Zinowiew: górą komunizm

[snow21]

Internacjonalistyczna lewica przerzuciła swoją miłość ze Stalina na Izrael,a
internacjonalizm robotniczy zastąpiła internacjonalizmem finansowo-medialnym
zwanym pospolicie globalizmem.

[sburczymucha]

Grigorij Jewsiejewicz Zinowiew (ros. ???????? ???????? ????????), właściwie Owsiej-Gerszen
Aronowicz Radomyslskij (?????-?????? ???????? ?????????????), używał także nazwiska Hirsz
Apfelbaum (???? ??????????). Ur. 23 września 1883 roku w Jelizawietgradzie na Ukrainie, zm. 25
sierpnia 1936. Czołowy działacz ruchu bolszewickiego.
Członek SDPRR od 1901 roku. Ze względu na zaangażowanie polityczne i przynależność do nielegalnej
partii musiał wyjechać na emigrację. Przebywał m.in. w Szwajcarii, gdzie poznał Lenina, którego był
bliskim współpracownikiem. Stanął po stronie bolszewików w momencie rozłamu w partii w 1903.
Studiował na wydziale chemii i prawa Uniwersytetu w Bernie. Współpracował z bolszewickimi
czasopismami, takimi jak Wpieriod (??????). Podczas rewolucji 1905 roku pomagał w organizacji
powstania w Petersburgu.
W 1907 kongres partii w Londynie wybrał go do sześcioosobowego KC. Od 1908 do 1917 roku
przebywał na emigracji, gdzie między innymi współpracował z Leninem i Kamieniewem (razem
stanowili ścisłe kierownictwo ruchu bolszewickiego, tzw. trojkę) oraz redagował pismo Proletariusz
(????????).
W 1917 wrócił do Rosji, gdzie otrzymał stanowisko razem z Lwem Kamieniewem wystąpili przeciw
powstaniu i za utworzeniem rządu koalicyjnego lewicy. W 1918 stanął po stronie Lenina w sprawie
zawarcia pokoju brzeskiego; przewodniczący Rady Delegatów Robotniczych w Piotrogrodzie, domagał
się wzmożenia "czerwonego terroru". W latach 1919 - 1926 Zinowiew był przewodniczącym Komitetu
Wykonawczego Kominternu. Głosił hasło rewolucji światowej, postulował jak najszybsze przeniesienie
rewolucji na inne kraje, widząc w kapitalizmie zagrożenie dla ZSRR. Jednocześnie przeciwstawiał się
wtedy współpracy z partiami socjaldemokratycznymi, które określał mianem "socjalfaszystowskich".
W latach 1921 - 1926 był członkiem Biura Politycznego KC partii bolszewickiej. Od 1923 roku wraz z
Kamieniewem nawiązał bliską współpracę ze Stalinem, jednak kiedy zdystansował się od niego został
oskarżony o frakcyjność i opozycyjność ("Nowa opozycja"), co spowodowało przyłączenie się Zinowiewa
do Trockiego. W 1926 roku został pozbawiony stanowisk. W latach 1927-1928 oraz 1932-1933
wydalony z partii. Prowadził podwójną grę ze Stalinem, o której ten doskonale wiedział, zręcznie
wykorzystując go do swych celów. W 1935 został aresztowany i skazany na 10 lat więzienia, a potem, w
kolejnym procesie, skazany na śmierć pod zarzutem spisku przeciwko Stalinowi. Wyrok wykonano 25
sierpnia 1936 roku.

[maruda.r]

sburczymucha napisał:

> Grigorij Jewsiejewicz Zinowiew (ros. ???????? ???????? ????????), właściwie Ows
> iej-Gerszen
> Aronowicz Radomyslskij (?????-?????? ???????? ?????????????), używał także nazw
> iska Hirsz
> Apfelbaum (???? ??????????). Ur. 23 września 1883 roku w Jelizawietgradzie na U
> krainie, zm. 25
> sierpnia 1936. Czołowy działacz ruchu bolszewickiego.

*********************************

Po co podajesz notkę biograficzną innego Zinowiewa?

[maruda.r]

snow21 napisał:

> Internacjonalistyczna lewica przerzuciła swoją miłość ze Stalina na Izrael,

************************************

Pewnie chodzi o amerykańskich republikanów. Nie wiem tylko czy się zgodzą z
kwalifikowaniem ich jako lewicy.

