TOWARZYSZ Jaruzelski: ZDRAJCA POLAKOW

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Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Descision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981

By Mark Kramer

ANDROPOV:

The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal
countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our troops
will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV:

In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our troops to
Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.22


When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the
meeting, the Polish leader complained that "the allies have forced us into an
impasse" and "left us on our own."31 He could not understand why "the
allies do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they
have constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole
Warsaw Pact, not just for Poland." Jaruzelski added that he was "still
hoping for a miracle," but could sense that his "options [were] running
out."32 Implicit in all these comments was Jaruzelski's distinct lack of
confidence that martial law could be imposed without external military
support.

Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski's position in
late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on 10 December,
barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants
in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking—or at least they
believed he was seeking—a military guarantee.

Among those putting forth this view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU
Secretary responsible for intra-bloc affairs, who had been keeping close
track of the situation from Moscow and was the main contact point in December
1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in Poland who needed to convey
information to, or receive instructions from, the CPSU Politburo:

Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this -matter [martial law]
with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with
the resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive
assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of
armed forces on the territory of Poland.33



http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=library.document&topic_id=1409&id=62

Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981, by Mark Kramer
By Mark Kramer


Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Descision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981




By Mark Kramer


The behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the Polish crisis of 1980-
81 remains a source of great controversy.
On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt
that the Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in
1980-81.1 The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combat-ready
troops around Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long
series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed
Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led
invasion, and made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and
multilateral channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to
fear that the Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law.
Whether Soviet leaders actually intended to invade is a very different
matter. All the latest evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet
officials were extremely reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland.
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this new evidence,
persuasive though it seems in retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In
1980-81, Polish leaders were not privy to the internal deliberations of the
Soviet Politburo and could never be fully certain about Soviet intentions.
Hence, they may have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a
solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial law) did not materialize.
Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have wanted to create that impression—
even if they did not intend to follow up on it—because they believed it would
induce the Polish authorities to take action.2 In that respect, the
declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that he
introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and
the "lesser of two evils."3
On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises
serious doubts about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically
about his position in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. First-
hand accounts and newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981
(and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without
external (i.e., Soviet) military assistance or at least a solid guarantee
that Soviet troops would move in if the martial law operation failed. The
documents also suggest that Soviet leaders by then were unwilling to provide
direct military support to Jaruzelski, telling him that it would
be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops into Poland and that he must instead
proceed with martial law on his own. Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet
military assistance, as revealed in the latest evidence, nearly caused him to
postpone the whole operation in the hope that he would then be given a
concrete external assurance.
The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in
December 1981 was first propounded in September 1992 by a retired Soviet
officer, Army-General Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as
Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. In
that capacity, he played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81. Looking
back on the Polish crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed
martial law to forestall a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that,
rather than trying to stave off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did
just the opposite in December 1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of
military assistance [from the USSR] if the situation in Poland becomes
critical."4 The Soviet Politburo, according to Gribkov, promptly turned
down the Polish leader's requests, informing him that "Soviet troops will not
be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after this decision was
conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to reconsider and warned
them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland will be lost to the
Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-minute pleas for a
Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the nervousness and diffidence
that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their ability to carry out the
plans for martial law."5
Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been
gaining a favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even
among some of his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were
willing to accept Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of
two evils" in December 1981.6 Confronted by Gribkov's revelations,
Jaruzelski strenuously denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military
guarantee and argued that Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet
military pressure and intervention in 1981.7 An acrimonious standoff
between the two men ensued.
Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to
bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence
includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and
secret records of meetings and conversations. Until recently,

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Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to
bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence
includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and secret
records of meetings and conversations. Until recently, the new evidence was
very strong—strong enough to raise serious doubts about Jaruzelski's self-
exculpatory claims—but it was not yet conclusive. That changed in November
1997, when I obtained a document that provides much clearer evidence about
Jaruzelski's behavior in the lead-up to martial law. Combined with all the
previous disclosures, this document (which I have translated and annotated
below) offers powerful confirmation of Gribkov's article.
Before turning to this new document, it is worth reviewing the other
evidence that corroborates Gribkov's account. Some of the evidence has come
from unexpected sources, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of
the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) during the Polish crisis.
Gorbachev was and is an admirer and close friend of Jaruzelski and has
described him as "a true hero" who in 1981 "had no choice" and "acted
correctly."8 In an interview in late 1992, Gorbachev affirmed that he "always
had complete trust in Jaruzelski" and had "talked to him more openly and
honestly than I did with some members of the CPSU Politburo."9 Gorbachev also
has insisted that Jaruzelski's reputation will be secure as "a Polish patriot
and a man of great honor" who "saved his country."10 Hence, Gorbachev has no
reason to say anything that would impugn Jaruzelski's honesty. Nor does
Gorbachev have any reason to defend the reputation of those on the Soviet
Politburo in 1981 who may have wanted to dispatch Soviet military forces to
Poland unless Jaruzelski imposed martial law. If anything, Gorbachev might
have been expected to go out of his way to substantiate Jaruzelski's claims
about what happened in December 1981.
Yet in several interviews with Polish journalists in October and
November 1992, Gorbachev averred that the CPSU Politburo made no threat of
military intervention in December 1981, contrary to the assertions in
Jaruzelski's memoirs. Gorbachev also recalled that shortly before martial law
was introduced, a top Polish official (who Gorbachev deduced was Jaruzelski)
had placed an urgent phone call to Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU
Politburo and CPSU Secretariat who chaired the Politburo's special commission
on the Polish crisis. Gorbachev maintained that Suslov had informed the Polish
leader that Soviet troops would continue to protect Poland against external
threats, but would not be used against internal dangers.11 According to
Gorbachev, Suslov's refusal to provide a military guarantee came as a shock to
the Polish leader, who tried in vain to persuade Suslov to change his mind.
On all key points, Gorbachev's testimony closely parallels and
reinforces Gribkov's account, even though the two men obviously did not consult
with one another and were unaware of each other's comments until at least
several weeks afterwards, when a controversy ensued in Poland. The accounts
overlap both in their broad themes and in many of the details they contain
(e.g., about Suslov's role). Because Gorbachev and Gribkov were both in a
position to know first-hand about the events they described, the inadvertent
similarity of their remarks enhances their credibility.
The accounts provided by Gorbachev and Gribkov were endorsed by a
retired general of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), Vitalii Pavlov,
who was the KGB station chief in Warsaw from 1973 to 1984. In a series of
interviews with the Polish press in early 1993, and in his memoirs (published
in Poland in 1994 and in Moscow in 1998), Pavlov argued that Jaruzelski
desperately wanted an assurance of military intervention in December 1981, but
that Suslov and other Soviet leaders refused to comply.12 Pavlov claimed that
Suslov had spoken with Jaruzelski by phone on 12 December and had told the
Polish leader that "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union was "out
of the question," adding that "we will help you materially, financially, and
politically, but not with armed force."13 Pavlov recalled that Yurii
Andropov, a CPSU Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, sent the same
message to General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs.
The main elements of Pavlov's account were substantiated by Kiszczak
himself, who is a close friend of Jaruzelski. In an interview in 1993,
Kiszczak confirmed that Pavlov is one of the very few people who can speak
authoritatively about the KGB's operations and Soviet policy during the Polish
crisis.14 Elsewhere, Kiszczak acknowledged that Jaruzelski placed an urgent
phone call to Moscow on 12 December to inquire about military "help from the
allies." Because Brezhnev declined to take the phone, Jaruzelski ended up
speaking with Suslov.15 Kiszczak recalled, as Pavlov did, that Suslov
admonished Jaruzelski not to expect Soviet military support "under any
circumstances." Although Kiszczak's recollections differ on some points from
Pavlov's, the similarities between the two are striking.
These various first-hand accounts have been supplemented over the past
five to six years by the release of crucial documentation in Russia, Poland,
and other former Warsaw Pact countries. Although many Soviet and Polish
documents have not yet been declassified, the items that have emerged lend
credence to Gribkov's account of what happened in December 1981. Selected
transcripts from some of the CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980-81 were released
in late 1992, August 1993, and early 1994.16 A few of these transcripts,
including one from 10 December 1981, bear directly on the question of
Jaruzelski's stance in December 1981. Documents from some of the East European
countries, notably Hungary and East Germany, also shed valuable light on the
matter.17
One of the consistent themes in these documents is the lack of
confidence that Jaruzelski and his close aides had about their ability to
sustain martial law without external military aid. Even after mid-September
1981, when Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (Komitet obrony kraju, or KOK)
reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law
(leaving only the precise date to be determined), Polish leaders remained
doubtful that they could handle it on their own.18 Although the Polish
authorities had repeatedly assured the Soviet Union over the previous twelve
months that they would "resolve the crisis with our own means," they had said
this in the hope of somehow finding a political solution that would not require
the opposition to be wiped out (at least not all at once). The imposition of
martial law, aimed at crushing the opposition, was an entirely different matter.
Newly released documents indicate that a few days after the KOK's
watershed meeting in September 1981, "the Polish Communist leaders assessed
their forces [and] found that their resources would be insufficient for this
sort of action [i.e., martial law] and that the support of allied forces would
therefore be needed."19 Because Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, the head of
the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) from September 1980 to mid-October 1981
(when he was replaced by Jaruzelski), both realized that "direct intervention
by [troops from] other socialist countries" would "set back the development of
socialism by decades" and "would be exploited by the imperialist forces," they
were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision.
Although Kania claimed t

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Although Kania claimed that he would not "exclude the possibility of steps that
would unavoidably require the intervention of [Poland's] allies," he was still
hoping that some alternative to martial law could be found.20 Kania's
continued hesitancy sparked a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on
17 September, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately
to "prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland."21 Soon thereafter, on
18 October, Kania was replaced as PUWP First Secretary by Jaruzelski, under
Soviet auspices. (By that point, Soviet leaders had correctly surmised that
Kania was doing his best to avoid imposing martial law.)
Once Jaruzelski assumed the top party post and began making all the
final preparations for martial law, his demeanor seems to have changed a good
deal compared to the previous thirteen months, when he had been working with
Kania. The evidence suggests that Jaruzelski increasingly sought a concrete
military guarantee from the Soviet Union, a request that Soviet leaders
declined to fulfill. His position on this matter was discussed at a Soviet
Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981 by Andropov and the Soviet defense
minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov:

ANDROPOV: The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the
fraternal countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our
troops will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV: In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our
troops to Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.22

To be sure, this passage can lend itself to different interpretations.
Andropov's and Ustinov's perceptions of Jaruzelski's position may not have been
fully accurate. Moreover, it is unclear precisely what Ustinov meant when he
said that "the Poles are not ready to receive our troops." Most likely, he was
arguing that if Soviet military units entered Poland to support Jaruzelski,
they would encounter vigorous armed resistance.23
Even if some ambiguity about this passage remains, Andropov's and
Ustinov's comments tend to bear out the view that Jaruzelski was requesting
Soviet military intervention or at least the assurance of military support if
the martial law operation collapsed. Their remarks also imply that Soviet
leaders had no intention of sending troops to Poland (either in support of or
against Jaruzelski) unless some unforeseeable circumstance arose. In both
respects the transcript bears out a key episode recorded by Gribkov, who
recalled that just after a Soviet Politburo session in late October 1981, he
and the Commander-in-Chief of the War-saw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, were
ordered by Ustinov to inform Jaruzelski that the Poles "had better rely more on
their own forces to restore order in the country and not hope that some big
brother will step in and take care of every-thing for them."24 Gribkov's
recollection of this matter is especially credible because his account of it
was published well before he could have seen the transcript of the Politburo
meeting, which was not declassified until more than a year later.
Further evidence that Jaruzelski was hoping to receive Soviet military
backing in late 1981 comes from two highly classified documents prepared by the
Polish General Staff and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of
November 1981, which reviewed the ongoing preparations for martial law. One of
the documents, compiled by the Polish General Staff on 23 November, indicated
that "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the
transport of our own troops and allied troops [wojsk wlasnych i sojuszniczych]
can be carried out fully and properly."25 This phrasing does not necessarily
indicate that the "allied troops" would be intervening in support of the
martial law operation—after all, the Soviet Politburo had consistently
emphasized that lines of communication between the USSR's Northern Group of
Forces and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany must be protected—but it
certainly is compatible with the notion that Polish leaders would seek external
military assistance. That notion is borne out even more strongly by another
document, prepared two days later by the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs,
which noted that "assistance from Warsaw Pact forces would not be ruled out" if
the martial law operation produced widespread violent turmoil.26 This
position was in line with the views expressed earlier in the year by senior
ministry officials, who argued that martial law would be infeasible unless the
Polish authorities received external military support.27
Another indication that Jaruzelski was hoping to gain outside backing
for the martial law operation came a week later, in early December 1981, when
he sought an explicit Warsaw Pact statement "condemning the actions of the
counterrevolution [in Poland] and the interference by NATO in [Poland's]
internal affairs."28 Jaruzelski was unable to travel to Moscow for a meeting
of the Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December, but in his place
he sent his closest aide, the chief of the Polish General Staff, General
Florian Siwicki. Jaruzelski instructed Siwicki to urge the assembled ministers
and Warsaw Pact commanders to issue a strong statement "demonstrating to the
whole world that the Polish Communists are not alone." Drafts of the proposed
statement referred to "the fulfillment of alliance obligations by the armed
forces of the Warsaw Pact member states" and pledged "complete support for the
Polish people" in their "struggle against counterrevolution."29 These
formulations sparked a protracted discussion, but in the end the meeting failed
to produce the type of statement Jaruzelski had sought. The Romanian and
Hungarian defense ministers, Colonel-General Constantin Olteanu and Army-
General Lajos Csinege, argued that their governments had not given them
authority to endorse such a statement, and the other ministers decided it would
be inadvisable to release a document that was not approved unanimously.30
When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the
meeting, the Polish leader complained that "the allies have forced us into an
impasse" and "left us on our own."31 He could not understand why "the allies
do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they have
constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole Warsaw
Pact, not just for Poland." Jaruzelski added that he was "still hoping for a
miracle," but could sense that his "options [were] running out."32 Implicit
in all these comments was Jaruzelski's distinct lack of confidence that martial
law could be imposed without external military support.
Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski's position in
late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on 10 December,
barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants
in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking—or at least they
believed he was seeking—a military guarantee. Among those putting forth this
view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc
affairs, who had been keeping close track of the situation from Moscow and was
the main contact point in December 1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in
Poland who needed to convey information to, or receive instructions from, the
CPSU Politburo:

Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this -matter [martial law] with
his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the
resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive
assistance from other countrie

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Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this -matter [martial law] with
his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the
resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive
assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed
forces on the territory of Poland.33

Rusakov noted that "Jaruzelski, in expressing this hope, has been
citing remarks by Cde. Kulikov, who supposedly said that the USSR and other
socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed
forces. However, as far as I know, Cde. Kulikov did not say this directly, but
merely repeated the words voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our
determination not to leave Poland in the lurch."34
If Jaruzelski was indeed citing Kulikov at this point, as Rusakov
reported, that would be interesting in itself. It is possible that Kulikov did
in fact say something to Jaruzelski on 8 December—if only inadvertently—that
seemed (in Jaruzelski's view) to be a pledge of Soviet military assistance if
the martial law operation collapsed. During at least one previous occasion
when Kulikov was in Poland in 1981 he brought up this very matter with
Jaruzelski. In a conversation with East German military officials on 7 April
1981, Kulikov said he had indicated to Jaruzelski and Kania a few days earlier
that "unless [the Polish authorities] used the Polish security organs and army
[to impose martial law], outside support could not be expected because of the
international complications that would arise." Kulikov said he "emphasized to
the Polish comrades that they must first seek to resolve their problems on
their own." However, he was careful to add that "if the Polish authorities
tried to resolve these problems on their own and were unable to, and were then
to ask [the Soviet Union] for assistance, that would be a very different
situation from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed [to Poland] from
the outset."35 Kulikov probably did not intend these remarks to be regarded
as an ironclad pledge of a Soviet military guarantee, but he certainly may have
given Jaruzelski and Kania the impression (whether rightly or wrongly) in April
1981 that they could count on Soviet military help if the martial law operation
went awry. Although there is no evidence that Kulikov said something identical
when he met with Jaruzelski in December 1981, Jaruzelski may have construed
some of Kulikov's remarks at that time as a reaffirmation of what Kulikov had
been saying to him earlier in the year. A misunderstanding in a tense
situation like this would hardly be unusual. (Nor is it inconceivable that
Kulikov mistakenly went beyond his brief in December 1981 and gave Jaruzelski
the wrong idea about Soviet policy.)
Whatever the case may be, Jaruzelski's invocation of Kulikov's remarks
(as Jaruzelski interpreted them) tends to bear out the hypothesis that—at least
in Rusakov's view—the Polish leader expected and wanted to receive Soviet
military backing.
That same inference can be drawn from a comment by Yurii Andropov at
the 10 December meeting of the Soviet Politburo. Andropov voiced dismay
that "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our
willingness to offer . . . military assistance," and he urged his colleagues to
resist any temptation to fulfill Jaruzelski's request:

Although we support the notion of internationalist assistance and are alarmed
by the situation in Poland, the matter must entirely and unequivocally be
handled by the Polish comrades themselves. We do not intend to introduce
troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must adhere to it
until the end.36
Andropov's sentiments were echoed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, who argued that "we must somehow try to dispel the notion that
Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of [Soviet]
troops. There cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland. I think we
can give instructions about this to our ambassador, asking him to visit
Jaruzelski and communicate it to him."37 Andropov's and Gromyko's statements
were endorsed by others at the meeting, all of whom agreed that Jaruzelski's
last-minute effort to receive external military support for the martial law
operation should not induce the Soviet Politburo to alter its stance.
Taken together, the documents and memoirs that were just cited provide
powerful evidence that Jaruzelski was calling for and expecting Soviet troops
to be sent to Poland in December 1981. Even so, a number of doubts—or at least
differences of interpretation—could remain. For example, one could argue,
after poring over these materials, that Soviet leaders might have misperceived
Jaruzelski's actions, or that Jaruzelski was raising the question of Soviet
military intervention not because he wanted it to occur, but because he was
probing Soviet intentions. One also might argue that without precise records
of what Jaruzelski was doing and saying at the time, it would be impossible to
reconstruct his motives with any certainty.
Fortunately, a first-hand, contemporaneous record of Jaruzelski's
behavior in the last few days before martial law—including his repeated
requests for Soviet military support and the consternation he felt when those
requests were turned down—is now finally available. It turns out that Marshal
Kulikov's personal adjutant, Lieutenant-General Viktor Anoshkin, kept daily
notes of Kulikov's phone calls, telegrams, conversations, and meetings.38 As
Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, Kulikov had been a frequent
envoy to Poland throughout the 1980-81 crisis, performing sensitive missions on
behalf of the CPSU Politburo. He and Anoshkin had been in Warsaw in late
November 1981 when the final preparations for martial law were completed, and
they were again in Poland from 7 to 17 December 1981, when the preparations
were transformed into action. Anoshkin's records of Kulikov's interactions
with Jaruzelski in the lead-up to martial law show that Jaruzelski wanted and
requested Soviet military assistance, and that he was distraught when Soviet
leaders informed him that no troops would be sent.
Among other things, Anoshkin's notebook reveals that Jaruzelski spoke
by phone with Brezhnev early in the morning of 10 December, right after a late-
night meeting at the Polish General Staff where Jaruzelski and other top Polish
military commanders unanimously approved a final decision to proceed with
martial law.39 The Polish leader informed Brezhnev that the decision had been
adopted, and he then asked "whether Poland can count on [Soviet] military
assistance if the situation in the country becomes critical." Brezhnev evaded
a direct response, but just a few hours later Kulikov received specific
instructions from Ustinov to let Jaruzelski know that "the Poles themselves
must resolve the Polish question. We are not preparing to send troops onto the
territory of Poland." When Jaruzelski received this message, he expressed
concern that "you [the Soviet Union] are distancing yourselves from us," and he
tried to find out whether the decision could be reversed.40
The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the
Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader
again flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the
USSR—the additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a
response to Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed
Jaruzelski that his request had been turned down, the Polish leader
exc

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The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the Soviet
ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader again
flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR—the
additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a response to
Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed Jaruzelski that his
request had been turned down, the Polish leader exclaimed: "This is terrible
news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went
on—now everything has disappeared." Jaruzelski's comment here, as recorded by
Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do
all other documents combined. Any notion that Jaruzelski was simply probing
Soviet intentions no longer seems tenable.
Jaruzelski's profound disappointment upon learning that he would not
receive external military assistance was due to his continued lack of
confidence that the martial law operation would succeed. According to Kania,
Jaruzelski had long feared that chaotic turmoil might ensue and that Polish
units would be unable to cope with violent upheavals on their own.41 He was
convinced that if opposition forces withstood the "first stage" of the
crackdown, the whole operation would collapse unless external aid were
forthcoming. Although Jaruzelski may have "continued to hope for a miracle"
(as he himself put it in a conversation with Siwicki), he could no longer
contain his misgivings when the decisive moment arrived in December 1981.
Having led himself to believe that the "first stage" of the operation would be
unsuccessful, he desperately hoped that Soviet troops would come bail him out,
just as Gribkov had claimed.
When Jaruzelski suddenly realized that "the Poles [would] have to fend
for themselves," he seemed at a loss about what to do. Rather than steeling
himself for the impending martial law crackdown, he repeatedly tried to
persuade Soviet leaders to change their minds. In addition to conveying
his "great concern" to Kulikov that "no one from the political leadership of
the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale . . . military
assistance," Jaruzelski spoke by secure telephone with Andropov, warning him
that military support was urgently needed. These overtures, however, bore no
fruit, as Andropov bluntly informed the Polish leader that "there can be no
consideration at all of sending [Soviet] troops."
Following this second rebuff, Jaruzelski was more unnerved than ever.
Soviet officials had already been complaining, at the CPSU Politburo meeting on
10 December, that Jaruzelski seemed "extremely neurotic and diffident about his
abilities" and was "back to his vacillations" and "lack of resolution."42
Those qualities became even more pronounced after the exchanges on 11
December. At Jaruzelski's behest, Siwicki met with Kulikov on the evening of
the 11th and warned him that "we cannot embark on any adventurist actions
[avantyura] if the Soviet comrades will not support us." Siwicki noted that
Jaruzelski seemed "very upset and very nervous," and
that "psychologically, . . . Jaruzelski has gone to pieces [rasstroen]."
Siwicki emphasized that Jaruzelski would rather "postpone the introduction of
[martial law] by a day" than proceed without Soviet military backing.
The possibility of delaying the crackdown had already been broached by
Jaruzelski the previous day in an exchange with Konstantin Rusakov. Rusakov
informed the Soviet Politburo on 10 December that Jaruzelski was "not
presenting a clear, straightforward line" about the date of "Operation X," the
code name in Moscow for the martial law operation:

No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation
about "Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12
December, and then this was changed to the night of the 12th and 13th. And now
they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th.43

Actually, Siwicki was proposing to defer the martial law crackdown by
only a day—indeed, he emphasized several times that a delay of more than a day
would be infeasible—but Rusakov may have suspected that a daylong postponement
would be extended indefinitely.
In any case, Kulikov's discussion with Siwicki reveals that
Jaruzelski's motivation for a possible delay, of whatever length, was to
persuade Soviet leaders to send troops to Poland. The implication was that if
the Soviet Union failed to respond, the whole operation might have to be called
off. Underscoring this point, Siwicki declared: "[I]f there will be no . . .
military support from the USSR, our country might be lost for the Warsaw Pact.
Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step [of
imposing martial law]." All these statements are essentially identical to
comments recorded by Gribkov in his 1992 article.44
In response, Kulikov argued that the martial law operation would
succeed if Jaruzelski implemented it as planned, and he sought to disabuse
Siwicki of the idea of postponing the operation. The Soviet marshal pointed
out that Polish leaders had repeatedly "insisted that Poland is able to resolve
its problems on its own," and that Soviet officials had accepted and agreed
with that view. Kulikov expressed dismay that Jaruzelski's position had now
changed: "Why has this question of military assistance arisen? We already
went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law." Kulikov added
that "you carried out a great deal of work in preparing for the introduction of
martial law" and "you have enough strength" to succeed. "It's now time to
act," he argued. "The date should not be postponed, and indeed a postponement
is now impossible." Kulikov also expressed concern that the talk about a
postponement and about the need for Soviet military support might signify that
Jaruzelski was backing away from his "final decision" to impose martial
law. "If that is so," Kulikov declared, "we would like to know about it."
Siwicki assured Kulikov that "the decision has been made," and that
Jaruzelski was not going to renege on his plans to introduce martial law. At
the same time, he emphasized, once again, that "without [military] help from
outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles," to sustain martial law.
Siwicki said that both he and Jaruzelski hoped that Soviet leaders would "look
upon these matters with understanding" and would "consider [our] requests," but
Kulikov displayed no inclination to consider any changes in the earlier
arrangements, which stipulated that Polish units would introduce martial law on
their own. By the time the meeting ended, Siwicki had pledged to embark on "a
resolute struggle against the counterrevolution," as Soviet leaders had long
demanded. Even so, Anoshkin could tell that "Siwicki left here dissatisfied
because he got nothing new and heard nothing new from [Kulikov]."
The extent of the Polish leaders' continued nervousness and
dissatisfaction became clear the following day (12 December) as the hour
approached for the introduction of martial law. Despite what had happened over
the previous two days, Jaruzelski was still urging the Soviet Union to "provide
military help." So insistent were Jaruzelski's pleas that Kulikov began to
suspect that the Polish leader was trying to "make the introduction of martial
law dependent on the fulfillment of [his demand for Soviet intervention]."
Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no
direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law
operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to be

[Gość: FAKTS]

Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no
direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law
operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to begin.
Arrangements had even been made for a high-level Soviet delegation, led by
Suslov, to fly to Warsaw for urgent consultations at Jaruzelski's request, but
at the last minute this visit was called off, apparently because Suslov's phone
conversation with Jaruzelski obviated the need for a direct visit.

Anoshkin's notebook continues after 12 December into early 1982,
reporting on the martial law crackdown and the various units involved. But on
the specific question of what Jaruzelski was seeking in the lead-up to martial
law, the crucial entries are the ones Anoshkin jotted down on 11 and 12
December, as translated below. These notes, combined with the other evidence
mentioned above, overwhelmingly suggest that Jaruzelski's role in December 1981
was very different from the portrayal he offers in his memoirs. Far from
having "saved" Poland from a Soviet invasion, Jaruzelski was desperately
promoting the very thing he now claims to have prevented.
None of this is meant to gloss over the excruciating pressure that
Jaruzelski had been encountering throughout the crisis. From the fall of 1980
on, Soviet leaders had kept up a relentless campaign of intimidation and
belligerent reproaches. It would have taken enormous strength and courage to
withstand that pressure. Kania was not a particularly strong leader, but
somehow he was continually able to defer the implementation of martial law. He
repeatedly assured Brezhnev that "decisive measures" would soon be imposed, but
invariably he refrained from carrying out his pledges. Jaruzelski in some ways
was a stronger figure than Kania, but, unlike Kania, he was willing in the end
to comply with Moscow's demands. His compliance initially gave rise to final
preparations for the "lesser of two evils"—that is, martial law—but when the
critical moment came in late 1981, he seems to have embraced the "greater of
two evils," Soviet military intervention. By December 1981 (and perhaps
earlier), Jaruzelski was pleading with Soviet leaders to send troops into
Poland to assist with the martial law operation, and by all indications he was
devastated when his requests were turned down. For Jaruzelski, it seems,
Soviet interests ultimately took precedence over all else.
The evidence provided by the Anoshkin notebook and by the other
materials cited above will serve an especially useful purpose if it prompts
Jaruzelski and Siwicki to seek the declassification of Polish documents that
would shed additional light on the events of December 1981. Jaruzelski's and
Siwicki's own contemporaneous records of their meetings and conversations with
Soviet officials during that crucial period have not yet been made available
(assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with). It is at least
remotely possible that such materials, if they exist, would result in a more
favorable assessment of the Polish leaders' actions.
Jaruzelski, in particular, should have a strong incentive to pursue the
release of new documents, for he is well aware that the issue is of more than
purely historical or scholarly interest. Since leaving office in December
1990, Jaruzelski has been viewed with respect, even admiration, by a majority
of Poles. Although charges were filed against him in the early 1990s for his
role in imposing martial law, and although he was required to testify a number
of times before the Polish Sejm's Commission for Constitutional Oversight, the
last of the charges relating to the 1980-81 crisis were dropped in 1996, when
the Sejm voted to pardon Jaruzelski and other former leaders who had been due
to go on trial for violating the constitution.45 (Separate charges were
retained against Kiszczak and 22 former members of the security forces for one
specific incident—the deaths of miners in Katowice on 13 December 1981—but all
the defendants were eventually acquitted.) After the September 1997
parliamentary elections in Poland, a court in Gdansk proposed to resume its
proceedings against Jaruzelski and four other former officials, but this case
pertained only to the shootings of workers in December 1970. No suggestion was
made of reinstating charges related to the 1981 crackdown.
No doubt, the lenient treatment of Jaruzelski has been based primarily on a
widespread belief that he did indeed choose the "lesser of two evils" in
December 1981 and spared his country great bloodshed and a military
occupation. That view may yet be borne out. But if, as the evidence above
suggests, Jaruzelski was actually urging, rather than opposing, Soviet military
intervention in late 1981, his status in Poland today—not to mention his place
in history—deserves a full-scale reassessment.


Mark Kramer is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies,
Harvard University. He is grateful to Richard T. Davies for his valuable advice.



1 A preliminary discussion of the new evidence is Mark Kramer, "Poland,
1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis," Cold War International
History Project Bulletin No.5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126. A much more
extensive analysis will be presented in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper.
2 For example, at a Soviet Politburo meeting in January 1981, Soviet
defense minister Dmitrii Ustinov argued that "constant pressure on the Polish
leadership" would not work unless "we make clear that we have forces ready" to
move in at short notice. Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 22 yanvarya
1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki delegatsii partiinykh rabotnikov KPSS vo glave L.
M. Zamyatinym v Pol'shu," 22 January 1981 (Top Secret), in Tsentr Khraneniya
Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 42, Delo
(D.), 36, List (L.) 5. Similarly, at a Politburo meeting on 16 April 1981, the
Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, said it was "necessary to exert
constant pressure" on the Polish authorities through political contacts and the
staging of military exercises, though he added that "we should not harass them
needlessly or increase the level of tension so much that they would just give
up." Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 g.: O
razgovore L. I. Brezhneva s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP S. Kanei (po telefonu),"
16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 1-3.
3 This has been the basic theme of all of Jaruzelski's comments on
the subject since late 1991, including his two volumes of memoirs: Stan
wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); and Les chaines et le refuge (Paris:
Lattes, 1992). Until 1990, Jaruzelski staunchly denied that the Soviet Union
had intended to invade Poland in 1981; and even as late as September 1991, in
an interview in Novoe vremya (Moscow), No. 38 (21 September 1991), pp. 26-30,
he was evasive about the matter. No doubt, his discretion prior to the breakup
of the Soviet Union was attributable to his long-standing deference to Soviet
wishes.
4 Army-General A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis
nachala 80-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 9 (September
1992), p. 52.
5 Ibid.
6Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o generalu Jaruzelskim i
pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw: CBOS, October 1992), pp. 1-4. See also Leonid
Kornilov, "Dlya bol'shinstva polyakov Yaruzel'skii ostaetsya patriotom,"
Izvestiya (Moscow), 30 October 1992, p. 5.
7 "Ironiczny grymas historii," Prawo i zycie (Warsaw), No. 49 (December
1992), p. 11.
8"Gorbaczow o sta

[Gość: FAKTS]

8"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil
prawidlowo," Trybuna (Warsaw), 9 November 1992, pp. 1, 2.
9 Ibid., p. 2.
10 M. S. Gorbachev, Zhizn' i reformy, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1996),
vol. 2, pp. 336-351.
11 "Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce," p. 2. See also "Wywiad z
Michailem Gorbaczowem: 'Jestem inny, niz probuja mnie przedstawic',"
Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 23 October 1992, p. 9.
12 Among the interviews, see "Dostep do wszystkiego," Polityka (Warsaw),
No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15; and Leon Bojko, "A wejsc nie chcieli?" Gazeta
wyborcza (Warsaw), 10 February 1993, p. 6. The Polish version of Pavlov's
memoirs is Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, 1994); the Russian
version is Rukovoditeli Pol'shi glazami razvedchika (Moscow: Terra, 1998).
Pavlov published a second volume of memoirs in Russia, which also features some
coverage of the Polish crisis, Operatsiya "Sneg": Polveka vo vneshnei razvedke
KGB (Moscow: TOO-Geya, 1996).
13 Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 185.
14 "Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak," Polityka (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p.
15.
15 Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie
wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 129-130.
16 Most, but not all, of the declassified transcripts are stored in Fond 89
at TsKhSD. My annotated translations of an initial batch (as well as my
translations of some East German documents) appeared in "Declassified Documents
on the Polish Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin No.5
(Spring 1995), pp. 117, 129-139.
17 A sample of these documents was included in a briefing book edited by
Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian Ostermann, for the conference
on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," in
Jachranka, Poland in November 1997, which was co-organized by the National
Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the
Institute for Political Studies (ISP) in Warsaw. Many other documents
pertaining to the 1980-81 Polish crisis are stored in the Magyar Orszagos
Leveltar (MOL) in Budapest, the Statni Ustredni Archiv (SUA) in Prague, the
Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) in Prague, the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien
und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der
SED (SAPMDB/ZPA) in Berlin, the Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagen des
Staatssicherheits-dienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit Zentralarchiv (BUS-MSZ) in Berlin, the
Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (MZA) in Potsdam, the Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv
(TsDA) in Sofia, and the Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist
Roman (Arh. CCPCR) in Bucharest. A useful selection of relevant documents from
the former East German archives can be found in Michael Kubina and Manfred
Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen
1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).
18 For a complete record of the KOK meeting on 13 September 1981, see
the handwritten notes by General Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of
KOK, "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia
1981 r.," 13 September 1981, now stored in Centralne Archywum Wojskowe (CAW),
Posiedzenia Kok, Teczka Sygn. 48. A translation of this document was published
as an appendix in Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, On The Decision To
Introduce Martial Law In Poland In 1981: Two Historians Report to the
Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland,
Cold War International History Project Working Paper 21 (Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). Tuczapski was the only one at the meeting who was
permitted to take notes. Until his 10-page account was released at the
Jachranka conference in November 1997, it was generally thought that no formal
record of the meeting had been kept. The importance of the KOK meeting was
first disclosed by Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in his lengthy interview, "Wojna z
narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 32-33.
Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff and a top aide to
Jaruzelski in 1980-81, was part of a small group responsible for planning the
martial law operation. He also was a crucial intelligence source for the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), having provided invaluable information to
the West since the early 1970s about Warsaw Pact military developments. (He
had to escape from Poland in early November 1981, and now lives in the United
States.) Several years after the interview with Kuklinski appeared, Stanislaw
Kania briefly discussed the KOK meeting in his memoirs (after being asked about
it by the interviewer who compiled the book); see Zatrzymac konfrontacje
(Wroclaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 110-111. More recently, it has come to light that
Kuklinski sent a long cable to the CIA on 15 September 1981—two days after the
KOK meeting—outlining the plans for martial law and warning that
Operation "Wiosna" (the codename of the martial law crackdown) would soon
follow. In May 1997, with help from Richard T. Davies, the former U.S.
ambassador to Poland, I obtained a copy of the Polish text of Kuklinski's cable
and then translated it for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference and
this issue of the Bulletin.
19 "Jelentes a MSzMP Politikai Bizottsagnak," memorandum from Jozsef
Garamvolgyi, Hungarian ambassador in Poland, to the Politburo of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party, 19 September 1981 (Top Secret), in MOL, 288, F.
11/4400, o.e., fol. 128-134. This document records a conversation with Kania
and exchanges between Kania and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar.
20 Ibid., fol. 133-134.
21 "Oswiadczenie KC KPZR i rzadu ZSRR przedstawione kierownictwu KC
PZPR i rzadu PRL," Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 18 September 1981, p. 1.
22 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh
poezdki K. V. Rusakova v GDR, ChSSR, VNR i BPR," 29 October 1981 (Top Secret),
in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, Ll. 3-4.
23 A contingency plan devised in 1980 would have brought up to
fifteen Soviet divisions into Poland to "provide military assistance."
Ostensibly, the Soviet troops would have been taking part in military
exercises, but in reality they would have joined with the Polish army and
security forces to impose a crackdown. The plan evidently was conceived as
early as August 1980 (see my translation below of a key Soviet document from 28
August 1980), and preparations for it gained momentum in early December 1980,
as is evident from the cable that Kuklinski sent to the United States at that
point (which I also have translated below). Subsequently, the contingency plan
was updated and refined, becoming a full-fledged operational plan. In mid-
1981, according to Vitalii Pavlov (in Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 219),
the operational plan was largely set aside; but as late as the fall of 1981
Soviet military planners evidently retained—at least on paper—the option of
sending Soviet troops into Polish territory under the guise of military
exercises scheduled for November 1981. The existence of the updated plan was
divulged to the U.S. government in the fall of 1981 by two high-ranking Polish
military intelligence officials who defected, Colonel Jerzy Suminski and
Colonel Wladyslaw Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak,
who had been head of Polish military intelligence until he became minister of
internal affairs in 1981, in Beres and Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi,
pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until
we

[Gość: FAKTS]

Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until well into December
1981, though he emphasizes that Soviet leaders never decided whether they would
implement it if martial law collapsed. See "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii
krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 54-56.
24 "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p.
56.
25 "Notatka w sprawie najwazniejszych przedsiewziec wykonanych w
Silach Zbrojnych od lipca br. w sferze przygotowan do ewentualnego wprowadzenia
stanu wojennego," 23 November 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygnatura (Sygn.)
1813/92/1 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for providing
me with a copy of this document and the next two documents cited here. See
Paczkowski's own brief but illuminating discussion in O Stanie Wojennym: W
Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo
Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 134-152.
26 "Zalacznik Nr. 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnetrzych,"
attachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych, "Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w
kraju wg. stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.," 25 November 1981 (Secret/Special
Dossier), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (CA/MSW), Sygn.
228/1B, L. 19.
27 Comments by Miroslaw Milewski, then-Minister of Internal Affairs,
transcribed in "Ocena sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej," 12 June 1981 (Top
Secret), in CAW, Sygn. 2308/IV.
28 Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh
godov," pp. 50-51. A more detailed, contemporaneous account of this meeting is
available in "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des
Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer
Vertrages in Moskau," GVS-Nr. A 465 831 (Strictly Secret/Special
Classification), 5 December 1981, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, East German
minister of defense, to Erich Honecker, in MZA, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN)
32641, Bl. 313-316.
29 See "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik
vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 1— Vorschlag, der am 03.12.1981 beraten
wurde" and "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen
Entwurfstexte: Variante 2—Vorschlag, der am 04.12.1981 beraten wurde," 3
December 1981 and 4 December 1981, respectively, attached as appendices to
Hoffmann's report cited in the previous note.
30 "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des
Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer
Vertrages in Moskau." See also Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii
krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 50-51.
31 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 378-379. See also the
comments by Siwicki and Jaruzelski in "Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura
Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.," 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Zbigniew
Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-
1981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 555, 567-568.
32 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 379.
33 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu
o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op.
66, D. 6, L. 5 (emphasis added).
34 Ibid. On both 7 and 8 December 1981, Jaruzelski spoke by phone
with Brezhnev, who assured the Polish leader that "the Soviet Union will not
leave Poland in the lurch" (Sovetskii Soyuz ne ostavit v bede Pol'shu), a
formulation that Soviet officials had frequently used during the crisis (along
with the nearly identical formulation of Sovetskii Soyuz ne dast v obidu
Pol'shu—that is, "the Soviet Union will stick up for Poland."). On 9 December,
Jaruzelski and other high-ranking Polish military officers, including all the
top General Staff officers, deputy defense ministers, military district
commanders, and service commanders, held a late-night meeting in the Polish
General Staff building, where they reached a final decision to proceed with
martial law. Evidently, Brezhnev's rather vague statement of the previous day
had been viewed—at least temporarily—as a sufficient basis on which to act.
See Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 387-394; and the entries for 8 and 9
December 1981 in "Rabochaya tetrad'" No. 5, by Lieutenant-General V. I.
Anoshkin, adjutant to Marshal Kulikov. (This document will be discussed and
cited at greater length below.)
35 Quoted from "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem
Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des
Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung
der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung 'SOJUS 81'," Report
No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-Potsdam, AZN 32642, Bl. 54.
36 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 7.
37 Ibid., Ll. 8-9.
&nbs



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Subject: Andropov,Gorbachev,Gromyko,Jaruzelski,Poland 1980-81,Soviet Armed
Forces,Warsaw Pact,Kulikov,Kania,Anoshkin Bulletin 11 - Cold War Flashpoints
Pact
Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID: New Evidence on the 1980-81 Polish
Crisis
Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author: Mark Kramer
Document Origin: CWIHP Bulletin Published: CWIHP Document
Document Date: 03/01/99 Document ID:
Document Type: Article Archive:

Jaruzelski sie tlumaczy:

[Gość: FAKTS]

Commentary on the Anoshkin Notebook, by Wojciech Jaruzelski
By Wojciech Jaruzelski


Commentary


Editor's Note: Earlier this year, CWIHP asked General Wojciech Jaruzelski,
former Polish Prime Minister and a key participant in the Polish events of 1980-
81, to comment on Mark Kramer's introduction and translation of the Anoshkin
notebook. We are pleased to print his commentary below. A few editorial changes
(indicated by brackets) were necessary due to the fact that General Jaruzelski
commented on a Polish translation (and differently paginated version) of Mark
Kramer's article. CWIHP encourages the release of further documents from Polish
and other archives on the events of 1980-81.

