Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl?

18.08.03, 13:11
Teraz wreszcie wiadomo dlaczego na tym forum tak bazkarnie szerzy sie
antysemityzm!
    • Gość: Tysprowda Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? Oto jest pytanie IP: 193.188.161.* 18.08.03, 13:42
      Na powyzsze pytanie moze odpowiedziec tylko Mosad, ktory go poczal,
      niepokalanie zreszta, chociaz zbrukowanego krwia nie wlasna, tez zreszta.

      Nastapila otoz, zupelnie niezaleznie od Idi Amina, pieriestrojka w
      antysemityzmie.

      Zamienil sie on w panantysemityzm wciagajac w siebie antyamerykanizm.

      Dzieki wspolpracy szaronistow i buszystow.

      Jak tak dalej ta wspolpraca wespol w zespol bedzie kwitla, bedzie drugi etap
      pieriestrojki wicie rozumicie i zrobi sie panantyamerykano-semityzm.
      • goldbaum Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? Oto jest pytani 18.08.03, 16:48
        To tlumaczyloby, dlaczego najbardziej zaciekli syjonisci (i syjoniSTKI)
        o sklonnosciach lewackich i homoseksualnych odczuwaja taki pociag do
        antysemityzmu.
        • Gość: Tysprowda Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? Oto jest pytani IP: 193.188.161.* 18.08.03, 18:03
          Co prowda to prowda.

          Swoj swego zawsze pozna, znajda sie jak w garncu maku.

          Wiele nie wiem, ale wiem, ze nie wiem, skad sie biora terrorysci i antysemici i
          antyamerykancy. Wiem tez ze ich bociany nie niosa ani sie nie znajduja w
          kapuscie.

          Moze po prostu zwyczajnie, jak po bozemu i w prawie fizyki ze kazda akcja
          powoduje reakcje, terroryzm tworzy terrorystow, semityzm tworzy antysemityzm, a
          amerykanizm tworzy antyamerykanizm.
    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:04
      goldbaum napisał:

      > Teraz wreszcie wiadomo dlaczego na tym forum tak bazkarnie szerzy sie
      > antysemityzm!
      Ten Murzyn zaczal znami he..he.. !

      General Information Doctrine Organization Insignia History Links Homefront
      Command Home תירבע

      Entebbe Diary
      by Maj. (Res.) Louis Williams
      The name "Entebbe" and the operation with which it is associated enjoy a
      special place in the annals of the ongoing war against terrorism. To the people
      of Israel, and to many others, it was a declaration that free men need not
      submit to terrorist blackmail and extortion, no matter how impossible the
      alternatives may seem.

      Entebbe Diary is dedicated to the scores of men who flew to Africa and back,
      and to the hundreds more who, by their unstinting efforts in planning and
      preparation, made the mission possible, and whose hearts went with their
      comrades to Entebbe.

      "The basic assumption in our work is to prepare in the best possible fashion,
      so that we may stand quietly on the day of judgment, when it comes, in the
      knowledge that we did everything we could in the time that we had."

      Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, killed in action, Entebbe, July 4, 1976

      Prologue
      At 6:45 on the morning of June 27, 1976, Singapore Airlines flight 763 landed
      at Athens Airport en route from Bahrain via Kuwait. Of the five disembarking
      passengers, four headed for the transit area to check in for Air France 139 to
      Paris, then settled down to a long wait in the transit lounge.

      At 8:59 on the same morning, Captain Michel Bacos, at the controls of Air
      France 139, took off from Ben Gurion Airport on what promised to be a routine
      flight to Paris via Athens.

      As the Airbus made its final approach to Athens, the boarding passengers, 58 in
      all, were being processed through passport and customs formalities. Nobody was
      on duty at the metal detector in the passenger corridor and the policeman at
      the fluoroscope was paying little attention to the screen at his side. In the
      line passing through to the bus that would take them across the tarmac to
      flight 139, were a twenty-five year old woman traveling on an Ecuadorian
      passport in the name of Ortega and, a few places behind her, a young blond-
      haired man whose Peruvian passport identified him as A. Garcia. Further back in
      the line were two dark-skinned youngsters with Bahraini and Kuwaiti travel
      documents.

      The Airbus completed its approach to flight path "Red 19" and touched down at
      11:30, to taxi to its parking spot, disgorge its 38 Athens-bound passengers and
      take on its 58 newcomers.

      At 12:20 the flight was airborne and climbing steadily to its cruising height
      of 31,000 feet. The stewards and stewardesses were already busy in the galleys
      preparing lunch for the 246 passengers. Eight minutes after takeoff, "Ortega"
      and "Garcia" and their two Arab companions made their move. The young woman
      left her first-class seat and took up station at the front of the cabin; in the
      tourist compartment, the youngsters were already on their feet with guns in
      their hands. The blond youngster, a revolver in one hand and a grenade in the
      other, burst through the unlocked cockpit door.

      Within minutes of the takeover of flight 139, Ben Gurion Airport management and
      the Air France station manager were aware that radio contact with Captain Bacos
      had been lost. The news was passed on to the Prime Minister, the Minister of
      Transport and the Defense Minister all of whom were at the regular Sunday
      Cabinet session.

      At 13:27 , IDF Operations Branch put into motion the pre-planned procedures for
      coping with possible emergencies at Ben Gurion Airport. IDF Central Command
      promptly moved to establish a command post at the airport, and to alert the
      necessary army units.

      Shortly after 14:00 hours, Air France 139 radioed Benghazi control tower, in
      Libya, demanding to have fuel available for at least four hours onward flight,
      and requesting that the local Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
      representative be summoned to the airport.

      The immediate destination was now clear, but everything indicated the the plane
      would be traveling on - and Ben Gurion Airport was a possibility. At 14:58, the
      airliner touched down in Benghazi and was directed to a remote runway. Nobody
      was allowed off the plane with the exception of one young woman who succeeded
      in convincing both the terrorists, and a hastily summoned Libyan doctor, that
      she was pregnant and in danger of miscarrying. The woman, who was in fact on
      her way to her mother's funeral in Manchester, England, spent an anxious few
      hours in the airport terminal, and was then put on a plane to England.

