Gość: ! IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 24.10.01, 19:33 www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/publications/steinberg-WMD/steinberg-1.htm#4 Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś czytaj wygodnie posty
Gość: # Studium Terroru IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 24.10.01, 20:39 www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfm?docid=2450 Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: #### Re: Studium Terroru 25.10.01 IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 02:14 www.idf.il/english/announcements/2001/october/25.stm#2 Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: #### Re: Studium Terroru - PFLP IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 00:52 Government: PFLP chiefs ordered Ze'evi murder By Arieh O'Sullivan JERUSALEM (October 25) - The two top commanders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ordered the assassination of tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi, the government said yesterday. PFLP secretary-general Ahmed Sadat and his deputy Ahad Olma recruited a resident of Beit Rima, north of Ramallah, to lead the assassination squad, according to a statement from the Prime Minister's Office. The PFLP has claimed responsibility for Ze'evi's murder. According to the IDF, Sadat is the leader of an extreme faction in the PFLP and has "stood out as the one directing the organization's terrorist attacks, along with Olma." Sadat was elected chairman on October 3 to replace Mustafa Zibri (Abu Ali Mustafa), who was killed by Israeli forces in August. He was the most senior official of a Palestinian organization killed in accordance with the government's policy of targeting terrorist leaders, and the PFLP vowed to avenge his death. Israel is continuing its search for Sadat and Olma, who have gone underground. Security officials said the PFLP tapped Majdi Ghimawi to recruit the assassins, Ahmed Qouran and Basel a-Rahman Asmar, both from El-Bireh. Ghimawi also recruited Muhammad Fahmi Ghimawi of Beit Rima and Salah Alawi from Eizariya. They were captured, one last week right after the assassination, and the second in the Beit Rima incursion. They were apprehended by members of the police Gideonim special unit and General Security Service agents. A court-ordered injunction had banned the publication of the suspects' identities until yesterday, after the raid on Beit Rima. From the interrogation of Muhammad Ghimawi, 35, security agents pieced together the anatomy of Ze'evi's assassination. According to a detailed report cited in the statement by the Prime Minister's Office, two weeks before the assassination, Qouran told members of his gang their mission was to assassinate a senior Israeli official. The cell then rented a commercial vehicle to be used for their escape. They were also given a submachine gun and pistols with silencers. The investigation revealed the relative ease with which the assassination team collected intelligence about Ze'evi and then carried out the killing. Ze'evi habitually stayed at Jerusalem's Hyatt Regency Hotel. Ghimawi told his interrogators it was his job to wait for Qouran and Asmar outside the hotel and drive the getaway vehicle. He was armed, in the event of detection. The day before the assassination, cell leader Qouran booked a room at the Hyatt under an alias. On the morning of the murder, he instructed Ghimawi to wait at a pre-arranged location near the hotel at 6:30. They planned to speed off to Ramallah after the murder. Qouran told Ghimawi he shot Ze'evi, Ghimawi told interrogators. He said Qouran told him he had seen Ze'evi in the dining room eating breakfast. Qouran and Asmar went back to the eighth floor, where Ze'evi's room was located, and waited behind a door of the stairwell. "A few minutes later, Minister Ze'evi passed by, headed to his room," Ghimawi said, according to the statement issued by the Prime Minister's Office. "As he was opening his door, Qouran approached and called out to him. Their eyes met and Qouran fired at him from point blank range with his pistol, which had a silencer attached to it." Qouran waited to see Ze'evi fall to the floor, bleeding profusely. Doctors said he was hit once in the eye and in the neck. A third bullet missed. Ghimawi said Asmar was a few meters behind Qouran the entire time and witnessed the event from beginning to end. The pair fled to the waiting car and traveled to Eizariya, where Qouran, Asmar, and Ghimawi hid in Alawi's house. Later, Qouran and Asmar succeeded in sneaking into the Palestinian Authority, but Alawi and Ghimawi were captured, security officials said. The two were caught with the Scorpion submachine gun, one pistol and two silencers. A forensic examination determined this was not the pistol used to shoot Ze'evi. They did discover, however, that it had been used in a number of murders committed by the PFLP in the late 1980s. The assassins Qouran and Asmar are still at large, and the pistol used in the killing has not been recovered. Israel has given the Palestinian Authority their names and demanded they be arrested. Some of those arrested in Beit Rima are now being questioned about the possible involvement in the assassination. Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: ! Re: Studium Terroru - Arabskie kłamstwa ! IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 01:56 www.idf.il/english/announcements/2001/august/20.stm Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: ... Is There an Islamist Internationale? IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 22:49 Is There an Islamist Internationale? Reuven Paz ICT Academic Director Common Grounds for Cooperation between Islamist Terrorist Groups and their Implications for Western Security and American Foreign Policy Introduction Many researchers and analysts, not to mention reporters and politicians, seem to view the development of Islamist terrorism over the past decade as a kind of “new terrorism.” Indeed, the prospects of cooperation between a variety of Islamist groups and movements seem to have been improved in the past decade, and particularly in the last two years. There are a number of reasons for this, of which the fall of the Soviet Union is probably the most important. The breakup of the USSR was seen through the eyes of the Islamists as a victory over “the Kingdom of Evil”—a victory that symbolized a long-range historical phase and a foretaste of the future global victory of Islam and the Muslims. Ten years after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the war against the Soviet Union was seen by the Islamists as the next stage of the global war between Islam and Western culture. The Iranian Revolution had itself provided a revolutionary Islamic model for the Sunnis as well as Shi’ites, even though the Sunni Islamic groups had many reservations about its content. The fall of the Soviet Union not only symbolized victory, but also served as a reminder of the existence of a “global conspiracy against Islam.” After the fall of the Soviet Union the United States remained the sole force in this conspiracy against Islam. The U.S. is perceived by the Islamists as the spearhead of Western culture and modernization that threatens the Islamic world, not necessarily by military force or political colonialism and influence, but by its cultural influence. The Islamists saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a direct result of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan at the hands of Islamic warriors. The masses of Arab volunteers recruited to fight the Soviets in the Afghan conflict later sought to maintain the momentum of victory in other places. Hence, the Afghan conflict led to the opening of Islamic and Islamist fronts in various local and national disputes with religious overtones: Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan and Kashmir. This involvement has led many observers in recent years to view the phenomenon of “Afghan Arabs” as a kind of Islamist Internationale, similar in many ways to the International Brigades of Socialist and Communist volunteers in the civil war in Spain in the 1930s. The rise of Islamist Terrorism Over the past decade Islamist involvement in terrorism and political violence in various Arab and Islamic states, as well as in the West or against Western targets has been on the rise. This trend has gone hand-in-hand with a trend of increasing destructiveness of terror attacks: the use of more powerful car bombs, suicide bombings, massacres of innocent civilians or tourists, and attacks against multi-story buildings in order to cause massive damages and casualties. This type of terrorism has been used against both local regimes in the Middle East and Western—mainly American—interests. Major developments in Islamist terrorism in the past decade include Islamist terrorism for the first time in the United States, perpetrated by Egyptian Islamists. In the late 1990s these militants cooperated with Arab Afghan elements. The consolidation of the Jihad Front around Osama bin Ladin’s Al-Qa`idah organization in Afghanistan. This attracted several small Islamist groups to join him in order to benefit from his financial aid, the training facilities in Afghanistan and the hospitality of the Taliban regime. This consolidation made possible the attacks against American interests in Saudi Arabia, the bombing of two American embassies in East Africa, and the attempts to carry out terrorist operations in the U.S. and other places on the occasion of the Millennium. A significant increase in casualties caused by Islamist terrorism. This can be illustrated by the attacks on the American military base in Khobar, Saudi Arabia and the two American embassies in East Africa, as well as the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires and mass killing of tourists in Luxor, Egypt. In the Middle East, high-casualty attacks included a series of massive suicide bombings by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel. Mention should also be made of massacres of civilians at the hands of Islamists in Algeria. We should add to these the many similar attempted terrorist attacks that were prevented by the security services in various countries. A shift in focus from religious and nationalist struggles in individual Arab or Muslim states to the global scope of Islam. This international perspective has developed gradually throughout the 1990s, and has led to better organizational ties and cooperation between groups. A major increase in fund raising for Islamist organizations and movements, mainly those indulging in both terrorist and social activity, where it is sometimes impossible to separate the financing of the various fields of activity in order to curtail the ability of such