By Wojciech Jaruzelski


The limitations of time, as well as an eye ailment, make it difficult for me at
this time to comment fully and essentially on Mr. Mark Kramer's article
entitled, Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition Martial Law in
Poland all the more since General Florian Siwicki and I are simultaneously
preparing materials in relation to General Anoshkin's working notebook. These
materials will contain concrete, factually argued comments dealing also with
some questions not dealt with or discussed at length in this letter.
Trusting in the professional competence of Mr. Kramer, I wish to avoid the
inevitable polemics should his text be published in its present form. Polemics
as such, of course, are not a bad thing, they can even be useful and desirable,
but it would not be good if I had to present publicly specific criticisms
questioning not only the logic, but also the veracity, of many statements,
facts, and quotations cited in the above mentioned text. I believe Mr. Kramer
wrote the text under the pressure of a deadline and that is why he was unable
to consult other supplementary and verifiable documents. He was unable at the
same time to confront and appraise in a more profound way the credibility of
the sources he summoned. As a result, his outlook on a very complicated weave
of facts, events, and processes at the time through the prism of only a few and
selectively revealed sources is by its nature restrictive, simplified, and on a
series of issues completely pointless. Unfortunately, the summary judgments in
Mr. Kramer's text go quite far. If this was simply a historical debate about
the distant past, I would not see it as a serious problem. In this case,
however, the matter refers to a "hot" topic that is still, and lately even more
so, the object of political games and confrontations.
Moving to matters of substance, I will limit myself to commenting on just
some. First, let me deal with those that have to do with manifest facts as
well as with elementary logic. From the sources quoted by Mr. Kramer, it is
allegedly clear that during those few days of December 1981 he describes I was
supposedly depressed, "unnerved," "extremely neurotic and diffident about [my]
abilities," vacillating, "psychologically...gone to pieces." Consequently, not
seeing any possibility of implementing martial law with my own forces,
I "desperately implore[d], want[ed], ask[ed]" for foreign troops to be brought
into Poland. I would like to put aside the moral and political aspects of such
a statement, which, for me as a Pole, a front-line soldier, and a commander of
many years are, to put it simply, offensive. I would like to put aside
the "poetic" moods from which I allegedly suffered. There is no question that
deciding to implement martial law was an unusually and dramatically difficult
step, and it was extremely hard on me. But there are scores, even hundreds, of
people with whom I met and talked directly at the time, and nobody can say that
I lacked in decisiveness or self-control. Let me describe one event to
illustrate this. In the afternoon hours on December 13, that is, after the
decision had already been made, I met (and proof of that can be found in
newspapers) with a delegation (consisting of several score people) of the
Housing Cooperative Congress, which was taking place in Warsaw at the time. I
wonder what those people would have said about my behavior at the time. I am
supposed to have been "crushed by the refusal" [i.e., of Suslov to guarantee
Soviet intervention — trans.]. Nothing of the sort was in fact the case—I was
relaxed and calm. Besides, the course of the whole operation confirms this.
At this point, one question comes to mind: In whose interests was it to
portray my mood in such an extremely deformed way? What about the entry in
Anoshkin's "notebook" that says, "The Commander-in-Chief of Unified Armed
Forces had his hands tied by Moscow"? Perhaps historians should analyze this
track.
The core of the "vivisection" of the state of my soul conducted by Mr. Kramer
in his article is to show my thinking to have been as follows: First, that the
reaction and resistance of the opposition and of the majority of the society
would be so strong that we would not be able to deal with it using our own
forces; and second, that the Polish Army was not sufficiently reliable or loyal.
Neither the former nor the latter makes any sense, which was very convincingly
proved by real life. In another place describing Anoshkin's "notebook," I will
prove this point in a more concrete way. Before that, however, I would like to
ask a question that has been stubbornly on my mind since I read Mr. Kramer's
article. If Jaruzelski indeed was almost panic-stricken, full of fear,
apprehension, and doubts whether we would be able to impose martial law by
ourselves, why then did he not abandon the idea of imposing it in the first
place? Or did he, by imposing martial law, entangle himself in a hopeless,
suicidal mess that would end in unavoidable ruin?! As everyone knows, neither
the former nor the latter happened.
Another piece of information cited by Mr. Kramer is the supposed readiness
expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law
back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant
not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies
that any such considerations took place. After all one of the key conditions
for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed,
was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents
could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main
authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity).
I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd
notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions
of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the
workday. It was never considered, not even for a moment. Such an entry
completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of
the person who wrote such a thing in the said "notebook," or passed such
information to their political superiors.
On page 5 [page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this
Bulletin—ed.] of Mr. Kramer's article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii
Gribkov "played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81." It is not my
intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the
context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than
amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other
Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanislaw Antos, who at the time was
Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in
which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on
vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of m

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However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the
imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov
himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen.
Stanislaw Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified
Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981.
For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about
the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister
Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back
to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns
out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact.
Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in
1992 by Istoricheskii Zhurnal are almost literally identical with some phrases
from Anoshkin's "notebook." It looks as though many roads lead to that very
same "source."
The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer's article is strangely one-sided. Why
does he not mention Gen. Siwicki's polemical response to the above-mentioned
article by Gribkov, which was published in Polska Zbrojna on 22 December 1992?
Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different
ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under
overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about
the "sergeant's widow who whipped herself."
On page [6] of his article, Mr. Kramer talks about a document which allegedly
constitutes "powerful" evidence. He means Anoshkin's "notebook." Treating
the "notebook" in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something
about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds.
After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained there—
claiming that we allegedly demanded military aid—were not presented by
the "Russian side" during the Jachranka conference.1 This made it impossible
for the [Polish] "government side" to take a stance concerning them and to
directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear
if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be
published.2 As a result, the "notebook"—which, as it turns out, is being
prepared for publication as a separate brochure—has become an independent fact,
removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but
a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.
I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues.
Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of
documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the
Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and
protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records,
particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for
the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic
consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not
registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals [gryf] or marked by page
numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts
with Kulikov's arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is
from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation
with me the night of the 8th, which Baibakov reported about on December 10
during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what
is peculiar is that there is not even one word in Baibakov's report about the
Polish side waiting for military help. Maybe that is the reason why there is
no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin's
notebook.
As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed
description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other
hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only
want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from
December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal
Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16
about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion,
which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov
spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish person he talked to? Was he
the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded
and interpreted?
I am sorry to say that regardless of what might generously be described as
the "defects" of the notebook, Mr. Kramer's interpretations sometimes go well
beyond what can be deduced from an entry. Take, for example, the alleged
answer given by Rusakov to Ambassador Aristov. [In the notebook entry for
December 11] that answer is written across the margin. It goes: "This is
terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of
troops went on —now everything has disappeared." [In his introduction on page
9], Mr. Kramer omits the last words of this entry, which say, "What is
Jaruzelski's situation now?!" But these words make it obvious that somebody
else has uttered this statement, not me. Here Mr. Kramer's intentions become
obvious. He says: "Jaruzelski's comment here as recorded by Anoshkin, says
more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other
documents combined. (my emphasis — W.J.)." Thus this carefully prepared
quotation, in fact "robbed" of the element clearly indicating that it was not
me who said those words, becomes to the author more important "than all other
documents." This is scandalous manipulation.
Besides, what does the talk of "a year-and-a-half of chattering" mean when my
reactions (if someone is skeptical, please consult Kuklinski's report in an
interview for the Paris Kultura, April 1987) and many public statements, as
well as statements [made] during the top-secret meetings when I talked about
the necessity to solve Polish problems by ourselves, with our own means, are
known? And as far as Aristov is concerned, I know one thing—that he judged the
situation in Poland very seriously, much like Kulikov. He was constantly
passing signals, as well as complaints and warnings, about the Kremlin's
dissatisfaction to the Polish leadership, many of which he must have co-
authored (this was apparently the case with the famous letter from the CPSU
Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party
(PUWP) in June 1981, which was in fact to open the way to a kind of political
coup). I know from Stanislaw Kania that Aristov even went so far as to call
me "general-liberal."
On page [6] some alleged opinions of Gorbachev's are also quoted. Mr. Kramer
writes in particular about how in October and November 1992 Gorbachev gave
several interviews to Polish journalists. [. . .] The focus is on an interview
for the Warsaw newspaper Rzeczpospolita [The Republic]. Mr. Kramer, who
usually uses plenty of quotations, this time when talking about Gorbachev,
chooses to relate his alleged statements using mainly his own words, even
venturing to say what Gorbachev allegedly "meant." Since I do not have the
said interview in Rzeczpospolita handy, I cannot take a firm stance. I will
try to do this later. However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev
said officially. He was invited as a witness by the Commission of
Constitutional Oversig

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However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev said officially. He was
invited as a witness by the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm
[Parliament] of the Republic of Poland, but he could not come personally and
sent a letter, dated 31 August 1995, instead. He wrote:

It was obvious to me as a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee that Gen. Jaruzelski as the First Secretary of the PUWP
Central Committee took all the measures that were available to him in order to
lead Poland out of the economic and political crisis in a peaceful way and
aimed at excluding any possibility of using troops of member countries of the
Warsaw Pact to interfere in internal affairs of his country (my emphasis —
W.J.). It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the imposition of martial
law in Poland was conditioned not only by the growing social and political
internal crisis, but also by an increased tension in Polish-Soviet relations
closely related to this crisis. Under such conditions, Gen. Jaruzelski was
forced to take upon himself this altogether difficult decision, which at the
time was, in my opinion, the choice of a lesser evil. [. . .] The Soviet
leadership was frantically looking for a solution between two equally
unacceptable solutions: To make peace with the chaos spreading in Poland
threatening the breakdown of the whole socialist bloc, or to react to the
events in Poland with military force. However, I want to repeat that the view
was that both solutions were unacceptable. At the same time, our troops and
tank columns were there along the Polish border, along with the sufficiently
strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland itself. All could have been
used in extreme circumstances.

Gorbachev wrote in a similar tone a letter to Maciej P=BBa=F3y=BDski, the
Speaker of the Sejm (published in Gazeta Wyborcza on 5 December 1997). And all
this is what has been stated not secretly, not privately, but officially by a
man who not only was a member of the highest Soviet leadership, but also a
member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in
Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish
border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also
did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR
and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the
opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover,
according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any
pressure put on Poland ("davleniia ne bylo"). However, other Soviet
politicians and military officials talk about what really happened and quote
actual facts (I will refer to some of those sources in the piece I mentioned
before).
On page [6] Kramer also refers to a book by Vitalii Pavlov (Bylem rezydentem
KGB w Polsce [I Was a KGB Resident in Poland]). I read the Polish edition
carefully. Pavlov, who understands and reads Polish, authorized the
translation. (I know the person who picked up the manuscript after it had been
authorized.) There is absolutely no mention there that I was desperately
trying to obtain some guarantee of military intervention and that
Suslov "refused." Actually, before the so-called Suslov Archive (1993) or
Pavlov's book (1994) were published in Poland, I spoke (Gazeta Wyborcza, 12
December 1992) about my conversation with Suslov on the morning of 12 December
1981. I quote:

JARUZELSKI: We were always pressured by the external factor, but I never put
it forward [as the main thing]. An examination of conscience must always begin
with oneself. Only the people who gave up power are being judged today, but it
is the authorities as well as the opposition who should be pouring ash on their
heads. With the international situation becoming ignited, our Polish brawl
meant playing with fire. Our conversations with the representatives of the
Kremlin were often a way for them to check the effectiveness of their pressure
and, for us a way to check their inclinations for intervention. In a way, it
was mutual testing, a mutual game. We kept getting the impression that they
were keeping some cards hidden.
(Jaruzelski met on 12 December 1981 at 9 am with Generals Czeslaw Kiszczak,
Florian Siwicki, and Michal Janiszewski.)
JARUZELSKI: In my office we assessed the situation. It had reached the
brink. We knew that if the Gdansk debate [brought] no glimmer of hope then we
[would] have to choose the lesser evil. Siwicki, who was still under the
depressing impression of talks in Moscow on December 4, asked, "And what is the
guarantee that even if we go ahead they are not going to come in?" With the
generals present I tried to call Brezhnev. Mikhail Suslov came on the phone.
He wasn't very easy to communicate with; he must have already been very sick.
I asked whether it would be our internal affair if we imposed martial law. He
said, "Yes." "And if the situation becomes more complicated?" I asked (I
remembered the words Brezhnev never took back: 'Esli bud'et uslozhniatsia,
veid'em' [If it turns out to be necessary, we will go in] as well as the
constantly repeated 'my Pol'shi ne ostavim v b'ede' [We will not leave Poland
in the lurch]). The gist of Suslov's answer was, "But you have always said
that you can manage by yourselves."
That was a lot, but of course, it was not everything. In Bratislava in August
1968 there were even kisses, yet, as we all know, everything ended very
quickly. Therefore, we had to pay attention above all to numerous worrisome
facts and signals.

In relation to the above, it is worth quoting a passage from the book by
Pavlov, which for some strange reason was omitted by Mr. Kramer. When writing
about my phone conversation with Suslov, Pavlov claims that Suslov "confirmed
then that the Soviet Union will not directly interfere in Polish affairs and
will under no circumstance send troops to Poland, which, it seemed, put
Jaruzelski at ease." In saying that it "put me at ease," Pavlov admits that
there were indeed reasons to feel uneasy.
On page [6] Kramer writes with reference to the same book by Pavlov, that
Andropov sent the same message to Kiszczak (i.e. that the direct military aid
from the USSR is out of the question). Mr. Kramer must not have read the book
carefully. There is no mention there of "sending a message." However, there
is a description of a visit to Moscow in September 1981 by Gen. Kiszczak, the
newly nominated Minister of Internal Affairs. During that visit, Andropov
allegedly informed him of the above. Gen. Kiszczak denies this categorically.
I believe him, but the facts are most important. First, after his return from
Moscow, Kiszczak did not pass any message of such great importance to me or to
Kania. Second, Pavlov claims that he was present during the conversation
between Andropov and Kiszczak. However, although he met with Kania often (he
had had close relations with him for a long time, since Kania for many years
was a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the issues of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs), and met with me several times, he never
mentioned a word about that matter. And the scale of the matter was such that
it required asking our opinion about what Andropov [allegedly] said to
Kiszczak. He [Pavlov] never brought up this topic, which he himself in fact
confirms by not mentioning it in his book.
On page [6] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in "[mid-September]
1981, [. . .] Poland's Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final
decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law." The documents
are all there to see (they were discu

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On page [6] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in "[mid-September]
1981, [. . .] Poland's Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final
decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law." The documents
are all there to see (they were discussed and assessed in great detail during
the meetings of the Commission for Constitutional Oversight, and there are
minutes of those meetings), showing that materials concerning martial law were
already being prepared in the mid-sixties. The practical verification of some
solutions was conducted during a large-scale military exercise under the code
name of "Kraj-73" ("Country-73"). The intensification and concretization of
work took place in the fall of 1980, when a special task-group led by then-
premier, Jozef Pinkowski, was formed. Later, there were further developments
in the following stages. For example, on 27 March 1981, S. Kania and I signed
a document called "The Fundamental Idea of Martial Law." There is also a
protocol of the meeting of the National Defense Committee from 13 September
1981 (the last meeting before martial law was imposed). One can read what
Kania said and what I said. Typically, whenever I referred there to
the "imposition of martial law" (four times), I always preceded it with the
word "potential" [ewentualne]. Moreover, when the protocol summarizes my
statement, it says that "he pointed out the particular importance and necessity
of solving internal problems by ourselves, with the political and economic
support from neighboring socialist countries." So where does "Jaruzelski's
demand" come from? Is the image [of a decision] personified exclusively in
myself necessary, and if so, then to whom? I speak of this not to avoid
responsibility. I have always openly declared that I accept the
responsibility. But I do think that a historian should have more finesse in
forming ad hominem attacks.
Moreover, on page [7], there is additional confusion. It is said that our own
forces may not be enough to impose martial law "and that the support of allied
forces would therefore be needed." Then follows a statement that does not
accord well with the previous one: "Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania . . . both
realized that 'direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries'
would 'set back the development of socialism by decades' and 'would be
exploited by the imperialist forces.'" Therefore "they were extremely
diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision." Such hesitation
resulted in "a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17,
which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to 'prevent the
imminent loss of socialism in Poland.'" Again, if we are to talk about strict
historical accuracy, the letter was from the CPSU Central Committee and the
government of the USSR to the PUWP Central Committee and the government of
Poland, and concerned mainly the anti-Soviet campaign in Poland. On what
grounds is the claim about the National Defense Committee's statement made? On
September 13, the Committee made no decisions about martial law (there is a
protocol). However, the whole process of preparations for this eventuality
with all the hesitations lasted, as I said before, from at least the fall of
1980 until 12 December 1981. And finally, how is one to understand that
Jaruzelski thought at the time that an intervention would "set back the
development of socialism by decades," and three months later "he desperately
hoped for it." What brought on this change? Particularly since the prognosis
for successful imposition of martial law was much better in December than in
September.
On page [7] Mark Kramer also claims that Jaruzelski replaced Kania "under
Soviet auspices." I regret that
Mr. Kramer, who after all participated in the Jachranka conference, makes such
a generalization. He probably heard me quote from an East German document
(acquired by the [Sejm] Commission for Constitutional Oversight) that records a
conversation between Honecker and Rusakov which took place 21 October 1981. (I
was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP on October
18). Rusakov informed Honecker that I had all kinds of doubts and did not want
to accept the position. Soviet suggestions turned out to be ineffective. I
agreed only as a result of the insistence of Polish comrades. Prof. Jerzy
Holzer has confirmed this, adding that it was the "good" Polish comrades who
mattered. I also said that it was Kazimierz Barcikowski, always fought against
by the conservative forces in the party and by the allies at the time, who
recommended me for that function. It is interesting that when referring to a
statement made by Andropov at the previously mentioned CPSU Politburo meeting
on 29 October 1981, Mr. Kramer does not notice that it was at that time that
Andropov said, "Barcikowski and Kubiak are big obstacles in the Politburo."
Finally, does the word "auspices" not sound offensive with respect to the CC
PUWP members of the time? It is true that four of them were against my
candidacy, but 179 supported me in a secret ballot. Were they all "agents of
the Kremlin"?
On page [7] Mark Kramer also informs us that during the above-mentioned October
29 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Andropov said, "the Polish leaders are
talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries." But which
leaders? It is a fact known from former Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak
documents that there were people in the leadership of the party who held very
different views and who enjoyed a very different degree of trust from the
allies at the time. During that meeting Brezhnev also made the following
statement: "I don't believe that Com. Jaruzelski will do anything
constructive. I think he is not bold enough." But Mr. Kramer does not notice
any of that. Following the words "Polish leaders," just a few lines below he
deduces that it was Jaruzelski who "was requesting military intervention from
the Soviet Union." It seems that there is a great need to put me
in the worst possible light. But it should have been
done in a less obvious way. On what grounds does the plural "Polish leaders"
immediately change into the
name "Jaruzelski?"
On page [8] we find the following quotation from Andropov's statement of
December 10: "Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent
on our willingness to offer … military assistance." I must here confirm a very
unpleasant, even ugly thing. That quotation has been made up. The actual
statement went exactly as follows: "Jaruzelski states economic demands
strongly and makes our economic aid a condition for conducting Operation X; I
would even go further to say that he brings up, but not directly, the question
of military aid." Andropov does not refer to any conversation with me. The
only Pole he mentions as somebody he talked to is Miroslaw Milewski. What he
says conflicts with what Anoshkin's "notebook" says about Milewski. There we
find no "but," no "not directly," but simply: "Can we count on military aid
put before economic aid[?]" And as far as the "not directly" is concerned,
Gen. Siwicki has written about it long ago in the above mentioned article in
Polska Zbrojna.
On page [9] of the article, we find [one] evident lie.
I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what
grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure
phone?" [. . .] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted
no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-
mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit
that there are no documents, declarations, or

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On page [9] of the article, we find [one] evident lie.
I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what
grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure
phone?" [. . .] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted
no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-
mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit
that there are no documents, declarations, or statements from which it could be
deduced that I indeed had such conversations. Gen. Siwicki also firmly states
that this
is the first time he has heard of a conversation with Andropov. If there are
references to my alleged
opinions and assessments stated during the meeting
of December 10, there is no indication where they came from. The only
reference to a direct conversation with me can be found in the above-mentioned
report of Baibakov. However, Brezhnev, who of course talked to me on the phone
on December 7, does not say anything about
that conversation, and certainly not that I asked for
military aid.
It is a pity that when quoting different voices from the Soviet Politburo
meeting of December 10, Mr. Kramer omits such statements as the following by
Rusakov: "Jaruzelski is leading us by the nose" (Russian: "Vodit nas za
nos."); or by Suslov: "Jaruzelski is showing a certain cunning. Through his
requests to the Soviet Union he wants to create an alibi for himself. Of
course, it is perfectly obvious that we are not able to actually fulfill those
requests, and Jaruzelski will later say 'but I addressed the Soviet Union,
asked for help, and they did not give me any.' At the same time, the Poles are
clearly stating that they are against bringing the troops in. If the army
enters Poland, it will be a catastrophe." There were many other shocking
statements made there, some of them reminding one of a surrealistic spectacle.
But all this "does not fit" the picture, a picture in which a de facto
accusatory statement against me is being concluded.
On page [7] a General Staff document dated 23 November 1981 is quoted. In the
document we read: "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure
that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [. . .] can be carried
out." On that basis, Mr. Kramer claims that it "certainly is compatible with
the notion that the Polish leaders would seek external military assistance."
On the contrary, it is an argument to the advantage of the so-called authors of
martial law. I must explain some obvious things here, unfortunately. Anyone
who lived in Poland at that time remembers the fears that any little damage to
the interest of the Warsaw Pact might become a pretext for intervention.
Possible difficulties in military transport would, after all, be a classic
violation of the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of the
bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our minds. Let the fact that
I stated, publicly in the Sejm as well as during a Central Committee plenary
meeting, that the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth functioning
of this transportation infrastructure attest to how important and sensitive
this point was. Imputing that a concern that this transportation should
function smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law) meant
looking for help from the outside is not only absurd, but politically and
strategically infantile.
On pages [7-8] is another example of how Mr. Kramer is being led up a "blind
alley." He is, as far as I am aware, a historian by profession and therefore I
assume that he will read the addendum I have enclosed in the proper spirit. It
will become clear to him from it how thin the different arguments are of people
wishing at any cost to accuse the so-called authors of martial law, if they are
reduced to using such "evidence."
On page [11] Mr. Kramer also suggests that Gen. Siwicki and I attempt to make
secret Polish documents public. There are already many documents (particularly
protocols from the PUWP Politburo meetings, different materials from other
institutions and bodies) that have been made public in different ways, but Mr.
Kramer is clearly not interested in them. On the other hand, it is true that
there is no access to many documents, particularly those of the Ministry of
National Defense. Perhaps Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski did not have time to inform
Mr. Kramer that several times I addressed the organizers of the Jachranka
conference and asked for access to be made possible in Polish institutions. I
even wrote statements which were intended to help in those efforts.
Unfortunately, in many cases these efforts ended unsuccessfully (it is true
that I did not at the time foresee the possibility that after the conclusion of
such an important international conference some kind of "work notebook" would
be "pulled out of a pocket" and become a "decisive" source for Mr. Kramer).
However very distasteful—to use just such a term—is this statement about our
notes (Gen. Siwicki's and mine)—"assuming they still exist and have not been
tampered with." So only Polish generals would falsify things, while Soviet
notes are above any suspicion? I would like to ask here whether we really can
treat them [i.e., the Anoshkin notes] as reliable "evidence" (Mr. Kramer calls
it "decisive") for describing events of great political, historical, and moral
importance? At the same time, considering the threats and announcements coming
even from the highest offices and leading political circles, should one treat
the suggestions of an American historian as a welcome gesture in this
campaign? I trust that this was not Mr. Kramer's intention. All the more so,
since when he wrote his article he did not know many of the circumstances,
facts, and arguments I have presented here.
I understand that Mr. Kramer's article is based exclusively on words written
then as well as years later. But this is only a partial base. I do not deny
the necessity and importance of his research. But to make the picture
objective, one needs to look also at evident facts, phenomena, and symptoms
from the time in question. Many of them have been presented by many witnesses
who testified before the Commission of Constitutional Oversight under the rules
of the Penal Code. I did not notice even a trace of those testimonies in Mr.
Kramer's article. But the most important thing is to avoid a situation of "if
the facts indicate something different, then too bad for the facts."
Therefore, counting on the support of Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, an outstanding
specialist in contemporary history, I would like to ask Mr. Kramer to
reevaluate the text of the inaugural brochure, the main substance of which is
to be Anoshkin's "working notebook." Gen. Siwicki, myself, and other people
have a number of important comments about it, which we will present at a later
point. I am ready for conversations which will lead to better mutual
understanding, will confront and verify views, and above all, which will bring
us closer to the very complex truth.
To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years
were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all
kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not talking of Mr.
Kramer, of course, since I don't know his views—are suddenly turning into
defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and
constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems
exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the
Polish People's Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I
always have

[Gość: FAKTS]

To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years
were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all
kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not talking of Mr.
Kramer, of course, since I don't know his views—are suddenly turning into
defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and
constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems
exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the
Polish People's Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I
always have said and to this day keep saying openly that the Soviet Union was
our ally within the "sick" reality of those years and with all the heavy load
of limited sovereignty. To the Soviet Union we owe what is actually the most
advantageous configuration of Polish territory in history (although I admit
that such a configuration suited Soviet interests). For many years, the Soviet
Union was the sole guarantor of that territory. I respect and like the
Russians. I think that the relations between our countries which are now equal
should be good and mutually advantageous. Also, when I look back at those
years I try to keep a rational distance, since as a politician and a general I
know the ruthless logic of that divided world. I used to say that if I had
been a Soviet marshal or general I would have perceived Poland as a territory
endangering the bloc, with all the consequences of that for us, of course. We
were fully aware of that situation, which was assessed similarly in the
American documents disclosed at Jachranka. All this required from us, the
Polish authorities, the appropriate measures and countermeasures. Their
effectiveness was proved by life itself. We imposed and carried out martial
law alone, and then, walking along a rough road, reached the Round Table [of
1989] and the groundbreaking changes which became an impulse and model for
other countries of the region.