      Meanwhile, in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Rabin passed a note to the Cabinet
      Secretary to convene, in his office after the Cabinet session, a small team of
      ministers: Defense Minister Peres, Foreign Minister Allon, Transport Minister
      Yaakobi, Justice Minister Zadok and Minister without portfolio Galilee.
      Whichever way the Air France 139 episode would develop, these were the men who
      would have to take the decisions. The meeting, which convened at 16:05, decided
      very quickly on a number of immediate measures. Yigal Allon was to contact his
      French counterpart and demand that the French government do everything in its
      power to obtain the release of the passengers; 139 was after all an Air France
      plane. Gad Yaakobi would approach the international civil aviation authorities
      with a similar request, and would establish liaison with the families of the
      hostages and the communications media. All the arms of Israeli security would
      take all the necessary steps in the eventuality that the plane was destined for
      Israel.

      After a long wait on the deserted runway at Benghazi, the Airbus, having taken
      on 42 tons of fuel, started its engines, gathered speed and, at 21:50 on the
      evening of June 27, was airborne.

      At Ben Gurion Airport, where it was now known that 77 Israeli nationals were on
      board the plane, IDF Chief-of-Staff Mordechai ("Motta") Gur phoned Shimon
      Peres, who decided to come to the airport himself. It was slowly becoming clear
      that the aircraft, with its range of 2500 miles, was heading away from the
      Middle East in a southerly direction. Nevertheless, all the security
      preparations were kept in force.

      With only a few minutes fuel left in its tanks, Air France 139 landed at
      Entebbe, in Uganda, at 03:15 local time on the morning of June 28. The units at
      Ben Gurion Airport were ordered back to their bases, and the command post
      disbanded. Whatever would happen from here on, it would not require elaborate
      preparations at Ben Gurion Airport.

      Next




      www.idf.il ©Copyright IDF 1996-2003

      Suggestions and Comments: Assistance Division, IDF Spokesperson
      Fax +972-3-6080343
      contact us by email
    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:04

      General Information Doctrine Organization Insignia History Links Homefront
      Command Home תירבע

      Entebbe Diary
      by Maj. (Res.) Louis Williams
      The name "Entebbe" and the operation with which it is associated enjoy a
      special place in the annals of the ongoing war against terrorism. To the people
      of Israel, and to many others, it was a declaration that free men need not
      submit to terrorist blackmail and extortion, no matter how impossible the
      alternatives may seem.

      Entebbe Diary is dedicated to the scores of men who flew to Africa and back,
      and to the hundreds more who, by their unstinting efforts in planning and
      preparation, made the mission possible, and whose hearts went with their
      comrades to Entebbe.

      "The basic assumption in our work is to prepare in the best possible fashion,
      so that we may stand quietly on the day of judgment, when it comes, in the
      knowledge that we did everything we could in the time that we had."

      Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, killed in action, Entebbe, July 4, 1976

      Prologue
      At 6:45 on the morning of June 27, 1976, Singapore Airlines flight 763 landed
      at Athens Airport en route from Bahrain via Kuwait. Of the five disembarking
      passengers, four headed for the transit area to check in for Air France 139 to
      Paris, then settled down to a long wait in the transit lounge.

      At 8:59 on the same morning, Captain Michel Bacos, at the controls of Air
      France 139, took off from Ben Gurion Airport on what promised to be a routine
      flight to Paris via Athens.

      As the Airbus made its final approach to Athens, the boarding passengers, 58 in
      all, were being processed through passport and customs formalities. Nobody was
      on duty at the metal detector in the passenger corridor and the policeman at
      the fluoroscope was paying little attention to the screen at his side. In the
      line passing through to the bus that would take them across the tarmac to
      flight 139, were a twenty-five year old woman traveling on an Ecuadorian
      passport in the name of Ortega and, a few places behind her, a young blond-
      haired man whose Peruvian passport identified him as A. Garcia. Further back in
      the line were two dark-skinned youngsters with Bahraini and Kuwaiti travel
      documents.

      The Airbus completed its approach to flight path "Red 19" and touched down at
      11:30, to taxi to its parking spot, disgorge its 38 Athens-bound passengers and
      take on its 58 newcomers.

      At 12:20 the flight was airborne and climbing steadily to its cruising height
      of 31,000 feet. The stewards and stewardesses were already busy in the galleys
      preparing lunch for the 246 passengers. Eight minutes after takeoff, "Ortega"
      and "Garcia" and their two Arab companions made their move. The young woman
      left her first-class seat and took up station at the front of the cabin; in the
      tourist compartment, the youngsters were already on their feet with guns in
      their hands. The blond youngster, a revolver in one hand and a grenade in the
      other, burst through the unlocked cockpit door.

      Within minutes of the takeover of flight 139, Ben Gurion Airport management and
      the Air France station manager were aware that radio contact with Captain Bacos
      had been lost. The news was passed on to the Prime Minister, the Minister of
      Transport and the Defense Minister all of whom were at the regular Sunday
      Cabinet session.

      At 13:27 , IDF Operations Branch put into motion the pre-planned procedures for
      coping with possible emergencies at Ben Gurion Airport. IDF Central Command
      promptly moved to establish a command post at the airport, and to alert the
      necessary army units.

      Shortly after 14:00 hours, Air France 139 radioed Benghazi control tower, in
      Libya, demanding to have fuel available for at least four hours onward flight,
      and requesting that the local Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
      representative be summoned to the airport.

      The immediate destination was now clear, but everything indicated the the plane
      would be traveling on - and Ben Gurion Airport was a possibility. At 14:58, the
      airliner touched down in Benghazi and was directed to a remote runway. Nobody
      was allowed off the plane with the exception of one young woman who succeeded
      in convincing both the terrorists, and a hastily summoned Libyan doctor, that
      she was pregnant and in danger of miscarrying. The woman, who was in fact on
      her way to her mother's funeral in Manchester, England, spent an anxious few
      hours in the airport terminal, and was then put on a plane to England.

