przycinek.usa
03.01.12, 06:13
Bywalcy pamietaja stary i zakurzony watek z archiwum, w ktorym od dawna mowilem, ze dolar spadnie az do momentu kiedy osiagnieta zostanie proporcja 1:2 z Euro - czyli tytulowe 2 dolary za jedno Euro. To bylo naprawde dawno temu - chyba nawet w 2005 roku i oczywiscie ta prognoza nigdy sie nie wypelnila. Dzisiaj jednak postanowilem do tej prognozy powrocic. Nie dlatego, ze jestem uparty - ani nie dlatego, ze chce uparcie promowac te idee az do skutku - ale po prostu wszystkie znaki na niebie i ziemi swiadcza o tym, ze ta prognoza ma szanse sie wypelnic wlasnie w tym roku. Dlaczego?
Tutaj najpierw przytocze dane o TIC:
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/TIC%20December%202011.pdf
Jak widzimy dane sa dosyc negatywne, ze tak powiem. -)
Jesli wezmiemy pod uwage skale paniki wynikajaca z "rozpadajacej sie Europy" - to skala odplywow z USA musi byc spora, skoro pomimo tej paniki mamy w bilansie wielkosci ujemne.
Danych o deficycie handlowym nie musze chyba przytaczac, nie? Wszyscy wiedza? -)
To majac taka fajna pozycje wyjsciowa nalezaloby zadac sobie pytanie co dalej.
I ja mysle tak - jesli panstwo ma deficyt handlowy oraz rownoczesnie ujemne saldo przeplywow pienieznych - to nie ma sily - cena waluty musi spasc. To jest po prostu nieuchronne. Utrzymanie kursu walutowego w poziomie jest w takiej sytuacji NIEMOZLIWE.
Popatrzmy jednak co dzisiaj wyprodukowal internet:
Total Collapse of The Dollar and Skyrocketing Oil Prices in 2012: Lindsey Williams Reports 1/3
www.youtube.com/watch?v=IULvnqb1BOg
Total Collapse of The Dollar and Skyrocketing Oil Prices in 2012: Lindsey Williams Reports 2/3
www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoX1vU_h1sg
Total Collapse of The Dollar and Skyrocketing Oil Prices in 2012: Lindsey Williams Reports 3/3
www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8OXoyDI4QQ
Te powyzsze to jest jedna wielka teoria spisku i zamiast tracic 40 minut czasu - to ja wam to streszcze - jeden facet mowi, ze inni znani mu faceci powiedzieli, ze bedzie 40% skokowa dewaluacja dolara zaplanowana na 2012 rok i to jest na bazie przemowienia BB z dnia Nov 21 2002 w National Economists Club w DC. Zatem rachunek jest prosty: kurs euro wyniesie 1.3*1.4=1.82 dolara - lub wiecej. Ja zaokraglilem do 2. Przyjrzyjmy sie temu przemowieniu:
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm
Cytuje:
"a principal message of my talk today is that a central bank whose accustomed policy rate has been forced down to zero has most definitely not run out of ammunition. As I will discuss, a central bank, either alone or in cooperation with other parts of the government, retains considerable power to expand aggregate demand and economic activity even when its accustomed policy rate is at zero. In the remainder of my talk, I will first discuss measures for preventing deflation--the preferable option if feasible. I will then turn to policy measures that the Fed and other government authorities can take if prevention efforts fail and deflation appears to be gaining a foothold in the economy. "(...)
"First, the Fed should try to preserve a buffer zone for the inflation rate, that is, during normal times it should not try to push inflation down all the way to zero.6 Most central banks seem to understand the need for a buffer zone. For example, central banks with explicit inflation targets almost invariably set their target for inflation above zero, generally between 1 and 3 percent per year."(...)
"Second, the Fed should take most seriously--as of course it does--its responsibility to ensure financial stability in the economy. Irving Fisher (1933) was perhaps the first economist to emphasize the potential connections between violent financial crises, which lead to "fire sales" of assets and falling asset prices, with general declines in aggregate demand and the price level.(...)And at times of extreme threat to financial stability, the Federal Reserve stands ready to use the discount window and other tools"(...)
"Third, as suggested by a number of studies, when inflation is already low and the fundamentals of the economy suddenly deteriorate, the central bank should act more preemptively and more aggressively" (...) "In the remainder of my talk I will discuss some possible options for stopping a deflation once it has gotten under way." (...)
"The conclusion that deflation is always reversible under a fiat money system follows from basic economic reasoning. A little parable may prove useful: Today an ounce of gold sells for $300, more or less. Now suppose that a modern alchemist solves his subject's oldest problem by finding a way to produce unlimited amounts of new gold at essentially no cost. Moreover, his invention is widely publicized and scientifically verified, and he announces his intention to begin massive production of gold within days. What would happen to the price of gold? Presumably, the potentially unlimited supply of cheap gold would cause the market price of gold to plummet. Indeed, if the market for gold is to any degree efficient, the price of gold would collapse immediately after the announcement of the invention, before the alchemist had produced and marketed a single ounce of yellow metal.
What has this got to do with monetary policy? Like gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the extent that they are strictly limited in supply. But the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services. We conclude that, under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation." (...)
"A more direct method, which I personally prefer, would be for the Fed to begin announcing explicit ceilings for yields on longer-maturity Treasury debt (say, bonds maturing within the next two years). The Fed could enforce these interest-rate ceilings by committing to make unlimited purchases of securities up to two years from maturity at prices consistent with the targeted yields. If this program were successful, not only would yields on medium-term Treasury securities fall, but (because of links operating through expectations of future interest rates) yields on longer-term public and private debt (such as mortgages) would likely fall as well." (...)
"Of course, if operating in relatively short-dated Treasury debt proved insufficient, the Fed could also attempt to cap yields of Treasury securities at still longer maturities, say three to six years. Yet another option would be for the Fed to use its existing authority to operate in the markets for agency debt (for example, mortgage-backed securities issued by Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association)." (...)
"If lowering yields on longer-dated Treasury securities proved insufficient to restart spending, however, the Fed might next consider attempting to influence directly the yields on privately issued securities. Unlike some central banks, and barring changes to current law, the Fed is relatively restricted in its ability to buy private securities directly.12 However, the Fed does have broad powers to lend to the private sector indirect