Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[ubiquitousghost88]

Spoko. nie ma tam żadnej rakiety.
Będą, jak Merkel Putina o zgodę poprosi i da mu... klucz do magazynu.

Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[konsta-nty12]

Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania opracowanych przez Żydów.

Według Ciebie to dobrze, czy źle?

[2-pswiecki]

[tenare]

A Żydzi jak wiadomo chcieli opchnąć bombę atomową apartheidowi z RPA żeby się
pozbyć Murzynów.

[gambiting]

konsta-nty12 napisał:

> Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania opracowanych przez Żydów
> .
I co z tego? Masz tak mały mózg żeby wysunąć hipotezę prosto z notatek doktora
Mengele - że żydzi są jakąś inną rasą niż my? A jakby to wymyślili polacy,albo
niemcy,albo hiszpanie,albo anglicy,albo murzyn albo azjata, to co,miałoby to
jakieś znaczenie?

[xnonorx]

gambiting napisał:

> konsta-nty12 napisał:
>
> > Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania
opracowanych przez
> Żydów
> > .
> I co z tego? Masz tak mały mózg żeby wysunąć hipotezę prosto z
notatek doktora
> Mengele - że żydzi są jakąś inną rasą niż my? A jakby to wymyślili
polacy,albo
> niemcy,albo hiszpanie,albo anglicy,albo murzyn albo azjata, to
co,miałoby to
> jakieś znaczenie?

Podzielił się człowiek informacją. Po co to podniecenie? Słowa Żyd
nie można wymówić żeby histerii nie wywołać?

Pewnie! Jak Żyd to nie patriota?

[ubiquitousghost88]

xnonorx napisał:

> gambiting napisał:
>
> > konsta-nty12 napisał:
> >
> > > Amerykańskie wojsko i banki używają systemów kodowania
> opracowanych przez
> > Żydów
> > > .
> > I co z tego? Masz tak mały mózg żeby wysunąć hipotezę prosto z
> notatek doktora
> > Mengele - że żydzi są jakąś inną rasą niż my? A jakby to wymyślili
> polacy,albo
> > niemcy,albo hiszpanie,albo anglicy,albo murzyn albo azjata, to
> co,miałoby to
> > jakieś znaczenie?
>
> Podzielił się człowiek informacją. Po co to podniecenie? Słowa Żyd
> nie można wymówić żeby histerii nie wywołać?

[jaroslawa.kaczynskego]

Biedny homofobie, zrób maturę, ale najpierw skończ te 8 klas podstawówki zanim
sie wypowiesz !

[jatokomtur]

I CZEGO TO DOWODZI?

Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[tenare]

"Nie przesadzajmy z ich potencjałem"

Czyli potwierdza, że to atrapy.

Europa nie jest całkiem wolna i słusznie

[miszczu.pll]

Polska trafiła pod kolejną okupację a politycy jedynie potwierdzili że Polskie
wojsko jest do du_py i nic nie potrafi.

[gambiting]

miszczu.pll napisał:

> Polska trafiła pod kolejną okupację a politycy jedynie potwierdzili że Polskie
> wojsko jest do du_py i nic nie potrafi.
Ty chyba nie masz pojęcia co znaczy słowo okupacja. Podpowiem Ci - obecność
nawet tysiąca żołnierzy obcego państwa na ograniczonym terenie pod naszą
jurysdykcją NIE jest okupacją.

[1szczygiel]

W tych "relacjach", dotychczasowych, zadowolona byla tylko Rosja-a
tu obie strony maja cos do powiedzenia.
Zgodnie z logika ich propagandy: Patrioty zostaly ustawione w celu
obrony przyjacielskiej Rosji (a nie bronili nas od 39 do 93?).
I to przedstawianie sie jako ofiara ?

lepiej żeby cywilbanda nie mieszała

[studioh]

się do wojskowych spraw. Jeśli futerały na rakiety to broń, to broń nas Panie
Boże!

Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[kufa-62]

ZA,NASZYCH W AFGANISTANIE.ZA WYRYPANIE.W IRAKU.FAJNIE I ATRAPĘ DOSTAĆ.A
,CHŁOPAKI SE MOŻE W TYM MORĄGU.CO BZYKNĄ.