      Meanwhile, in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Rabin passed a note to the Cabinet
      Secretary to convene, in his office after the Cabinet session, a small team of
      ministers: Defense Minister Peres, Foreign Minister Allon, Transport Minister
      Yaakobi, Justice Minister Zadok and Minister without portfolio Galilee.
      Whichever way the Air France 139 episode would develop, these were the men who
      would have to take the decisions. The meeting, which convened at 16:05, decided
      very quickly on a number of immediate measures. Yigal Allon was to contact his
      French counterpart and demand that the French government do everything in its
      power to obtain the release of the passengers; 139 was after all an Air France
      plane. Gad Yaakobi would approach the international civil aviation authorities
      with a similar request, and would establish liaison with the families of the
      hostages and the communications media. All the arms of Israeli security would
      take all the necessary steps in the eventuality that the plane was destined for
      Israel.

      After a long wait on the deserted runway at Benghazi, the Airbus, having taken
      on 42 tons of fuel, started its engines, gathered speed and, at 21:50 on the
      evening of June 27, was airborne.

      At Ben Gurion Airport, where it was now known that 77 Israeli nationals were on
      board the plane, IDF Chief-of-Staff Mordechai ("Motta") Gur phoned Shimon
      Peres, who decided to come to the airport himself. It was slowly becoming clear
      that the aircraft, with its range of 2500 miles, was heading away from the
      Middle East in a southerly direction. Nevertheless, all the security
      preparations were kept in force.

      With only a few minutes fuel left in its tanks, Air France 139 landed at
      Entebbe, in Uganda, at 03:15 local time on the morning of June 28. The units at
      Ben Gurion Airport were ordered back to their bases, and the command post
      disbanded. Whatever would happen from here on, it would not require elaborate
      preparations at Ben Gurion Airport.

      Next




      www.idf.il ©Copyright IDF 1996-2003

      Suggestions and Comments: Assistance Division, IDF Spokesperson
      Fax +972-3-6080343
      contact us by email
    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:05

      General Information Doctrine Organization Insignia History Links Homefront
      Command Home תירבע

      Tuesday, June 29
      At dawn on June 29, the only available new information was a brief description
      of the hijackers, which had come in from Major General Rehavam Zeevi in London.
      Zeevi, the Prime Minister's advisor on terrorism, had been in Europe when the
      hijacking took place, and was asked to remain there to coordinate contacts with
      the French government and efforts to obtain any relevant data.

      At 08:30, PrimeMinister Rabin met with the Foreign Affairs and Security
      Committee of the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, to bring its members up to date
      on the hijacking and the decisions taken on the previous day by the ministerial
      team. Later in the morning, in keeping with his awareness that critical
      security problems transcend party barriers, Rabin sat in private session with
      Menahem Begin, the leader of the Likud opposition. At the end of their meeting
      the Prime Minister offered to keep Begin posted on any developments in the
      situation.

      A meeting of the ministerial team was set for five in the afternoon. In the
      early afternoon, the Prime Minister asked that IDF Chief-of-Staff Gur be
      summoned to take part in the session. A routine exercise was in progress in
      Sinai, and the call to Gur caught him as he was about to board a helicopter at
      Dov Airport in north Tel Aviv, on his way to watch the maneuvers in the south.
      Before ascending the hills to Jerusalem, the C-O-S called Deputy Head of
      General Staff Branch, Brig. Gen. Avigdor Ben-Gal, and told him to "start
      thinking about plans for Entebbe..." The Air Force and Combined Operations
      Officers, who had been "thinking" since the day before, were now free to move
      into higher gear.

      The Prime Minister opened the five o’clock meeting with a direct question to
      Lieutenant-General Gur:“Has the IDF any proposal on how to extricate the
      hostages?”The General replied that it was too early, but options were being
      examined. There followed a few moments’ debate on possible tactics, but this
      was cut short by Shimon Peres, who suggested that this was neither the time nor
      the place to discuss operational matters before they had been properly
      examined.

      Minutes before the meeting, both the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry
      received from Paris, a preliminary list of terrorists, held in Israel, France,
      Germany, Switzerland and Kenya, whose release was being demanded by the
      hijackers in Entebbe. The Director-General of the Foreign Ministry phoned the
      list through to the cabinet room. Now the price was clear and now there was
      hard information on who was responsible. The ministers were given a briefing by
      the intelligence consultant who was sitting in, on the PFLP and its head, Dr.
      Wadia Hadad.

      The Prime Minister closed the meeting with an announcement of a special
      government session at eleven the next morning.

      Early in the evening, another cable from the Paris embassy was placed on
      Foreign Minister Allon’s desk. this one contained all the technical details of
      the exchange of terrorists for hostages, and set a deadline -14:00 hours,
      Israel time, on Thursday, July 1. If their demands were not met, the terrorists
      threatened to blow up the plane and its passengers.

      At 21:00 hours, a small group of IDF generals sat facing Shimon Peres and Motta
      Gur, while each in turn outlined his preliminary ideas. Kuti Adam, who
      henceforward would be coordinator and motive force in planning the operation,
      spoke briefly of three possible options, then turned to Major General Benny
      Peled, GOC Air Force, for his evaluation of the logistics involved in getting
      to Entebbe. Peled whose planning officers had been working on the problem for
      36 hours, explained all the problematics, then stated that the necessary force
      ("1200 men with all their equipment, if you want") could be flown, nonstop, to
      target. It was too early for operational decisions, but the Air Force had said,
      loud and clear, that it could be done.

      Unknown to the officers in Tel Aviv, Ugandan soldiers in Entebbe had spent the
      part of the afternoon cutting an opening from the hostages' hall in the old
      terminal through to the next room, and had nailed planks in the shape of a "T"
      across the opening.

