Szpiedzy tacy jak my :))))

06.02.04, 00:32
fajny artykul o rywalizacji sowiecko - US...warto poczytac :))))

www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/opinion/02SAFI.html
jednoczesnie mam mala sugestie,o ile ktos natknie sie na jakies ciekawe artykuly dotyczace szczegolnie operacji wywiadowczych albo funkcjonowania wywiadow niech wkleja...ten temat jest strasznie na forum opuszczony..glownie jak sadze przez to ze sa to informacje ktore nie sa tak ogolnie popularne....

tak wiec jak tylko komus uda sie znalezc jakas ciekawa ksiazke dotyczaca funkcjonowania KGB,mossadu,CIA,jakies strony,linki etc niech sie pochwali :))

podobnie sugeruje w temacie typu "cyberwars"...

temat cyberwars jest nieco na pewno nowym tematem dla "tradycjonalistow" ale przestrzen wirtualna,ataki hackerow,obrona wojskowych sieci komputerowych oraz cala kwestia "wojennego wykorzystania sieci" zostala zaliczona oficjalnie jako nowe "pole bitwy"...oczywiscie nie chodzi tutaj o wszystkie tematy zwiazane z cyberwars ale te zwiazane z wojskowoscia.

mamy XXI wiek,do tradycyjnych pol walki jak ziemia,morze i powietrze musimy dodac jeszcze 2 --> przestrzn kosmiczna i wlasnie przestrzen wirtualna...



    • Gość: dokt0r Nie rejestruj sie IP: *.pth0107.pth.iprimus.net.au 06.02.04, 05:35
      Chyba nie zamierzacie oddawac swoich informacji osobistych za darmo?

      The Farewell Dossier
      By WILLIAM SAFIRE

      Published: February 2, 2004


      Intelligence shortcomings, as we see, have a thousand fathers; secret
      intelligence triumphs are orphans. Here is the unremarked story of "the Farewell
      dossier": how a C.I.A. campaign of computer sabotage resulting in a huge
      explosion in Siberia — all engineered by a mild-mannered economist named Gus
      Weiss — helped us win the cold war.

      Weiss worked down the hall from me in the Nixon administration. In early 1974,
      he wrote a report on Soviet advances in technology through purchasing and
      copying that led the beleaguered president — détente notwithstanding — to place
      restrictions on the export of computers and software to the U.S.S.R.

      Seven years later, we learned how the K.G.B. responded. I was writing a series
      of hard-line columns denouncing the financial backing being given Moscow by
      Germany and Britain for a major natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe.
      That project would give control of European energy supplies to the Communists,
      as well as generate $8 billion a year to support Soviet computer and satellite
      research.

      President François Mitterrand of France also opposed the gas pipeline. He took
      President Reagan aside at a conference in Ottawa on July 19, 1981, to reveal
      that France had recruited a key K.G.B. officer in Moscow Center.

      Col. Vladimir Vetrov provided what French intelligence called the Farewell
      dossier. It contained documents from the K.G.B. Technology Directorate showing
      how the Soviets were systematically stealing — or secretly buying through third
      parties — the radar, machine tools and semiconductors to keep the Russians
      nearly competitive with U.S. military-industrial strength through the 70's. In
      effect, the U.S. was in an arms race with itself.

      Reagan passed this on to William J. Casey, his director of central intelligence,
      now remembered only for the Iran-contra fiasco. Casey called in Weiss, then
      working with Thomas C. Reed on the staff of the National Security Council. After
      studying the list of hundreds of Soviet agents and purchasers (including one
      cosmonaut) assigned to this penetration in the U.S. and Japan, Weiss counseled
      against deportation.

      Instead, according to Reed — a former Air Force secretary whose fascinating cold
      war book, "At the Abyss," will be published by Random House next month — Weiss
      said: "Why not help the Soviets with their shopping? Now that we know what they
      want, we can help them get it." The catch: computer chips would be designed to
      pass Soviet quality tests and then to fail in operation.

      In our complex disinformation scheme, deliberately flawed designs for stealth
      technology and space defense sent Russian scientists down paths that wasted time
      and money.

      The technology topping the Soviets' wish list was for computer control systems
      to automate the operation of the new trans-Siberian gas pipeline. When we turned
      down their overt purchase order, the K.G.B. sent a covert agent into a Canadian
      company to steal the software; tipped off by Farewell, we added what geeks call
      a "Trojan Horse" to the pirated product.

      "The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was
      programmed to go haywire," writes Reed, "to reset pump speeds and valve settings
      to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and
      welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever
      seen from space."

      Our Norad monitors feared a nuclear detonation, but satellites that would have
      picked up its electromagnetic pulse were silent. That mystified many in the
      White House, but "Gus Weiss came down the hall to tell his fellow NSC staffers
      not to worry. It took him another twenty years to tell me why."

      Farewell stayed secret because the blast in June 1982, estimated at three
      kilotons, took place in the Siberian wilderness, with no casualties known. Nor
      was the red-faced K.G.B. about to complain publicly about being tricked by bogus
      technology. But all the software it had stolen for years was suddenly suspect,
      which stopped or delayed the work of thousands of worried Russian technicians
      and scientists.

      Vetrov was caught and executed in 1983. A year later, Bill Casey ordered the
      K.G.B. collection network rolled up, closing the Farewell dossier. Gus Weiss
      died from a fall a few months ago. Now is a time to remember that sometimes our
      spooks get it right in a big way.
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