Wojciech Jaruzelski
Warsaw, 27 April 1998



Appendix


The supposition that Poland was interested in so-called "fraternal aid" is
disgraceful and absurd. People included in the Preliminary Summons, the
witnesses, and some historians have explained this in detail. However, some
members of the Commission (Parliament member Jacek Taylor in particular) during
the Commission's deliberations referred to a "document" from the MSW (Ministry
of Internal Affairs) files which can presently be found in the Sejm archives
(file 228/IB). The document is called An Assessment of the Current Situation
in the Country on 25 November 1981."3 The following passage can be found in
appendix No. 2 to that Assessment of the Situation:

Implementation of martial law may result in the following developments:
Scenario 1: Political organizations submit to the requirements of martial
law. At the same time, there is a possibility of small-scale strikes and
limited hostile propaganda.
Scenario 2: Massive strikes are organized in some parts of the country without
workers leaving the workplace.
Scenario 3: A general occupation strike, with workplaces taken over; some
workers go out in the streets; there are street demonstrations and attacks
occur on buildings housing party offices and state administration, on police
stations, etc. Strong intervention of police and armed forces takes place.
Aid from Warsaw Pact troops is not out of the question.

People who attempt to use this [document] as evidence against those included in
the Preliminary Summons are misusing it. The reasons I say this are as
follows. First, [the document was] in a file in which only loose, preliminary
materials can be found. Secondly, the said Assessment of the Current Situation
is really only a draft, without any filing number, without any annotations, and
was not signed by anybody or distributed anywhere. There is also another
telling factor, one that remains conveniently not mentioned, which proves the
ill will of the people who insist on the basis of such material the contention
that Poland allegedly expected so-called "aid." This is the fact that in the
same file—about which there was no mention—there is another, later document,
called An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country and Proposals for
Solutions, dated 5 December 1981. There is not even one word concerning any
kind of "aid" there. However, unlike the earlier document of November 25,
there are many hand-written comments and corrections of Czeslaw Kiszczak, who
was at the time the Minister of Internal Affairs. And although that document
has not been signed or distributed either, the very fact that the Minister made
many annotations on it makes it more trustworthy. But in spite of that it
remains unmentioned.
It is necessary to add here that although the Commission had access to an
enormous amount of different material and documents, no traces of expectations
or requests for this so-called "military aid" have been found. On the
contrary, the claim that we need to solve our Polish problems on our own
appears repeatedly in many secret as well as public statements made by the
representatives of the PPR government at the time. Therefore, using the
said "Assessment of the Situation" of 25 November 1981 as an argument is
evident manipulation. Perhaps it was hoped that nobody would be inclined to
go through the pile of files where less important, loose materials were kept.
The selective character of omissions described above can be further illustrated
by the following fact. Solidarity activists have been claiming that all kinds
of anti-Soviet excesses, such as the desecration of monuments and graves of
soldiers were provocations organized by the State Security. But surprisingly
enough, in the Assessment of the Situation of November 25 (appendix no. 1), is
the information that from the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (18
October 1981) until the time the said Assessment was written, 26 criminal
investigations concerning the above mentioned acts were started. At that time
eighteen people had been found who had vandalized monuments in Jedrzejow and
one person who had desecrated the graves of Soviet soldiers in Gryfin.
Remembering these facts is not convenient now. Nor is remembering (in
accordance with the described Assessment) that on November 25, eleven public
buildings were under occupation, and a note made of plans to occupy another
fourteen.

[Translated from Polish by Anna Zielinska-Elliott and Jan Chowaniec.]


Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski served as prime minister of Polish People's Republic
from 1981-1985.


1 Editor's note: For the Jachranka conference, see Malcolm Byrne's introduction
to this Bulletin section and Ray Garthoff's report in CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March
1997), pp. 229-232
2 Editor's note: The conference organizers are planning to publish the
Jachranka proceedings; transcription of the audio tapes of the conference is in
progress.
3 Editor's note: On this document, see also the article by Pawel Machcewicz in
this Bulletin."

Subject: Archives,Gorbachev,Jaruzelski,Poland 1980-81,Sources,Warsaw
Pact,Kulikov,Kuklinski,Anoshkin,Kania Bulletin 11 - Cold War Flashpoints Pact
Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID: New Evidence on the 1980-81 Polish
Crisis
Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author: Wojciech Jaruzelski
Document Origin: CWIHP Bulletin Published: CWIHP Document
Document Date: 03/01/99 Document ID:
Document Type: Article Archive:

Kuklinski: codename: Jack Strong.

[Gość: FAKTS]

Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis, 1980-81, by Mark Kramer
By Mark Kramer

Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis, 1980-81

By Mark Kramer

From the early 1970s until November 1981, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski was a
crucial intelligence source for the United States. Having become profoundly
disillusioned with Communism and the Soviet Union's heavy-handed presence in
Poland, Kuklinski began supplying the United States with highly sensitive
information about Soviet-bloc military planning and weapons developments.
Altogether, he smuggled out photographs and transcribed copies of more than
30,000 pages of classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents, including war
plans, military maps, mobilization schedules, allied command procedures,
summaries of exercises, technical data on weapons, blueprints of command
bunkers, electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and allied
nuclear doctrine. To ensure that his motives would not be questioned,
Kuklinski refused to take any payment for his work. For roughly a decade, his
efforts gave the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) an unparalleled look
inside the Warsaw Pact.1
Kuklinski was in an especially important position when a prolonged crisis swept
over Poland in 1980-81. Not only was he an aide to the Polish national defense
minister (and later prime minister and Communist Party leader), Army-Gen.
Wojciech Jaruzelski; he also was one of a handful of senior officers on the
Polish General Staff who helped draw up plans for the imposition of martial
law. The Polish General Staff's formal role in planning the military aspects
of martial law began on 22 October 1980, when Jaruzelski ordered the chief of
the General Staff, Gen. Florian Siwicki, to set up an elite planning unit.
This unit, which worked closely with a martial law planning staff at the Polish
Internal Affairs Ministry, consisted predominantly of general officers,
including all of Siwicki's deputies. Kuklinski, as the head of the General
Planning Department and deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish
General Staff, was a key member of the martial law planning unit from the very
start. Among other tasks, he served as a liaison with Marshal Viktor Kulikov,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces, and with other
high-ranking Soviet military officers from the Pact's Joint Command. Kuklinski
also was frequently responsible for drafting operational plans, helping to
design exercises, and compiling notes of secret meetings and discussions.
These functions proved invaluable when he sought to transmit detailed
information to the United States.
Until November 1981, when Kuklinski was forced to escape from Poland to avert
arrest, his reports were indispensable for the CIA's efforts to monitor the
Polish crisis. Kuklinski was not the only senior Polish military officer who
was working for the CIA at the time—it is known that at least four others,
including two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officers, Col. Jerzy
Szuminski and Col. Wladyslaw Ostaszewicz; a military adviser to Jaruzelski,
Gen. Leon Dubicki; and a Polish military liaison in West Germany, Col. Antoni
Tykocinski, were all supplying information to the United States—but no one was
more crucial than Kuklinski.2 His voluminous dispatches and transfers of
documents allowed the CIA to keep close track of the martial law planning, the
status of the Polish army, and the dynamics of Soviet-Polish relations in 1980-
81.
During the crisis, Kuklinski transmitted daily reports and operated with
relatively few hindrances (albeit at great risk) until September 1981, when the
Polish internal affairs minister, Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, was informed that
Solidarity had learned many of the details of the planning for martial law,
including the codename of the opening phase of the operation. That
codename, "Wiosna" (Spring), denoted the part of the operation that involved
mass arrests of Solidarity activists and dissident intellectuals all around the
country.3 (The codename was promptly changed to "Wrzos," meaning "Heather.")
Because the codename had been a very tightly-held secret—only a small number of
people from the General Staff and the Internal Affairs Ministry were permitted
to know it—Kiszczak immediately realized that a serious leak had occurred. He
launched an investigation into the matter, which naturally focused on Kuklinski
among others. Kuklinski managed to evade detection for another several weeks,
but he had to exercise greater caution and to scale back the frequency of his
reports.
By the beginning of November, the finger of suspicion increasingly pointed at
him. On 2 November, the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) warned the
Polish authorities that the U.S. government had obtained the full plans for
martial law.4 It is not known how the KGB learned of this matter—whether it
was through signals intelligence, a mole within the CIA, a leak from another
NATO intelligence service, or some other means—but the disclosure clearly came
as a great jolt to Jaruzelski and Siwicki.5 A much more intensive
investigation began, which was bound to focus on Kuklinski. He and another
deputy chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, Col. Franciszek
Puchala, were the only ones who had had regular access to the full plans for
martial law. Moreover, one of the speeches that Kuklinski had prepared for
Siwicki, which Siwicki later amended by deleting a sentence about the possible
use of deadly force, had been transferred by Kuklinski to the United States
before the offending sentence had been removed. The discovery of the original
draft, with the sentence still in it, would be a telltale sign that Kuklinski
was the source.6
Facing imminent arrest in early November, Kuklinski finally decided he had no
alternative but to escape as soon as possible. The precise way he and his
family were spirited out of Poland has never been disclosed—one of the chief
participants in the exfiltration described it as a "real cloak-and-dagger
affair"—but it is clear that the operation was a great success.7 Kuklinski,
his wife, and his two sons left Poland on 7 November 1981 and by the 8th were
safely in West Germany. On 11 November, the colonel was flown on a military
aircraft to the United States, where he has lived ever since.8 At least two
attempts are thought to have been made by Soviet-bloc agents against
Kuklinski's life after he left Poland.9 What has troubled him far more,
however, are the tragic deaths of his two sons, both of whom were killed in
1994 in mysterious circumstances.10 To this day, Kuklinski is extremely
reluctant to disclose his place of residence.
A few hints of Kuklinski's role in 1980-81 surfaced in the West in the early to
mid-1980s (most notably when a Polish government press spokesman, Jerzy Urban,
suddenly mentioned at a news conference that the U.S. government had known in
advance about the martial law operation and had failed to warn Solidarity), but
it was not until April 1987 that Kuklinski's name and exploits became publicly
known. In a remarkable, 53-page interview that appeared in the Paris-based
monthly journal Kultura, Kuklinski provided a fascinating account of what he
had witnessed in 1980-81.11 This interview remains a vital source for anyone
interested in the Polish crisis.
Despite the wide-ranging nature of the Kultura interview, Kuklinski refrained
at that time from disclosing that he had been working for the CIA since the
early 1970s, not just in 1980 and 1981. Details about his earlier work first
came to light in September 1992, when a reporter for The Washington Post,
Benjamin Weiser, published the first of two important

[Gość: FAKTS]

Despite the wide-ranging nature of the Kultura interview, Kuklinski refrained
at that time from disclosing that he had been working for the CIA since the
early 1970s, not just in 1980 and 1981. Details about his earlier work first
came to light in September 1992, when a reporter for The Washington Post,
Benjamin Weiser, published the first of two important articles on Kuklinski,
based on some 50 hours of interviews with the colonel as well as many hours of
interviews with some of Kuklinski's former colleagues, including Kiszczak and
Jaruzelski.12 The two articles make a valuable supplement to the Kultura
interview. (Weiser, who later left the Post to join The New York Times, has
been working on a book about Kuklinski.) Further documents and information
about Kuklinski's career and legal case, including interviews with him, have
been published in Poland in three recent Polish-language books, and a fourth
collection of newly released documents is due out soon.13
Back in Poland, nothing was said in public about Kuklinski for many years. In
May 1984, after a secret court-martial in absentia, the Warsaw Military
District Court sentenced Kuklinski to death on charges of high treason and
stripped him of his citizenship and military rank. In March 1990, the District
Court commuted his death sentence to a prison term of 25 years (under an
amnesty bill adopted in December 1989, shortly after a non-Communist government
came to power in Warsaw), but the guilty verdict remained in effect for another
five years. In May 1990, the Polish justice minister, Aleksander Bentkowski,
who for many years had served under Communist governments, rejected an appeal
of Kuklinski's conviction. Even though the founding leader of Solidarity, Lech
Walesa, was elected president of Poland in December 1990, he, too, refused to
exonerate Kuklinski of the charges.
Not until March 1995 did the Polish Supreme Court finally annul the prison
sentence and send the case back for review. In passing down its verdict, the
Court excoriated the District Court's "blatant violations of legal procedures,"
and left no doubt about one of the factors that influenced the decision to
annul the sentence:

One must take into account the widely-known fact that the sovereignty of Poland
was severely diminished [during the Communist era] and that there was an
imminent threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union and other contiguous member-
states of the Warsaw Pact. One also must take into account the fact that R.
Kuklinski was fully informed then about the situation and, through his
desperate actions, tried to head off the impending threat of invasion by
conveying this information to the leaders of states that are strong enough to
alter the world's fate. . . . The security of the [Polish] state
unquestionably takes precedence over the disclosure of a secret, especially if
the disclosure is intended to serve a higher cause.14

Col. Kuklinski's actions, the Court added, "were in the interest of [Polish]
sovereignty and independence."
Over the next two years, while the final review of Kuklinski's case was under
way, some former Communist officials, especially Jaruzelski, led a bitter
campaign to prevent the colonel from being fully exonerated. (Ironically, in
1996 Jaruzelski himself, the chief overseer of martial law, was absolved by the
Polish parliament of all charges brought against him in the early 1990s for his
role in 1980-81.15 ) Despite Jaruzelski's recalcitrance, Kuklinski cleared his
final legal hurdle in September 1997, when, with the grudging approval of
Walesa's successor, Aleksander Kwasniewski (a former high-ranking Polish
Communist official), the Chief Military Procurator of the Warsaw Military
District revoked the charges against Kuklinski, allowing him to return home as
a free man. All his rights of citizenship and his military rank were
restored. The basis for the Military Procurator's decision was that
Kuklinski "acted out of a higher necessity"
(w stanie wyzszej koniecznosci), and that his "cooperation with the American
intelligence service" was "intended to benefit the nation."16
Even after the Military Procurator's decision, Jaruzelski and his supporters
kept up a rearguard action against Kuklinski. Their efforts were not enough,
however, to deter Kuklinski from making an emotional visit back to Poland in
April and May 1998. In Krakow, he was awarded honorary citizenship for his
contribution to the restoration of Polish independence.17 In many other stops
around the country he was hailed as a "true patriot." Prime Minister Jerzy
Buzek met with Kuklinski for two hours and declared afterwards that the
colonel's "decisions spared our country great bloodshed."18 The visit sparked
complaints in some quarters, notably from Adam Michnik, who in recent years has
become a frequent supporter of Jaruzelski.19 Jaruzelski himself lamented that
the "praise for Kuklinski's actions automatically places the moral blame on
myself and other generals."20 Public ambivalence about Kuklinski, which had
been relatively widespread in the early 1990s, has steadily abated (though it
has not wholly disappeared).21 Overall, then, the visit marked a decisive
vindication for a man who only recently had been under sentence of death in his
homeland.
* * *
Almost all of the materials that Kuklinski supplied to the U.S. government,
including thousands of photographed documents and a vast quantity of his own
reports, are still sealed in classified CIA files. Efforts to pry loose those
materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have run into
frustrating bureaucratic obstacles. However, some of the reports that
Kuklinski sent in 1980 and 1981 were released in the early 1990s so that he
could use them in preparing for the judicial review of his case in Poland.
Three of those dispatches are featured below in chronological order. Each is
preceded by an introduction that provides a brief context for understanding
what the report covers and what its significance is. Although these three
items are only a minuscule fraction of the materials that Kuklinski provided to
the CIA, they give some idea of the extraordinary contribution he made to
Western intelligence analysis during the Polish Crisis.




REPORT No. 1: Early December 1980 —
Warning of Soviet Intervention


This first report, headed "Very Urgent!," was sent in early December 1980 under
the codename Jack Strong. It had a profound impact on U.S. policy.
Kuklinski's message seemed to corroborate a number of other indications in
early December 1980 that the Soviet Union was about to undertake a large-scale
military intervention in Poland. On 3 December, a day-and-a-half before
Kuklinski's report arrived at CIA headquarters, President Jimmy Carter had sent
an urgent communication via the Hot Line to the General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid I. Brezhnev. Carter
promised that the United States would "not exploit the events in Poland" and
would not "threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region," but
warned that East-West relations "would be most adversely affected" if the
Soviet Army tried "to impose a solution upon the Polish nation."22
Kuklinski's report reinforced the sense of foreboding that had prompted
Carter's use of the Hot Line, and it convinced U.S. officials that very little
time was left before Soviet troops moved en masse into Poland.
There is no question that events in the latter half of November 1980 and the
first few days of December had provided grounds for concern in the West about
the prospect of Soviet military action. Tensions in Poland had steadily
increased in mid- to late November, culminating in a two-hour warning str

[Gość: FAKTS]

Tensions in Poland had steadily increased in mid- to late November, culminating
in a two-hour warning strike on 25 November by Polish railway workers, who
threatened to call a general strike unless their demands were met. These
developments provoked alarm in Moscow about the security of the USSR's lines of
communication through Poland with the nearly 400,000 Soviet troops based in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR).23 Unease about Poland was even more acute
in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the media in late November had
stepped up their condemnations of the "counterrevolutionary forces
who are endangering Poland's socialist order."24 On
29 November, the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany,
Army-Gen. Evgenii Ivanovskii, suddenly informed members of the Western Military
Liaison Missions in East Germany that they would be prohibited from traveling
into territory along the GDR-Polish border.25 A few days later, on 3
December, rumors surfaced that an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders
would be held in Moscow on the 5th. This news, coming right after the
conclusion of a meeting in Bucharest of the Warsaw Pact's Council of Defense
Ministers (on 1-2 December), raised further apprehension among Western leaders
about the possible use of Soviet troops.
Anxiety in the West continued to grow over the next few days as unconfirmed
(and, it turned out, largely inaccurate) reports filtered in about a huge
buildup of Soviet forces around Poland's borders. Dense clouds over Poland and
the western Soviet Union prevented U.S. reconnaissance satellites from focusing
in on Soviet tank and mechanized divisions based there.26 Not until the
latter half of December, when the cloud cover temporarily receded, were U.S.
satellites able to provide good coverage of Soviet forces in the western USSR.
Before the photoreconnaissance became available, many high-ranking U.S.
intelligence officials simply assumed that reports of a massive mobilization
were accurate. That assumption seemed to be vindicated when reports also began
streaming in about last-minute preparations by Soviet troops to set up
emergency medical tents and stockpiles of ammunition.27
Against this backdrop, Kuklinski's dispatch was bound to spark great anxiety
when it arrived at the CIA's headquarters in the early morning hours of 5
December. The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, promptly informed Zbigniew
Brzezinski, the national security adviser, that "eighteen Soviet divisions"
would move into Poland
on 8 December. Brzezinski immediately relayed the information to Carter. At a
meeting of top U.S. officials the following day, Turner repeated his
warning.28 Although his estimate on 6 December of the number of Soviet
divisions that would enter Poland "from the east" was slightly lower than it
had been the previous day (fifteen versus eighteen), he averred that "more
[Soviet] divisions will follow" the initial fifteen. On 7 December, Turner
conveyed an even gloomier assessment, claiming that "all the preparations for a
[Soviet] invasion of Poland were completed" two days earlier, and that a
final "decision to invade" on the night of 7-8 December had been adopted
by Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders on the 5th.29 Turner made these predictions
without any confirmation from U.S. reconnaissance satellites about a purported
buildup of Soviet forces around Poland.
Under the circumstances, Turner's assumptions may have seemed reasonable, but a
close analysis of the period from mid-November to early December 1980 suggests
that he and most other U.S. officials misperceived Soviet intentions. A
careful analysis also suggests that Kuklinski's message, written in great haste
and with only partial information, unavoidably left out certain key points that
bore directly on the question of Soviet intentions. U.S. intelligence
officials who apprised political leaders of Kuklinski's message were remiss in
failing to highlight the great uncertainty that remained about Soviet policy.
(The uncertainty was especially pronounced in early December 1980 because so
little was known at that point about the actual state of readiness of Soviet
forces in the western USSR.)
Newly declassified materials confirm that in the latter half of November 1980,
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were preparing to hold Soyuz-80
military "exercises" in Poland in early to mid-December.30 The new archival
evidence also suggests that these "exercises" were intended mainly as a cover
for the Polish authorities to impose martial law. Documents from the East
German military archive reveal that four Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak
divisions, and one East German division were supposed to join four Polish army
divisions and the Polish security forces in introducing military rule.31 If
these operations proved insufficient, another fourteen Warsaw Pact divisions
(eleven Soviet and three East German) were supposed to move in as
reinforcements, according to the documents. It is not clear when and how the
second stage of Soyuz-80 would have begun—or where the Soviet forces would have
come from—but the option of a second stage was clearly specified in the plans.
This general scenario was consistent with a document prepared by the Soviet
Politburo's Commission on Poland (the so-called Suslov Commission) in late
August 1980.32 That document, subsequently approved by the full CPSU
Politburo, authorized the Soviet defense ministry to bring four Soviet tank and
mechanized divisions in the three military districts adjoining Poland up to
full combat readiness "in case military assistance is provided to Poland." It
also authorized the defense ministry to plan for—though not yet to carry out—
the "call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000
additional vehicles" to fill out at least "another five to seven [Soviet]
divisions" that would be mobilized "if the situation in Poland deteriorates
further." The number of additional reservists and vehicles was large enough to
fill out as many as eleven extra Soviet divisions, if necessary, rather than
just five to seven.
If final approval had been given for the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" to begin as
scheduled on 8 December, enough Soviet forces were in place to carry out the
first stage of the operation, but not the second. In mid- to late December
1980, U.S. intelligence sources (photoreconnaissance satellites and electronic
intercepts) revealed that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the
western USSR had been brought up to full combat readiness.33 These units
constituted three of the four Soviet divisions slated to enter Poland on 8
December in the first stage of Soyuz-80. The fourth Soviet division, according
to East German military documents, was to be an airborne division.34 (Soviet
airborne divisions were always maintained at full readiness. The unit in
question was based in the Baltic Military District.) There is no evidence that
any of the additional eleven Soviet tank and mechanized divisions were ever
mobilized. Although planning for the mobilization of these divisions had been
under way since late August—something that presumably would have enabled Soviet
military officials to proceed with the mobilization quite expeditiously if so
ordered—the number of Soviet divisions actually available for immediate
deployment was extremely limited.
Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on
8 December was very different from the impression one might have gained from
Kuklinski's dispatch (not to mention from Turner's briefings). Kuklinski was
not present when Soviet and Polish military commanders discussed the "exercise"
scenario at a secret meeting in Moscow on 1 December . Instead, he

[Gość: FAKTS]

Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on 8 December was very different
from the impression one might have gained from Kuklinski's dispatch (not to
mention from Turner's briefings). Kuklinski was not present when Soviet and
Polish military commanders discussed the "exercise" scenario at a secret
meeting in Moscow on 1 December .