      The hostages were encouraged to believe that more space was being made
      available to alleviate their cramped conditions. But in the late evening,
      Wilfried Boese, the blond-haired hijacker, appeared and announced that he was
      going to read a list of names, and that all those mentioned should crawl
      through the opening into the next room. Despite his assurances that the list
      had nothing to do with nationality, it was clear that he was naming only
      Israelis and Jews. The German word “Selektion” was muttered around the room - a
      reminder of Dr. Josef Mengele at Auschwitz choosing those who would live and
      those who would die!

      During the late evening, and into the night, an Israel Air Force officer was
      making phone calls to senior Air Force personnel, serving and retired, who had
      seen duty in Uganda. All received the same message:”Report to the Deputy Chief
      of Intelligence Branch at one a.m.!” From elsewhere in the General Staff,
      similar calls were going out to officers who had enjoyed a personal
      relationship with Idi Amin, to meet in the P.M.’s office at 08:00 hours (their
      squadron leader, Lt.Col. S., was called out of a wedding party in Haifa to
      receive his summons); and to ground forces combat officers, whose input was now
      required by the planning teams.

      Next




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    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:05

      General Information Doctrine Organization Insignia History Links Homefront
      Command Home תירבע

      Wednesday, June 30
      Ehud Barak, the Deputy Head of IDF Intelligence Branch, had two meetings
      scheduled during the early hours of Wednesday, June 30. At 01:00 he met with
      senior Air Force officers who had spent time in Uganda, to find out everythig
      they could tell him about Entebbe Airport, other airbases in Uganda, Idi Amin’s
      air force - and anything else that came to mind. At 04:00 hours, he chaired a
      meeting of the planners to survey progress. There were ideas, but nothing
      concrete so far; in fact, both meetings were more concerned with listing the
      gray areas where information was needed, and with compiling checklist of
      possible sources. Among the officers now present in the meetings was Muki, a
      young paratroop major, who had been called in that night; his assignment would
      be to consider all the possibilities of seizing the Old Terminal and
      eliminating the terrorists.

      The strangest meeting of all to take place during that day was in Shimon Peres’
      office, where the Defense Minister was picking the brains of a handful of air
      force and army officers who were personally acquainted and even friendly with
      Idi Amin. Slowly but surely, Peres was putting together a psychological profile
      of the African dictator - including details like Amin’s ambition to be awarded
      the Nobel prize for Peace, and his mother’s appearance to him in a dream to
      warn him against ever harming the Jews. As a direct outcome of this session, a
      retired IDF colonel, Burka Bar-Lev, was led into a nearby room to wait while an
      international call was placed to Kampala. In the ensuing conversation with Idi
      Amin, and others that followed over the next few days, Bar-Lev was instructed
      to play heavily on Amin’s ego and their personal friendship to extract every
      bit of useful information and gain as much time as possible. Through most of
      the conversations, Peres listened in on an extension phone, taking note of
      everything of importance that Amin let slip.

      The Government of Israel convened, in full session, at 11:00 hours in the
      Cabinet Room of the Knesset. The only really new developments to report were
      the refusals of the governments of France and West Germany to give up
      terrorists from their prisons. The French had however, quietly intimated that
      they would follow Israel’s lead. The consensus of the meeting, as summed up by
      Prime Minister Rabin, was that there was still time to decide; the Cabinet
      would be summoned again either later in the day or the following morning, a few
      hours before the ultimatum was scheduled to expire.

      At Air Force Headquarters, General Peled and his officers were fitting together
      the pieces of data to make a full picture. Peled’s most basic concern was not
      with the logistics of reaching Entebbe, but rather with the possibility that
      unidentified aircraft might be fired on. he had already concluded that little
      was to be feared from radar detection on route. Even if the planes did show up
      on hostile radar screens, it was unlikely that they would be believed to be
      Israeli aircraft so far from home.

      At Entebbe, 47 hostages of the non-Israeli group were being herded on board
      awaiting an Air France plane. Captain Bacos and his crew from flight 139
      refused to leave. They were adamant about staying with their passengers to the
      very end. A French nun also insisted on staying and giving up her place to
      someone else, but the Ugandans took no notice of her protests, and she was
      shoved on board the plane.

      During the afternoon, two officers of the IDF returned to central Israel from
      the exercises in the south, to find that they were urgently required to report
      to the General Staff. One of them was Brigadier General Dan Shomron, Chief
      Paratroop and Infantry Officer, and his summons was to a briefing by Major
      General Kuti Adam at 15:30 hours. The second officer was Lieutenant Colonel
      Jonathan (“Yoni”) Netanyahu, and his meeting was with his own deputy, Muki, who
      wanted to bring his C. O. into the picture. Neither of these men had been aware
      of frenzied activity taking place within the small inner circle; they were not
      alone in this - as the requirements of security had even left most of the
      generals of the IDF General Staff in the dark about the search for the possible
      military option.

      It was a busy evening. At 21:00 hours, Dan Shomron convened a meeting session
      at his headquarters. Two hours earlier, Prime Minister Rabin met the editors of
      Israel’s daily press to discuss with them aspects of the terrorist ultimatum
      and the diplomatic efforts, and to urge restraint in covering the story. From
      that meeting, Rabin went straight into session with the small ministerial team,
      again opening the proceedings with a direct question “do we have a military
      option?” addressed to the Chief of Staff, again receiving a terse “not yet!”
      After hearing reports from Foreign Minister Allon on the diplomatic scene,
      Shimon Peres reviewed the ideas already produced in the IDF - but there were
      still gaps in the available intelligence data. The team would meet again in the
      morning, before the Cabinet session that would have to decide about the 2 p.m.
      ultimatum.

