Pomnik genialnych kryptologów

zarat.hustra Rola Biura Szyfrow w Bitwie Warszawskiej 11.11.07, 09:13

"... The most frequently used Russian cipher was broken as early as 1919 by a
young mathematician, Stefan Mazurkiewicz, who would later become vice rector of
Warsaw University.

During the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-20, Russian army staffs followed the same
signals-security procedures as had Tsarist army staffs during World War I. As a
result, the Polish army was kept informed by Russian radiotelegraphic stations
about the movements of Russian armies and their intentions and operational
orders. The Russian staffs, according to Polish Colonel Mieczysław Ścieżyński,
"had not the slightest hesitation about sending any and all messages of an
operational nature by means of radiotelegraphy; there were periods during the
war when, for purposes of operational communications and for purposes of command
by higher staffs, no other means of communication whatever were used, messages
being transmitted either entirely ["in clear," or plaintext] or encrypted by
means of such an incredibly uncomplicated system that for our trained
specialists reading the messages was child's play. The same held for the
chitchat of personnel at radiotelegraphic stations, where discipline was
disastrously lax."

In the crucial month of August 1920 alone, Polish cryptologists decrypted 410
signals: from Soviet General Mikhail Tukhachevski, commander of the northern
front; from Leon Trotsky, Soviet commissar of war; from commanders of armies,
e.g. the commander of the IV Army, Sergieyev; the commander of the Horse Army,
Semyon Budionny; the commander of the 3 Cavalry Corps, Gaya; from the staffs of
the XII, XV and XVI Armies; from the staffs of the Mozyr Group [named after the
Belarussian city]; the Zolochiv Group [after the Ukrainian town]; the Yakir
Group [after General Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir]; from the 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12,
16, 17, 18, 24, 27, 41, 44, 45, 53, 54, 58 and 60 Infantry Divisions; from the 8
Cavalry Division, etc.

The intercepts were as a rule decrypted the same day, at latest the next day,
and were immediately sent to the Polish General Staff's Section II
(Intelligence) and operational section. The more important signals were read in
their entirety by the Chief of the General Staff, and even by the Commander in
Chief, Marshal Józef Piłsudski.

Interception and reading of the signals provided Polish intelligence with entire
Russian operational orders. The Poles were able to follow the whole operation of
Budionny's Horse Army in the second half of August 1920 with incredible
precision, just by monitoring his radiotelegraphic correspondence with
Tukhachevsky, including the famous and historic conflict between the two Russian
commanders. The intercepts even included an order from Trotsky to the
revolutionary council of war of the Western Front, confirming Tukhachevsky's
operational orders, thus giving them the authority of the supreme chief of the
Soviet armed forces. An entire operational order from Tukhachevsky to Budionny
was intercepted on August 19, and read on August 20, stating the tasks of all of
Tukhachevsky's armies, of which only the essence had previously been known.

Ścieżyński surmises that the Soviets must likewise have intercepted Polish
operational signals; but he doubts that this would have availed them much since
Polish cryptography "stood abreast of modern cryptography" and since only a
small number of Polish higher headquarters were equipped with radio stations, of
which there was a great shortage; and finally, Polish headquarters were more
cautious than the Russians and almost every Polish division had the use of a
land line.[2]

Polish cryptologists enjoyed generous support under the command of Col. Tadeusz
Schaetzel, chief of the Polish General Staff's Section II (Intelligence). They
worked at Warsaw's radio station WAR, one of two Polish long-range radio
transmitters at the time.

The Polish cryptologists' work led, among other things, to discovery of a large
gap on the Red Army's left flank, and the Poles were able to drive a war-winning
wedge into that gap during the August 1920 Battle of Warsaw. Thanks to their
cryptologists' work, Polish intelligence also determined, among many other
things, that the 4th Red Army had lost contact with its headquarters and, as a
result, continued advancing into Pomerania (Pomorze) on the Baltic coast, even
after a general Soviet retreat was underway (the 4th Red Army was completely
destroyed)..."

