manny_ramirez
11.03.05, 13:12
A Fine Rendition
By MICHAEL SCHEUER
Washington
AS Congress and the news media wail about the Central Intelligence
Agency's "rendition" program - its practice of turning suspected terrorists
over for detainment and questioning in third countries - it is time to focus
on the real issue at hand. A good starting place is Page 127 of the tablets
on which are inscribed the scripture handed down by the 9/11 commission.
Here we find a description of a 1998 conversation between National Security
Director Samuel Berger and his counterterrorism chief, Richard Clarke, about
the capture of Abu Hajer al Iraqi, the "most important bin Laden lieutenant
captured thus far." According to the report, Mr. Clarke commented to Mr.
Berger "with satisfaction that August and September had brought the 'greatest
number of terrorist arrests in a short period of time that we have ever
arranged or facilitated.' " Part and parcel of this success, the men make
clear, were the renditions of captured Qaeda terrorists.
Neither Mr. Clarke nor Mr. Berger were C.I.A. officers. They were senior
White House officials who - in consultation with President Bill Clinton - set
America's Al Qaeda policy from 1993 to 2001. They told the C.I.A. what to do,
and decided how it should pursue, capture and detain terrorists. They knew
that Abu Hajer al Iraqi was being brought to the United States for trial, and
they knew - and approved - of the rendition of his compatriots to Egypt and
elsewhere. Having failed to find a legal means to keep all the detainees in
American custody, they preferred to let other countries do our dirty work.
Why does this matter? Because it makes clear that in dealing with detainees
in 1998, and today as well, the C.I.A. is following orders from the president
and his National Security Council advisers. Likewise, in 1998 and today, the
agency is executing operations under those orders only after they are
approved by a vast cohort of lawyers at the security council, the Justice
Department and the C.I.A. itself.
I know this because, as head of the C.I.A.'s bin Laden desk, I started the
Qaeda detainee/rendition program and ran it for 40 months. And in my 22 years
at the agency I never a saw a set of operations that was more closely
scrutinized by the director of central intelligence, the National Security
Council and the Congressional intelligence committees. Nor did I ever see one
that was more blessed (plagued?) by the expert guidance of lawyers.
For now, the beginning of wisdom is to acknowledge that the non-C.I.A. staff
members mentioned above knew that taking detainees to Egypt or elsewhere
might yield treatment not consonant with United States legal practice. How
did they know? Well, several senior C.I.A. officers, myself included, were
confident that common sense would elude that bunch, and so we told them -
again and again and again. Each time a decision to do a rendition was made,
we reminded the lawyers and policy makers that Egypt was Egypt, and that
Jimmy Stewart never starred in a movie called "Mr. Smith Goes to Cairo." They
usually listened, nodded, and then inserted a legal nicety by insisting that
each country to which the agency delivered a detainee would have to pledge it
would treat him according to the rules of its own legal system.
So as the hounding of C.I.A. and the calls for its officers' blood continue,
a few things must be made clear - all the more so if the government is really
considering the renditions of many detainees now held at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba. First, the agency is peculiarly an instrument of the executive branch.
Renditions were called for, authorized and legally vetted not just by the
N.S.C. and the Justice Department, but also by the presidents - both Mr.
Clinton and George W. Bush. In my mind, these men and women made the right
decision - America is better protected because of renditions - but it would
have been better if they had not lacked the bureaucratic and moral courage to
work with Congress to find ways to bring all detainees to America.
Second, the rendition program has been a tremendous success. Dozens of senior
Qaeda fighters are today behind bars, no longer able to plot or participate
in attacks. Detainee operations also netted an untold number of computers and
documents that increased our knowledge of Al Qaeda's makeup and plans.
Third, if mistakes were made, like the alleged cases of innocent detainees,
they should be corrected, but the C.I.A. officers who followed orders should
not be punished. Perfection is never attainable in the fog of war, and any
errors should not distract from the overwhelming success of the program.
All Americans owe a debt of gratitude to the men and women of the agency who
executed these presidentially requested and approved operations, often at the
risk of their lives. Unfortunately, rather than receiving thanks, the C.I.A.
officers are again learning the usual lesson: to follow orders, make America
safer and prepare to be abandoned and prosecuted when the policy makers
refuse to defend their own decisions.
Michael Scheuer is the author of "Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the
War on Terror."
