflict
          (LIC), a central doctrine of the Reagan administration. Note that as the
          description indicates and actual practice confirms, LIC — much like its
          predecessor “counterinsurgency” — is hardly more than a euphemism for state-
          directed international terrorism, that is, reliance on force that does not
          reach the level of the war crime of aggression.

          The point is recognized within the scholarly discipline, though with the usual
          doctrinal twist. One leading Israeli specialist observes that “state-sponsored
          terrorism is a form of low-intensity conflict that states undertake when they
          find it convenient to engage in ‘war’ without being held accountable for their
          actions” (Professor Yonah Alexander).5 Alexander restricts his attention to the
          Kremlin conspiracy to destabilize the West with “surrogate groups,” offering
          such examples as “an extensive PLO training programme... provided for
          Nicaragua.” In this conception, “the PLO, which maintains a special
          relationship with Moscow,” serves its Soviet master by passing on
          the “specialized training” in terrorism it acquires in the Soviet Union to
          Nicaragua, which is therefore able to conduct LIC against the United States and
          its interests. He also suggests ways in which “the Eastern Bloc’s sincerity
          must be tested;” for example, “Showing willingness to stop propaganda campaigns
          linking the US and its allies to terrorism.”

          As the examples illustrate, it would take a fertile imagination to conjure up a
          thought so outlandish as to ruffle the composure of the fraternity, as long as
          doctrinal purity is preserved.

          • Gość: diabeł Western State Terrorism IP: webcacheP* / *.visp.energis.pl 17.12.02, 19:38
            2 Terrorism and the Political Culture

            There are many terrorist states in the world, but the United States is unusual
            in that it is officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale
            that puts its rivals to shame. Thus Iran is surely a terrorist state, as
            Western governments and media rightly proclaim. Its major known contribution to
            international terrorism was revealed during the Iran-Contra inquiries: namely,
            Iran’s perhaps inadvertent involvement in the US proxy war against Nicaragua.
            This fact is unacceptable, therefore unnoticed, though the Iranian connection
            in US-directed international terrorism was exposed at a time of impassioned
            denunciation of Iranian terrorism.

            The same inquiries revealed that under the Reagan Doctrine, the US had forged
            new paths in international terrorism. Some states employ individual terrorists
            and criminals to carry out violent acts abroad. But in the Reagan years, the US
            went further, not only constructing a semi-private international terrorist
            network but also an array of client and mercenary states — Taiwan, South Korea,
            Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others — to finance and implement its terrorist
            operations. This advance in international terrorism was revealed during the
            period of maximal anguish over the plague, but did not enter into the
            discussion and debate.

            The US commitment to international terrorism reaches to fine detail. Thus the
            proxy forces attacking Nicaragua were directed by their CIA and Pentagon
            commanders to attack “soft targets,” that is, barely defended civilian targets.
            The State Department specifically authorized attacks on agricultural
            cooperatives — exactly what we denounce with horror when the agent is Abu
            Nidal. Media doves expressed thoughtful approval of this stand. New Republic
            editor Michael Kinsley, at the liberal extreme of mainstream commentary, argued
            that we should not be too quick to dismiss State Department justifications for
            terrorist attacks on farming cooperatives: a “sensible policy” must “meet the
            test of cost-benefit analysis,” an analysis of “the amount of blood and misery
            that will be poured in, and the likelihood that democracy will emerge at the
            other end.” It is understood that US elites have the right to conduct the
            analysis and pursue the project if it passes their tests.6

            When a Contra supply plane was shot down in October 1986 with an American
            mercenary on board, it became impossible to suppress the evidence of illegal
            CIA supply flights to the proxy forces. The Iran-Contra hearings ensued,
            focusing much attention on these topics. A few days after they ended, the
            Central American presidents signed the Esquipulas II peace agreement. The US
            undertook at once to subvert it.