[gambiting]

kufa-62 napisała:

> ZA,NASZYCH W AFGANISTANIE.ZA WYRYPANIE.W IRAKU.FAJNIE I ATRAPĘ DOSTAĆ.A
> ,CHŁOPAKI SE MOŻE W TYM MORĄGU.CO BZYKNĄ.
A może już wytrzeźwiejesz i zaczniesz pisać po ludzku?

[kufa-62]

MYŚL. MYŚL!TO.MA PODOBNO PRZYSZŁOŚĆ.(ALBO SE JAKA KSIĄŻKA KUP)

Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[kufa-62]

ZA,NASZYCH W AFGANISTANIE.ZA WYRYPANIE.W IRAKU.FAJNIE I ATRAPĘ DOSTAĆ.A
,CHŁOPAKI SE MOŻE W TYM MORĄGU.CO BZYKNĄ

Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[mona517]

Tu nie chodzi o te futerały na rakiety tylko żeby ulokować swoje
wojska na terenie następnego kraju tj Polski.Teraz będzie z
futerałami kilkaset żołnierzy a za pare lat kilka
tysięcy.Wyrzuciliśmy wojska Rosyjskie a sprowadziliśmy
Amerykańskie.Ciekawostka Amerykanie swoje wojska mają rozlokowane w
ponad 150 panstw na świecie.

[gambiting]

mona517 napisał:

> Tu nie chodzi o te futerały na rakiety tylko żeby ulokować swoje
> wojska na terenie następnego kraju tj Polski.Teraz będzie z
> futerałami kilkaset żołnierzy a za pare lat kilka
> tysięcy.Wyrzuciliśmy wojska Rosyjskie a sprowadziliśmy
> Amerykańskie.Ciekawostka Amerykanie swoje wojska mają rozlokowane w
> ponad 150 panstw na świecie.
No jak już piszesz takie ciekawostki to może dorzuć jakiś wniosek - dobrze to
czy źle? Ja uważam że lepiej,aby polska trzymała z krajami które są blisko nas
niż daleko,ale jakoś nie czuje się zaniepokojony obecnością amerykańskiej
jednostki w Polsce

[emeryt0_1]

gambiting napisał:

> mona517 napisał:
>
> > Tu nie chodzi o te futerały na rakiety tylko żeby ulokować swoje
> > wojska na terenie następnego kraju tj Polski.Teraz będzie z
> > futerałami kilkaset żołnierzy a za pare lat kilka
> > tysięcy.Wyrzuciliśmy wojska Rosyjskie a sprowadziliśmy
> > Amerykańskie.Ciekawostka Amerykanie swoje wojska mają rozlokowane
w
> > ponad 150 panstw na świecie.
> No jak już piszesz takie ciekawostki to może dorzuć jakiś wniosek -
dobrze to
> czy źle? Ja uważam że lepiej,aby polska trzymała z krajami które są
blisko nas
> niż daleko,ale jakoś nie czuje się zaniepokojony obecnością
amerykańskiej
> jednostki w Polsce
A ja tak .Oznacza to że Yankesi znowu nas wydymają na ciężkie miliny
za upchnięty nam w przyszłości złom.

Potencjałem?hahaha Chyba impotencją.

[mark6]

Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który zachwyca się
hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/

[przyjacielameryki]

mark6 napisał:

> Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który zachwyca się
> hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/

Wkrótce będą uzbrojone i dużo ich będzie. Będzie też nowa tarcza antyrakietowa.
A to oznacza koniec putinowskich planów terroryzowania i straszenia ościennych
bezbronnych krajów a także całej Europy.

[jaroslawa.kaczynskego]

mark6 napisał:

> Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który zachwyca się
> hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/

Oooo wyraźnie piszesz o sobie. Zalecam zrobienie matury przed komentowaniem
czegokolwiek biedaku.

Najwyrazniej matura to szczyt twoich marzeń?

[mark6]

Pleciesz na lewo i prawo o zrobieniu matury.Bozia "yntylygencyji"
nie dała i skończyłeś wykształcenie na zawodówce?
Daj se spoko i wyluzuj. Jeżeli jednak otwierasz japę to rób to na temat.

[emeryt0_1]

mark6 napisał:

> Polak był jest i zawsze będzie idiotą/przynajmniej ten ,który
zachwyca się
> hamerykańskimi ATRAPAMI !!!/
Masz 100% racji .

Zachwycaja sie tym idioci z PO...

