"The Economist": Zrewidowana doktryna Powella

[Gość: Unleashed]

Trzeba było więcej wyciąć redaktorzy - nawet jak robicie to w
dobrej wierze, to i tak wychodzi syf jak zwykle.

Idz do Empiku i sobie kup calosc

[Gość: ttrytk]

To tylko 16 zlotych a moze przestaniesz pisac te bzdury na
forum.

Nie przestanę...

[Gość: Unleashed]

[Gość: patriota]

unleashed my racje, nasze media stac jedynie na papugowanie po
innych, i w dodatku chrzania przeklad i gubia sens.

Szkoda, ze ekipa Busha

[Gość: dragonetka-wkurzona]

nie zna sie na prawie miedzynarodowym chocby w takim stopniu, co
glupia studentka prawa, ktora miala z tego przedmiotu 3. USA
nie maja prawa bawic sie w policjanta swiata; owszem, moga
chronic swoich obywateli, ale juz nie swiat, jak chce tego
Powell. To paradne, ze powolują sie na prawo mdzyn warunkowo i
stosują je, kiedy jest im to wygodne. Z blogoslawienstwem RB?
Pieknie, ale bez niego - i tak zaatakujemy. Jakie:
Zaatakujemy, do cholery?! To jest zbrodnia prawa mdzyn i tyle!

[Gość: MM]

Gość portalu: dragonetka-wkurzona napisał(a):

> nie zna sie na prawie miedzynarodowym chocby w takim stopniu, co
> glupia studentka prawa, ktora miala z tego przedmiotu 3. USA
> nie maja prawa bawic sie w policjanta swiata; owszem, moga
> chronic swoich obywateli, ale juz nie swiat, jak chce tego
> Powell. To paradne, ze powolują sie na prawo mdzyn warunkowo i
> stosują je, kiedy jest im to wygodne. Z blogoslawienstwem RB?
> Pieknie, ale bez niego - i tak zaatakujemy. Jakie:
> Zaatakujemy, do cholery?! To jest zbrodnia prawa mdzyn i tyle!

No bo wlanie pan Bush traktuje prawo miedzynarodowe jak tramwaj - jezeli jedzie
w te sama strone, to do niego wsiada, a jesli nie, to wysiada. Zreszta nie
tylko miedzynarodowe.

To ciekawe, ze Clintona chciano odwolac ze stanowiska nie za to, ze mu Monica
zrobila, co mu zrobila, ale ze sie prestraszyl i staral sie sprawe zatuszowac.
W uzasadnieniu mowiono duzo o wadach charakteru i mogacej z nich wynikac
sklonnosci do lamania prawa. To co powiedziec o skorumpowanym polityczynie,
ktory dokonywal malwersacji gieldowych (Haliburton) i zdefraudowal pieniadze
podatnikow (Texas Rangers). Nie mowiac juz o alkoholiznie. Jaki charakter ma
ten wlasnie prezydent!!!!
Czekam na odpowiedz na to pytanie od wszystkich popierajacych wojne pana Busha.
Tylko merytorycznie.

[Gość: toja]

Każdy podmiot prawa miedzynarodowego tak je traktuje - gratuluję
trójki

Chyba przez pomyłkę Wyborcza nie napisała, że

[Gość: Unleashed]

premier australii, po tym jak wysłał oddziały swojej armii do
Zatoki Perskiej, został potępiony przez swój senat.
Co do Bazy, to napisano tylko, że Ameryka twierdzi, że Irak ma
powiązania z nią.
Ach to rzetelne dziennikarstwo...

economist -original version

[Gość: !!!]

Has the secretary of state changed from dove to hawk?






THE transformation of Colin Powell has been astonishing. For the past two
years, the secretary of state has sometimes seemed to be the Bush
administration's in-house opposition. His caution, his distaste for “hard
power” and his preference for multilateral support have won him praise and
blame in equal measure: praise from those Europeans who think he is the only
man preventing a foreign-policy disaster, blame from hawks who say he is the
main domestic obstacle to an American-led better ordering of the world.

Yet now the dove has grown claws. Three weeks ago, Mr Powell was urging
patience with Iraq and argued that the United Nations' weapons inspectors
needed more time. Now, he says, “Iraq's time for choosing peaceful disarmament
is fast coming to an end,” and—in full Dick Cheney mode—“inspections will not
work.” The voice of the turtle sounds like a war trumpet.



Dealing with Iraq
Jan 30th 2003
Iraq's weapons and the Blix report
Jan 30th 2003
America's Iraq policy
Nov 14th 2002


Iraq, United States


Iraq


Click to buy from Amazon.com: “My American Journey”, by Colin Powell.

Colin Powell responds to the Blix report.





