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17.06.03, 16:09
US turns to the Taliban
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Such is the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan,
compounded by the return to the country of a large number of former Afghan
communist refugees, that United States and Pakistani intelligence officials
have met with Taliban leaders in an effort to devise a political solution to
prevent the country from being further ripped apart.
According to a Pakistani jihadi leader who played a role in setting up the
communication, the meeting took place recently between representatives of
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Taliban leaders at the Pakistan Air Force base of Samungli,
near Quetta.
The source told Asia Times Online that four conditions were put to the
Taliban before any form of reconciliation can take place that could
potentially lead to them having a role in the Kabul government, whose present
authority is in essence limited to the capital:
Mullah Omar must be removed as supreme leader of the Taliban.
All Pakistani, Arab and other foreign fighters currently engaged in
operations against international troops in Afghanistan must be thrown out of
the country.
Any US or allied soldiers held captive must be released.
Afghans currently living abroad, notably in the United States and England,
must be given a part in the government - through being allowed to contest
elections - even though many do not even speak their mother tongue, such as
Dari or Pashtu.
Apparently, the Taliban refused the first condition point blank, but showed
some flexibility on the other terms. As such, this first preliminary contact
made little headway. It is not known whether there will be further meetings,
but given the fact that the reason for staging the talks in the first place
remains unchanged, more contact can be expected.
The channels for the contact have been set up by Taliban who defected when
the government collapsed in Kabul, and fled to Pakistan, where they were
sheltered in ISI safe houses. Now these defectors, working with Pakistani
jihadis who know how to approach the Taliban leadership, are acting as go-
betweens.
The backdrop to the first meeting is an ever-increasing escalation in the
guerrilla war being waged against foreign troops in Afghanistan. Small hit-
and-run attacks are a daily feature in most parts of the country, while face-
to-face skirmishes are common in the former Taliban stronghold around
Kandahar in the south.
According to people familiar with Afghan resistance movements, the one that
has emerged over the past year and a half since the fall of the Taliban is
about four times as strong as the movement that opposed Soviet invaders for
nearly a decade starting in 1979.
The key reason for this is that the previous Taliban government - which is
dispersed almost intact in the country after capitulating to advancing
Northern Alliance forces without a fight - is backed by the most powerful
force in Afghanistan: clerics and religious students.
For centuries, these people were the most respected segment of Afghan
society, and before 1979 they never participated in politics. On the
contrary, their role was one of reconciliation in conflicts. During the
Afghan resistance movement against the USSR, things changed, and clerics
threw their weight behind the mujahideen struggle, but, with a few
exceptions, such as Maulana Yunus Khalis, they were not in command.
With the withdrawal of the Soviets and the emergence of the Taliban in the
early 1990s, though, the situation once again changed. The Taliban, taking
advantage of the power struggles among bitterly divided militias in Kabul,
consolidated themselves into an effective political movement led by clerics
and in 1996 seized power in Kabul. A part of their success also lay in the
fact that initially Afghans, especially Pashtuns who make up the majority of
the country, were reluctant to take up the gun against clerics.
Now, in the renewed guerrilla war against foreign troops, it is the clerics
who are calling the shots. For instance, Hafiz Rahim is the most respected
cleric in the Kandahar region, and he commands all military operations from
the sanctuary of the mountainous terrain.
The US forces have employed maximum air support and advanced technology in an
attempt to curtail attacks, but without the help of local Afghan forces they
are unable to track down Hafiz Rahim, who to date has targeted US convoys
scores of times. The United States has admitted a few deaths, while the
Taliban claim they have killed many more than the official numbers state. For
funds, the Taliban use money looted from the central bank before they
abandoned Kabul, estimated in excess of US$110 million, in addition to money
received from Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda.
At the same time, famed warlord Gulbbudin Hekmatyar has joined the resistance
after returning from exile in Iran. His Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) is
the most organized force in Afghanistan, and its participation has added real
muscle to the resistance. Many top slots in the Kabul administration are
occupied by former HIA members who, although they were once anti-Taliban, are
loyal to the Islamic cause and anti-US. Also, several provincial governors
and top officials are former HIA commanders. They are suspect in the eyes of
the Americans, but because of their huge political clout it is impossible to
remove them.
With this groundswell of support - even if in places it is only passive - and
with Kabul's influence restricted to the capital, the Americans and their
allies will remain vulnerable targets, let alone be in a position to restore
any form of law and order. It is in situations like this, argue most experts
on Afghanistan, that traditionally insurrections begin in the Afghan army
against foreign administrators.
This is not the end of the problems. More than 2 million Afghan refugees,
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, have returned
to Afghanistan from countries all over the world, including India, Russia,
Cambodia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and Central Asian countries. Many of them
belonged to communist factions during and after the Soviet invasion, while a
number of their counterparts remained and now hold positions in Kabul.
At present, Kabul is divided into two main factions. The first is pro-US,
which is represented by the US and allied troops and those loyal to President
Hamid Karzai. The second is pro-Russian and pro-Iranian, represented by
Defense Minister General Qasim Fahim and his Northern Alliance forces.
Although the camps are cooperating at present, they are silently building
their support bases to make a grab for full power once the present interim
administration runs its course, a process that is due to begin in October
with a loya jirga (grand council).
In this respect, every returned or returning former "communist comrade" is
important, for should the Northern Alliance faction develop sufficient
critical mass, it would come as no surprise if its leaders openly forged an
alliance with the resistance movement.
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