[langston]

Kaczory wynegocjowaly obecnosc tarczy czyli systemu od ktorego
zalezaloby bezp. USA wiec nikt nie smialby zagrozic Polsce dodatkowe
ustalenia:

USA znacząco pomogą w wyposażeniu w nowoczesne technikę Wojska
Polskiego[51].
Ameryka zobowiązała się do ochrony wojskowej Polski, w razie ataku
militarnego, i nie tylko państw trzecich[51].
Powstanie rada polsko-amerykańska Grupa Konsultacyjna ds. Współpracy
Strategicznej analizująca i przeciwdziałająca zagrożeniom z innych
państw[51].
Polska armia zakupi od USA do 2018 roku[52] docelowo przynajmniej
[51] kilkanaście[53] (najprawdopodobniej 19) baterii (ok. 2
bataliony) Patriot PAC-3, wyposażonych w 1800
antyrakietowych/przeciwlotniczych pocisków[15].
Baza systemu antyrakietowego USA powstanie w Redzikowie[54].
Siły Powietrzne RP zakupią[54] dodatkowe kilkadziesiąt samolotów
wielozadaniowych (ok. 50) F-16[51].
Powstanie też druga baza antyrakietowa na terytorium Polski, w
której będzie stacjonował garnizon amerykańskich żołnierzy liczący
120 osób[55], wyposażony w kilka[56] baterii Patriot liczących po 96
pocisków PAC-3[51]. Baza ta będzie istnieć do czasu wyposażenia
polskich sił zbrojnych w system Patriot[54].
Polski oddział żołnierzy będą chronić z zewnątrz bazę[54], a jego
dowódca będzie miał dostęp do całej strefy chronionej[15].
USA zobowiązują się wspierać, szkolić i rozwijać możliwości obrony
antyrakietowej, przeciwlotniczej i antyterrorystycznej Polski[19].
Stany Zjednoczone będą wspierać wspólne prace sektora przemysłowo-
technologiczno-wojskowego[19].
USA będą dostarczać Polsce informacje dotyczące zagrożeń
bezpieczeństwa Polski[19].

Halicki o Patriotach: nie przesadzajmy z ich po...

[emeryt0_1]

To po jaką cholerę oni tu przyjechali?

[kapitan.kirk]

Bo przypłynąć nie mogli z przyczyn geograficznych, a przylecieć się nie opłacało.
Pzdr

Potencjal obrnny dla nas milaby tarcza!

[langston]

Potencjal obrnny dla nas milaby tarcza!

Jako urzadzenie broniace rowniez USA amerykanie na broniliby tarczy
jak swojego bezpieczenstwa i dlatego Rosjanom i Niemcom tak ona sie
nie podobala bo nie mogliby fikac w Europie Srodkowej.
natomiast nawet gdybysmy mieli 100baterii Patriotow to Rosjanie
chcac nas zaatakowac i tak t zrobi atylko bardziej sie sparza.

Gdyby byla tarcza to nawet nie smieliby o tym pomyslec

Oto co mielismy dostac za tarcze!!!

[langston]

USA znacząco pomogą w wyposażeniu w nowoczesne technikę Wojska
Polskiego[51].
Ameryka zobowiązała się do ochrony wojskowej Polski, w razie ataku
militarnego, i nie tylko państw trzecich[51].
Powstanie rada polsko-amerykańska Grupa Konsultacyjna ds. Współpracy
Strategicznej analizująca i przeciwdziałająca zagrożeniom z innych
państw[51].
Polska armia zakupi od USA do 2018 roku[52] docelowo przynajmniej
[51] kilkanaście[53] (najprawdopodobniej 19) baterii (ok. 2
bataliony) Patriot PAC-3, wyposażonych w 1800
antyrakietowych/przeciwlotniczych pocisków[15].
Baza systemu antyrakietowego USA powstanie w Redzikowie[54].
Siły Powietrzne RP zakupią[54] dodatkowe kilkadziesiąt samolotów
wielozadaniowych (ok. 50) F-16[51].
Powstanie też druga baza antyrakietowa na terytorium Polski, w
której będzie stacjonował garnizon amerykańskich żołnierzy liczący
120 osób[55], wyposażony w kilka[56] baterii Patriot liczących po 96
pocisków PAC-3[51]. Baza ta będzie istnieć do czasu wyposażenia
polskich sił zbrojnych w system Patriot[54].
Polski oddział żołnierzy będą chronić z zewnątrz bazę[54], a jego
dowódca będzie miał dostęp do całej strefy chronionej[15].
USA zobowiązują się wspierać, szkolić i rozwijać możliwości obrony
antyrakietowej, przeciwlotniczej i antyterrorystycznej Polski[19].
Stany Zjednoczone będą wspierać wspólne prace sektora przemysłowo-
technologiczno-wojskowego[19].
USA będą dostarczać Polsce informacje dotyczące zagrożeń
bezpieczeństwa Polski[19].