            The agreement identified one factor as “an indispensable element to achieving a
            stable and lasting peace in the region,” namely termination of any form of
            aid “to irregular forces or insurgent movements” on the part of “regional or
            extraregional” governments. In response, the US moved at once to escalate the
            attacks on soft targets in Nicaragua. Right at the moment when indignation over
            Washington’s clandestine operations peaked, Congress and the media kept their
            eyes scrupulously averted from the rapid increase in CIA supply flights to
            several a day, while cooperating with the White House program of dismantling
            the unwanted accords, a goal finally achieved in January 1988; though further
            steps were required to subvert a follow-up agreement of the Central American
            presidents in February 1989.7

            As supply and surveillance flights for the proxy forces increased, so did
            violence and terror, as intended. This too passed largely unnoticed, though an
            occasional reference could be found. The Los Angeles Times reported in October
            1987 that “Western military analysts say the contras have been stashing tons of
            newly dropped weapons lately while trying to avoid heavy combat... Meanwhile,
            they have stepped up attacks on easy government targets like the La Patriota
            farm cooperative..., where several militiamen, an elderly woman and her year-
            old grandson died in a pre-dawn shelling.” To select virtually at random from
            the many cases deemed unworthy of notice, on November 2, 1987, 150 Contras
            attacked two villages in the southern province of Rio San Juan with 88-mm
            mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, killing six children and six adults and
            injuring 30 others. Even cooperatives of religious pacifists who refused to
            bear arms were destroyed by the US terrorist forces. In El Salvador too, the
            army attacks cooperatives, killing, raping and abducting members.8

            The decision of the International Court of Justice in June 1986 condemning the
            United States for the “unlawful use of force” and illegal economic warfare was
            dismissed as an irrelevant pronouncement by a “hostile forum” (New York Times).
            Little notice was taken when the US vetoed a Security Council resolution
            calling on all states to observe international law and voted against General
            Assembly resolutions to the same effect (with Israel and El Salvador in 1986;
            with Israel alone in 1987). The guiding principle, it appears, is that the US
            is a lawless terrorist state and this is right and just, whatever the world may
            think, whatever international institutions may declare.

            A corollary is the doctrine that no state has the right to defend itself from
            US attack. The broad acquiescence in this remarkable doctrine was revealed as
            Reagan administration agitprop floated periodic stories about Nicaraguan plans
            to obtain jet interceptors. There was some criticism of the media for
            uncritically swallowing the disinformation, but a more significant fact was
            ignored: the general agreement that such behavior on the part of Nicaragua
            would be entirely unacceptable. When the tale was concocted to divert attention
            from the Nicaraguan elections of 1984, Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts,
            with the support of other leading doves, warned that the US would have to bomb
            Nicaragua if it obtained vintage 1950s MiGs, because “they’re also capable
            against the United States,” hence a threat to its security — as distinct, say,
            from US nuclear missiles on alert status in Turkey, no threat to the USSR since
            they are purely for defensive purposes.9 It is understood that jet interceptors
            might enable Nicaragua to protect its territory from the CIA supply flights
            needed to keep the US proxy forces in the field and the regular surveillance
            flights that provide them with up-to-the-minute information on the disposition
            of Nicaraguan troops, so that they can safely attack soft targets. Understood,
            but scarcely mentioned.10 And it seems that no one in the mainstream released
            the open secret that Nicaragua would happily accept French planes instead of
            MiGs if the US had not pressured its allies to bar military aid so that we
            might cower in fear of “the Soviet-supplied Sandinistas.”

            The same issue arose in August 1988, when congressional doves effusively
            supported the Byrd Amendment on “Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance.”
            Three days before, the Contras had attacked the passenger vessel Mission of
            Peace, killing two people and wounding 27, all civilians, including a Baptist
            minister from New Jersey who headed a US religious delegation. The incident was
            unmentioned in the Senate debate on the Byrd Amendment. Rather, congressional
            doves warned that if the Nicaraguan army carried out “an unprovoked military
            attack” or “any other hostile action” against the perpetrators of such
            terrorist atrocities, then Congress would respond with vigor and righteo
            • Gość: diabeł Western State Terrorism IP: webcacheP* / *.visp.energis.pl 17.12.02, 19:40
              Rather, congressional doves warned that if the Nicaraguan army carried out “an
              unprovoked military attack” or “any other hostile action” against the
              perpetrators of such terrorist atrocities, then Congress would respond with
              vigor and righteousness by renewing official military aid to them. Media
              coverage and other commentary found nothing odd or noteworthy in this stance.