      At Orly Airport outside Paris, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues welcomed the
      47 hostages from Entebbe in the name of the President of France. A number of
      men circulated in the crowd, discreetly collecting names and addresses. Late
      into the night, there would be knocks on the doors of families celebrating the
      safe homecoming of their kin, and questions would be asked: the number of
      terrorists, what weapons were they carrying and what were they wearing, how
      were the hostages housed, how many Ugandans were around the building and how
      were they behaving? Despite the lateness of the hour and the strangeness of the
      circumstances, none of the nocturnal visitors were turned away empty-handed.

      Meanwhile, in Tel-Aviv, Defense Minister Peres was sitting in his crowded
      office, listening to Kuti Adam, Benny Peled, Intelligence Branch Chief Shlomo
      Gazit and their assistants. Three possible plans were taking shape: a parachute
      drop into Lake Victoria and a quiet landing at Entebbe from rubber boats, a
      large-scale crossing of the lake from the Kenyan shore - using whatever craft
      could be rented, borrowed or stolen, and a direct landing at Entebbe, a quick
      assault and a fast removal of the hostages by air. Both of the first two plans
      depended on releasing the hostages then relying on either Idi Amin or UN
      intercession to get them out. They would drop by the wayside over the coming
      hours, both for military reasons and because the data coming in from Paris
      would confirm that the Ugandans were active partners in the hijacking. In the
      meantime, the problem was still insufficient information - and the clock was
      ticking away the vital minutes to midday on Thursday, July 1.

      Next




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    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:06

      General Information Doctrine Organization Insignia History Links Homefront
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      Thursday, July 1
      At the early morning meeting of Intelligence Branch planners, one of the points
      that came to light was the fact that an Israeli building contractor had built
      installations at Entebbe, including the Old Terminal. At 08:00 hours when the
      normal working day was beginning in Tel Aviv, young officers in civilian
      clothes paid visits to tourist agencies and airline offices to enquire about
      flight schedules in East Africa. Another small group descended on the
      headquarters of one of Israel’s biggest building companies in order to “borrow”
      in strictest confidence their blueprints of Entebbe airport, and, most
      particularly of the Old Terminal building.

      Shimon Peres sat at his desk, reading over the transcript of the previous
      night’s phone call to Idi Amin, and refreshing his memory about the information
      that the Ugandan leader, perhaps inadvertently, and let slip to his old friend,
      Burka Bar-Lev. Peres was convinced, based on his last session with the officers
      of the General Staff, that there had to be a military option and that it was
      only a matter of time till all of the pieces fell into place. He was absolutely
      certain that giving way to terrorist extortion was not the path that a
      sovereign state should choose. At 07:45, when the ministerial team convened,
      Peres stressed his convictions, but the clock on the wall - which showed 08:40
      as the meeting ended - was against him.

      All eighteen ministers in the Cabinet meeting that began at 09:00 hours were
      very conscious of the limited time remaining. But the issues were too serious
      to pass without some debate. After hearing the opening round of discussion,
      Yitzhak Rabin apologized to his colleagues, and departed for a brief session
      with the members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, at
      which he read out the proposed text of a government resolution in favor of
      negotiation for the release of the hostages, and asked the opinions of the men
      present. He went out of his way to state that the Minister of Defense, and some
      other Cabinet ministers, were on record as saying that they would vote for
      negotiation solely as a means of gaining time. After a brief recess, requested
      by the head of the opposition, in order to allow consultation, the Prime
      Minister was assured of the committee’s agreement for what he felt he had to
      do.

      Returning to the Cabinet Room, Rabin called for a vote, insisting that each man
      must vote “yes” or “no”; there could be no avoidance of responsibility by
      abstention. The vote was unanimous in favor of negotiation, it being recorded
      in the minutes of the meeting that Shimon Peres, and Shlomo Hillel, the
      Minister of Police, regarded the decision as a tactic to gain time. Yigal Allon
      placed an urgent phone call to the Ambassador of France, and asked him to
      inform the French Foreign Minister immediately. There were ninety minutes to
      spare to the expiration of the ultimatum.

      The answer was not slow in coming. Idi Amin told Burka Bar- Lev that the PFLP
      would broadcast on Ugandan Radio at two p.m. Israel time. He would say no more
      than that. The PFLP had extended the ultimatum to 14:00 hours on Sunday, July
      4, a fact that Amin had already announced in yet another personal visit to the
      hostages in the Old Terminal.

      The tension of the morning hours and the relief of temporary reprieve in the
      afternoon made little difference to the IDF. The air and ground forces teams
      had achieved substantial progress now that the required - and requested - data
      was pouring in. There was still one major gap in intelligence, - any changes
      that might have been made to runways, taxi paths and other installations at
      Entebbe in the four years since the Israel Air Force had last visited Uganda.

      However, assurances had been given that every effort was being made to get an
      up-dated picture; in any case, the ground plans of international airports were
      not exactly top secret.

      At 10:00 hours, while the members of the Government were agonizing over their
      decision, Chief Paratroop and Infantry officer, Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron, was
      presenting his preliminary ideas to Major General Adam. At 15:15 hours, a group
      of senior officers convened in Shimon Peres’ office to listen to the minister’s
      report on the decision to negotiate. But that was not all. Peres went on to
      provoke a discussion on the probabilities of success of a military operation -
      though it must have seemed in conflict with the political situation. Despite
      the general atmosphere of caution, Benny Peled and Kuti Adam were optimistic.
      Forty-five minutes later, Major General Adam formally ordered Shomron to flesh
      out the details of a military operation to rescue the hostages.

      At 17:00 hours, Dan Shomron and his team were in joint session with the Air
      Force planners and, at 18:30, a more detailed conception was presented to
      Shimon Peres, as a result of which the Defense Minister approved the
      preparation of operational orders. Dan Shomron was appointed to command the
      operation on the ground.