Instead, he had to rely on what he could hurriedly learn afterwards from a few
documents (maps and charts) and from comments by the "very restricted group of
people" who had seen the full plans, especially the officers who had traveled
to Moscow.

Kuklinski's dispatch accurately reported the projected size of the full
operation (both the first and the second stages), but it did not mention that
only four of the projected fifteen Soviet divisions would be used in the first
stage. This omission obviously was crucial. Although Kuklinski can hardly be
faulted, in the face of such extreme uncertainty and time pressure, for having
inadvertently left out a key part of the scenario, the difference between his
version and the real plan can hardly be overstated. Rather than being a
single, massive operation, the projected "exercises" were in fact divided into
two stages: a limited first stage, and, if necessary, a much larger second
stage. There is no doubt, based on the East German documents, the Suslov
Commission's memorandum, and the evidence from
U.S. intelligence sources, that the number of Soviet divisions slated to take
part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger
number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least
fifteen) represented the combined total of forces in both the first and the
second stages.
As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four
Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place.
This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—
an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not
possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with
the "maneuvers" unless the Polish authorities were ready to use the outside
military support to impose martial law. Soviet leaders never regarded the
entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Poland as being the same type of operation
conducted against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When Soviet and East European
troops intervened on a massive scale in Czechoslovakia, they did so to halt the
Prague Spring and remove the regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. At no point
before the invasion were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubcek or the
other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist
Czechoslovak troops to help pinpoint entry routes and deployment sites for
incoming Soviet forces. In 1980, by contrast, plans for the Soyuz "maneuvers"
were coordinated very carefully with the Polish authorities, and Polish
officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units.35
Moscow's aim in November-December 1980 was not to move against Stanislaw Kania,
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and Jaruzelski, but
to offer them support. Soviet leaders did their best, using a mix of coercion
and inducements, to ensure that the two Polish officials would seize this
opportunity to impose martial law; but the fate of Soyuz-80 ultimately depended
on whether Kania and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could crush Solidarity
without sparking a civil war.
The Soviet Union's desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as a
disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders, who tended
to espouse a more belligerent position. On 26 November 1980, the East German
leader, Erich Honecker, wrote a letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate
adoption of "collective [military] measures to help the Polish friends overcome
the crisis."36 Honecker emphasized his "extraordinary fears" about what would
happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and its allies failed to send in
troops. "Any delay in acting against the counterrevolutionaries," he
warned, "would mean death—the death of socialist Poland." To bolster his case,
the East German leader authorized a hasty search for possible hardline
alternatives to Kania and Jaruzelski. On 30 November , the East German defense
minister, Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that certain "leading
comrades from the
[Polish United Workers' Party] have expressed the view that a [violent]
confrontation with the counterrevolution can no longer be avoided and [that]
they expect to receive help from outside."37 Evidently, Honecker helped
encourage the leading Polish hardliner, Stefan Olszowski, to travel secretly to
Moscow on 4 December for an emergency consultation. The East German General
Secretary clearly was hoping that if he could come up with a suitable
alternative in Warsaw, Soviet leaders would agree to install a new Polish
regime once Soyuz-80 began. Honecker's perspective was fully shared in Sofia
and Prague.
In the end, however, the only thing that mattered was what Brezhnev and the
rest of the Soviet Politburo wanted. The final decision ultimately was
theirs. Even though they heeded the concerns expressed by the other Warsaw
Pact states, they were convinced that military action would be worthwhile only
if the Polish authorities were ready and able to take full advantage of it. Up
to the last moment, Honecker was hoping that Soviet leaders would change their
minds. On 6 and 7 December, East German military commanders ordered units of
the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee, or NVA) to be ready to move
into Poland at a moment's notice, just in case Soviet leaders decided that the
intervention should proceed as originally planned.38 To Honecker's dismay,
these preparations were all for naught. The Soviet Politburo had firmly
decided by then that no Warsaw Pact troops should enter Poland unless a more
propitious opportunity arose.
None of this is to suggest that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to
chance. By actively preparing for the "exercise" scenario, they were seeking
to force Kania's and Jaruzelski's hand, giving the Polish leaders little option
but to move ahead with a crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was
thought, would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for
martial law. (It is even conceivable, albeit unlikely, that Soviet leaders were
never actually intending to send troops to Poland and, instead, were simply
using the preparations for Soyuz-80 as a means of pressuring Kania to implement
martial law.39 )
Whatever the Soviet Union's precise intentions may have been, it soon became
clear that the fierce pressure from outside in November-December 1980 would not
in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of
martial law. Kania and Jaruzelski constantly stressed the need for more time
when they spoke with Soviet leaders in the latter half of November, both
directly and through Marshal Kulikov, who served as an envoy for the CPSU
Politburo. Kania continued to emphasize the desirability
of seeking an "honorable compromise," rather than resorting immediately to
violent repression.40 Although
he did not rule out the eventual "use of force" and formed a new high-level
staff to speed up the preparations for martial law, he was convinced that
a "political solution" was still feasible.
Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been
willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of
Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units locate the
best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gesture

[Gość: FAKTS]

Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on
8 December was very different from the impression one might have gained from
Kuklinski's dispatch (not to mention from Turner's briefings). Kuklinski was
not present when Soviet and Polish military commanders discussed the "exercise"
scenario at a secret meeting in Moscow on 1 December . Instead, he had to rely
on what he could hurriedly learn afterwards from a few documents (maps and
charts) and from comments by the "very restricted group of people" who had seen
the full plans, especially the officers who had traveled to Moscow.
Kuklinski's dispatch accurately reported the projected size of the full
operation (both the first and the second stages), but it did not mention that
only four of the projected fifteen Soviet divisions would be used in the first
stage. This omission obviously was crucial. Although Kuklinski can hardly be
faulted, in the face of such extreme uncertainty and time pressure, for having
inadvertently left out a key part of the scenario, the difference between his
version and the real plan can hardly be overstated. Rather than being a
single, massive operation, the projected "exercises" were in fact divided into
two stages: a limited first stage, and, if necessary, a much larger second
stage. There is no doubt, based on the East German documents, the Suslov
Commission's memorandum, and the evidence from
U.S. intelligence sources, that the number of Soviet divisions slated to take
part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger
number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least
fifteen) represented the combined total of forces in both the first and the
second stages.
As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four
Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place.
This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—
an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not
possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with
the "maneuvers" unless the Polish authorities were ready to use the outside
military support to impose martial law. Soviet leaders never regarded the
entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Poland as being the same type of operation
conducted against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When Soviet and East European
troops intervened on a massive scale in Czechoslovakia, they did so to halt the
Prague Spring and remove the regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. At no point
before the invasion were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubcek or the
other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist
Czechoslovak troops to help pinpoint entry routes and deployment sites for
incoming Soviet forces. In 1980, by contrast, plans for the Soyuz "maneuvers"
were coordinated very carefully with the Polish authorities, and Polish
officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units.35
Moscow's aim in November-December 1980 was not to move against Stanislaw Kania,
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and Jaruzelski, but
to offer them support. Soviet leaders did their best, using a mix of coercion
and inducements, to ensure that the two Polish officials would seize this
opportunity to impose martial law; but the fate of Soyuz-80 ultimately depended
on whether Kania and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could crush Solidarity
without sparking a civil war.
The Soviet Union's desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as a
disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders, who tended
to espouse a more belligerent position. On 26 November 1980, the East German
leader, Erich Honecker, wrote a letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate
adoption of "collective [military] measures to help the Polish friends overcome
the crisis."36 Honecker emphasized his "extraordinary fears" about what would
happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and its allies failed to send in
troops. "Any delay in acting against the counterrevolutionaries," he
warned, "would mean death—the death of socialist Poland." To bolster his case,
the East German leader authorized a hasty search for possible hardline
alternatives to Kania and Jaruzelski. On 30 November , the East German defense
minister, Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that certain "leading
comrades from the
[Polish United Workers' Party] have expressed the view that a [violent]
confrontation with the counterrevolution can no longer be avoided and [that]
they expect to receive help from outside."37 Evidently, Honecker helped
encourage the leading Polish hardliner, Stefan Olszowski, to travel secretly to
Moscow on 4 December for an emergency consultation. The East German General
Secretary clearly was hoping that if he could come up with a suitable
alternative in Warsaw, Soviet leaders would agree to install a new Polish
regime once Soyuz-80 began. Honecker's perspective was fully shared in Sofia
and Prague.
In the end, however, the only thing that mattered was what Brezhnev and the
rest of the Soviet Politburo wanted. The final decision ultimately was
theirs. Even though they heeded the concerns expressed by the other Warsaw
Pact states, they were convinced that military action would be worthwhile only
if the Polish authorities were ready and able to take full advantage of it. Up
to the last moment, Honecker was hoping that Soviet leaders would change their
minds. On 6 and 7 December, East German military commanders ordered units of
the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee, or NVA) to be ready to move
into Poland at a moment's notice, just in case Soviet leaders decided that the
intervention should proceed as originally planned.38 To Honecker's dismay,
these preparations were all for naught. The Soviet Politburo had firmly
decided by then that no Warsaw Pact troops should enter Poland unless a more
propitious opportunity arose.
None of this is to suggest that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to
chance. By actively preparing for the "exercise" scenario, they were seeking
to force Kania's and Jaruzelski's hand, giving the Polish leaders little option
but to move ahead with a crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was
thought, would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for
martial law. (It is even conceivable, albeit unlikely, that Soviet leaders were
never actually intending to send troops to Poland and, instead, were simply
using the preparations for Soyuz-80 as a means of pressuring Kania to implement
martial law.39 )
Whatever the Soviet Union's precise intentions may have been, it soon became
clear that the fierce pressure from outside in November-December 1980 would not
in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of
martial law. Kania and Jaruzelski constantly stressed the need for more time
when they spoke with Soviet leaders in the latter half of November, both
directly and through Marshal Kulikov, who served as an envoy for the CPSU
Politburo. Kania continued to emphasize the desirability
of seeking an "honorable compromise," rather than resorting immediately to
violent repression.40 Although
he did not rule out the eventual "use of force" and formed a new high-level
staff to speed up the preparations for martial law, he was convinced that
a "political solution" was still feasible.
Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been
willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of
Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units locate the
best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gestures,
K

[Gość: FAKTS]

Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been
willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of
Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units locate the
best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland.

Despite these gestures, Kania and Jaruzelski had never been enthusiastic about
the maneuvers, and they decided that they had to make their views clear after
two senior Polish officers, Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski, the first deputy chief of
the Polish General Staff, and Col. Franciszek Puchala, a deputy head of the
General Staff's Operations Directorate, traveled to Moscow on 1 December to
receive "instructions" from the Soviet High Command.41 The information that
Hupalowski and Puchala brought back to Poland, which indicated that an
immediate, full-scale crackdown was an integral part of the scenario, was
enough to spur Kania and Jaruzelski to warn Soviet
leaders that any attempt to bring Warsaw Pact forces into Poland would greatly
exacerbate the situation and risk widespread violence. They promised that if
they were given a bit more time, they would be able to resolve the crisis on
their own.
Kania's and Jaruzelski's wariness about Soyuz-80
was determined mainly by three factors: first, their awareness that
preparations for an internal crackdown
were still too rudimentary to give any assurance of success without the risk of
large-scale bloodshed; second, their belief that the use of any Warsaw Pact
troops for policing functions in Poland would stir widespread public outrage
and resistance; and third, their specific concern (for obvious historical
reasons) about the proposed use of East German troops. This last point was
something on which almost all Polish officials, including most of the "healthy
forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners), could agree. Even some of the hardline
Polish military officers who were secretly encouraging the Soviet Union to send
troops to crush Solidarity were averse to any notion that East German divisions
should take part as well. In a typical case, a Polish army officer told Soviet
officials in early December 1980 that "Poland can now be saved only by
the introduction of Soviet troops," but he then warned that he himself "would
be the first to take up arms against
[East] German or Czech troops if they are sent in. They merely wish us harm
and secretly revel in all our misfortunes. Only your [Soviet] troops should be
involved in this."42
Once Kania and Jaruzelski had made clear that the entry of Warsaw Pact troops
into Poland would risk a "bloody confrontation that would roil the whole
socialist world," and once they had pledged to take "decisive action"
against "hostile" and "anti-socialist" elements in the near future, Soviet
leaders were willing to defer the provision of outside military assistance, at
least for the time being.43 Although Kania and Jaruzelski both claim in their
memoirs that Brezhnev agreed to call off the entry of Warsaw Pact troops only
after the hastily arranged meeting of East-bloc leaders in Moscow on 5
December, newly declassified documents undercut that assertion.44 Numerous
documents, including the top-secret transcript of the 5 December meeting (which
was unavailable when Kania and Jaruzelski compiled their memoirs), indicate
that the decision to leave troops out of the Soyuz-80 exercises must have been
approved well before the Moscow meeting, perhaps as early as 2 December.45 (A
speech that Kania delivered at a PUWP Central Committee plenum on 2 December
suggests that he already had been assured that Warsaw Pact forces would not be
moving
into Poland on the 8th.) Although Kania faced serious
criticism in Moscow on 5 December, the transcript of
the meeting leaves little doubt that he and the other participants already knew
that the Soviet Union would
give the Polish leaders more time to take care of the crisis "with their own
forces."46 Kania himself emphasized this point the following day (on 6
December) when he gave the PUWP Politburo an overview of the Moscow meeting.
Among other things, he reported that all the participating states had expressed
confidence that the Polish authorities could "manage the situation on their
own" (ze sytuacje opanujemy wlasnymi silami).47
Thus, Kuklinski's dispatch outlined a scenario that, by the time it was
reviewed by U.S. officials, had already been put on hold. Soyuz-80 secretly
began on 8 December, but only as a command-staff exercise (CPX), rather than
as full-fledged troop maneuvers.48 The CPX continued rather aimlessly for
several weeks, long after its value
had been exhausted. Although the four Soviet divisions, one East German
division, and two Czechoslovak
divisions remained at full alert until late December 1980, the prospect of
bringing them into Poland had been postponed indefinitely.


Document No. 1


VERY URGENT!

At a meeting with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in accordance
with orders from Gen. Jaruzelski's Defense Ministry, Gen. Hupalowski and Col.
Puchala endorsed a plan to admit into Poland (under the pretext of maneuvers)
the Soviet Army (SA), the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA), and the
Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA). Documents and reproduced portions of the
plans [for joint intervention] were presented to show that the following forces
are to be sent into Poland: three armies comprising 15 SA divisions, one army
comprising two CLA divisions, and the staff of one army and one division from
the NVA. In total, the intervening group initially will consist of 18
divisions.
(A state of readiness to cross the Polish borders was set for 8 December.) At
present, representatives from the "fraternal armies," dressed in civilian
clothing, are undertaking reconnaissance of invasion routes as well as the
distances and terrain for future operations. The scenario of operations for
the intervening armies envisages a regrouping of armies to all major Polish
Army bases
to conduct maneuvers with live ammunition. Then, depending on how things
develop, all major Polish cities, especially industrial cities, are to be
sealed off.
According to the plan of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Polish Army
will remain within its permanent units while its "allies" are regrouping on
Polish territory. The only exceptions will be supervisory officers and
military traffic control units, which will ensure a collision-free regrouping
of the SA, CLA, and NVA armies from the border to the territories of future
operations. Four Polish divisions (the 5th and 2nd Tank Divisions and the 4th
and 12th Mechanized Divisions) will be called into operation at a later point.
Finally, I very much regret to say that although everyone who has seen the
plans (a very restricted group of people) is very depressed and crestfallen, no
one is even contemplating putting up active resistance against the Warsaw Pact
action.49 There are even those (Jasinski,49a Puchala) who say that the very
presence of such
enormous military forces on the territory of Poland
may calm the nation.

JACK STRONG



REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981
A "Hopeless" Situation


This next report, addressed to Kuklinski's closest contact at the CIA, who used
the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included
on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was
initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the
letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his
nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.
The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw
Pact's Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end

[Gość: FAKTS]

REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981
A "Hopeless" Situation


This next report, addressed to Kuklinski's closest contact at the CIA, who used
the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included
on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was
initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the
letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his
nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.
The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw
Pact's Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end
on 31 March, had been extended to 7 April at the request of the Polish
authorities. Jaruzelski and Kania also had secretly urged that the exercises
be continued after 7 April so that the PUWP leaders could "strengthen their
position, give inspiration to the progressive forces [i.e., orthodox
Communists] in Poland, make Solidarity and KOR [Committee for the Defense of
Workers] realize that the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to provide help of
all kinds to Poland, and thereby exert pressure on the
leaders of Solidarity."50 Soviet military commanders
turned down the request, arguing that it was merely "further proof that the
Polish leaders believe others
should do their work for them."51
While the Soyuz-81 exercises were still under way, Kania and Jaruzelski had met
secretly in Brest on the Polish-Soviet border with Andropov and Ustinov on
3-4 April. The two Polish leaders were extremely apprehensive before the
meeting, but they left with much greater confidence that they would be given
more time to resolve the crisis on their own. A week after the Brest talks,
Marshal Kulikov sought to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski to get them to sign
the implementation directives for martial law (which would effectively set a
date for the operation to begin), but the Polish leaders first postponed the
meeting and then told Kulikov on 13 April that they would have to wait before
signing the documents. For
the time being, the Polish authorities had gained a
further respite.
Soviet leaders, for their part, realized by mid-April that they would have to
ease up a bit in their relentless pressure on Kania and Jaruzelski. Brezhnev
summed up this view at a CPSU Politburo meeting on 16 April when he affirmed
that "we shouldn't badger [the Polish leaders], and we should avoid making them
so nervous that they simply throw up their hands in despair."52 When Suslov
and another key member of the Suslov Commission, Konstantin Rusakov, visited
Warsaw on 23-24 April, they "attacked the [Polish leaders'] indecisiveness"
and "sharply criticized their actions," but also sought to "support and
encourage them" and to ensure that "they will have a distinct degree of trust
in us."53 Although Brezhnev and his colleagues realized that "the current
lull is only a temporary henomenon" and although they were determined
to "exert constant pressure" on Kania and Jaruzelski, the Soviet leaders were
also convinced that "we must now maintain a more equable tone in our relations
with our [Polish] friends."
Thus, the pessimistic outlook of Kuklinski's message on 26 April was not so
much a reflection of the immediate political climate as it was a venting of
frustration about
two things:
First, the Warsaw Pact states were continuing to exert enormous pressure on the
Polish army. In his report, Kuklinski indicated that he and other General
Staff officers had recently returned from Bulgaria, where they had been
attending a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Military Council on 21-23 April.54
Marshal Kulikov, his chief deputy,
Army-Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, and other Warsaw Pact military leaders reemphasized
at this session that they were as determined as ever to keep Poland and the
Polish army fully within the socialist commonwealth.
Second, the progress toward martial law seemed inexorable. By mid-April 1981,
the conceptual phase of the martial law planning was over, and work was
proceeding apace on the practical steps needed to implement the plans.55
Kuklinski could see that in the seeming absence of an opportunity for the
Polish army to defy the Soviet Union,
the imposition of martial law was drawing ever nearer.



Document No. 2


WARSAW, 26 April 1981

Dear Daniel!56

After returning from Sofia with several officers from the General Staff,57 we
discussed the current situation in Poland, a situation that, from the military
point of view, is hopeless. In this extremely gloomy atmosphere, one of the
most committed officers openly said that Poland had to undertake far-reaching
political reforms. Gen. XXX58 bitterly accused "the Americans [of having]
sold us out to Russia. Without the Americans' silent assent, the 'comrades'
would not dare to act this way." We are now very desperate, but we have not
lost hope that Gen. XXX is wrong! Appropriate use must be made of the flood of
information he is sending to you.

We Poles realize that we must fight for our own freedom, if necessary making
the ultimate sacrifice. I remained convinced that the support your country has
been giving to all who are fighting for that freedom will bring us closer to
our goal.

Thank you for your most recent, pleasant letter.