Streszczenie:
Polscy kryptolodzy kompletnie zlamali radziecki kodowany system
kumunikacyjnyjny. Wedlug pulkownika Mieczysława Ścieżyńskiego rozpracowanie
odziedziczonego po caracie rosyjskiego systemu, bylo dziecinna zabawa na
specjalistow Biura Szyfrow. Dzieki sluzbom kryptologocznym, polski Sztab
Generalny precyzyjnie precyzyjnie znal cala korespondencje Armii Konnej
Budionnego, lacznie z korespondencja z Tuchaczewskim i ich "historycznym
konfliktem".

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zarat.hustra Rola Biura Szyfrow w Bitwie Warszawskiej 11.11.07, 09:13

"... The most frequently used Russian cipher was broken as early as 1919 by a
young mathematician, Stefan Mazurkiewicz, who would later become vice rector of
Warsaw University.

During the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-20, Russian army staffs followed the same
signals-security procedures as had Tsarist army staffs during World War I. As a
result, the Polish army was kept informed by Russian radiotelegraphic stations
about the movements of Russian armies and their intentions and operational
orders. The Russian staffs, according to Polish Colonel Mieczysław Ścieżyński,
"had not the slightest hesitation about sending any and all messages of an
operational nature by means of radiotelegraphy; there were periods during the
war when, for purposes of operational communications and for purposes of command
by higher staffs, no other means of communication whatever were used, messages
being transmitted either entirely ["in clear," or plaintext] or encrypted by
means of such an incredibly uncomplicated system that for our trained
specialists reading the messages was child's play. The same held for the
chitchat of personnel at radiotelegraphic stations, where discipline was
disastrously lax."

In the crucial month of August 1920 alone, Polish cryptologists decrypted 410
signals: from Soviet General Mikhail Tukhachevski, commander of the northern
front; from Leon Trotsky, Soviet commissar of war; from commanders of armies,
e.g. the commander of the IV Army, Sergieyev; the commander of the Horse Army,
Semyon Budionny; the commander of the 3 Cavalry Corps, Gaya; from the staffs of
the XII, XV and XVI Armies; from the staffs of the Mozyr Group [named after the
Belarussian city]; the Zolochiv Group [after the Ukrainian town]; the Yakir
Group [after General Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir]; from the 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12,
16, 17, 18, 24, 27, 41, 44, 45, 53, 54, 58 and 60 Infantry Divisions; from the 8
Cavalry Division, etc.

The intercepts were as a rule decrypted the same day, at latest the next day,
and were immediately sent to the Polish General Staff's Section II
(Intelligence) and operational section. The more important signals were read in
their entirety by the Chief of the General Staff, and even by the Commander in
Chief, Marshal Józef Piłsudski.

Interception and reading of the signals provided Polish intelligence with entire
Russian operational orders. The Poles were able to follow the whole operation of
Budionny's Horse Army in the second half of August 1920 with incredible
precision, just by monitoring his radiotelegraphic correspondence with
Tukhachevsky, including the famous and historic conflict between the two Russian
commanders. The intercepts even included an order from Trotsky to the
revolutionary council of war of the Western Front, confirming Tukhachevsky's
operational orders, thus giving them the authority of the supreme chief of the
Soviet armed forces. An entire operational order from Tukhachevsky to Budionny
was intercepted on August 19, and read on August 20, stating the tasks of all of
Tukhachevsky's armies, of which only the essence had previously been known.

Ścieżyński surmises that the Soviets must likewise have intercepted Polish
operational signals; but he doubts that this would have availed them much since
Polish cryptography "stood abreast of modern cryptography" and since only a
small number of Polish higher headquarters were equipped with radio stations, of
which there was a great shortage; and finally, Polish headquarters were more
cautious than the Russians and almost every Polish division had the use of a
land line.[2]

Polish cryptologists enjoyed generous support under the command of Col. Tadeusz
Schaetzel, chief of the Polish General Staff's Section II (Intelligence). They
worked at Warsaw's radio station WAR, one of two Polish long-range radio
transmitters at the time.