      Throughout the evening, the circle widened. Lt. Colonel Netanyahu was again
      summoned from the south by his deputy, to be brought up to date, in a late
      night session, on the various ideas for an assault on the Old Terminal. They
      adjourned at 03:00 hours - Yoni Netanyahu to get some sleep, and Muki to draw
      up the assignments for their men and to list the equipment they would need. The
      Senior Medical Officer, at the Head of Communications and Electronics Branch
      were called in to be briefed, then departed to set their own wheels in motion.
      At Air Force headquarters, lists were being drawn up of pilots and aircrew,
      some of them reservists, the main criterion being experience in long-range
      flights over Africa. Brigadier Shomron instructed his headquarters to bring in
      troops, drawn from three units, to a relatively quiet base in central Israel.
      The units should be drawn from Yoni Netanyahu’s paratroops, another paratroop
      unit and the Golani Infantry Brigade. Golani had endured a long tradition of
      being the unit to which all rejects from other IDF echelons had been sent. In
      the years preceding the Yom Kippur War, the brigade had demonstrated a
      remarkable ability to “pull itself up by its own bootstraps” and was now
      recognized as an elite unit. The choice for the Entebbe operation was yet
      another recognition of its new status in the IDF. Meanwhile, strict
      instructions were being issued to maintain communications silence; there was to
      be no hint in telephone conversations, or among the uninitiated, about what was
      in the wind.

      During the night, Kuti Adam ordered the erection of a full-scale model of the
      Entebbe Old Terminal, based on the available blueprints and photographs, at the
      base where Yoni Netanyahu’s men were now assembling; they would exercise on the
      model, with the help of a Hercules aircraft parked nearby. Almost as an
      afterthought, the Computer Center was asked to provide a code name for the
      operation: after rejecting their first offering, Shomron accepted “Operation
      Thunderball”.

      Meanwhile, a second group of 101 non-Israeli hostages had arrived in Paris.
      There was a double implication: there were fewer hostages to bring out of
      Entebbe; on the other hand, the knowledge that the terrorists were now holding
      Israelis and Jews exclusively, had to raise doubts about the sincerity of their
      negotiations. In any case, they had already intimated, via the Somali
      Ambassador to Uganda, who was serving as go-between for the French, that they
      were not interested in negotiation - only in total satisfaction of their
      d
    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:07

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      Friday, July 2
      In discussion with the other generals, Chief of Staff Gur was still not
      convinced that the now rapidly evolving plan was feasible. However, he agreed
      to with old judgment until some detail were drilled both on the ground and in
      the air. Thus, as dawn broke on Friday, July 2, all the preparations were being
      made for an operation that had not yet been approved by the Chief of Staff.
      Shortly after midnight, Dan Shomron had a brief session with the Prime
      Minister, but the basis was still “let’s wait and see...”

      At 08:00 on Friday, July 2, an “Orders Group” took place for the officers of
      the units assigned to “Thunderball”. At 08:30, while three Hercules aircraft
      were landing at the base, to serve as stage props for the rehearsals of the
      operation, the Air Force team was presenting its detailed planning to General
      Motta Gur. The pilots were assuming a flight plan that would bring them to
      Entebbe in a time slot between one commercial airliner taking off and another
      landing. It was highly unlikely that the control tower would bother to turn off
      the runway lights for a short period; in any case, Entebbe was, for the next
      few days, the “duty airport” for emergencies over East Africa. However, the
      Chief of Staff was concerned about the dangers of landing in the dark, so it
      was agreed that he should fly with Lt. Col. S., the command pilot, in a night
      exercise, to prove that a Hercules could be landed safely without runway
      lights. For the time being, the assumption was that the aircraft would be
      refueled at Entebbe, from the airport’s own tanks - though Nairobi, in Kenya
      was suggested as a possible alternative.

      At 10:00 hours, Yoni Netanyahu, Muki and their officers started to run through
      all the possible variants of an assault on the Old Terminal, while the other
      units mapped out their roles in securing the rest of the airport, including the
      New Terminal, and control tower, and the refueling area.

      Elsewhere, Air Force ground crews were hard at work on “routine maintenance
      plus” of seven aircraft: four Hercules would be needed (there had been a
      suggestion to take many more - but Muki had argued vigorously and effectively
      against too large a force); one extra Hercules would be held in reserve; two
      Boeing 707’s were included in the plan - though they would not be landing at
      Entebbe. Brigadier Dan Michael’s staff in the IDF Medical Corps were assembling
      the equipment that would be needed to convert one Boeing into a flying medical
      facility. While Brigadier Yisrael Zamir, the Chief Communications Officer, was
      working with his team on equipping the other as a communications link.

      At 12:00 noon, the unit commanders presented their detailed plans for approval
      by Chief Paratroop and Infantry officer Shomron. Two hours later, Yoni
      Netanyahu convened his own officers for a final “Orders Group” before the
      rehearsals on the model. There was some concern over how to achieve maximal
      surprise: the assault team would have to cover quite a distance by road to the
      Old Terminal, since taxing the aircraft too close to the building was bound to
      alert the terrorists and the Ugandans. Muki suddenly had a brainwave. He
      grabbed a phone and told a startled staff officer in Tel Aviv that they must
      have a Mercedes limousine immediately. Putting down the receiver, he explained
      that all senior Ugandan officers, including Amin himself, always traveled by
      black Mercedes. A limousine, escorted by Landrovers, would be a normal enough
      sight not to arouse undue interest until it was too late.

      As the light was fading, at 17:00 hours, the assigned aircrews gathered for a
      briefing on the drills that were to take place after dark. Immediately after
      the briefing, Lt. Col. S. settled down at the controls of Hercules, with Lt.
      Gen. Gur and Maj. Gen. Peled at his shoulder. Motta Gur had already told the
      pilots that it made no difference to the combat teams where they had to
      perform; it was the pilots’ job to bring them safely to their destination. Lt.
      Col. S. now had to convince Motta that the pilots could indeed make a blind
      landing - if they needed to. The plane took off and flew south to Ophir, at the
      southern tip of Sinai. There , it made a landing on a dark runway, but once was
      not enough for the COS, so Lt. Col. S. took off again and repeated the
      maneuver. Coming into Ophir airfield, the plane was a hundred yards off line,
      but there was ample time to correct - and the landing was again satisfactory.
      The Air Force had made its point.