Halicki sie usprawiedliwia

[rt-z]

Halicki do Rosjan: są to rakiety bez potencjału, ba! nawet bez
potencji, ot po prostu impotentne race. Dobzie, dobzie??

Cos do poczytania...

[rocco-siffredi]

www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100524_germany_after_eu_russian_scenario
oraz

The CSTO and Russia's Expanding Sphere of Influence
May 27, 2010 | 1108 GMT
Text Resize:
ShareThis
T

HE BELARUSIAN PARLIAMENT ratified an agreement on Wednesday that calls for the
country to participate in the Collective Rapid Response Force (CRRF) of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Moscow-dominated security
bloc that consists of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Belarusian Defense Minister Yuri Zhadobin followed
this by saying the country would contribute more than 2,000 military personnel
to the CRRF, including conventional military units, counterterrorism officers
and a contingent from the intelligence services.

While 2,000 elite troops dedicated to Belarus’ participation in the CRRF is
significant, we at STRATFOR are less interested in Minsk’s contributions than we
are in those of Moscow. What the Belarusian ratification means is that Russia
can now legally station its own troops, under the guise of the CSTO, on
Belarusian territory. Even more significant is what the move says about Moscow’s
strategic position: Russia has evolved over the past 20 years from a collapsed
and crippled former superpower to a country that is swiftly building much of its
strategic influence in the countries it used to formally control.

The fall of the Soviet Union left Russia a shadow of its former (Soviet) self in
terms of population, economy and general political coherence. One institution
that particularly suffered was the Russian military. Russia’s military went from
competing with the United States for influence on a global scale at the height
of the Soviet Union to shrinking dramatically after its fall, both in terms of
size and effectiveness. Russian bases evaporated, and strategic assets such as
weapons, aircraft and infrastructure began to crumble. Russia failed miserably
in getting its own country in order, suffering two protracted wars in
secession-minded Chechnya and watching helplessly as NATO engaged in air raids
on longtime ally Yugoslavia.

“It has come to the point where Russia is simply running out of places in the
former Soviet Union upon which to bring its influence to bear.”

But there has been somewhat of a reversal of these fortunes over the last
decade, which has seen the vast bulk of U.S. military efforts and resources
concentrated in the Middle East and South Asia. Despite the current military
drawdown in the Iraqi theater, the political and security situation in the
country is still tenuous and beholden to the perpetuation of relative calm and
stability. U.S. forces continue to surge into Afghanistan, where they will
remain committed at current levels for at least another year. And that is not
even considering the constant threat emanating from Iran, the regional power
that sits between the two countries. If all goes as planned (and that is a big
if), only in the next few years will the United States begin to rediscover
excess bandwidth for its ground combat forces. Until that happens, the American
distraction has opened a window of opportunity for Russia, one Moscow has been
working feverishly to seize before it closes.

The 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine was a turning point for Russia, as Moscow
saw the most strategic state to its security interests swept under the wave of
Western-fueled movements that brought a hostile and pro-Western government right
to its border. After the Orange Revolution, the Kremlin began to focus its
efforts and resources, buoyed by high energy prices and a political
consolidation by then-president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on
pushing back Western influence in the former Soviet Union and substituting it
with its own.

To this end, Moscow has seen a series of victories across its former Soviet
periphery in the past few years. These include the military defeat of
pro-Western Georgia in the 2008 war, the election of a pro-Russian regime in
Ukraine, and most recently another color revolution — this time favorable to its
own interests — in Kyrgyzstan. Through these events and countless others, Moscow
has positioned itself in its near abroad to sufficiently project power in
virtually every strategic nook and cranny. It has come to the point where Russia
is simply running out of places in the former Soviet Union upon which to bring
its influence to bear.