              The message is clear: no one has the right of self-defense against US terrorist
              attack. The US is a terrorist state by right. That is unchallengeable doctrine.

              Accordingly, organization of a terrorist proxy army to subdue some recalcitrant
              population is a legitimate chore. On the right, Jeane Kirkpatrick explained
              that “forceful intervention in the affairs of another nation” is
              neither “impractical” nor “immoral”11 — merely illegal, a crime for which
              people were hanged at Nuremberg and Tokyo with ringing declarations that this
              was not “victor’s justice” because, as Justice Robert Jackson proclaimed, “If
              certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the
              United States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to
              lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be
              willing to have invoked against us.12 Countering any such thoughts, Irving
              Kristol explains that “The argument from international law lacks all
              credibility.” True, “a great power should not ordinarily intervene in the
              domestic affairs of a smaller nation,” but this principle is overcome
              if “another great power has previously breached this rule.” Since it is “beyond
              dispute” that “the Soviet Union has intervened in Nicaragua” by providing arms
              and technicians “in both the military and civilian spheres,” then the US has
              the right to send it proxy army to attack Nicaragua. By the same argument, the
              Soviet Union has a perfect right to attack Turkey or Denmark — far more of a
              security threat to it than Nicaragua is to the United States — since it
              is “beyond dispute” that the US provides them with assistance, and would do far
              more if the USSR were to exercise the right of aggression accorded it by
              Kristol’s logic.

              Kristol might, however, counter this argument too by invoking a crucial
              distinction that he has drawn elsewhere in connection with the right of
              forceful intervention by the United States: “insignificant nations, like
              insignificant people, can quickly experience delusions of significance,” he
              explained. And when they do, these delusions must be driven from their minds by
              force: “In truth, the days of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ are never over... Gunboats
              are as necessary for international order as police cars are for domestic
              order.” Hence the US is entitled to use violence against Nicaragua, an
              insignificant nation, though the USSR lacks this right in the case of Turkey or
              Denmark.13

              The overwhelming endorsement for US-directed international terrorism should not
              be obscured by the wide elite opposition to the Contra war. By 1986, polls
              showed that 80 percent of “leaders” opposed aid to the Contras, and there was
              vigorous debate in Congress and the media about the program. But it is
              important to attend to the terms of the debate. At the dissident extreme, Tom
              Wicker of the New York Times observed that “Mr. Reagan’s policy of supporting
              [the Contras] is a clear failure,” so we should “acquiesce in some negotiated
              regional arrangement that would be enforced by Nicaragua’s neighbors” — if they
              can take time away from slaughtering their own populations, a feature of these
              terror states that does not exclude them from the role of enforcing regional
              arrangements on the errant Sandinistas, against whom no remotely comparable
              charge could credibly be made. Expressing the same thought, the editors of the
              Washington Post saw the Contras as “an imperfect instrument,” so that other
              means must be sought to “fit Nicaragua back into a Central American mode” and
              impose “reasonable conduct by a regional standard,” the standard of
              Washington’s terror states. Senate Majority Whip Alan Cranston, a leading dove,
              recognized that “the Contra effort is woefully inadequate to
              achieve...democracy in Nicaragua” (the US aim by doctrinal fiat, whatever the
              facts may be), so the US must find other means to “isolate” the “reprehensible”
              government in Managua and “leave it to fester in its own juices.” No such
              strictures hold for Washington’s murderous clients.14

              In short, there is little deviation from the basic terms of Michael
              Kinsley’s “sensible policy.” The questions have to do with efficacy, not
              principle. The state has the right to use violence as deemed appropriate.