groups to “juggle” the accounts. There has also been an increase in financial support of Arab and Muslim governments to various Islamic groups or projects in an attempt to gain control over the Islamists, or alternately to influence, through them, various sectors of the population. It should be noted that the Islamist terrorist activity has taken place against a background of slow but steady decline in popular support for some of the Islamist groups, such as GIA (Armed Islamic Group) in Algeria, The Islamic Jihad and al-Gama`at al-Islamiyyah in Egypt, Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, and the Jihadi groups in the Yemen. The loss of popular support is inter alia the result of massive terrorism, which led governments to apply heavy pressure on large sectors of the population suspected of being affiliated with Islamist groups or sympathetic towards them. An improvement of the ability of Arab Muslim governments to recruit popular support for their counter-terrorist efforts. In most cases Western—primarily American—encouragement allowed governments to crack down on Islamist terrorist groups without the fear of being labeled anti-Islamic. Islam and the West One important factor has in fact not changed since the beginning of the Islamist revival in the Arab world in the 1970s: the difficulty of Muslim populations to cope with modernization and with Western culture. This has resulted in a rise in the popularity of Islamic and Islamist groups and individuals among the Muslim communities in the West. This popularity is due to the rapid growth of these communities by natural growth and immigration over the past three decades, aided by the development of tension and hatred of foreigners in many of the host countries, particularly in Europe. There is a growing sense of insecurity on the part of Muslims living in Western societies, brought about by social and psychological processes that led to the return to Islam as a kind of a shield and a source of identity. A visitor to the Islamic bookstores of London, Paris, New Jersey, or Michigan would find that most of the religious doctrinal literature sold or distributed relate to the issues of “How to preserve Muslim life in Western society and culture.” These processes increased the quest for an organized religious society, in which the Islamic organizations play a role in helping communities to cope with the threat of Western culture—a threat, in the eyes of many Muslims, to Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: ... Re: Is There an Islamist Internationale? cd2 IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 22:53 These processes increased the quest for an organized religious society, in which the Islamic organizations play a role in helping communities to cope with the threat of Western culture—a threat, in the eyes of many Muslims, to the Muslim mind, soul and cultural values. Similar tensions exist in the Arab and Muslim world itself and are at the root of the popularity of the Islamist groups there as well. But in the Western world this sense of threat has only increased over time. The fundamentalist, radical messages of modern Islam, the most political religion on earth, has gained a following among Muslim populations in the West. In many cases this has occurred with the help of the Western governments themselves, through their inability or unwillingness differentiate between social welfare or educational activities and potentially violent political activities. Western democracies—particularly the more culturally liberal among them—have thus unwittingly leant themselves to the cause of the Islamists, for better or worse. For many of the violent Islamist groups, their Islamic projects, publications and welfare services serve as the backbone of support for their terrorist activities. Such services aid in recruitment, fund raising, training, communications, connections within the group and with other groups, distribution of political, doctrinal, and ideological messages, publishing pamphlets, assistance from foreign governments, etc. Part of this activity is sometimes sheltered by a kind of “untouchable” legitimate organizational complex, in the form of social and welfare associations. In some countries, particularly in the UK, Germany and Scandinavia, these organizations benefit from generous financial support from the authorities. In general, over the past decade the freedom of operation of most of the Islamist groups has greatly improved outside of their homelands. This relative freedom did not decrease the basic hostility to the West, particularly the U.S., but may even have led to increased animosity. Wahhabi-Takfiri Jihad Under the influence of the “Arab Afghan” phenomenon there has also been an ideological consolidation of Wahhabi-Takfiri Jihadi ideology and rhetoric that resulted in two main developments: A shift in the struggle, mainly through massive terrorism, from the heart of the Arab World into the “Wild West” of Central Asia and to Western countries or Western interests in the region. Better cooperation between various groups and organizations. In the Middle East examples are Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and to some extent Hizballah. On the international scene one can see this in the case of the Egyptian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, Algerian, Jordanian, Yemeni, and Sunni Lebanese groups. The