      Meanwhile, Yoni’s paratroops were exercising, time and again, the drive to the
      model and the assault and elimination of the terrorists, while their CO held a
      stopwatch, urging them to clip more seconds until he was satisfied. A Mercedes
      limousine had indeed arrived, borrowed from a car dealer who specialized in
      used taxicabs, but no - to Muki's horror - it was white! Never mind! That
      problem could be dealt with later.

      At 22:45 hours, after Lt. Col. S. had brought his load of top brass back from
      Ophir, the paratroops performed once again. this time with the Hercules, and
      with the Chief-of-Staff watching.

      Next




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    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:08

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      Saturday, July 3
      At 01:00, on the early morning of Saturday, July 3, Motta Gur phoned Shimon
      Peres and reported that the men were ready - and the operation could be staged.
      The news throughout the day had not been promissing: the Embassy in Paris was
      relaying messages that indicated no progress, and no obvious desire for
      progress, on the diplomatic front. Now there was at least a ray of light.

      Throughout the night, army mechanics labored on the engine of the aging
      Mercedes. As they finished, two soldiers began to slap black paint on the white
      bodywork. Yoni and Muki spent the remaining hours of darkness reviewing every
      aspect of the assault and devising answers eventualities. Air Force
      headquarters drafted detailed operational orders and, at 05:00, issued them to
      the transport squadron. Briefing of the aircrews was set for 08:45 hours.
      Shortly after dawn, the combat units loaded their equipment, and drove on
      deserted road to a nearby airbase, where ground crews stood ready to lash their
      vehicles securely in the bellies of the waiting aircraft. Alongside a runway,
      Dan Michaeli's doctors and medical orderlies made a last check of the equipment
      to be loaded on board the "hospital" Boeing. The IDF Medical Corps had quietly
      called in reservist doctors, with no explanations offered for the unusual
      summons.

      It was a sunny morning in Israel, the plight of the Entebbe hostages
      overshadowed the normal Sabbath joys. There were no indications of progress in
      the negotiations for their release, and indeed it seemed that terrorists were
      only interested in inforcing Israel to its knees in a humiliating capitulation.
      Via France, Israel had insisted that the exchange must take place at a neutral
      venue, preferably Paris, but the answer had been an outright refusal. There was
      little certainty in anybody's mind that trading convicted terrorists would save
      the lives of 105 men, women and children in the Entebbe Old Terminal.

      Shortly after 11:00, the small ministerial team convened, for the last time, in
      the Prime Minister's Tel Aviv office. They listened in silence to General Gur's
      detailed presentation of Operation Thunderball. It was not a total surprise,
      since Shimon Peres had already told three of the ministers that a military
      option had opened up. Perhaps to retain a sense of the gravity of the
      situation, Yitzhak Rabin reviewed the risks involved and the implications of
      failure. The meeting concluded with a question to Motta Gur: "When do the
      planes have to go". The answer was:"Shortly after 1 p.m. from central Israel."

      Most of the ministers who gathered for the full Cabinet session, immediately
      after the team meeting, were expecting the agenda to contain just one item: a
      decision to accede to the hijackers' demands before tomorrow's deadline.
      Despite the holiness of the Sabbath, all the Cabinet members were present; one
      religious minister who lived in Jerusalem had received a hint from his
      colleague, Transport Minister Yaakobi - at midday on Friday - that he would not
      regret taking his family to Tel Aviv for the weekend.

      The gloomy atmosphere and long faces gave way to growing astonishment as the
      Chief-of-Staff spread maps, sketches and photographs across the table, and
      began yet another detailed briefing. While General Gur was speaking, the heavy
      doors of five Hercules aircraft slammed shut, and the planes began to gather
      speed on the runway. At 13:20, they were airborne and southbound for Ophir at
      the tip of the Sinai peninsula. The flight plan envisaged a last staging point
      as far south as possible, for reasons of both timing and range. But normal
      flight paths would have taken the aircraft westward over crowded Tel Aviv
      beaches, before making the turn south. And there was no way that so many
      aircraft in the Sabbath skies could have passed overhead without arousing
      speculation. So each of the five planes took a separate route across the
      heartland of Israel. Over the Negev and Sinai deserts, the upcurrents of hot
      air made it a very rough flight. The soldiers on board the transports had been
      issued airsickness pills, but the turbulence was so bad that they were glad to
      set foot on solid ground at Ophir.

      In the Cabinet Room in Tel Aviv, Motta Gur concluded his briefing and the
      ministers were asking questions. Time was now short, but no attempt was made to
      stop the discussion: the decision was too important to rush the Government of
      Israel into it. At Ophir, four heavily laden transports (their payloads as much
      as 20,000 pounds over normal rated capacity) lumbered through the thin desert
      air and, after using up the whole length of the runway, were airborne. Watching
      them go were a very airsick paratrooper - and a very frustrated pilot of the
      reserve Hercules. The prevailing winds and weather forced the four planes to
      take off northwards, then bank slowly - five degrees at time - back to their
      southerly course, making part of their turn over the empty desert wastes of
      Saudi Arabia.

      A note passed across the table from Yitzhak Rabin to Shimon Peres suggesting
      that the planes should go: they could always be recalled. From Peres' smile,
      the Prime minister could understand that "Operation Thunderball" was already on
      its way. As if they had all the time in the world, Rabin summed up the debate,
      then called for a vote. It was unanimous: the IDF was going to Entebbe.

      Fifteen minutes after the last Hercules was airborne out of Ophir, the second
      Boeing was on its way south from an airbase in central Israel. It would also
      land at Ophir, then follow the transports - three hours behind to allow for its
      higher speed. On board were Major General Kuti Adam, another senior officer,
      and a team of communications operators.

