EMIGRACJA Z ROSJI

[misterpee]

Zadziwiajace jak swiat sie zmienil po wyjezdzie tych ludzi z terytorium
bylego ZSSR.
1. mur berlinski zostal zburzony i Niemcy zjednoczone.
1. mur palestynski wybudowany, palestynczycy pozbawieni praw , ludobojstwo
palestynczykow.
2. nie ma walki klas w bylym imperium ZSSR
3. Jest wojna z terrorem , zapowiedziany czas - 50 lat (nowe imperium )
4. Bezpieka przestal dzialac, zlikwidowane gulagi na Syberi
5. w Stanach tworzy sie panstwo policyjne, wiezienia gulagi w krajach
tropikalnych. Miliony ofiar wojny w Iraku/
6. Haslem komuny bylo - przyjazn i przyklad ZSRR podlozem naszych zwyciestw
7. haslem imperium jest - nasza demokracja i walka z antysemityzmem jest
przykladem dla swiata i swiat musi obrac nasza droge.
8. W komunie rabowanie dobr kulturalnych narodoow poddanych mialo charakter
ukryty
9. Obecnie agresja kulturalna mediami, i niemal w kazdej dziedzinie nie
pozostawia malym narodom zadnego marginesu wolnosci. W Iraku i Serbi
kuluralne zabytki tych narodow zostaly spalone - SUKCES.

te porownania mozna przytaczac bez konca.
wydaje sie ze bez doswiadczenia rosyjskich emigranow, Stany Zjednoczone nie
bylyby w stanie stworzyc obecnego imperium.

[misterpee]

Ronald Reagan's supposed role in ending the cold war
by Bill Blum
www.globalresearch.ca 7 June 2004
The URL of this article is: globalresearch.ca/articles/BLU406A.html


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Ronald Reagan's biggest crimes were the bloody military actions to suppress
social and political change in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and
Afghanistan, but I'd like to deal here with the media's gushing about Reagan's
supposed role in ending the cold war. In actuality, he prolonged it.

Below is an excerpt from Bill Blum's book Killing Hope: www.killinghope.org .


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It has become conventional wisdom that it was the relentlessly tough anti-
communist policies of the Reagan Administration, with its heated-up arms race,
that led to the collapse and reformation of the Soviet Union and its
satellites. American history books may have already begun to chisel this
thesis into marble. The Tories in Great Britain say that Margaret Thatcher and
her unflinching policies contributed to the miracle as well. The East Germans
were believers too. When Ronald Reagan visited East Berlin, the people there
cheered him and thanked him "for his role in liberating the East". Even many
leftist analysts, particularly those of a conspiracy bent, are believers.

But this view is not universally held; nor should it be.

Long the leading Soviet expert on the United States, Georgi Arbatov, head of
the Moscow-based Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, wrote his
memoirs in 1992. A Los Angeles Times book review by Robert Scheer summed up a
portion of it:

"Arbatov understood all too well the failings of Soviet totalitarianism in
comparison to the economy and politics of the West. It is clear from this
candid and nuanced memoir that the movement for change had been developing
steadily inside the highest corridors of power ever since the death of Stalin.
Arbatov not only provides considerable evidence for the controversial notion
that this change would have come about without foreign pressure, he insists
that the U.S. military buildup during the Reagan years actually impeded this
development."

George F. Kennan agrees. The former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, and
father of the theory of "containment" of the same country, asserts that "the
suggestion that any United States administration had the power to influence
decisively the course of a tremendous domestic political upheaval in another
great country on another side of the globe is simply childish." He contends
that the extreme militarization of American policy strengthened hard-liners in
the Soviet Union. "Thus the general effect of Cold War extremism was to delay
rather than hasten the great change that overtook the Soviet Union."

Though the arms-race spending undoubtedly damaged the fabric of the Soviet
civilian economy and society even more than it did in the United States, this
had been going on for 40 years by the time Mikhail Gorbachev came to power
without the slightest hint of impending doom. Gorbachev's close adviser,
Aleksandr Yakovlev, when asked whether the Reagan administration's higher
military spending, combined with its "Evil Empire" rhetoric, forced the Soviet
Union into a more conciliatory position, responded:

It played no role. None. I can tell you that with the fullest
responsibility. Gorbachev and I were ready for changes in our policy
regardless of whether the American president was Reagan, or Kennedy, or someone
even more liberal. It was clear that our military spending was enormous and we
had to reduce it.

Understandably, some Russians might be reluctant to admit that they were forced
to make revolutionary changes by their arch enemy, to admit that they lost the
Cold War. However, on this question we don't have to rely on the opinion of
any individual, Russian or American. We merely have to look at the historical
facts.

From the late 1940s to around the mid-1960s, it was an American policy
objective to instigate the downfall of the Soviet government as well as several
Eastern European regimes. Many hundreds of Russian exiles were organized,
trained and equipped by the CIA, then sneaked back into their homeland to set
up espionage rings, to stir up armed political struggle, and to carry out acts
of assassination and sabotage, such as derailing trains, wrecking bridges,
damaging arms factories and power plants, and so on. The Soviet government,
which captured many of these men, was of course fully aware of who was behind
all this.

Compared to this policy, that of the Reagan administration could be categorized
as one of virtual capitulation. Yet what were the fruits of this ultra-tough
anti-communist policy? Repeated serious confrontations between the United
States and the Soviet Union in Berlin, Cuba and elsewhere, the Soviet
interventions into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, creation of the Warsaw Pact (in
direct reaction to NATO), no glasnost, no perestroika, only pervasive
suspicion, cynicism and hostility on both sides. It turned out that the
Russians were human after all