With heartfelt greetings. Yours, PV



REPORT No. 3: 15 September 1981—
Plans for Martial Law



This third message recounts a landmark meeting of Poland's Homeland Defense
Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju, or KOK) on 13 September 1981. The KOK
consisted of high-ranking military and political officials and was chaired by
Jaruzelski in his capacity as prime minister. During the 1980-81 crisis, the
KOK took on a supreme decision-making role, overseeing all the planning for
martial law. On 13 September 1981, the KOK made a firm decision to press ahead
with the martial law operation, leaving only the precise timetable to be
determined. The great importance of this secret meeting was first revealed by
Kuklinski in his 1987 interview, and it was then briefly discussed by Kania in
his book-length interview (published in 1991) and by Jaruzelski in his two
volumes of memoirs.59 Kuklinski's report says that notetaking was forbidden
at the KOK meeting, but that is not quite true. One of the participants, Gen.
Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, was responsible for taking notes of
the session. His eight pages of handwritten notes, classified top-secret, were
released from the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) in
Warsaw in 1997.60
Kuklinski was not present at the KOK meeting, but he was briefed about it
immediately afterwards. Although Tuczapski's notes (which are not a verbatim
record, but merely summaries of remarks) do not record Kiszczak's agitated
comments about the leak of the martial law plans to Solidarity, all evidence
suggests that Kiszczak did in fact deal with that issue at length in his
opening speech, as Kuklinski indicates. It is unclear precisely how the Polish
security forces discovered the leak, but it has long been known that the
Internal Affairs Ministry had a dedicated campaign under way to infiltrate
Solidarity. The aim was not only to compromise the organization and discredit
its leaders, but also to gather intelligence about its plans and
activities.61 Kuklinski himself has recently described the infiltration
programs about which he knew first-hand in 1980 and 1981.62 These programs
were aimed mainly at recruiting informers and agents provocateurs in Solidarity.
Kuklinski's dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security
was tightened within the General Staff's martial law planning unit, and an
investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was o

[Gość: FAKTS]

Kuklinski's dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security
was tightened within the General Staff's martial law planning unit, and an
investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was one of a very small group of
suspects, he had to curtail his activities and avoid doing anything that might
arouse suspicion. It is interesting, however, that even at this perilous
juncture, he showed no sign of wanting to leave Poland. Clearly, he regarded
his work there as too crucial to abandon.
At the same time, the report suggests that Kuklinski was surprised by the CIA's
decision to transfer this highly sensitive information to Solidarity at a
moment when no crackdown appeared imminent. Because the disclosure of secret
codenames risked exposing Kuklinski, it seemed to be a rather short-sighted
step that might undermine his whole mission. Kuklinski obviously realized that
Solidarity needed to be warned in general terms about the planning for martial
law, but he knew that the receipt of highly detailed information, especially
codenames, would be reported immediately to the PUWP leadership by infiltrators
within Solidarity. The colonel seemed to be hoping that the CIA would be more
discreet in the future, at least until a more precise timetable for martial law
had been set.



Document No. 3


WARSAW
2030, 15 September 1981

At an extraordinary session of the KOK on Sunday, which Kania attended for the
first time, no final decision was made about the imposition of martial law.
Almost all of the participants supported it. It seems that the tenor of the
meeting surprised Kania. Although he did not question that such a development
was inevitable, he reportedly said, in these precise words, that "a
confrontation with the class enemy is unavoidable. This involves first a
struggle using political means, but if that should fail, repression may be
adopted." Note-taking was forbidden at the session. During the KOK's meeting,
Kiszczak declared that Solidarity knew the details of our plans, including
Operation "Wiosna"63 and its secret codename. I should emphasize that this is
a codename— the secret title of the operation—and not the codeword needed to
put it into effect. The officials responsible for implementing the plans don't
know the codename; hence, it will be easy to compile a group of suspects. (The
MSW64 was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have
already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in
operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer
visited Szklarski65 and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future
leaks. At present, Jasinski66 has taken command of planning at the national
level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been
working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC
official,67 with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski
from MSW,68 on a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of
martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give
a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this
telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between
Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial
plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an
announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television.
Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of
around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off
the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the
MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made
about "improving the deployment of armies," that is, redeploying entire
divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about
larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of
divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with
the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take
roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of
Warsaw.
Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports
about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am
conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The
nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not
object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve
those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am
prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something
is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.

Long live free Poland!
Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!

JACK STRONG



Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the director of the
Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies,
Harvard University.

1Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources
adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas
J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of
Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski
and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for
working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist)
officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story.
For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, "Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy
karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-
2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, "Zagadka Kuklinskiego,"
Przeglad Tygodniowy (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully
checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception,
to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully
vetted for
its accuracy.
2For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the United
States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy
Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991),
pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before
the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious
circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica smierc Leona Dubickiego,"
Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.
3See "Komenda Stoleczna: Plany przedsiewziec dotyczacych drugiego etapu
akcji 'Jodla'," October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw
Wewnetrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom
(T.) IV.
4See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in "Pulkownik
Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," Tygodnik Solidarnosc (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December
1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od
srodka," Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.
5In "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the
head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski,
claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably
meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset
and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was
in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain.
6See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi,"
pp. 13-14.
7The quotation comes from Francis Meehan,

[Gość: FAKTS]

7The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980
to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.
8Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview in October
1997, excerpts of which were broadcast on Polish radio in November 1997 on the
program "Trojka pod Ksiezycem," which I heard while riding to Warsaw's Okecie
airport after having attended a conference in Jachranka on "Poland 1980-1982:
Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized by the National Security
Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of
Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
9These incidents, one in Washington and the other in Chicago, were described by
Andrzej Krajewski and Sylwia Wysocka in "Trojka pod Ksiezycem."
10His younger son, Boguslaw, an avid yachtsman, was lost at sea in early
January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was
ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident
during the 4th of July weekend.
11"Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 3-55.
12Weiser's first article was "Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War
Plans," Washington Post 27 September 1992, pp. A1, A38, and the second was "A
Question of Loyalty," Washington Post Magazine, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-
29.
13Maciej Lukasiewicz, ed., Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawa
pulkownika Kuklinskiego (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona
Jurczenko, Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pulkowniku Ryszardie Kuklinskim (Warsaw:
KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., Pulkownik Kuklinski: Wywiady, Opinie,
Dokumenty (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although Kuklinski is still reluctant to be
interviewed, several lengthy interviews have appeared in recent years; see
especially the interview cited above, "Pulkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mowi," pp.
1, 12-14.
14The full text of the Court's verdict is reproduced in "Rewizje
nadzwyczajna," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 7 April 1995, p. 17.
15"Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD
przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 14
February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several
months later. The parliament's action did not cover the separate charges
brought against Jaruzelski for his role in the bloody crackdown of December
1970. A trial resumed in mid-1998 of Jaruzelski and eleven other senior
officials charged with the massacres.
See "Proces-Grudzien '70, krotka: Rozpoczal sie proces oskarzonych ws.
Grudnia '70," Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw),
16 June 1998, p. 2.
16"Umorzono sledztwo przeciw plk. Kuklinskiemu," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 23
September 1997, p. 1.
17Jerzy Sadecki, "Kuklinski na Wawelu: Honorowy
Obywatel Stolecznego Krolewskiego Miasta Krakowa," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 29
April 1998, p. 2; and Jerzy
Sadecki, "Honorowe obywatelstwo dla Ryszarda Kuklinskiego: Zwykly zolnierz
Rzeczypospolitej," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 30 April 1998, p. 2.
18"Juz nie chce stad wyjezdzac: Uratowal przed rozlewem krwi—oswiadczyl
premier," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.
19Adam Michnik, "Pulapka politycznej beatyfikacji," Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw),
10-11 May 1998, pp. 10-11.
20"Jaruzelski: Przyjazd Kuklinskiego nie budzi moich zastrzezen,"
Rzcezpospolita (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.
21Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw:
CBOS, May 1998), pp. 1-3.
22For the genesis and full text of Carter's message, see the reproduced entries
from the diary of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the
Carter administration, in "White House Diary, 1980," Orbis, Vol. 32, No. 1
(Winter 1988), pp. 33-38. See also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Power and
Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, rev. ed. (New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1985), pp. 495-498; and Jimmy Carter,
Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 583-585.
23At the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December 1980, Brezhnev remarked that "the
situation with the lines of communication [in Poland], especially with the
railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would experience an
economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were paralyzed. This would
also be a great blow to the economic interests of other socialist states. Let
me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate it if the security
interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered by difficulties with the
transportation system. An elaborate plan must be devised to use the [Polish]
army and security forces to assert control over the transportation facilities
and the main lines of communication [in Poland], and this plan must be
implemented. Even before martial law is declared, it would be worthwhile to
set up military command posts and to initiate military patrols along the
railroads." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender
Reprasentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember
1980 in Moskau," 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien
und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales
Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, (Berlin) J IV, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Michael
Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED
contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 173.
24See, among many examples, "Unuberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen
Feind," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 1 December 1980, p. 3; "Walesa uber
Zusammenarbeit mit KOR," Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 27 November 1980, p.
5; Jan Lipavsky, "Konfrontace: Od naseho varsavskeho zpravodaje," Rude pravo
(Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; "V boji o socialisticky charakter obnovy
zeme," Rude pravo (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; and "Strana se upevnuje v
akcji," Rude Pravo, 1 December 1980, p. 6.
25Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East
Germany on 4 December 1980 by Army-Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then
appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the post that Zaitsev
had held. See "Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewurdigt: Herzliche
Begegnung mit Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat,"
Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), 5 December 1980, pp. 1-2.
26The problems posed by cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, From the
Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the
Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. A Special
Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid
determination that only three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the
western USSR were on full alert. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
National Foreign Assessment Center, "Approaching the Brink: Moscow and the
Polish Crisis, November–December 1980," Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret),
January 1981, pp. 2–5.
27See Brzezinski, "White House Diary, 1980," p. 45.
28Ibid., pp. 37-39.
29Ibid., pp. 40-41.
30The emphasis here is on the word "preparing." It is unclear whether Soviet
leaders were actually intending to bring troops into Poland, or were perhaps
simply using the preparations as a means of spurring the Polish authorities to
accelerate their plans for martial law. I will return briefly to this point
below.
31See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in
Militarisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date
is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1
or 2 December. See also "Erlauterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly
Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/

[Gość: FAKTS]

31See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in
Militarisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date
is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1
or 2 December. See also "Erlauterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly
Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date
is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on
either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).
32See my article about, and translation of, the Commission's document in this
same issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin.
33 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment
Center, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), pp.
1-5 and CIA, "Approaching the Brink," p. 5.
34 "Einweisung," Bl. 16.
35 "Wesentlicher Inhalt der Meldung des Chefs des Militarbezirkes V, General-
major Gehmert, uber die Ergebnisse der Rekognoszierung auf dem Territorium der
Volksrepublik Polen zur Durchfuhrung der gemeinsamen Ubung," Report No. A-575-
702 (Top Secret), 16 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, chief-of-
staff of the East German National People's Army, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 23-
27.
36 "Anlage Nr. 2," 26 November 1980 (Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868,
Bl. 5-6. My translation of, and commentary on, this letter appeared in "The
Warsaw Pact and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: Honecker's Call for Military
Intervention," Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 5
(Spring 1995), p. 124.
37 "Werter Genosse Honecker!" letter from Hoffmann to Honecker, 30 November
1980 (Top Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 4-5.
38 "Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers fur Nationale Verteidigung uber die
Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung einer gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmassnahme der der
Vereinten Streitkrafte vom 06.12.1980," Nr. A-265-992 (Top Secret), 6 December
1980, from Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 32-
37; "Anordnung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des
Hauptstabes zur Gewahrleistung des Passierens der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR
Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme an einer
auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenubung vom
06.12.1980," No. A-477-624 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz
Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 38-41; "Schreiben des Stellvertreters des
Ministers und Chef des Haupstabes, Generaloberst Streletz, an den Chef
Verwaltung Aufklarung," No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Col.-
Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other
documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos
durchgreifen", pp. 197-208.
39 No matter how much new evidence eventually becomes available, this matter
may never be conclusively resolved. One item that suggests Soviet leaders may
not have been intending to send troops into Poland is the huge turnover that
occurred within the Soviet High Command in early December 1980. Most of the
officers who would have been overseeing a large-scale operation in Poland were
suddenly replaced. These included the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground
forces, the commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany, the commander
of the USSR's Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), the commander of the
Belorussian Military District, and the commander of the Baltic Military
District. This reshuffling would have been highly unusual if Soviet leaders
knew they were about to embark on a potentially dangerous military operation.
The reshuffling evidently was connected with changes in Soviet command-and-
control procedures (including the establishment of new Theater Commands), but
it clearly could have had a detrimental effect on near-term military
contingencies in Poland. See Jack Sullivan and Tom Symonds, Soviet Theaters,
High Commands and Commanders (Fort Meade, MD: Air Force Intelligence Service,
1986); Michael J. Deane, et al., "The Soviet Command Structure in
Transformation," Strategic Review, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 55-70; and
Gregory C. Baird, "The Soviet Theater Command —An Update," Naval War College
Review, Vol. 34, No. 6 (November-December 1981), pp. 90-94.
40 "Protokol Nr. 51 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 26 listopada 1980
r.," 26 November 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne
Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc" 1980-1981 (London: Aneks,
1992), pp. 180-188.
41 For more on this, see Kuklinski's comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od
srodka," pp. 21-22.
42 "O vyskazaniyakh turistov iz PNR v svyazi s resheniyami VII Plenuma TsK PORP
i vstrechei partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh deyatelei stran-uchastnits
Varshavskogo Dogovora," Memorandum No. 135-s (Secret), 9 December 1980, from V.
D. Dobrotvor, head of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism, in
Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Kyiv,
Fond (F.) 1, Opis' (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.), Listy (Ll.) 170-172.
43 The quoted passage is from Kania's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5
December, "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten
der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,"
p. 143.
44 Wojciech Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Lattes, 1992), pp. 237-
241; and Stanislaw Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 90-
93.
45 "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der
Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," pp.
140-196.
46 Ibid.
47 "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980
r.," 6 December 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura
Politycznego, p. 189.
48 Army-Gen. A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala
1980-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 54-55.
49 This is an important statement because it confirms that the Polish General
Staff had no plans to resist Soviet military intervention. That does not mean
all troops from the Polish army would have simply stood by while Soviet units
moved in, but it does indicate that the highest-ranking Polish commanders were
not going to oppose the Soviet Union.
49a Gen. Antoni Jasinski, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff for
organization, played a crucial role in supervising the planning of martial law,
as did the deputy chief of the General Staff for operations, Gen. Jerzy Skalski.
50 "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der
Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am
07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-
strategischen Kommandostabsubung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret),
9 April 1981, in MZA-P, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.
51 Ibid.
52 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov.
Brezhnva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu)," 16
April 1981 (Top Secret), in Center for Preservation of Contemporary
Documentation [TsKhSD], F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, L. 3.
53 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh
peregovorov delegatsii KPSS s rukovodstvom PORP," in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D.
42, Ll. 2-4.
54 "V Ob'edinennykh vooruzhenykh silakh gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo
Dogovora," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 24 April 1981, p. 1.
55 The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to
four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet
officials: "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze

[Gość: FAKTS]

55 The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to
four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet
officials: "Mysl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze
wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), "Centralny plan
dzialania organow politycznych w=BBadzy i administracji panstwowej na wypadek
koniecznosci wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego," 27 March 1981 (Top
Secret), "Ramowy plan dzialania sil zbrojnych," 27 March 1981 (Top
Secret), "Ramowy plan przedsiewziec gospodarczych," 2 April 1981 (Top Secret),
all in Centralne Archywum Wojskore [CAW], Warsaw, 1813/92, Sygn. 2304/IV.
56 Daniel was the codename of Kuklinski's main contact at
the CIA.
57 A long-planned session of the Warsaw Pact's Military Council was held in
Bulgaria on 21-23 April 1981.
58 Kuklinski himself redacted the surname of this Polish general. It may have
referred to Gen. Leon Dubicki, who was an adviser to Jaruzelski at the time.
59 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 32-34; Kania, Zatrzymac
konfrontacje, pp. 110-111; Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge, pp. 384-385;
and Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 269-
271.
60 "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981
r.," 13 September 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Protokoly z posiedzen Komitetu
Obrony Kraju, Teczka Sygn. 48. I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for giving
me a copy of these notes.
61 See "Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe
voevodstvo PNR," Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I.
Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU's Yaroslavl oblast committee, in
TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 85, Ll. 298-301; and "Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des
Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR,
Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politbhros
und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei," 20 November
1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Kubina and
Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen", p. 105.
62 "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," p. 26.
63 "Wiosna" (Spring) was the codename for the opening stage of the martial law
operation. It involved mass arrests of leading Solidarity officials and
dissident intellectuals.
64 The acronym for Ministerstwo spraw wewnetrznych (Ministry of Internal
Affairs).
65 Gen. Waclaw Szklarski, the head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish
General Staff, was Kuklinski's commanding officer.
66 Presumably this official would have been from the PUWP CC Propaganda
Department, which had been actively taking part in the initial martial law
planning.
67 Col. Bronislaw Pawlikowski, the head of a directorate in the Polish Internal
Affairs Ministry, was one of the main liaisons with Kuklinski and other
officers on the Polish General Staff.
He played an especially important role in designing the mass-arrest operation."




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Subject:
Brezhnev,Brzezinski,Carter,Dubcek,Espionage,Honnecker,Jaruzelski,KGB,Kuklinski,K
ulikov,Poland 1980-81,Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring),Warsaw
Pact,CIA Bulletin 11 - Cold War Flashpoints Pact
Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID: New Evidence on the 1980-81 Polish
Crisis
Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author: Mark Kramer
Document Origin: CWIHP Bulletin Published: CWIHP Document
Document Date: 03/01/99 Document ID:
Document Type: Article with Documents Archive:



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Oral Message from Brezhnev to Jaruzelski, 21 Nov.

[Gość: FAKTS]

CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract) and Text of Oral Message from Brezhnev to
Jaruzelski, 21 November 1981

To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P37/21
To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromykov, Suslov, Ustinov,
Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Baibakov, Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov.
Extract from Protocol No. 37 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 21 November 1981

On the reception in the USSR of a party-state delegation from the PPR and an
oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade W. Jaruzelski.
1. To affirm the text of an oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev,
who instructed the Soviet ambassador in Poland to transmit it to Comrade W.
Jaruzelski (see attached).
2. To acknowledge the desirability of receiving in the USSR a party-
state delegation from the PPR headed by Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 14-15 December
1981.
To affirm the composition of the Soviet delegation at the talks with
the Polish delegation: Comrades L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delegation), M. A.
Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U.
Chernenko, and K. V. Rusakov.
3. By 1 December the CPSU CC Department, the USSR Foreign Ministry,
the Defense Ministry, the USSR KGB, and USSR Gosplan are to prepare all
necessary materials for the talks with the Polish party-state delegations,
including a draft communiqu=E9 for the press.
The CPSU CC Department and the USSR Foreign Ministry are to set forth
recommendations concerning organizational measures connected with the reception
of a Polish delegation in the USSR.
CC SECRETARY



Regarding point 21 of Prot. No.
37
Secret
WARSAW
SOVIET AMBASSADOR
Pay a visit to Comrade W. Jaruzelski and, citing your instructions,
transmit to him the following oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev:
"Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski!
"We have attentively considered your proposal to visit Moscow at the
head of a party-state delegation that would include the heads of the parties
allied with the PZPR, and we agree with it. As far as the timeframe is
concerned, the visit might take place on 14-15 December, assuming of course
that this is suitable for you.
"In the meantime, because several weeks still remain before the
meeting, I decided to transmit to you through Comrade Aristov some thoughts
about urgent matters pertaining to the situation in Poland, which remains a
cause of serious anxiety for us.
"I am revealing no secrets when I say that we greeted your election as
PZPR CC First Secretary with great hopes. We were aware that earlier in the
struggle against the anti-socialist forces you, as the chairman of the Council
of Ministers, were inhibited by the political indecisiveness of the party
leadership. Now this obstacle has been eliminated. The 4th plenum of the PZPR
CC directly linked the decision to change the First Secretary with the
necessity for urgent measures to salvage socialism in Poland.
"When I congratulated you over the phone, I was pleased to hear that
one of the reasons you had agreed to take on the responsible post of PZPR
leader at such a critical juncture was the confidence you felt we had in you.
I mentioned this to my comrades, and our hope strengthened even more that in
you we had finally found someone who thinks as we do and who will be an ally in
one of the most trying phases of the struggle against imperialism, as is now
occurring in Poland.
"You'll recall that during the phone conversation I expressed my hope
that people now, both in Poland and abroad, would sense that things in your
country were finally headed on a different course. We spoke then about the
essential preconditions for a turnabout in the situation, and you agreed that
you needed to choose reliable assistants from among the ranks of staunch and
devoted Communists and to spur the whole party into motion, having instilled it
with the spirit of struggle and then, without losing any time, resorting to
active measures against the counterrevolution.
"It's obvious that the fundamental question now is the struggle for the
hearts and minds of the masses. However, one gets the impression that a
turnaround on this matter has so far not been achieved. The anti-socialist
forces not only are gaining sway in many large industrial enterprises, but are
also continuing to spread their influence among ever wider segments of the
population. Worse yet, the leaders of 'Solidarity' and the
counterrevolutionaries are still appearing before various audiences and making
openly inflammatory speeches aimed at stirring up nationalist passions and
directed against the PZPR and against socialism. The direct consequence of
this hostile activity is the dangerous growth of anti-Sovietism in Poland.
"It seems to us that you now must mobilize the entire party in the
struggle to win the hearts and minds of people by coming forth with a precise
and clear program for resolving the crisis, a program that will convince
everyone of its appropriateness. In other words, you must seek anew to gain
the confidence of ordinary workers, as was done by the Communists during the
years of the founding of popular rule. Of great importance in this effort will
be regular meetings by leading officials from the PZPR aktiv with labor
collectives, especially collectives at large state enterprises, which the enemy
has succeeded in transforming into its bastions. This is so not just in the
capital. And, of course, the struggle for the hearts and minds of the masses
will not achieve the necessary results if the current party leadership is not
supported by the mass media and if the adversary, as before, is given
unhindered opportunity to disseminate his hostile propaganda.
"I'd now like to broach another matter. Recently in Poland a lot has
been written about your meeting with Glemp and Walesa. Some call it historic
and see in it the beginning of a turn away from chaos toward social
tranquility. As we know, the results of the meeting were positively evaluated
by the Politburo and the PPR government.3
"We understand, of course, that by proposing at this meeting, in the
form of a critical question, the creation of a 'Front of National Accord,' you
are pursuing a number of tactical objectives, above all the widening of public
support for the regime and the fragmentation of the top levels
of 'Solidarity.' But how far can one really go with such agreements without
the threat of losing control over the situation? Indeed, aren't the class
enemies trying to instill the 'Front of National Accord' with political content
that would bolster their idea of, at a minimum, attaining a division of power
among the PZPR, 'Solidarity,' and the church, with the result that socialism
would collapse. It is also clear that they are exploiting their current
influence among the masses to establish a huge advantage in the upcoming
elections for the national councils, thus continuing their path toward the
legal seizure of power in the country.
"This, it seems to me, implies that it will be fundamentally important
for the leading role of the PZPR to be greatly strengthened in the 'Front of
National Accord,' as well as for the participants in the Front to recognize the
PPR Constitution, socialism, and Poland's international alliances. Will these
things be done in the Statutes and other documents of the Front, and more
important will they be guaranteed in practice? What do you propose to do about
the elections for local organs of power,