response of the West under American leadership was to improve international cooperation in counter-terrorism. However this has not really helped to confront the recent developments. For most of the past decade cooperation in counter-terrorism between the Arab states did not exist, and only during the past year has such cooperation begun to bear fruit. The development of the Islamist perspective The Islamist or Jihadi terrorism is an extension of the more radical aspects of the Islamic revival. This revival was a result of the inability of Islamic societies to cope with the modernization presented to them by Western civilization and culture. It was encouraged by regimes unable to merge Islamic social, political, and cultural perceptions with the “imported” Western secular culture. The outcome was the development of a doctrine of Jihad, which offered a solution to the clash of civilizations. The opposing forces were presented as Islam, as represented by the movements of the Islamic revival, on the one hand and the processes of modernization, as represented by Western culture on the other hand. The incursion of Western culture was perceived as being aided and abetted by national, royalist, socialist or Marxist regimes in the Arab and Muslim World. One of the greatest successes of the Islamist groups was their ability to present the ideology of this inexorable clash as true and genuine Islam, and hence to attract relatively large proportions of the Muslim public. The next stage was the Islamist movements’ attempt to crystallize Muslim public opinion around the notion that the Muslims are at constant war. This war is seen as part of an eternal global struggle between Islam and its adherents and a long string of enemies throughout the history of Islam. The 20th Century gave many Muslims a sense of permanent retreat in which they were besieged by the threatening Western culture and modernization. The immediate outcome was secularization and the decline of Islamic political and social culture as a way of life, as it should have been according to the Islamic teachings. The superiority of the West gave this war a sense of desperation, causing it to be presented as a war of self-defense, with Jihad the only response. But Jihad does not mean only military conflict. This was a war of cultures, and therefore it has been conducted mainly for the minds of those Muslims attracted to the new perceptions. The feeling of being involved in a war of self-defense led to a sense of being under siege by the both the West and the secular Arab regimes. Most of the Islamist movements succeeded in convincing their followers that they were threatened everywhere in the world. Anyone who reads the collection of Sayyed Qutb’s letters in the book “America from the inside” (Amrika min al-Dakhil) in the early 1950s(2), can easily trace the origins of the sense of global war that eventually led to Islamist terrorism, violence, and hatred in the form of Jihad. The next stage was the formation of Jihad groups aimed at the creation of a proud new generation of Islamist warriors, who saw themselves as defenders of Islam in this global war—a war in which they were persecuted and threatened from all sides. One of the questions we should ask ourselves is “who threatens whom? And who terrorizes whom?” Is the admittedly extant tactical threat of Islamist terrorism to Western societies greater than the threat of Western modernization and culture to certain Muslim publics? Was the American intensive assistance to the Afghan Mujahedin (the former partners of Osama bin Laden) really meant to save them from the “Evil Empire” of the Soviet Union? If so, then why not allow them to establish a true Islamic State? Why did the Americans bombard the Serbs in Kosovo, but totally ignore the Islamists in Chechnya, who fight the successors of “the Evil Empire”? The Western mind can find the answers through the logic of political culture and interests. But, the Islamist political culture, which in Islamic eyes is an integral part of religious rulings and perceptions, cannot. And thus we come to the last phase of the development of these Islamist perceptions. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 led many Western societies to view Islamist terrorism as a new threat to the free world. The result is that the United States, the leading element of Western civilization, is on the verge of adopting the Islamic perception of the Global War. For Muslims, the wars against the Christian Crusaders are the archetype of the Islamic Jihad—a war on clear religious principles with no distinction between religion and politics. This perception was revived in the last decades by all the Islamist movements. When Osama bin Ladin styles his front “The Front of Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jews” it is obvious to the entire Muslim world what he means Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: ... Re: Is There an Islamist Internationale? cd3 IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 22:55 For Muslims, the wars against the Christian Crusaders are the archetype of the Islamic Jihad—a war on clear religious principles with no distinction between religion and politics. This perception was revived in the last decades by all the Islamist movements. When Osama bin Ladin styles his front “The Front of Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jews” it is obvious