      In the cockpits of the four transport planes, which were now flying low over
      the Gulf of Suez, beneath the height of hostile radar surveillance, the pilots
      were studying a batch of aerial photographs of Entebbe Airport. taken by an
      amateur, at an angle, from Kenyan airspace over Lake Victoria, and shoved into
      the pilots' hands seconds before takeoff. They held the answers to the
      remaining questions. In the bellies of the aircraft, the soldiers of the
      assault teams, and the doctors and corpsmen who were to land with them,
      sprawled alongside their vehicles getting whatever sleep they could. Some of
      the officers were studying their maps and orders again, making sure that
      everything was committed to memory.

      Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres went home for a few hours to try and relax
      before the long night ahead. Peres was expecting dinner guests, and there was
      no way to postpone without arousing speculation. Rabin had spent the last few
      minutes before leaving his office on the phone to France, doing his best to
      invent plausible reasons for delaying the negotiations, yet unable to tell
      General Zeevi in Paris what was actually happening.

      Around the dinner table in Peres' home, the talk quite naturally turned to the
      plight of the hostages in Entebbe. In the hope of keeping up pretenses before
      his American VIP guest of honor, the Minister of Defense turned to another of
      his guests, the publisher of a Tel Aviv daily who was known for his dovish
      attitudes, and asked him what he would do under the circumstances. Fully
      expecting an ardent plea for unconditional capitulation to the terrorists'
      demands, Shimon Peres was astonished by the publishers answer: "Send the IDF!"
      Fortunately, General Gazit, the head of the Intelligence Branch, was able to
      help his host explain just how impossible that idea was.

      Motta Gur, who was spending every available hour with his family-his wife's
      father had died earlier in the week-returned t
    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:08

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      Sunday, July 4
      The paratroops reloaded their vehicles and equipment. Their job done, they were
      airborne at 00:12. Behind them, their comarades completed their tasks and
      checked that nothing was left behind - except the fuel pumps which were too
      much trouble to manhandle back on board a Hercules. The intention had been to
      leave the pick-up truck as a present for Idi Amin, but a soldier convinced one
      of the pilots too load that too. At 00:40, the last of Thunderball Force left
      Entebbe. Thirty minutes later, the second Boeinig and the first Hercules landed
      at Nairobi, and taxied to the fuel tanks in a quiet corner of the airport.

      Though the pilots could not know it, Prime Minister Rabin had made a decision,
      on Friday morning, not to inform the Government of Kenya. Firstly there was
      security to consider and, secondly, he did not want to embarrass the Kenyans,
      who had enough troubles of their own with Idi Amin. Without any fuss, fuel
      tankers moved into position by the planes and began the refueling, while the
      drivers presented the paperwork to their pilots for signature - just as they
      would to any commercial flight. No questions were asked and no information
      volunteered. Sergeant Hershko who was seriously wounded, was transferred to the
      hospital Boeing. Two hostages whose wounds needed immediate care in a fully
      equipped hospital, were loaded into a waiting station wagon and taken into
      Nairobi, where one of them died. At four minutes past two on Sunday morning,
      the remaining passengers and aircrew of Air France 139 were airborne on the
      lastleg of their long journey home.

      Long after midnight, the Spokesman of the Defense Ministry made a phone call to
      a sleeping household in Tel Aviv. The relatives of the hostages had elected a
      committee to pressure the Government, and the committee in turn had chosen a
      chairman who had met throughout the week with Rabin, Peres, Yaakobi and anyone
      else who would listen. This time, it was the chairman who was listening -
      though it took some moments for the news to jolt him awake.

      The flight home was long, easy and uneventful - except for one nasty jolt! At
      03:00, a Hercules pilot was twiddling the controls hoping for some music, when
      he heard the Israel Army Network announce:”IDF forces tonight rescued…” Why
      would they announce it before the planes reached home? He could not know that
      the Agence France Presse in Kampala had filed a wire story of shots heard in
      Entebbe, and it was already a headline on Paris radio and the BBC.

      There was no mood of celebration on the transports. The hostages, huddled
      together against the cold, and aware now that their rescue had cost the life of
      a soldier, were thankful to be among their own again, but in no mood to join in
      the singsong that someone halfheartedly tried to start. They still needed time
      to absorb it all - to shake off the nightmare of Entebbe. In Lt. Col. S.’s
      plane, the paratroops were sunk in their own private thoughts. Despite all
      efforts of the doctors,Yoni was dead. The mission was later renamed ”Operation
      Jonathan” in his memory.

      Early in the morning of Sunday, July 4, 1976 - by chance the day that Americans
      were celebrating their Bicentenial - the lead Hercules flew low over Eilat, at
      the southern tip of Israel. The tired airmen in the cockpit were astonished to
      see people in the streets below waving and clapping. The plane landed at an
      Airforce Base in central Israel. The hostages were fed and given a chance to
      shake off the trauma. The wounded were taken off to hospital, and psychologists
      circulated among the others, giving help where it was needed.

      In a remote corner of the same airfield, the three combat teams unloaded their
      vehicles and equipment. They would return to their bases, hardly aware of the
      excitement in Israel, and throughout the free world, over what they had done
      this night.

      It was a mid-morning when a Hercules transport of the Israel Air Force touched
      down at Ben Gurion International Airport, rolled to a stop and opened its rear
      ramp to release its cargo of men, women and children into the the outstretched
      arms of their relatives and friends and of a crowd of thousands. The ordeal was
      over.


      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      The author, an editor with long experience in publications on military
      subjects, is a senior press officer in the IDF Spokesperson’s reserve unit.

      Beginning of the Article




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    • fredzio54 Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:09
      Murzyny i Goje kto zaczyn z Zydami nie dozyje !
      Amen IDF !
      • goldbaum Re: Idi Admin rzeczywiscie zmarl? 18.08.03, 17:16
        Fredzio powtorz to jutro rano, zeby podpompowac temat do gory.

        Z gopry dziekuje.
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