              The motivation for the resort to international terrorism has been candidly
              explained. High administration officials observed that the goal of the attack
              against Nicaragua was “forcing [the Sandinistas] to divert scarce resources to
              the war and away from social programs.” This was the basic thrust of the 1981
              CIA program endorsed by the administration. As outlined by former CIA analyst
              David MacMichael in his testimony before the World Court, this program has as
              its purpose: to use the proxy army to “provoke cross-border attacks by
              Nicaraguan forces and thus serve to demonstrate Nicaragua’s aggressive nature,”
              to pressure the Nicaraguan Government to “clamp down on civil liberties within
              Nicaragua itself, arresting its opposition, demonstrating its allegedly
              inherent totalitarian nature and thus increase domestic dissent within the
              country,” and to undermine the shattered economy. Discussing the strategy of
              maintaining a terrorist force within Nicaragua after the huge CIA supply
              operation was theoretically cancelled by Congress in February 1988 (and the
              proxy forces largely fled, revealing — though not to articulate opinion — how
              little resemblance they bore to indigenous guerillas), a Defense Department
              official explained:

              “Those 2000 hard-core guys could keep some pressure on the Nicaraguan
              government, force them to use their economic resources for the military, and
              prevent them from solving their economic problems — and that’s a plus...
              Anything that puts pressure on the Sandinista regime, calls attention to the
              lack of democracy, and prevents the Sandinistas from solving their economic
              problems is a plus.”

              Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs in the
              Carter administration, observed that the principal argument for the terrorist
              attack is that “a longer war of attrition will so weaken the regime, provoke
              such a radical hardening of repression, and win sufficient support from
              Nicaragua’s discontented population that sooner or later the regime will be
              overthrown by popular revolt, self-destruct by means of internal coups or
              leadership splits, or simply capitulate to salvage what it can.” As a dove,
              Vaky regards the conception as “flawed” but in no way wrong.15

              The terrorist forces fully understand their directives, as we learn from one of
              the most important defectors of the 1980s, the head of intelligence of the main
              Contra force (FDN), Horacio Arce, whose nom de guerre was “Mercenario”, — talk
              of “democrats” and “freedom fighters” is for home consumption. Sandinista
              defectors are eagerly exploited by the White House and the media, and the
              Contra
              • Gość: diabeł Western State Terrorism cd. IP: *.visp.energis.pl 31.12.02, 16:33
                The terrorist forces fully understand their directives, as we learn from one of
                the most important defectors of the 1980s, the head of intelligence of the main
                Contra force (FDN), Horacio Arce, whose nom de guerre was “Mercenario”, — talk
                of “democrats” and “freedom fighters” is for home consumption. Sandinista
                defectors are eagerly exploited by the White House and the media, and the
                Contras generally received extensive coverage. Contra defectors are another
                matter, particularly when they have unwelcome tales to relate. Arce was ignored
                in the US when he defected in late 1988. In interviews in Mexico before
                returning to Managua to accept amnesty, Arce described his illegal training in
                an air force base in the southern United States, identified by name the CIA
                agents who provided support for the Contras under the AID cover in the US
                Embassy in Tegucigalpa, outlined how the Honduran army provides intelligence
                and support for Contra military activities, and discussed the immense
                corruption of the proxy forces and their sale of arms to the Honduran arms
                bazaar where they then reach Salvadoran guerillas. He then explained: “We
                attack a lot of schools, health centers, and those sort of things. We have
                tried to make it so that the Nicaraguan government cannot provide social
                services for the peasants, cannot develop its project... that’s the idea.” The
                success of the US training is amply confirmed by the record.16

                The contra war easily qualifies as “state-sponsored terrorism,” as former CIA
                director Stansfield Turner testified before Congress in April 1985. But one
                might argue that it should be termed outright aggression. That might be taken
                to be the import of the 1986 World Court decision. Let us, however, continue to
                give the US the benefit of the doubt, thus assigning its actions against
                Nicaragua to the category of international terrorism.