to the entire Muslim world what he means. Furthermore, such a perception evokes, not only for his immediate followers but also wider Islamic circles, a vision of a better future in which they emerge victorious. Bin Ladin’s success in marketing this notion not only lends legitimacy to terrorism against the West, but also opens the door to the feelings of hatred rooted in social and economic ills. This closes the circle and brings us to the roots of the Islamist violence: once again we find the inability to cope with Western modernization. The roots of Islamic fundamentalism lie in the search for the glorious past of Islam in the Middle Ages. The source of the phenomenon lies in the pursuit of immediate solutions to revive this glorious past. The continuous sense of retreat during the second half of the past century led to impatience, which in turn led to violence. The doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World or of Maududi’s Jamaah Islamiyyah in India and the non-Arabic Muslim World have lost their attraction for part of Islamic societies. Where these traditional doctrines stressed long-range social revolution, what people seek today is more immediate improvement in their social conditions. Thus many readily adopted the notion of Jihad and the clash of civilizations. Islamist Terrorism in the 1990s This quite long survey of the development of Islamist ideology is essential for the understanding of what seems to scholars and politicians as the “new Islamist terrorism” of the 1990s. But there is another element, which is perhaps the most important of all. The ideology of Jihad became for many adherents of Islamist movements not only an integral part of the religion, but the main and sometimes the only part of the religion to follow. Many members of Islamist groups lack knowledge any clear understanding of orthodox Islam. As their knowledge of true Islamic doctrine is poor, they often rely on various Sheikhs and religious scholars, adopting these leaders’ perceptions of Islam as their own. This gives these leaders and ideologues great influence over those sectors of the Muslim public whose knowledge of Islam is even poorer. Thus the version of Islam they offer their followers is often wholly divorced from religious law, centering instead on the roots of social and political confrontation. Another element that brought about the perception of global war was the vagueness of Islamist goals. Their struggle is not just to liberate a certain country from foreign occupation or from a “heretic” regime. These are merely steps along the way in an eternal religious mission, whose victory, though guaranteed, is to be realized only by future generations. Thus many of the Islamists lack a clear political world view and hence, any kind of pragmatism. New Terrorism? Many researchers and analysts tend to see the violent Islamist phenomenon as a kind of “new terrorism.” However, what we should ask ourselves is, do we face a new kind of terrorism, or do we simply lack a basic understanding of the sources and developments of the “old” terrorism? The conclusion drawn by at least some scholars is that a great deal of work remains to be done in order to identify the conditions that cause alienation to erupt into violence. What is especially important is to trace the links between religion and extreme forms of violence. So where then is the new terrorism? What is new in the Islamist terrorism of the 1990s? To begin with the so-called new Islamist terrorism is not the result of the decline of state-sponsored terrorism. Unlike the “secular” national, radical, anarchist terrorism sponsored by states such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, and behind the scenes by the Soviet camp, most of the Islamist terrorist groups have never been sponsored by states. Most of the Egyptian Islamist terrorist groups, for example, actually grew independently out of the internal Egyptian scene. Other than occasional logistic assistance to some of them on the part of Sudan they were not state-sponsored groups. The Algerian terrorist groups likewise were not sponsored by foreign states. Many of these groups neglected social activity, and were thus ineligible for the very generous financial support rendered to other groups by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Other groups, notably those of the school of the Muslim Brotherhood received extensive financial aid for all kinds of social and welfare projects. In this sense Hamas is unique, in that it is the only movement of the Brotherhood that is intensively involved in both terrorism and social activity. Its terrorism, due to the fact that it is directed only against Israel and as part of a Palestinian national struggle, gains the support of several Arab states or wealthy individuals in Arabia, not to mention its social and welfare infrastructure. But no one calls upon the U.S. State Department to include those countries in the list of states sponsoring terrorism. The model of Hamas has been imitated in recent years by Hizballah in Lebanon, which apart from its guerilla activities against Israel, is also involved in the social and political strengthening of the Shi`i community in Lebanon, and is sponsored by Iran under the patronage of Syria. A Geographical Shift The new phase of Islamist terrorism is actually the shift on the part of most of the Islamist groups from activities in their