[Gość: FAKTS]

What do you propose to do about the elections for local organs of power,
bearing in mind the risk of the party's destruction?
"In this connection another urgent matter arises. During many of our
discussions we have emphasized the same theme over and over: We are not
opposed to agreements. But such agreements must not make concessions to the
enemies of socialism. And the key thing is that the agreements must not become
ends in themselves. Along with measures you take to gain support among the
popular masses and the different political forces, you must also take decisive
actions against the sworn enemies of the popular order. You agreed with this
way of framing the question and spoke yourself about your intention of
struggling for the hearts and minds of the workers while at the same time
attacking the class enemy.
"But now the impression emerges that you're focusing only on the first
part of this two-part formula. We know that there are still people in the
leadership of your party who are still pinning all their hopes on a
continuation of the bankrupt course of Kania. It would be dangerous to succumb
to their entreaties. It is now absolutely clear that without a resolute
struggle against the class enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in
Poland. The essential question is not whether there will be a confrontation or
not, but who will begin it and by what means it will be carried out, as well as
who will seize the initiative.
"I'd like to emphasize that when we speak about a confrontation, we
believe it is contingent on a struggle to lure back to the side of the PZPR the
workers and toiling masses who have fallen under the influence of 'Solidarity'
and who now occupy a passive position and bide their time, waiting for things
to sort themselves out at the top.4
"You and I, Wojciech Wladyslawovich, have both experienced war and we
know that the strategy of fighting is crucially dependent on the question of
time. This is directly related to the adverse situation that has now emerged
in Poland. The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who long ago were already
gradually, and in some places openly, preparing for a decisive onslaught, are
now seeking to time it for the moment when they will have an overwhelming
advantage. In particular, they are placing great stakes on the fact that a new
group of recruits will be entering the army who have been worked on
by 'Solidarity.'5 Doesn't this suggest to you that a failure to take harsh
measures against the counterrevolution right away will cost you invaluable time?
"The key question is how to isolate the sworn enemies of socialism.
Until that is done, nothing will change. Moreover, such an overtly
counterrevolutionary organization as the 'Confederation for an Independent
Poland' (KPN) is enlisting new supporters and is able to function legally.
It's obvious that this has been possible because the party is in fact losing
control over the judicial organs, as is evident from the whole episode with the
trial of Moczulski and the other leaders of KPN.
"I want to share with you some thoughts about one further matter of
great urgency. It's obvious that any actions in defense of socialism demand in
the first instance a vigorous struggle for the Marxist-Leninist character of
the PZPR and an increase in its combat readiness. After the 4th plenum of the
PZPR CC, signs began to appear that the party organizations were springing back
to life. It is important to step up this work and to prevent the local
Communists from falling back into their state of passivity and hopelessness.
And for this what is needed most of all is for the members of the party to be
able to believe that words and deeds will no longer diverge, and that the
leadership is intent on firmly and consistently implementing decisions that
have been adopted.
"The strengthening of the PZPR depends also on a clear-cut line with
regard to different currents of thought among its ranks. In your country some
have argued that there now exist three basic directions in the party--the left,
the right, and the center--and they have recommended the severance of all ties
with the leftists and rightists, leaving them completely isolated by the force
of the blows. This is a dangerous recommendation. Who is it, after all, that
is being branded "leftists" or "hardliners"? Why, the Communists who have long
been supportive of Marxist-Leninist positions, while in no way dismissing the
need to rectify mistakes and distortions that have been committed. And who are
the so-called rightists? These are the people who espouse revisionist views
and ultimately become members of 'Solidarity.' It is clear that any sort of
actions against staunch Communists would be suicide for the PZPR as a Communist
party. And it is just as clear that until you get rid of the revisionists,
including the ones in the party leadership who are trying to uphold the
previous capitulationist line, they will weigh on you like a heavy burden.
"I believe these considerations provide the key to a solution of the
mounting problems with personnel. I am convinced that by working with your
comrades who are oriented toward the "leftists," and by giving them your
support, you will find that it is precisely these people who provide a sound
basis for the struggle to overcome the crisis.
"Esteemed Wojciech Wladyslawovich! Having raised, for your benefit,
several matters that are troubling us, and having offered you my views, I
naturally have left aside a number of problems that can be considered during a
face-to-face meeting.6
L. BREZHNEV"
Confirm transmittal by telegram.

Top Secret 10 December 1981

[Gość: FAKTS]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript, 10 December 1981

Top Secret

Single Copy

(Working Notes)

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

10 December 1981

Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.
Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A.
P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P.
N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I.
Dolgikh, K. V. Rusakov.
I. On the question of the situation in Poland
BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on our agenda. But I think that
the session of the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we have
specially dispatched Comrades [Head of Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw
Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov to Poland to meet with the
Polish comrades and go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On 8
December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with information about the discussions he
held in Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade Baibakov communicated from
Warsaw that he had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. From these
meetings and subsequent discussions held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent
that the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of
additional supplies and materials from the USSR and other socialist countries
in the first quarter of the coming year.7 This will include iron ore, non-
ferrous metals, fertilizer, oil, tires, grain, etc.
In making this request, as you see, the Polish comrades have in mind
that shipments of goods from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be maintained at
the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov assured his interlocutors that all their
requests would be considered in Moscow.
Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct Comrades Tikhonov,
Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying this matter,
taking account of the exchange of opinions, but without waiting for a final
agreement.
And now let's hear what Comrade Baibakov has to say.
BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the Politburo's instructions, I traveled
to Warsaw. I met there with all the comrades whom it was necessary for me to
see about the matters specified in my instructions.
First of all I had a discussion with the deputy chairman of the Council
of Ministers, Comrade Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish comrades
raised the question of economic assistance. I sent an encrypted cable back
here outlining the Polish request.
One must say that the list of goods included in the assistance from us
to the PPR comes to 350 items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This includes
such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand
tons of iron ore, and many other goods. The requests made by the Polish
comrades, combined with what we had already been thinking about giving Poland
in 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish People's Republic will
be approximately 4.4 billion rubles.
The time is now approaching when Poland will have to pay for its
credits from West European countries. For this, Poland will be required to pay
a minimum of 2.8 million rubles' worth of hard currency. When I was told by
the Polish comrades that they are requesting the amount that all this
assistance comes to, I raised the question of how to establish mutual economic
ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Polish industry is not even
coming close to fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the country's
basic means of earning hard currency, has been severely disrupted, and remedial
measures have not been implemented as strikes continue. And even now, when
there are no strikes, the mining of coal remains at a very low level.
Or, for example, let's say that production is going on among the
peasantry, with grain, meat products, vegetables, etc. But they aren't giving
any of it to the state; they're just playing a waiting game. At the private
markets the level of agricultural trade is sufficiently high and is being
carried out at very inflated prices.
I said directly to the Polish comrades that they must adopt more
decisive measures if such a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch
something in the nature of a requisitioning of farm produce.8
If we speak, for example, about reserves of grain, then Poland this
year has accumulated more than 2 million tons. The population is not going
hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the markets and buy up all they products
they need. And there are ample supplies of them.
As is known, by the Politburo's decision and at the request of the
Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand
tons of meat. Of these promised 30 thousand tons, 15 thousand have already
been shipped abroad. It should be added that the produce, in this case meat,
is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport
iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. During the transport of this produce
to the Polish stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. Poles have
been expressing highly obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet
people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even
begin to keep count of all the insults that have been directed against us.
Viewing the situation from the standpoint of the balance of payments,
the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to
Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, then all Polish vessels in
the waters of other states or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the
countries to which Poland owes debts, will be seized. For this reason the
Poles have given instructions to the captains of ships to refrain from entering
ports and to stay in neutral waters.
Now I will offer several words about my discussion with Comrade
Jaruzelski. He reaffirmed the request made earlier by Obodowski regarding the
delivery of goods. Then in the evening I again went to Jaruzelski's office,
accompanied by our ambassador and Comrade Kulikov. Also taking part in this
discussion were Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who handles these matters.
Jaruzelski was in a highly agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply
disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop
Glemp, who, as is known, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish
authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly responded that in the event of untoward
activities by "Solidarity," they will detain all hostile elements.
As far as the party organizations are concerned, they are ruined and
inactive in the outlying regions. And with regard to the party as a whole,
Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer exists. The country is being
destroyed, and the outlying regions are not receiving any sort of
reinforcement, because the Central Committee and government are not giving firm
and clear-cut instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been transformed into a man
who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities.
RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has correctly described the situation
regarding the Polish economy. What, then, should we be doing now? It seems to
me that we should deliver to Poland the goods provided for under the economic
agreements, but that these deliveries should not exceed the quantity of goods
we delivered in the first quarter of last year.
BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this much now?
BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given only by drawing on state
reserves or at the expense of deliveries to the internal market.
RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries
from the provin

[Gość: FAKTS]

RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries from
the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov9 reported, the secretaries of
the provincial committees are completely baffled by Jaruzelski's speech, which
did not present a clear, straightforward line. No one knows what will happen
over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At
first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was
changed to the night of 12-13. And now they're already saying it won't be
until around the 20th. What is envisaged is that the chairman of the State
Council, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television and declare the
introduction of martial law. At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on
the introduction of martial law can be implemented only after it is considered
by the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15
December. Thus, everything has become very complicated. The agenda of the
Sejm has already been published, and it makes no mention of the introduction of
martial law. But even if the government does intend to introduce martial
law, "Solidarity" knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing
all necessary measures to cope with that.
Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to deliver an address to the
Polish nation. But in his address he won't be speaking about the party.
Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments. Jaruzelski has talked
about the need to proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that existed
under Pilsudski.10 He indicated that the Poles will accept this more readily
than something else.
As far as officials like Olszowski are concerned, they recently have
begun to act more decisively; and one might add that at the session of the
Politburo where the decision was made to introduce martial law and adopt more
resolute measures against extremist figures in "Solidarity," the vote was
unanimous and no one expressed a word of opposition.11 At the same time,
Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about this matter with his allies.
He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up
by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive assistance from other
countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the
territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is basing this hope on the speech by Comrade
Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would
indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I
know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words
voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in
the lurch.
If we consider what is going on in the provinces, one must candidly say
that the strength of the party organizations there has been completely
dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative apparatus there is still
functioning, but in effect all power has now been transferred to the hands
of "Solidarity." In his recent statements, Jaruzelski is apparently trying to
pull the wool over our eyes, because his words fail to reflect a proper
analysis. If the Polish comrades don't quickly get organized, prepare
themselves, and resist the onslaught of "Solidarity," they will have no success
at all in improving the situation in Poland.
ANDROPOV. From the discussions with Jaruzelski it's clear that they
have not yet reached a firm consensus about the introduction of martial law.
Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR CC Politburo on the need to introduce
martial law, we still haven't seen concrete measures on the part of the
leadership. The extremists in "Solidarity" are attacking the Polish leadership
by the throat. The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its
position, which in essence is now completely supportive of "Solidarity."
Of course in these circumstances the Polish comrades must act swiftly
in launching "Operation X" and carrying it out. At the same time, Jaruzelski
declares that we will resort to "Operation X" when "Solidarity" forces us to do
so. This is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the latest session of
the PZPR CC Politburo and the decision it adopted to introduce martial law had
suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act more decisively. All the
members of the Politburo expressed support for decisive action. This decision
put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now compelled to find some way of
extricating himself. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what
measures they intended and when it would be done. He replied that he simply
doesn't know about "Operation X" and about the concrete timeframe in which it
would be carried out. Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is concealing
from his comrades the plan of concrete action, or he is simply abandoning the
idea of carrying out this step.
I'd now like to mention that Jaruzelski has been more than persistent
in setting forth economic demands from us and has made the implementation
of "Operation X" contingent on our willingness to offer economic assistance;
and I would say even more than that, he is raising the question, albeit
indirectly, of receiving military assistance as well.
Now, if you look at the list of goods we are providing to the Polish
comrades, we can candidly say that serious doubts arise about the necessity of
supplying these products. For example, what is the connection between the
success of "Operation X" and the delivery of fertilizer and certain other
goods? In connection with this I would say that our position, as it was
formulated earlier during the previous session of the Politburo and was
expressed even earlier on several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely
correct, and we must not depart from it at all.12 In other words, we support
the position of internationalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the
situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as "Operation X" is concerned, that
must entirely and unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades themselves.
Whatever they decide is what will be. We will not insist on any specific
course, and we will not dissuade them from pursuing what they decide.
As far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be
difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been
proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. But again I want to say that
the mere posing of the question of the apportionment of goods supplied as
economic assistance is an insolent way to approach things, and it is being done
purely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they'll be
able to lay all the blame on us. If Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about
the introduction of troops, then I believe he did this incorrectly. We can't
risk such a step. We don't intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is
the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end. I don't know how
things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control
of "Solidarity," that's the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries
pounce on the Soviet Union, and you know they have already reached agreement on
a variety of economic and political sanctions, that will be very burdensome for
us. We must be concerned above all with our own country and about the
strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.
In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland
was formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the
resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has
taken place during the session of the Po

[Gość: FAKTS]

In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland was
formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the resolutions
adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has taken place
during the session of the Politburo. All of this must serve as the basis of
the policy we must uphold vis-a-vis Poland.
As concerns the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the
GDR that run through Poland, then we of course must do something to provide for
their safekeeping.
GROMYKO. Today we've had a very spirited review of the situation in
Poland. You might even say this review was more spirited than any we've had
before. This is because at the moment we ourselves don't know what direction
the events in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself senses that power
is slipping from its grasp. Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their
ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no such opportunity, there
are no longer any neutrals. The position is defined sufficiently
clearly: "Solidarity" has proven to be a patently counterrevolutionary
organization which aspires to come to power and which has openly declared its
intention to seize power. The Polish leadership must decide the question:
Either it relinquishes its positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, or
it adopts decisive measures by introducing martial law, isolating the
extremists of "Solidarity," and restoring public order. There is no other
alternative.
What should our position be toward the Polish events? I fully agree
with what was already said here by the comrades. We can say to the Poles that
we view the Polish events with understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for
us to alter this measured formulation in any way. At the same time we must
somehow try to dispel the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland
have about the introduction of troops. There cannot be any introduction of
troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our
ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate this to him.
Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of the PZPR CC Politburo with
regard to the introduction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to his
vacillating position. At first he had somewhat stiffened his spine, but now,
once again, he's begun to soften. Everything is still in force that was said
to them previously. If in the struggle against counterrevolution and
afterwards they show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist Poland will
remain. The introduction of martial law, of course, would be the best way to
convey the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the
counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they intend to carry out are
indeed implemented, then I think we could expect positive results.
Now, with regard to the creation of a new party, as Jaruzelski
proposed, I think we must directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to
create any sort of new party, since this would merely signal a retreat on the
part of the Polish leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR is in fact
not a militant political organization, but simply an organization that has
committed mistakes. It would underscore the very weakness of the party and
would play into the hands of the "Solidarity" extremists. Then even the
population of Poland, which retains definite sympathy for the PZPR as a guiding
force, would be completely disabused of such sentiments.
I believe that we must not now permit any sort of harsh instructions,
which would force them to adopt one course or another. I think we have chosen
the correct position here: The restoration of order in Poland is a matter for
the Polish United Workers' Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We
already said to our Polish friends and will say again in the future that they
must pursue a steadfast course without slackening in the least.
Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to "Solidarity," the West in all
likelihood will not give them credits and will not offer any other kind of
help. They are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too,
have to bear in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was correct in proposing
that we instruct a group of comrades to examine this question, taking account
of our capabilities to extend substantial economic assistance to the PPR.
USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of course, is very bad. The
situation is worsening day by day. Among the leadership, especially in the
Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And all of this has taken its toll
on the state of affairs. Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo
was a decision unanimously approved to introduce martial law. And now all
hopes are riding on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying out this
decision? As yet, no one can openly speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We
just don't know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He candidly said that
even we [the Poles] don't know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man who
has been effectively responsible for discharging the duties of the Polish
defense minister doesn't know what will happen and what sort of actions will be
taken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister.
With regard to what Comrade Kulikov allegedly said about the
introduction of troops into Poland, I can say in full responsbility that
Kulikov never said this. He simply repeated what was said by us and by Leonid
Ilyich that we would not leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well
knows that the Poles themselves requested us not to introduce troops.
As far as our garrisons in Poland are concerned, we are fortifying
them. I myself am also inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on a
confrontation and only if, perhaps, "Solidarity" seizes them by the throat will
they come forth.
The problem is that the Polish leaders do not appear resolute. As was
rightly said here by the comrades, we must not force them to adopt any specific
decisions; we will simply carry out the policy on which we have agreed. For
our part, we must be ready ourselves and must not display any sort of actions
not provided for by our decisions.
SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the other comrades' speeches, we
all have the same view of the situation in Poland. During the whole prolonged
stretch of events in Poland, we have displayed steadfastness and composure.
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. We said this in public
to our people, and our people supported the policy of the Communist Party.
We've done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for
us to change our position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so.
We have carried out via the UN such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate
peace. What a great effect we have had from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the
FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This has enabled
all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union staunchly and
consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible for
us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start
of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what
actions they must pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward
more decisive actions. But we will, as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard
their actions with understanding.
As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of
slyness. He wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests,
which he presents to the Soviet Union

[Gość: FAKTS]

As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He
wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests, which he
presents to the Soviet Union. These requests, naturally, are beyond our
physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well, look here, I
turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn't receive it.
At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the
introduction of troops. If troops are introduced, that will mean a
catastrophe. I think we have reached a unanimous view here on this matter, and
there can be no consideration at all of introducing troops.
As far as the provision of assistance to Poland is concerned, we have
given that country more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we adopted a
decision to ship 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons
have already been delivered. I don't know whether we'll be able to ship the
full 30 thousand tons, but in any event we apparently are obliged by this
decision to give a further definite number of tons of meat as assistance.
With regard to the PZPR and the creation of a new party to replace it,
I believe it would be inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who spoke here
were correct in arguing that this would be a completely unhelpful action.
GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line
of our party toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the
proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot
agree with that. There can be no talk at all of introducing troops. We will
have to look at economic questions and at what can be given to the Poles.
SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the intrigues of "Solidarity" and
other counterrevolutionary forces.
CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the comrades have said here. It is
clear that the line of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the Polish
events, as formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the
decisions of the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of change.
I believe that today we could adopt the following decision:
1. Take under advisement the information provided by Comrade Baibakov.
2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, abide by the general political
line on this matter laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the
instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 December 1981 and the exchange of
opinions that occurred at the CC Politburo's session on 10 December 1981.
3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to
continue studying questions of economic assistance to Poland, taking account of
the exchange of opinions at the session of the CC Politburo.
BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel about this?
EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very properly formulated all the
proposals, and now it is time to adopt them.
The decree is adopted.

TOP SECRET: 13 December 1981

[Gość: FAKTS]

CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract),

"On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal
countries,"

13 December 1981

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P40/26
TO: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov,
Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamyatin
Extract from Protocol No. 40 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 13 December 1981

On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal
countries.
To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassadors in Bulgaria,
Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba, Vietnam, and
Laos (see attached).
CC SECRETARY
Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40


Secret
SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, ULAN-BATOR, PRAGUE, HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR
CC: WARSAW

[Gość: FAKTS]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt),
14 January 1982

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

14 January 1982

Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

Also taking part: C[omra]des. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, V. V.
Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, N. A.
Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov, B.
N. Ponomarev, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov
2. On the Results of the Negotiations with the PZPR CC Politburo Member and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic Cde. J. Czyrek

BREZHNEV. I think we all agree that Mikhail Andreevich [Suslov]'s and
Andrei Andreevich [Gromyko]'s discussions with Cde. Czyrek were useful.
Western officials, especially the Americans, are exerting enormous pressure on
Poland. In such circumstances, it is important to offer constant political
support for our friends and to bolster their spirits. One cannot permit their
spirits to sag or to allow them to relinquish what they have achieved with such
difficulty.

Martial law in the PPR has already lasted a month. As Jaruzelski says,
the counterrevolution is now crushed. However, the tasks ahead are more
complicated.

After introducing relative stability in the country, the Polish
comrades must now, one might say, resolve the strategic problems of what to do
with the trade unions, how to revive the economy, how to change the
consciousness of the masses, etc.

The most important question is the situation in the PZPR. Our friends
are trying to find a solution. No doubt, Jaruzelski does not intend to disband
the party or to change its name, but he can exploit martial law to carry out a
sweeping purge. This might yield good results.
In general one gets the impression that the general as a political
actor is very strong and is able, on most occasions, to find proper solutions.
Sometimes it seems that he is too cautious and acts more often than necessary
with an eye to the West and the Church. But in the current situation such
gestures will only ruin things. Along with firm, hardline measures on matters
of principle, one also needs flexibility and circumspection. It's good that
Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian experience in struggling against
counterrevolution.
All of us clearly understand that the decisive precondition for the
full stabilization of things in Poland is a revival of the economy. In
Czechoslovakia after 1968 political efforts made headway precisely because the
counterrevolution had not affected the economic sphere. In Poland just the
opposite is true.
In this connection a difficult question stands before us. We already
are stretched to the limit in our capacity to help the Poles, and they are
making still more requests. Perhaps we can do a bit more, but we certainly
can't give a lot more.
Still, we must of course answer Jaruzelski's letter,15 explaining in a
comradely way what we can and cannot do. By all means we must precisely carry
out our agreed deliveries in the first quarter, which for the Poles will be the
most difficult winter months.
Quite another matter are projects for political prestige, which should
not impose great strains on our economy. For example, we can lend assistance
in building the Warsaw subway. We should meet this request, having made our
participation a matter of public knowledge.
Incidentally, the food situation in Poland is not so bad. There is
enough bread in the country, and they must find a way to motivate the
peasasntry and to get them to work, arranging, as we sometimes say, a merger of
the city and village.
The Polish leadership continues to count on help from the West. Well,
in principle we can't be against that, although, to be honest, it's doubtful
that Western countries are about to start providing material assistance to a
military regime. They undoubtedly will try to extract concessions, which means
we must be especially vigilant.
Jaruzelski is raising another question, of whether he should accept
help from the Chinese. Well, why not? In the process China will be
disassociating itself from the USA and its economic sanctions.
In conclusion, one might say that the Polish question will be at the
center of international politics for a long time to come. That is why our
Polish commission has continued to work as actively as it has been up to now.

CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to Poland (1980-81)

[Gość: FAKTS]

CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to Poland (1980-81), 23 September 1982

SPECIAL DOSSIER

Secret16
I N F O R M A T I O N
about Soviet assistance to Poland in freely convertible currency in 1980-1981*
I. Credits Provided Millions of $
1. For the purchase of sugar 30
By order of the USSR Council
of Ministers on 1 August 1980
No. 1518 rs (P207 from 1.8.1980)
2. For the settlement of accounts 250
with capitalist countries.
By order of the USSR Council of
Ministers on 23 August 1980, No.
1192-rs (P201/30 from 23.VI.80)
3. For the establishment of a consor- 70
tium of banks to help the PPR.
Decision of the CPSU CC on 6 June
1980. No. P199/2
4. For the settlement of accounts 150
with capitalist countries
By order of the USSR Council of
Ministers on 11 November 1980
No. 1019-247 (P224/70
from 11.XI.1980)
5. For the purchase of grain 190
and food stuffs.
By order of the USSR Council
of Ministers
No. 1019-347 (P224/70
from 11.XI.1980)

Total 690
II. Deferred Payments
1. Deferral of payments to 219
Soviet banks. Decision of the
CPSU CC on 6 June 1980
(P199/II from 6.6.1980)
2. Deferral of payments to 280
Soviet banks. By order of the
USSR Council of Ministers on
11 September 1980
No. 1840 rs (P214/XI
from 11.XI.1980)
3. Deferral of payments to 280
Soviet banks. By order of the
USSR Council of Ministers on
11 November 1980
No. 1019-347 (P224/70
from 11.XI.1980)
4. Deferral of payments on the basic debt
up to 1,000
from all credits extended previously.
By order of the USSR Council of Ministers
on 16 August 1981.
No. 1630 rs (P23/14 from 16.8.81)

Total 1,779
III. Grant Aid
1. Joint grant aid from the USSR, 465
Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR,
and Czechoslovakia supplied via a
reduction of oil deliveries to the
CMEA countries.
Decision of the CPSU CC on
28 November 1980
No. P227/21
Total 2,934

*) According to data from USSR Gosplan

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Translator's Note: The notion of a "creeping counterrevolution" was first
devised by East German and Soviet officials during the 1968 crisis over the
Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia.
2. Translator's Note: Notes from this meeting are available in both Russian
and Polish archives; see, e.g., Fond (F.) No. 5, Opis' (Op.) No. 84, Delo (D.)
No. 596, Listy (Ll.) 33-35, Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii
(TsKhSD).
3. Translator's Note: Brezhnev presumably refers here to the PZPR Politburo.
4. Translator's Note: A page was missing at this point in the documents
originally supplied to the Polish government and published in Rzeczpospolita.
Fortunately, the missing page (no. 5 in the document) was included in the copy
of the document stored in the Moscow archives.
5. Translator's Note: Misgivings about the influence of Solidarity on the new
group of Polish army draftees were expressed frequently in 1981 in top-secret
Soviet assessments of the reliability of the Polish army. See, e.g., "O
nastroeniyakh sredi soldat i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF
PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," Cable No. 183 (Top
Secret), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in
TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19; and also "O politicheskoi situatsii i
nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo regiona PNR (Politpis'mo)," Cable No. 179
(TOP SECRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Krakow,
to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22.
6. Translator's Note: It is not wholly clear what Brezhnev had in mind here,
but he may have been alluding to some of the preparations for martial law.
7. Translator's Note: It is curious why in this secret forum Brezhnev used
dollars (instead of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for measuring the
size of Poland's request.
8. Translator's Note: The term Baibakov uses here, prodrazverstka (a
contraction of prodovol'stvennaya razverstka), refers to the policy introduced
by Lenin during the period of "War Communism" to force peasants to turn over
their produce to the state. The policy led to great bloodshed, upheaval, and
starvation.
9. Translator's Note: Either because of a mistake by Rusakov or because of a
typographical error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov's surname as
Arestov. The error was corrected in the Polish translation.
10. Translator's Note: Marshal Josef Pilsudski was the military ruler of
Poland during the interwar period, presiding over a regime that became
increasingly tyrannical.
11. Translator's Note: The Russian word Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous
vote, edinoglasno, is stronger than another word, edinodushno, which also is
translated as "unanimous." Rusakov's statement indicates that no abstentions
or dissenting votes were cast. It should be noted, however, that most
subsequent speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the word edinodushno when
referring to the PZPR Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno.
12. Translator's Note: The transcript of "the previous session of the
Politburo" (apparently of 8 December) has not yet been released.
13. Translator's Note: This statement is confirmed by the lack of concrete
discussion of the matter at PZPR Politburo meetings throughout the crisis; see
the transcripts in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego:
PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981 (London: Aneks, 1992). The extreme secrecy of
the planning also is emphasized in the interview with Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna
z narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), esp. 11-13,
33-35.
14. Translator's Note: The text of this communication (by most accountsa phone
conversation Jaruzelski had with Suslov and/or Brezhnev) reportedly exists in
the Russian Presidential Archive, but has not yet been released.
15. Translator's Note: Brezhnev later in the meeting described Jaruzelski's
letter of 3 January 1982: "...Jaruzelski expresses deep gratitude for the
fraternal help provided by the Soviet Union to the Polish People's Republic.
At the same time, he requests that the Soviet side reaffirm the volume of
deliveries for 1982 contained in the draft protocol on the coordination of both
sides' plans for 1981-1985 for oil, gasoline, and oil products. The volume of
oil deliveries in 1982 are being kept at the level of 13 million tons, and oil
products at 2.94 million tons; and deliveries of combustibles are being
retained at the maximum level in the first quarter of 1982.
"Further on Cde. Jaruzelski informs us that he appealed to the General
Secretaries of the Communist Party Central Committees of Hungary, the GDR,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia with a request to provide Poland with
basic agricultural and industrial goods."
16. Translator's Note: The classification was upgraded to "top secret"
(sovershenno sekretno) by a handwritten notation of sov. next to the original
sekretno. A stamped imprint just under the classification said that this was
CPSU CC Document No. 2931, prepared on 23 September 1982, and that it should be
returned to the CPSU CC General Department.
"

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO 13 December 1981

[Gość: FAKTS]

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO


10 December 1981


Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A.
P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P.
N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I.
Dolgikh, K. V. Rusakov.

I. On the question of the situation in Poland

BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on our agenda. But I think that
the session of the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we have
specially dispatched Comrades [Head of Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw
Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov to Poland to meet with the
Polish comrades and go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On 8
December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with information about the discussions he
held in Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade Baibakov communicated from
Warsaw that he had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. From these
meetings and subsequent discussions held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent
that the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of
additional supplies and materials from the USSR and other socialist countries
in the first quarter of the coming year.1 This will include iron ore, non-
ferrous metals, fertilizer, oil, tires, grain, etc.
In making this request, as you see, the Polish comrades have in mind
that shipments of goods from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be maintained at
the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov assured his interlocutors that all their
requests would be considered in Moscow.
Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct Comrades Tikhonov,
Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying this matter,
taking account of the exchange of opinions, but without waiting for a final
agreement.
And now let's hear what Comrade Baibakov has to say.

BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the Politburo's instructions, I traveled
to Warsaw. I met there with all the comrades whom it was necessary for me to
see about the matters specified in my instructions.
First of all I had a discussion with the deputy chairman of the Council
of Ministers, Comrade Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish comrades
raised the question of economic assistance. I sent an encrypted cable back
here outlining the Polish request.
One must say that the list of goods included in the assistance from us
to the PPR comes to 350 items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This includes
such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand
tons of iron ore, and many other goods. The requests made by the Polish
comrades, combined with what we had already been thinking about giving Poland
in 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish People's Republic will
be approximately 4.4 billion rubles.
The time is now approaching when Poland will have to pay for its
credits from West European countries. For this, Poland will be required to pay
a minimum of 2.8 million rubles' worth of hard currency. When I was told by
the Polish comrades that they are requesting the amount that all this
assistance comes to, I raised the question of how to establish mutual economic
ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Polish industry is not even
coming close to fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the country's
basic means of earning hard currency, has been severely disrupted, and remedial
measures have not been implemented as strikes continue. And even now, when
there are no strikes, the mining of coal remains at a very low level.
Or, for example, let's say that production is going on among the
peasantry, with grain, meat products, vegetables, etc. But they aren't giving
any of it to the state; they're just playing a waiting game. At the private
markets the level of agricultural trade is sufficiently high and is being
carried out at very inflated prices.
I said directly to the Polish comrades that they must adopt more
decisive measures if such a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch
something in the nature of a requisitioning of farm produce.2
If we speak, for example, about reserves of grain, then Poland this
year has accumulated more than 2 million tons. The population is not going
hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the markets and buy up all they products
they need. And there are ample supplies of them.
As is known, by the Politburo's decision and at the request of the
Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand
tons of meat. Of these promised 30 thousand tons, 15 thousand have already
been shipped abroad. It should be added that the produce, in this case meat,
is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport
iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. During the transport of this produce
to the Polish stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. Poles have
been expressing highly obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet
people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even
begin to keep count of all the insults that have been directed against us.
Viewing the situation from the standpoint of the balance of payments,
the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to
Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, then all Polish vessels in
the waters of other states or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the
countries to which Poland owes debts, will be seized. For this reason the
Poles have given instructions to the captains of ships to refrain from entering
ports and to stay in neutral waters.
Now I will offer several words about my discussion with Comrade
Jaruzelski. He reaffirmed the request made earlier by Obodowski regarding the
delivery of goods. Then in the evening I again went to Jaruzelski's office,
accompanied by our ambassador and Comrade Kulikov. Also taking part in this
discussion were Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who handles these matters.
Jaruzelski was in a highly agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply
disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop
Glemp, who, as is known, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish
authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly responded that in the event of untoward
activities by "Solidarity," they will detain all hostile elements.
As far as the party organizations are concerned, they are ruined and
inactive in the outlying regions. And with regard to the party as a whole,
Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer exists. The country is being
destroyed, and the outlying regions are not receiving any sort of
reinforcement, because the Central Committee and government are not giving firm
and clear-cut instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been transformed into a man
who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities.

RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has correctly described the situation
regarding the Polish economy. What, then, should we be doing now? It seems to
me that we should deliver to Poland the goods provided for under the economic
agreements, but that these deliveries should not exceed the quantity of goods
we delivered in the first quarter of last year.

BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this much now?

BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given only by drawing on state
reserves or at the expense of deliveries to the internal market.

RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries
from the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov3 reported, the secretaries
of the provi

[Gość: FAKTS]

RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries from
the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov3 reported, the secretaries of
the provincial committees are completely baffled by Jaruzelski's speech, which
did not present a clear, straightforward line. No one knows what will happen
over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At
first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was
changed to the night of 12-13. And now they're already saying it won't be
until around the 20th. What is envisaged is that the chairman of the State
Council, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television and declare the
introduction of martial law. At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on
the introduction of martial law can be implemented only after it is considered
by the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15
December. Thus, everything has become very complicated. The agenda of the
Sejm has already been published, and it makes no mention of the introduction of
martial law. But even if the government does intend to introduce martial
law, "Solidarity" knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing
all necessary measures to cope with that.
Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to deliver an address to the
Polish nation. But in his address he won't be speaking about the party.
Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments. Jaruzelski has talked
about the need to proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that existed
under Pilsudski.4 He indicated that the Poles will accept this more readily
than something else.
As far as officials like Olszowski are concerned, they recently have
begun to act more decisively; and one might add that at the session of the
Politburo where the decision was made to introduce martial law and adopt more
resolute measures against extremist figures in "Solidarity," the vote was
unanimous and no one expressed a word of opposition.5 At the same time,
Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about this matter with his allies.
He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up
by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades hope to receive assistance from other
countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the
territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is basing this hope on the speech by Comrade
Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would
indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I
know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words
voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in
the lurch.
If we consider what is going on in the provinces, one must candidly say
that the strength of the party organizations there has been completely
dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative apparatus there is still
functioning, but in effect all power has now been transferred to the hands
of "Solidarity." In his recent statements, Jaruzelski is apparently trying to
pull the wool over our eyes, because his words fail to reflect a proper
analysis. If the Polish comrades don't quickly get organized, prepare
themselves, and resist the onslaught of "Solidarity," they will have no success
at all in improving the situation in Poland.

ANDROPOV. From the discussions with Jaruzelski it's clear that they
have not yet reached a firm consensus about the introduction of martial law.
Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR CC Politburo on the need to introduce
martial law, we still haven't seen concrete measures on the part of the
leadership. The extremists in "Solidarity" are attacking the Polish leadership
by the throat. The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its
position, which in essence is now completely supportive of "Solidarity."
Of course in these circumstances the Polish comrades must act swiftly
in launching "Operation X" and carrying it out. At the same time, Jaruzelski
declares that we will resort to "Operation X" when "Solidarity" forces us to do
so. This is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the latest session of
the PZPR CC Politburo and the decision it adopted to introduce martial law had
suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act more decisively. All the
members of the Politburo expressed support for decisive action. This decision
put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now compelled to find some way of
extricating himself. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what
measures they intended and when it would be done. He replied that he simply
doesn't know about "Operation X" and about the concrete timeframe in which it
would be carried out. Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is concealing
from his comrades the plan of concrete action, or he is simply abandoning the
idea of carrying out this step.
I'd now like to mention that Jaruzelski has been more than persistent
in setting forth economic demands from us and has made the implementation
of "Operation X" contingent on our willingness to offer economic assistance;
and I would say even more than that, he is raising the question, albeit
indirectly, of receiving military assistance as well.
Now, if you look at the list of goods we are providing to the Polish
comrades, we can candidly say that serious doubts arise about the necessity of
supplying these products. For example, what is the connection between the
success of "Operation X" and the delivery of fertilizer and certain other
goods? In connection with this I would say that our position, as it was
formulated earlier during the previous session of the Politburo and was
expressed even earlier on several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely
correct, and we must not depart from it at all.6 In other words, we support
the position of internationalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the
situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as "Operation X" is concerned, that
must entirely and unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades themselves.
Whatever they decide is what will be. We will not insist on any specific
course, and we will not dissuade them from pursuing what they decide.
As far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be
difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been
proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. But again I want to say that
the mere posing of the question of the apportionment of goods supplied as
economic assistance is an insolent way to approach things, and it is being done
purely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they'll be
able to lay all the blame on us. If Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about
the introduction of troops, then I believe he did this incorrectly. We can't
risk such a step. We don't intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is
the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end. I don't know how
things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control
of "Solidarity," that's the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries
pounce on the Soviet Union, and you know they have already reached agreement on
a variety of economic and political sanctions, that will be very burdensome for
us. We must be concerned above all with our own country and about the
strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.
In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland
was formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the
resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has
taken place during the session of the Pol

[Gość: FAKTS]

In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland was
formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the resolutions
adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has taken place
during the session of the Politburo. All of this must serve as the basis of
the policy we must uphold vis-a-vis Poland.
As concerns the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the
GDR that run through Poland, then we of course must do something to provide for
their safekeeping.

GROMYKO. Today we've had a very spirited review of the situation in
Poland. You might even say this review was more spirited than any we've had
before. This is because at the moment we ourselves don't know what direction
the events in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself senses that power
is slipping from its grasp. Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their
ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no such opportunity, there
are no longer any neutrals. The position is defined sufficiently
clearly: "Solidarity" has proven to be a patently counterrevolutionary
organization which aspires to come to power and which has openly declared its
intention to seize power. The Polish leadership must decide the question:
Either it relinquishes its positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, or
it adopts decisive measures by introducing martial law, isolating the
extremists of "Solidarity," and restoring public order. There is no other
alternative.
What should our position be toward the Polish events? I fully agree
with what was already said here by the comrades. We can say to the Poles that
we view the Polish events with understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for
us to alter this measured formulation in any way. At the same time we must
somehow try to dispel the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland
have about the introduction of troops. There cannot be any introduction of
troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our
ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate this to him.
Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of the PZPR CC Politburo with
regard to the introduction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to his
vacillating position. At first he had somewhat stiffened his spine, but now,
once again, he's begun to soften. Everything is still in force that was said
to them previously. If in the struggle against counterrevolution and
afterwards they show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist Poland will
remain. The introduction of martial law, of course, would be the best way to
convey the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the
counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they intend to carry out are
indeed implemented, then I think we could expect positive results.
Now, with regard to the creation of a new party, as Jaruzelski
proposed, I think we must directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to
create any sort of new party, since this would merely signal a retreat on the
part of the Polish leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR is in fact
not a militant political organization, but simply an organization that has
committed mistakes. It would underscore the very weakness of the party and
would play into the hands of the "Solidarity" extremists. Then even the
population of Poland, which retains definite sympathy for the PZPR as a guiding
force, would be completely disabused of such sentiments.
I believe that we must not now permit any sort of harsh instructions,
which would force them to adopt one course or another. I think we have chosen
the correct position here: The restoration of order in Poland is a matter for
the Polish United Workers' Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We
already said to our Polish friends and will say again in the future that they
must pursue a steadfast course without slackening in the least.
Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to "Solidarity," the West in all
likelihood will not give them credits and will not offer any other kind of
help. They are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too,
have to bear in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was correct in proposing
that we instruct a group of comrades to examine this question, taking account
of our capabilities to extend substantial economic assistance to the PPR.

USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of course, is very bad. The
situation is worsening day by day. Among the leadership, especially in the
Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And all of this has taken its toll
on the state of affairs. Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo
was a decision unanimously approved to introduce martial law. And now all
hopes are riding on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying out this
decision? As yet, no one can openly speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We
just don't know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He candidly said that
even we [the Poles] don't know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man who
has been effectively responsible for discharging the duties of the Polish
defense minister doesn't know what will happen and what sort of actions will be
taken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister.
With regard to what Comrade Kulikov allegedly said about the
introduction of troops into Poland, I can say in full responsbility that
Kulikov never said this. He simply repeated what was said by us and by Leonid
Ilyich that we would not leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well
knows that the Poles themselves requested us not to introduce troops.
As far as our garrisons in Poland are concerned, we are fortifying
them. I myself am also inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on a
confrontation and only if, perhaps, "Solidarity" seizes them by the throat will
they come forth.
The problem is that the Polish leaders do not appear resolute. As was
rightly said here by the comrades, we must not force them to adopt any specific
decisions; we will simply carry out the policy on which we have agreed. For
our part, we must be ready ourselves and must not display any sort of actions
not provided for by our decisions.

SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the other comrades' speeches, we
all have the same view of the situation in Poland. During the whole prolonged
stretch of events in Poland, we have displayed steadfastness and composure.
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. We said this in public
to our people, and our people supported the policy of the Communist Party.
We've done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for
us to change our position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so.
We have carried out via the UN such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate
peace. What a great effect we have had from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the
FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This has enabled
all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union staunchly and
consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible for
us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start
of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what
actions they must pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward
more decisive actions. But we will, as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard
their actions with understanding.
As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of
slyness. He wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests,
which he presents to the Soviet

[Gość: FAKTS]

As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He
wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests, which he
presents to the Soviet Union. These requests, naturally, are beyond our
physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well, look here, I
turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn't receive it.
At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the
introduction of troops. If troops are introduced, that will mean a
catastrophe. I think we have reached a unanimous view here on this matter, and
there can be no consideration at all of introducing troops.
As far as the provision of assistance to Poland is concerned, we have
given that country more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we adopted a
decision to ship 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons
have already been delivered. I don't know whether we'll be able to ship the
full 30 thousand tons, but in any event we apparently are obliged by this
decision to give a further definite number of tons of meat as assistance.
With regard to the PZPR and the creation of a new party to replace it,
I believe it would be inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who spoke here
were correct in arguing that this would be a completely unhelpful action.

GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line
of our party toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the
proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot
agree with that. There can be no talk at all of introducing troops. We will
have to look at economic questions and at what can be given to the Poles.

SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the intrigues of "Solidarity" and
other counterrevolutionary forces.

CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the comrades have said here. It is
clear that the line of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the Polish
events, as formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the
decisions of the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of change.
I believe that today we could adopt the following decision:
1. Take under advisement the information provided by Comrade Baibakov.
2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, abide by the general political
line on this matter laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the
instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 December 1981 and the exchange of
opinions that occurred at the CC Politburo's session on 10 December 1981.
3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to
continue studying questions of economic assistance to Poland, taking account of
the exchange of opinions at the session of the CC Politburo.

BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel about this?

EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very properly formulated all the
proposals, and now it is time to adopt them.
The decree is adopted.




1. Translator's Note: It is curious why in this secret forum Brezhnev used
dollars (instead of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for measuring the
size of Poland's request.
2. Translator's Note: The term Baibakov uses here, prodrazverstka (a
contraction of prodovol'stvennaya razverstka), refers to the policy introduced
by Lenin during the period of "War Communism" to force peasants to turn over
their produce to the state. The policy led to great bloodshed, upheaval, and
starvation.
3. Translator's Note: Either because of a mistake by Rusakov or because of a
typographical error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov's surname as
Arestov. The error was corrected in the Polish translation.
4. Translator's Note: Marshal Josef Pilsudski was the military ruler of
Poland during the interwar period, presiding over a regime that became
increasingly tyrannical.
5. Translator's Note: The Russian word Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous
vote, edinoglasno, is stronger than another word, edinodushno, which also is
translated as "unanimous." Rusakov's statement indicates that no abstentions
or dissenting votes were cast. It should be noted, however, that most
subsequent speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the word edinodushno when
referring to the PZPR Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno.
6. Translator's Note: The transcript of "the previous session of the
Politburo" (apparently of 8 December) has not yet been released."

Subject: Brezhnev,Poland 1980-81 Bulletin 5 - Cold War Crises Pact
Keywords: Cold War Crises Collection ID:
Geographic Subject: Poland Document Author:
Document Origin: USSR Published:
Document Date: 12/01/81 Document ID:
Document Type: Memorandum of Conversation Archive: TsKhSD


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Cold War International History Project
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