Thus, Moscow is moving on to consolidate its gains and focus its attention
beyond its near abroad — beginning with Poland, a NATO member state wary of
Russia. In the face of a resurgent Russia, Warsaw has been seeking to strengthen
its security relationship with the United States. On Wednesday, Poland welcomed
the deployment of a U.S. Patriot missile battery and a complement of American
troops. Russia has vocally opposed such a deployment, not so much because of the
system itself but because of the threat it sees in the corresponding American
boots on the ground. With the addition of Belarus in the CRRF, Russia has the
legal right to position itself right on Poland’s doorstep. It is perhaps no
coincidence that the agreement to include Belarus in the CSTO rapid reaction
forces, which floated the country’s parliament for more than a year, was signed
into law the same day.

Despite the ratification, many of the Russian military’s institutional problems
remain. But the difference between the Russia of the chaotic 1990s and
present-day Russia is primarily geopolitical. Only a few years ago, the U.S.
perception of Russia was that of a broken former power. And while Washington
thought it had plenty of time before Moscow could even begin to bolster its
position, the Russians have already regained much of the influence in the bulk
of their old Soviet territory. That is not to say that the Red Army is about to
return en masse to the streets of Prague or Budapest any time soon, but the
Russians have begun to start pushing further out, beginning with the legal right
to station their troops on the European frontier near Poland.

Kryzys Europy, Niemcy i Rosja, scenariusz "po"?

[rocco-siffredi]

By George Friedman

Discussions about Europe currently are focused on the Greek financial crisis and
its potential effect on the future of the European Union. Discussions these days
involving military matters and Europe appear insignificant and even
anachronistic. Certainly, we would agree that the future of the European Union
towers over all other considerations at the moment, but we would argue that
scenarios for the future of the European Union exist in which military matters
are far from archaic.
Russia and the Polish Patriots

For example, the Polish government recently announced that the United States
would deploy a battery of Patriot missiles to Poland. The missiles arrived this
week. When the United States canceled its land-based ballistic missile defense
system under intense Russian pressure, the Obama administration appeared
surprised at Poland’s intense displeasure with the decision. Washington
responded by promising the Patriots instead, the technology the Poles had wanted
all along. While the Patriot does not enhance America’s ability to protect
itself against long-range ballistic missiles from, for example, Iran, it does
give Poland some defense against shorter-ranged ballistic missiles and
substantial defense against conventional air attack.

Russia is the only country capable of such attacks on Poland with even the most
distant potential interest in doing so, and at this point, this is truly an
abstract threat. In removing a system that was really not a threat to Russian
interests — U.S. ballistic missile defense at most can handle only a score of
missiles, meaning it would have a negligible impact on the Russian nuclear
deterrent — the United States ironically has installed a system that could
affect Russia. Under the current circumstances, this is not really significant.
While much is being made of having a few U.S. boots on the ground east of
Germany within 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) of the Russian Baltic exclave of
Kaliningrad, a few hundred technicians and guards are simply not an offensive
threat.

Still, the Russians — with a long history of seeing improbable threats turning
into very real ones — tend to take hypothetical limits on their power seriously.
They also tend to take gestures seriously, knowing that gestures often germinate
into strategic intent. The Russians obviously oppose this deployment, as the
Patriots would allow Poland in league with NATO — and perhaps even by itself —
to achieve local air superiority. There are many crosscurrents in Russian
policy, however.

For the moment, the Russians are interested in encouraging better economic
relations with the West, as they could use technology and investment that would
make them more than a commodity exporter. Moreover, with the Europeans
preoccupied with their economic crisis and the United States still bogged down
in the Middle East and needing Russian support on Iran, Moscow has found little
outside resistance to its efforts to increase its influence in the former Soviet
Union. Moscow is not unhappy about the European crisis and wouldn’t want to do
anything that might engender greater European solidarity. After all, a solid
economic bloc turning into an increasingly powerful and integrated state would
pose challenges to Russia in the long run that Moscow is happy to do without.
The Patriot deployment is a current irritation and a hypothetical military
problem, but the Russians are not inclined to create a crisis with Europe over
it — though this doesn’t mean Moscow won’t make countermoves on the margins when
it senses opportunities.