own countries against the secular “heretic” regimes to activities in the global arena. This shift began with two developments, which though unconnected on the organizational level, yet share a common ideological basis. The first of these was the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993. The second was the participation of Islamist volunteers in the conflicts in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Dagestan throughout the 1990s. These two developments seem to point to the establishment of what seems to be an international or inter-Muslim front in Afghanistan. However this trend was also the result of the oppression of these groups by the various Arab regimes, which created a camp of Islamist refugees who could no longer operate in their homelands. Thus these “Arab Afghans” were forced to take a new direction, that of global terrorism. This trend toward international activities was thus not necessarily a conscious decision, but may be more the result of external factors. Sociological Roots of European Islamism But there is an older sociological process at work in all this that seems to have been reinforced in the last decade, and may be even stronger in the future. In the second half of the 20th Century there was a significant increase in Muslim immigration to the West, mainly to North America and Western Europe. Whereas the first generation of immigrants sought to merge into Western society and fought to overcome major economic difficulties, the expectations of the second and third generation of immigrants were in many cases unfulfilled. This has reinforced their alienation from the Western societies that surrounded them. Although in many countries, primarily the UK, Scandinavia, and Germany, the immigrants were granted generous economic support, and benefited from total freedom of organization, spe Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś
Gość: ... Re: Is There an Islamist Internationale? cd4 end IP: *.cm-upc.chello.se 26.10.01, 23:00 Although in many countries, primarily the UK, Scandinavia, and Germany, the immigrants were granted generous economic support, and benefited from total freedom of organization, speech and education, their own communities were built mainly through the generosity of the wealthier Muslim countries. The xenophobia of the surrounding societies, coupled with unemployment and the difficulty in coping with modernization, led to the growth of an Islamic infrastructure, which in the liberal atmosphere of Western democracies could serve as a hothouse for Islamist movements. Social associations in London or research foundations in the United States, can, for example serve as the logistic foundation of Islamist terrorist groups. Such activities as recruiting, fund raising, publication and distribution of messages can all be done under the cover of social and cultural activities. This tends to reinforce the globalization and internationalization of Islamist terrorism, and will most likely continue to do so in the future. The growing feeling of alienation of Muslim youngsters is perhaps the most important factor in analyzing the prospects of future Islamist terrorism. Conclusion The answer to this phenomenon deserves a separate article. But part of it lies in a better understanding on the part of the Western world of the roots of Islamist violence. The steps taken by Western countries, under the leadership of the United States—steps such as increased cooperation in the field of intelligence, new legislation, encouragement of counter-terrorism by Arab and Muslim states, extradition of wanted terrorists—are all very important. But they provide no solution to the root cause of this phenomenon. This is especially true so long as Western countries, as represented by their media, politicians, and cultural leaders seem so ready to adopt the Islamist perception of the clash of civilizations between Islam and Western culture. In so doing they assist the Islamist terrorism to become a strategic global issue. By building up the image of an Islam at war with the West, they play into the hands of the Islamists. An additional element should be borne in mind, and is often neglected by scholars dealing with the Islamist phenomenon. This is the existence of elements of dissension, personality conflicts and rivalry that have so far prevented the growth of Islamist terrorist groups beyond the current level. At present the “Islamist Internationale,” such as it is, has several thousand hard core members and some ten thousand sympathizers, supporters and fund raising activists. However, Osama Bin Ladin is nowhere near to being the new Islamic Khalifah and has little prospects of being proclaimed as such. And while it is true that there is an increase in international cooperation between different groups, and even a consolidation of a new version of Wahhabi-Takfiri ideology that helps to unite some of these groups, we cannot say that there is an Islamist Internationale ready to unite into a global movement and become a global strategic threat. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reuven Paz is the academic director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel, and is currently a senior visitor research fellow in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C. His main fields of research are Islamic movements and terrorism and Palestinian society. Odpowiedz Link Zgłoś