[ewswr]

"Nie ma potrzeby przedstawiać dalszych argumentów. Każdy, kto choć trochę zna
tradycyjną ideologię rosyjska, łatwo je zrekonstruuje - zgniły Zachód i jego
ambicje imperialne, zachodni spisek i jego agentura, która przeniknęła do steru
rządów w Rosji, wyzysk ludów kolonialnych i bicie Murzynów... Co jednak
nieodparcie przychodzi na myśl, to spłaszczenie sinusoidy Zinowiewowskiego
myślenia. Onegdajsze drapieżne paradoksy często trafiające w sedno sowietyzmu
zastąpiły dziś paranoiczne spekulacje odwołujące się do najbardziej trywialnych
teorii spiskowych"

jasne, Zinowiew oszalał, zgłupiał itd.
Naiwna Wiara autora artykułu w dobrotliwych wujaszków z Zachodu w korkowych
chełmach, którzy po nocach nie spią - głowia sie jak tu ludnosc globu
uszczęsliwic z Rosja na czele, z pobudek wyłącznie altruistycznych, rozczula.
Z punktu widzenia W. Bartczaka, każdy kto smie w to zwatpic to szaleniec.

górą komunizm, a dolina ... stara ludzka nieufno

[paskudaprawdziwa]

Doskonala publikacja, dzeikuje.

""""""""""""""""""""
Epoka stalinowska była młodością społeczeństwa sowieckiego, okresem jego
przeistaczania się w dojrzały organizm. I choćby dlatego zasługuje na coś
więcej, niż tylko potępienie - zasługuje na zrozumienie".
""""""""""""""""""""""
Wszystko co zaistnialo w dziejach ludzkich zasluguje na zrozumienie, tyle, ze
sowa wylatuje noca, a jednak...
trzeba rozumiec chocby po to by nie pozwolic do powtorzenia, by sie ustrzec
przed "zlem" , bo nie w kategriach "dobra" moze byc "rozumiany" stalinizm.

Do "ewswr"
w Tobie za duzo goryczy i nieufnosci, majac do wyboru rosyjskie (czy ich
odmiane sowiecka) albo zachodnie idealy, bez chwili namyslu wybieram
zachodnie, tak idealy jak zycie...

[ewswr]

nie pisałem o ideałach zachodu czy wschodu. Zinowiew wg mnie też. tylko o
działalnosci ludzi, których sie powszechnie nazywa "przywódcy zachodni" itd.

[proofreader]

snow21 napisał:

> Internacjonalistyczna lewica przerzuciła swoją miłość ze Stalina na Izrael,a
> internacjonalizm robotniczy zastąpiła internacjonalizmem finansowo-medialnym
> zwanym pospolicie globalizmem.

Dokładnie. To znaczy ujmując to nieco eufemistycznie ;-)

Natomiast "nowa lewica" koncentruje się na dewiacjach seksualnych,
psudoekologii, czy alterglobalizmie (to asekuranckie określenie oznacza
gotowość pełnienia roli "pożytecznych idiotów" wobec neoliberalnej
globalizacji). Stroni przy tym od ekonomii, jak diabeł od wody święconej, nie
rozumiejąc przy tym, że dopóki nie przestanie bajdurzyc o jakichś prawach
człowieka i innych normach międzynarodowych w odniesieniu do konfliktu na
Bliskim Wschodzie, nie ma mowy, żeby luminarze niegdysiejszej lewicy zechcieli
ją choćby tolerować. Cóż, internacjonalizm ma swoje granice (to znaczy
niezupełnie swoje, ale co tam...).

Ileż to osób nie chce dostrzec, że w '89 nie było żadnej "jesieni ludów", tylko
początek pewnej, hmm, konwergencji. Politycy i specsłużby obu stron dużo
wcześniej znalazły wspólny język. Nie powiem jaki, bo nie chcę tu wysłuchiwać
inwektyw od "zwolenników teorii spiskowych", jak to pośmiertnie przyłożyła
Zinowiewowi GW. I jeszcze ta demencja (to i tak lepiej niz w przypadku Z.
Herberta). A podobno "de mortuis nil nisi bene". No, ale to w obrębie
cywilizacji łacińskiej. Bo w innych mawia się np. "niech kości jego będą
rozsypane, a imię zapomniane". Toteż i tak Zinowiew został potraktowany ulgowo.