For its part, the Obama administration is not focused on Poland at present. It
is obsessed with internal matters, South Asia and the Middle East. The Patriots
were shipped based on a promise made months ago to calm Central European nerves
over the Obama administration’s perceived lack of commitment to the region. In
the U.S. State and Defense department sections charged with shipping Patriots to
Poland, the delivery process was almost an afterthought; repeated delays in
deploying the system highlighted Washington’s lack of strategic intent.

It is therefore tempting to dismiss the Patriots as of little importance, as
merely the combination of a hangover from a Cold War mentality and a minor Obama
administration misstep. Indeed, even a sophisticated observer of the
international system might barely note it. But we would argue that it is more
important than it appears precisely because of everything else going on.
Existential Crisis in the EU

The European Union is experiencing an existential crisis. This crisis is not
about Greece, but rather, what it is that members of the European Union owe each
other and what controls the European Union has over its members. The European
Union did well during a generation of prosperity. As financial crisis struck,
better-off members were called on to help worse-off members. Again, this is not
just about Greece — the 2008 credit crisis in Central Europe was about the same
thing. The wealthier countries, Germany in particular, are not happy at the
prospect of spending taxpayer money to assist countries dealing with popped
credit bubbles.

They really don’t want to do that, and if they do, they really want to have
controls over the ways these other countries spend their money so this
circumstance doesn’t arise again. Needless to say, Greece — and countries that
might wind up like Greece — do not want foreign control over their finances.

If there are no mutual obligations among EU member nations, and the German and
Greek publics don’t want to bail out or submit, respectively, then the profound
question is raised of what Europe is going to be — beyond a mere free trade zone
— after this crisis. This is not simply a question of the euro surviving,
although that is no trivial matter.

The euro and the European Union will probably survive this crisis — although
their mutual failure is not nearly as unthinkable as the Europeans would have
thought even a few months ago — but this is not the only crisis Europe will
experience. Something always will be going wrong, and Europe does not have
institutions that could handle these problems. Events in the past few weeks
indicate that European countries are not inclined to create such institutions,
and that public opinion will limit European governments’ ability to create or
participate in these institutions. Remember, building a super state requires one
of two things: a war to determine who is in charge or political unanimity to
forge a treaty. Europe is — vividly — demonstrating the limitations on the
second strategy.

Whatever happens in the short run, it is difficult to envision any further
integration of European institutions. And it is very easy to see how the
European Union will devolve from its ambitious vision into an alliance of
convenience built around economic benefits negotiated and renegotiated among the
partners. It would thus devolve from a union to a treaty, with no interest
beyond self-interest.
The German Question Revisited

We return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status
of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is
clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that
the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless
Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be
done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to
economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over
time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe.

dalej za"Stratfor" by George Friedman

[rocco-siffredi]

The German Question Revisited

We return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status
of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is
clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that
the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless
Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be
done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to
economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over
time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe.

If Germany is the key decision maker in Europe, then Germany defines whatever
policies Europe as a whole undertakes. If Europe fragments, then Germany is the
only country in Europe with the ability to create alternative coalitions that
are both powerful and cohesive. That means that if the European Union weakens,
Germany will have the greatest say in what Europe will become. Right now, the
Germans are working assiduously to reformulate the European Union and the
eurozone in a manner more to their liking. But as this requires many partners to
offer sovereignty to German control — sovereignty they have jealously guarded
throughout the European project — it is worth exploring alternatives to Germany
in the European Union.

For that we first must understand Germany’s limits. The German problem is the
same problem it has had since unification: It is enormously powerful, but it is
far from omnipotent. Its very power makes it the focus of other powers, and
together, these other powers can cripple Germany. Thus, Germany is indispensable
for any decision within the European Union at present, and it will be the single
center of power in Europe in the future — but Germany can’t just go it alone.
Germany needs a coalition, meaning the long-term question is this: If the EU
were to weaken or even fail, what alternative coalition would Germany seek?