                3 International Terrorism in the 1980s

                During the 1980s, the primary locus of international terrorism has been Central
                America. In Nicaragua the US proxy forces left a trail of murder, torture,
                rape, mutilation, kidnapping, and destruction, but were impeded because
                civilians had an army to defend them. No comparable problems arose in the US
                client states, where the main terrorist force attacking the civilian population
                is the army and other state security forces. In El Salvador, tens of thousands
                were slaughtered in what Archbishop Rivera y Damas in October 1980, shortly
                after the operations moved into high gear, described as “a war of extermination
                and genocide against a defenseless civilian population.” This exercise in state
                terror sought “to destroy the people’s organizations fighting to defend their
                fundamental human rights,” as Archbishop Oscar Romero warned shortly before his
                assassination, while vainly pleading with President Carter not to send aid to
                the armed forces who, he continued, “know only how to repress the people and
                defend the interests of the Salvadorean oligarchy.”17 The goals were largely
                achieved during the Reagan administration, which escalated the savagery of the
                assault against the population to new heights. When it seemed that the US might
                be drawn into an invasion that would be harmful to its own interests, there was
                some concern and protest in elite circles, but that abated as state terror
                appeared successful, with the popular organizations decimated
                and “decapitated.” After elections under conditions of violence and repression
                guaranteeing victory to privileged elements acceptable to the US, the issue
                largely passed below the threshold.

                Little notice was taken of the significant increase in state terror after the
                Esquipulas II accords; or of an Amnesty International report entitled El
                Salvador: “Death Squads” — A Government Strategy (October 1988), reporting
                the “alarming rise” in killings by official death squads as part of the
                government strategy of intimidating any potential opposition by “killing and
                mutilating victims in the most macabre way,” leaving victims “mutilated,
                decapitated, dismembered, strangled or showing marks of torture... or rape.”
                Since the goal of the government strategy is “to intimidate or coerce a
                civilian population” (that is, terrorism, as officially defined in the US
                Code), it is not enough simply to kill. Rather, bodies must be left dismembered
                by the roadside, and women must be found hanging from trees by their hair with
                their faces painted red and their breasts cut off, while domestic elites
                pretend not to see as they continue to fund, train, and support the murderers
                and torturers.

                In the same years, a massacre of even greater scale took place in Guatemala,
                also supported throughout by the United States and its mercenary states. Here
                too, terror increased after the Esquipulas II peace agreement in order to guard
                against steps towards democracy, social reform, and protection of human rights
                called for in the accords. As in El Salvador, these developments were virtually
                ignored; the assigned task at the time was to focus attention on Nicaragua and
                to express vast outrage when Nicaragua occasionally approached the lesser
                abuses that are regular practices in the US client states. Since the goal is to
                restore Nicaragua to “the Central American mode” and ensure that it observes
                the “regional standards” satisfied by El Salvador and Guatemala, terror in
                client states is of no real concern, unless it becomes so visible as to
                endanger the flow of aid to the killers.18

                Notice crucially that all of this is international terrorism, supported or
                directly organized in Washington with the assistance of its international
                network of mercenary states.

                Well after the 1984 elections that were hailed for having brought democracy to
                El Salvador, the church-based human rights organization Socorro Juridico,
                operating under the protection of the archdiocese of San Salvador, described
                the results of the continuing terror, still conducted by “the same members of
                the armed forces who enjoy official approval and are adequately trained to
                carry out these acts of collective suffering,” in the following terms:

                Salvadoran society, affected by terror and panic, a result of the persistent
                violation of basic human rights, shows the following traits: collective
                intimidation and generalized fear, on the one hand, and on the other the
                internalized acceptance of the terror because of the daily and frequent use of
                violent means. In general, society accepts the frequent appearance of tortured
                bodies, because basic rights, the right to life, has absolutely no overriding
                value for society.19

                The same comment applies to the societies that oversee these operations, or
                simply look the other way.



                4 Before the Official Plague

                International terrorism is, of course, not an invention of the 1980s. In the
                previous two decades, its major victims were Cuba and Lebanon.

                Anti-Cuban terrorism was directed by a secret Special Group established in
                November 1961 under the code name “Mongoose,” involving 400 Americans, 2,000
                Cubans, a private navy of fast boats, and a $50 million annual budget, run in
                part by a Miami CIA station functioning in violation of the Neutrality Act and,
                presumably, the law banning CIA operations in the United States.20 These
                operations included bombing of hotels and industrial installations, sinking of
                fishing boats, poisoning of crops and livestock, contamination of sugar
                exports, etc. Not all of these actions were specifically authorized by the CIA,
                but no such considerations absolve official enemies.

                Several of
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