A co do Rosji, to warto poczytać sobie książki dawnego opozycjonisty Mariusza
Wilka, który osiadł (dobrowolnie) na Sołowkach i mieszka tam od 15 lat. Jest
pod wieloma względami zdumiewająco zgodny z Zinowiewem. Jakoś dotąd nie oberwał
za swoje obrazoburcze stwierdzenia, ba, zbiera świetne recenzje.
No, ale w swojej ostatniej książce "Wołoka" przytacza głupi dowcip. Pani mówi
do dzieci w szkole, że następnego dnia mają przyjśc w strojach narodowych. Na
co mama jednej z uczennic: "Czyś ty, Estera, zwariowała? W norkach i
brylantach?". Jeszcze kilka takich niewczesnych żartów, a niedługo dowiemy się,
że Wilk też "jurodiwyj", znaczy pomyleniec.

coś o zachodnim "totalniactwie"

[herr7]

freespace.virgin.net/pep.talk/Getty.htm
THE FRAMEWORK FOR SOVIET RESEARCH

(A review of Getty's, Origins of the Great Purges)

Ted Talbot

INTRODUCTION

Our perception of Soviet history has been conditioned by the 'totalitarian'
thesis. Introduced, or to be precise re-introduced into the 'Cold War' debate
by the Central Intelligence Agency. The notion of Soviet society as a vast
prison camp, where all conversations were recorded and friendships noted, was
actively promoted by the influential academic journal Survey. This was
published by the inappropriately named 'International Association for Cultural
Freedom' widely thought to be a C.I.A. front operating via Stanford University.

Totalitarianism permeated and extensively influenced the academic debate on the
Soviet Union. These 'experts' were the people who advised the mass media on its
news and documentary coverage and therefore indirectly addressed a mass
audience.

It is the creation of this cultural milieu which explains the substantial
impact on popular culture of Orwell's 1984. Orwell could argue that 1984 was a
critique of 'Stalinism' rather than socialism but it was not an impressive
argument. Certainly the book was well thought of by the bourgeoisie and was
heavily promoted and reprinted many times.



For the smaller but more sophisticated audience of 1968, Victor Serge's book,
also written in 1948, The Case of Comrade Tulayev was published in English.
Serge's impressive revolutionary credentials ensured that the work would be far
more credible to a potentially radical and 'New Left' audience than Orwell's
crude propaganda. The implicit message in these works is "look where social
revolutions end up - far better to stick with the devil you know."

Despite the massive state backing and consequent academic influence given to
them, the likes of Conquest/Crankshaw/ Dallin/Schapiro/Seton-Watson etal did
not manage to impose a complete stranglehold on Soviet research. In the end the
impact of reality was too strong.

In Britain, David Lane made a series of empirical studies which helped towards
a rational and objective understanding of the Soviet Union. Archibald Getty's
work is a further step in this direction because, if inevitably in a small way,
it takes us into Soviet society and helps us to understand what it was actually
like. One has the impression that Getty's book, which emanated from a Ph.D.
thesis, is written with intellectual curiosity in mind rather than to fulfil
either the requirements of an intelligence agency or the pre-determined
conclusions of sections of the American left. It is this which helps to make it
a useful text.



REVIEW

GETTY, Archibald John, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party
Reconsidered, 1933-1938, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985



METHODOLOGY

In his introduction, The Great Purges As History, Getty notes a vital
methodological question for anyone interested in Soviet history. Our
understanding of that history has emanated from a fairly narrow range of
sources, emigres, defectors and anecdotal accounts. (Page 4)* It can be added
that, because of their knowledge of Russian language and culture, the emigres
were able to dominate academic positions in the West. None of the diaspora from
the Bolshevik revolution were likely to be in a position to comment objectively
on its development and many important commentators were in relationships with
the Western intelligence services.