The casual answer is France, as the two economies are somewhat similar and the
countries are next-door neighbors. But historically, this similarity in
structure and location has been a source not of collaboration and fondness but
of competition and friction. Within the European Union, with its broad
diversity, Germany and France have been able to put aside their frictions,
finding a common interest in managing Europe to their mutual advantage. That
co-management, of course, helped bring us to this current crisis. Moreover, the
biggest thing that France has that Germany wants is its market; an ideal partner
for Germany would offer more. By itself at least, France is not a foundation for
long-term German economic strategy. The historic alternative for Germany has
been Russia.
The Russian Option

A great deal of potential synergy exists between the German and Russian
economies. Germany imports large amounts of energy and other resources from
Russia. As mentioned, Russia needs sources of technology and capital to move it
beyond its current position of mere resource exporter. Germany has a shrinking
population and needs a source of labor — preferably a source that doesn’t
actually want to move to Germany. Russia’s Soviet-era economy continues to
de-industrialize, and while that has a plethora of negative impacts, there is
one often-overlooked positive: Russia now has more labor than it can effectively
metabolize in its economy given its capital structure. Germany doesn’t want more
immigrants but needs access to labor. Russia wants factories in Russia to employ
its surplus work force, and it wants technology. The logic of the German-Russian
economic relationship is more obvious than the German-Greek or German-Spanish
relationship. As for France, it can participate or not (and incidentally, the
French are joining in on a number of ongoing German-Russian projects).

Therefore, if we simply focus on economics, and we assume that the European
Union cannot survive as an integrated system (a logical but not yet proven
outcome), and we further assume that Germany is both the leading power of Europe
and incapable of operating outside of a coalition, then we would argue that a
German coalition with Russia is the most logical outcome of an EU decline.

This would leave many countries extremely uneasy. The first is Poland, caught as
it is between Russia and Germany. The second is the United States, since
Washington would see a Russo-German economic bloc as a more significant
challenger than the European Union ever was for two reasons. First, it would be
a more coherent relationship — forging common policies among two states with
broadly parallel interests is far simpler and faster than doing so among 27.
Second, and more important, where the European Union could not develop a
military dimension due to internal dissensions, the emergence of a
politico-military dimension to a Russo-German economic bloc is far less
difficult to imagine. It would be built around the fact that both Germans and
Russians resent and fear American power and assertiveness, and that the
Americans have for years been courting allies who lie between the two powers.
Germany and Russia would both view themselves defending against American pressure.

And this brings us back to the Patriot missiles. Regardless of the bureaucratic
backwater this transfer might have emerged out of, or the political disinterest
that generated the plan, the Patriot stationing fits neatly into a slowly
maturing military relationship between Poland and the United States. A few
months ago, the Poles and Americans conducted military exercises in the Baltic
states, an incredibly sensitive region for the Russians. The Polish air force
now flies some of the most modern U.S.-built F-16s in the world; this, plus
Patriots, could seriously challenge the Russians. A Polish general commands a
sector in Afghanistan, something not lost upon the Russians. By a host of
processes, a close U.S.-Polish relationship is emerging.

The current economic problems may lead to a fundamental weakening of the
European Union. Germany is economically powerful but needs economic coalition
partners that contribute to German well-being rather than merely draw on it. A
Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the
Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former
would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military,
and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics. The
Russian-German bloc would attempt to bring others into its coalition, as would
the Polish-U.S. bloc. Both would compete in Central Europe — and for France.
During this process, the politics of NATO would shift from humdrum to absolutely
riveting.

And thus, the Greek crisis and the Patriots might intersect, or in our view,
will certainly in due course intersect. Though neither is of lasting importance
in and of themselves, the two together point to a new logic in Europe. What
appears impossible now in Europe might not be unthinkable in a few years. With
Greece symbolizing the weakening of the European Union and the Patriots
representing the remilitarization of at least part of Europe, ostensibly
unconnected tendencies might well intersect.

Give it to Friedman with kind regards...

[ubiquitousghost88]

"For $1 trillion we have bought time, nothing more..."
(16.05.2005 - ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet)


www.gadlerner.it/wp-content/themes/gad/thumb.php?src=http://www.gadlerner.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/europa-in-mutande.jpg&h=380&w=240&zc=1&q=80

[rocco-siffredi]

i co to niby ma byc?
podnieca cie widok pol-nagich urzednikow w srednim wieku?

To Friedmana podnieca Europa, której nie ma...

[ubiquitousghost88]

rocco-siffredi napisał:

> i co to niby ma byc?
> podnieca cie widok pol-nagich urzednikow w srednim wieku?

[rocco-siffredi]

czyli raczej nic do powiedzenia nie masz poza gadaniem bzdur