The Polish cryptologists' work led, among other things, to discovery of a large
gap on the Red Army's left flank, and the Poles were able to drive a war-winning
wedge into that gap during the August 1920 Battle of Warsaw. Thanks to their
cryptologists' work, Polish intelligence also determined, among many other
things, that the 4th Red Army had lost contact with its headquarters and, as a
result, continued advancing into Pomerania (Pomorze) on the Baltic coast, even
after a general Soviet retreat was underway (the 4th Red Army was completely
destroyed)..."

Streszczenie:
Polscy kryptolodzy kompletnie zlamali radziecki kodowany system
kumunikacyjnyjny. Wedlug pulkownika Mieczysława Ścieżyńskiego rozpracowanie
odziedziczonego po caracie rosyjskiego systemu, bylo dziecinna zabawa na
specjalistow Biura Szyfrow. Dzieki sluzbom kryptologocznym, polski Sztab
Generalny precyzyjnie precyzyjnie znal cala korespondencje Armii Konnej
Budionnego, lacznie z korespondencja z Tuchaczewskim i ich "historycznym
konfliktem".
- matrek Re: Rola Biura Szyfrow w Bitwie Warszawskiej 11.11.07, 09:22
  
  Szczerze mowiac, nawet o tym nie wiedzialem.
  - ignorant11 Re: Rola Biura Szyfrow w Bitwie Warszawskiej 12.11.07, 03:49
    
    matrek napisał:
    
    > Szczerze mowiac, nawet o tym nie wiedzialem.
    >
    
    Sława!
    
    To zapewne było tym cudem nad Wisła.
    
    Bo chyba Rosjanie mieli zbyt duza przewage aby bez znajomosci ich planów i
    rozkazów, rozmieszczenia udalo nam sie uniknac losu Ukrainy???
    
    Forum Słowiańskie
    gg 1728585
    - zarat.hustra Nie przesadzalbym az tak bardzo. 12.11.07, 04:12
      
      ignorant11 napisał:
      
      > matrek napisał:
      >
      > > Szczerze mowiac, nawet o tym nie wiedzialem.
      > >
      >
      >
      
      Znajomoasc rozkazow wroga zawsze wplywa na wynik bitwy, ale tez nie
      lekcewazylbym jakosci przyjetego planu i jakosci polskiego zolnierza.
      > Sława!
      >
      > To zapewne było tym cudem nad Wisła.
      >
      > Bo chyba Rosjanie mieli zbyt duza przewage aby bez znajomosci ich planów i
      > rozkazów, rozmieszczenia udalo nam sie uniknac losu Ukrainy???
      >
      > Forum Słowiańskie
      > gg 1728585
      - teclaw O kilkadziesiąt lat za późno.... 12.11.07, 10:18
        
        Czy wiecie że "bomby kryptograficzne" to były pierwsze komputery na
        świecie? A więc Polska a nie USA!
      - ignorant11 Re: Nie przesadzalbym az tak bardzo. 12.11.07, 15:15
        
        zarat.hustra napisał:
        
        > Znajomoasc rozkazow wroga zawsze wplywa na wynik bitwy, ale tez nie
        > lekcewazylbym jakosci przyjetego planu i jakosci polskiego zolnierza.
        
        NO jasne,ze zapytałem nieco prowokacyjnie.Ale dobre rozpoznanie i znajomość
        zamiarów przeciwnika, umiejetnosc ich wyprzedzenia, pokrzyzowania odgrywa jednak
        zasadnicza role w kazdej bitwie, kazdej wojnie.
        
        NB mozna starcic przewage bez tego czynnika jak wielokrotnie bywało a mozna
        dzieki niemu zyskac.
        
        Oczywiscie bez wartosciowych i ofiarnych jednostek nie ma czym walczyc.
        
        Forum Słowiańskie
        gg 1728585
matrek A tak generalnie 13.11.07, 00:03

Angole maja genialna umiejestnosc przypisywanie sobie zaslug innych, i znakomity PR.

Podobnie jak przypisali sobie zlamanie Enigmy, tak przypisali sobie odkrycie
futbolu, gdy tymczasem wymyslili go Wegrzy.
- axx611 Re: A tak generalnie 13.11.07, 01:51
  
  Cos Ci sie pomieszalo.

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