The immediate reason is frustration about France and Germany. Last week,
Germany sandbagged the secretary of state when it said it would not vote for
war on Iraq at any price. The French foreign minister then insisted
that “nothing” justified war now. This Franco-German grandstanding—the pair
were promptly dubbed the “axis of weasels” by Americans—was a personal
embarrassment for Mr Powell, the administration's strongest proponent of
seeking UN backing for American policy. It also angered George Bush, who blamed
his secretary of state for the rebuff. Mr Powell's new hawkishness may be
partly designed to defend himself.

But the secretary's changed rhetoric is more than just a response to tactical
embarrassment. It raises questions about his view of the world, and the extent
to which it may be changing. This matters because that view underpins his
patient pursuit of allies and his reluctance to go to war.

In his 1995 autobiography, “My American Journey”, Mr Powell wrote: “Many in my
generation [of Vietnam war officers] vowed that when our turn came to call the
shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked
reasons that the American people could not understand.” This was the Powell
doctrine: force should be used only in defence of America's vital national
interests and, when applied, should be decisive. It makes the secretary the
most prominent advocate of caution in applying military power. So has Mr Powell
abandoned his doctrine now? And if not, what are the implications of his new,
tough stance?

On the face of it, there is some evidence that he has abandoned, or at least
refined, his doctrine—and a good thing too, say the hawks. Mr Powell's
yardstick might have been fine in the days of the cold war. But now, they
argue, it sets a standard for intervention so high that it hampers American
engagement even in conflicts where intervention is justified.

Two cases in point. Mr Powell himself urged caution before the first Gulf war
of 1991, when he said there should be a long period of sanctions against Iraq
before sending troops and when he argued that the first military aim should be
to defend Saudi Arabia, not liberate Kuwait. Then, in 1993, he argued against
military intervention in Bosnia on the ground that bombing could not end a
centuries-old ethnic civil war. This led to Madeleine Albright's famous
question: “What's the point of having this superb military you're always
talking about if we can't use it?”“I thought I would have an aneurysm,” Mr
Powell wrote later.

Now, say the hawks, Iraq shows another problem with the Powell doctrine. Such
reluctance to use force is easily manipulated by enemies (and even allies) for
their own ends. Witness Saddam's catch-as-catch-can with the weapons
inspectors. Witness, perhaps, France and Germany's UN ambush last week.

The conclusion seems to be that Mr Powell's new hawkishness signals a turn
against his own doctrine. And this may mean that he is giving up the patient
alliance-building that is the practical corollary of scepticism about military
intervention. Right? Not necessarily.

To begin with, Mr Powell is no natural dove. He supported Ronald Reagan's star-
wars programme and backs Mr Bush's anti-missile defence system. He was chief
military adviser to Caspar Weinberger, whose record as defence secretary makes
Donald Rumsfeld look a bit like a peacenik. Neo-conservatives sometimes accuse
Mr Powell of being more in tune with the Clinton administration, which he
served briefly as head of the joint chiefs, than with his current boss. But he
himself wrote of the earlier period: “Although I was a member of the team, I
still felt a little like a skunk at the picnic.”



Autres temps, autres moeurs
Most important, Mr Powell himself insisted this week, after the Blix report,
that “one must never rule out the use of force...to protect our people and to
protect the world.” The only question is when to use it. If there is any
inconsistency between that view and the earlier doctrine, it can be attributed
to the emergence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
violently unpredictable dictators or terrorists. Like every other aspect of
American foreign policy, the Powell doctrine has required adjustment to the
realities of al-Qaeda.

The implication is that the doctrine is not dead. Its author has not turned
into a hawk (or, if he has, he had the capacity to be one all along). And this
almost certainly means that his pursuit of alliance-building is not over
either. Although America is clearly preparing for war, weeks are likely to pass
before it comes. Mr Powell, who will lay out the case against Saddam in more
detail in a speech to the UN on February 5th, may yet win over France or Russia
to America's cause. And this time there should be fewer judgment-clouding
doubts about the Bush administration's unity behind the president.

[Gość: !!!]

The Powell doctrine revisited

Jan 30th 2003
From The Economist print edition


Has the secretary of state changed from dove to hawk?

THE transformation of Colin Powell has been astonishing. For the past two
years, the secretary of state has sometimes seemed to be the Bush
administration's in-house opposition. His caution, his distaste for “hard
power” and his preference for multilateral support have won him praise and
blame in equal measure: praise from those Europeans who think he is the only
man preventing a foreign-policy disaster, blame from hawks who say he is the
main domestic obstacle to an American-led better ordering of the world.