Getty relies upon primary historical resource material and rejects "Great Man"
explanations of history. He also rejects, and as we shall see with good reason,
the theory of "totalitarianism" which pervades much Soviet
historiography. "Indeed, both Western and Stalinist writers have been
interested in showing that the Soviet bureaucracy was grimly efficient:
totalitarian to Western writers, monolithic or solidly united to Stalinists."
(Page 3)

In his "Bibliographical Essay", (Page 211) well worth reading in its own right,
Getty treats this subject thoroughly. Unpublished, and unattributed memoirs,
camp diaries, second hand accounts and simple rumour have been accepted as
primary source material in a manner unique for historical research. "For no
other period or topic have historians been so eager to write and accept history
by anecdote. (Page 5)

As for Trotsky, "Trotsky's location far from events always made him a dubious
source for anything except biting editorials on the Great Purges." (Page 214)

Research is beginning to reveal a picture of the Stalin era which is lacking
from the sources so far mentioned: internal wrangling inside the party, ad hoc
and voluntaristic decision making procedures, and an inability of the party
centres to establish control over the periphery.



A more sophisticated image of Stalin is emerging than the monster of bourgeois
and Trotskyist demonology. In assessing the research Getty argues that, "None
of these works has suggested that Stalin is not the most powerful actor, but
some of them have implied that he was not necessarily the author of every
initiative. He seems frequently to have exerted his authority by throwing his
weight behind one or other faction or alternative." (Pages 5/6) Indeed, this is
very much the scenario which Getty reveals for Stalin's activities during the
period which he is examining.

Getty's use of source material is meticulous. In all cases he appraises the
reader of his source of information, archive material, the Soviet press or
secondary source material.

This period is important to understand because what happened then set a
trajectory for later Soviet history.



THE C.P.S.U. 17th PARTY CONGRESS

Getty has a novel interpretation of Stalin's "cult of personality". He believes
that it was a deliberately accentuated facade in order to conceal the disunity
of the party riven by "factions and interest groups". "It may well be that
where one finds the loudest affirmations of unity are the place where unity is
most lacking." (Page 11)

Amongst the myriad tactical and personal struggles which occupied attention
Getty identifies three major issues, economic planning, the fate of the
defeated opposition, and the "control and rationalization of the territorial
party apparatus".

All of these issues were raised at the Seventeenth Party Congress which took
place from January 26th to February 10th 1934. The bold front of the, so
called, "Congress of Victors" may have been a sham. The party's "General Line"
was by no means uncritically accepted and it is a possibility "that a number of
delegates to the congress discussed removing Stalin or reducing his power."
(Page 12)

An important argument took place at the congress between "moderates" who
proposed an evolutionary approach to economic growth, and the "radicals" who
wished to establish extremely high production targets. This conflict between
technical expertise and political enthusiasm prefigurated the "better red than
expert" debate in China. The pros and cons of each position are complex, but
from our point of view it is pertinent to note that both points of view were
contained "within a Stalinist bloc that contained elements inclined towards
both extremes." (Page 13)

Far from initiating or stifling ideas, Stalin's contributions indicate that he
veered between various points of view. As had always been his practice in the
Bolshevik party, Stalin sided with a bloc hesitantly and cautiously. (Page 15)
In a spirit of compromise the "radicals" were allowed to run the First Five
Year Plan and "moderates" the second. During the second plan "radicals" were to
concentrate on "agitation, propaganda and political education." (Page 17)

cd.

[herr7]

All of these issues were raised at the Seventeenth Party Congress which took
place from January 26th to February 10th 1934. The bold front of the, so
called, "Congress of Victors" may have been a sham. The party's "General Line"
was by no means uncritically accepted and it is a possibility "that a number of
delegates to the congress discussed removing Stalin or reducing his power."
(Page 12)

An important argument took place at the congress between "moderates" who
proposed an evolutionary approach to economic growth, and the "radicals" who
wished to establish extremely high production targets. This conflict between
technical expertise and political enthusiasm prefigurated the "better red than
expert" debate in China. The pros and cons of each position are complex, but
from our point of view it is pertinent to note that both points of view were
contained "within a Stalinist bloc that contained elements inclined towards
both extremes." (Page 13)

Far from initiating or stifling ideas, Stalin's contributions indicate that he
veered between various points of view. As had always been his practice in the
Bolshevik party, Stalin sided with a bloc hesitantly and cautiously. (Page 15)
In a spirit of compromise the "radicals" were allowed to run the First Five
Year Plan and "moderates" the second. During the second plan "radicals" were to
concentrate on "agitation, propaganda and political education." (Page 17) Getty
informs us that, "all Stalin's public statements in the period suggested that
he supported the compromise." (Page 17) The compromise began to break down in
late 1935 as the "radicals" used the Stakhanovite movement to challenge
the "moderates."