Yet now the dove has grown claws. Three weeks ago, Mr Powell was urging
patience with Iraq and argued that the United Nations' weapons inspectors
needed more time. Now, he says, “Iraq's time for choosing peaceful disarmament
is fast coming to an end,” and—in full Dick Cheney mode—“inspections will not
work.” The voice of the turtle sounds like a war trumpet.

The immediate reason is frustration about France and Germany. Last week,
Germany sandbagged the secretary of state when it said it would not vote for
war on Iraq at any price. The French foreign minister then insisted
that “nothing” justified war now. This Franco-German grandstanding—the pair
were promptly dubbed the “axis of weasels” by Americans—was a personal
embarrassment for Mr Powell, the administration's strongest proponent of
seeking UN backing for American policy. It also angered George Bush, who blamed
his secretary of state for the rebuff. Mr Powell's new hawkishness may be
partly designed to defend himself.

But the secretary's changed rhetoric is more than just a response to tactical
embarrassment. It raises questions about his view of the world, and the extent
to which it may be changing. This matters because that view underpins his
patient pursuit of allies and his reluctance to go to war.

In his 1995 autobiography, “My American Journey”, Mr Powell wrote: “Many in my
generation [of Vietnam war officers] vowed that when our turn came to call the
shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked
reasons that the American people could not understand.” This was the Powell
doctrine: force should be used only in defence of America's vital national
interests and, when applied, should be decisive. It makes the secretary the
most prominent advocate of caution in applying military power. So has Mr Powell
abandoned his doctrine now? And if not, what are the implications of his new,
tough stance?

On the face of it, there is some evidence that he has abandoned, or at least
refined, his doctrine—and a good thing too, say the hawks. Mr Powell's
yardstick might have been fine in the days of the cold war. But now, they
argue, it sets a standard for intervention so high that it hampers American
engagement even in conflicts where intervention is justified.

Two cases in point. Mr Powell himself urged caution before the first Gulf war
of 1991, when he said there should be a long period of sanctions against Iraq
before sending troops and when he argued that the first military aim should be
to defend Saudi Arabia, not liberate Kuwait. Then, in 1993, he argued against
military intervention in Bosnia on the ground that bombing could not end a
centuries-old ethnic civil war. This led to Madeleine Albright's famous
question: “What's the point of having this superb military you're always
talking about if we can't use it?”“I thought I would have an aneurysm,” Mr
Powell wrote later.

Now, say the hawks, Iraq shows another problem with the Powell doctrine. Such
reluctance to use force is easily manipulated by enemies (and even allies) for
their own ends. Witness Saddam's catch-as-catch-can with the weapons
inspectors. Witness, perhaps, France and Germany's UN ambush last week.

The conclusion seems to be that Mr Powell's new hawkishness signals a turn
against his own doctrine. And this may mean that he is giving up the patient
alliance-building that is the practical corollary of scepticism about military
intervention. Right? Not necessarily.

To begin with, Mr Powell is no natural dove. He supported Ronald Reagan's star-
wars programme and backs Mr Bush's anti-missile defence system. He was chief
military adviser to Caspar Weinberger, whose record as defence secretary makes
Donald Rumsfeld look a bit like a peacenik. Neo-conservatives sometimes accuse
Mr Powell of being more in tune with the Clinton administration, which he
served briefly as head of the joint chiefs, than with his current boss. But he
himself wrote of the earlier period: “Although I was a member of the team, I
still felt a little like a skunk at the picnic.”

Autres temps, autres moeurs

Most important, Mr Powell himself insisted this week, after the Blix report,
that “one must never rule out the use of force...to protect our people and to
protect the world.” The only question is when to use it. If there is any
inconsistency between that view and the earlier doctrine, it can be attributed
to the emergence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
violently unpredictable dictators or terrorists. Like every other aspect of
American foreign policy, the Powell doctrine has required adjustment to the
realities of al-Qaeda.

The implication is that the doctrine is not dead. Its author has not turned
into a hawk (or, if he has, he had the capacity to be one all along). And this
almost certainly means that his pursuit of alliance-building is not over
either. Although America is clearly preparing for war, weeks are likely to pass
before it comes. Mr Powell, who will lay out the case against Saddam in more
detail in a speech to the UN on February 5th, may yet win over France or Russia
to America's cause. And this time there should be fewer judgment-clouding
doubts about the Bush administration's unity behind the president.

[Gość: toja]

Po przeczytaniu oryginału, nie wydaje mi się, żeby GW wyrzuciła
z tekstu coś co miałoby wielkie znaczenie (szczególnie dla
polskiego czytelnika). Przyczepiłbym się tylko do zdania: "Nowe
jastrzębie znaki, jakie daje Powell, obracają się przeciwko jego
dotychczasowej doktrynie", które wg. mnie jest idiotyczne.