Getty deals with the "vacillating relationship between the Stalinist group and
the opposition." (Page 17) The "General Line" was pushed through at the
seventeenth congress and the Stalin faction accepted ex-oppositionists back
into the party if they publicly accepted the "General Line". The Stalinist
group felt so confident of their supremacy in the party that they allowed
Zinoviev, Bukharin, Preobrazhenskii and Piatakov to address the congress.
Bukharin and Rykov were on the Central Committee of the party. On the other
hand, new dissident elements which surfaced between 1929 and 1932 were
ruthlessly suppressed. (Page 19) The party leadership were able to suppress
what few oppositionists were left with little opposition from the mass of party
members who were not threatened by such activity. (Page 20)



THE KIROV CASE

Stalin took advantage of the assassination of Kirov to finally eliminate all
opposition in 1935-36. I say "took advantage of" because in a special appendix
(page 207), as well as in his main text, Getty convincingly argues that it is
most unlikely that Stalin ordered the Kirov murder. In fact, Kirov was a
staunch supporter of Stalin and, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a strong
advocate of suppressing the opposition. (Page 93)

The Kirov case illustrates Getty's points regarding methodology, "one finds
that, before the Cold War, no serious authority argued that Stalin was behind
the assassination." (page 207) General Orlov a K.G.B. defector first made this
claim in 1953 (in his The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes) and the accusation
was picked up and elaborated on. Reprinted works, which previously had not
accused Stalin of the crime, had this incorporated in new editions. (Page 207)

Indicative of the fact that the regime had no idea who had committed the crime
was the mindless retaliation which it carried out in a typically bureaucratic
Stalinist manner. "There was an immediate wave of arrests in Moscow and
Leningrad" and "several dozens of people already in prison (and identified as
White Guards) were executed in blind retaliation for the crime." (Page 209)

It could be argued that the state carried out such actions in order to cloud
its own complicity. This appears unlikely when some of the bizarre actions of
the regime are noted. "A number of "former people," including nobles and former
merchants, were ejected from Leningrad for violations of residence permits.
(According to Leningrad rumours, the police scanned the city directory in an
attempt to find someone to repress for the killing." (Page 209) (Note that
Getty clearly reports rumours as rumours.)

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION-1930s: THE MEMBERSHIP

Chaotic is not too strong a word to describe party administration in the late
1920s and early 1930s. During this period, party membership more than doubled
as the organisation attempted to cope with industrialisation and
collectivisation. The calibre of membership was abysmally low, "many of the 1.8
million new members had no idea of the party's history or programme and were
regarded as politically illiterate." Party surveys indicated that between 32%
to 60% of members did not read the party press. (Page 22) Indeed, many of these
new recruits did not even know the names of prominent party leaders! (Page 21)

The party had no accurate records of its own membership. People who were
members were not recorded and persons who had been expelled, died or had lapsed
their membership were still on party records. Many party cards were obtained by
deception or were in some way invalid. This was a serious situation given the
privileges which a card gave: high prices were paid by ex-Tsarist officials for
whom a card gave re-admission to society. (Page 33) The situation in the party
regions was even more chronically disorganised and Moscow had no accurate
information on what the party organisation situation was at the periphery. The
centre had very little control over the regions and many requests for
information on party members were simply ignored. (Pages 35/6) The Purges were
an attempt by the party centre to force the regions to comply with its
directives.

The impression most literature on the Soviet Union gives of the Communist
Party, is of a rigidly hierarchical organisation with an authoritarian top down
rule. This is how the party looked on paper but Getty shows that in practice
the situation was far different. How did the bureaucracy really work? "In fact
the chain of command collapsed more than it functioned. The Communist Party far
from having penetrated every corner of Russian life, was more an undisciplined
and disorganised force with little influence outside the cities." (Page 27)
Major population areas had no party cells and the party's lack of influence in
the countryside was condemned as a "grievous weakness". The party lacked
penetration of important organisations of teachers, students, police and even
the N.K.V.D. where one would have expected membership to be de facto
compulsory.



THE PURGES: A DEFINITION

For his primary source of information on the purges Getty draws on
the "Smolensk Archive". These, thousands of pages, of documents were looted by
the Wehrmacht in 1941 and transported to Germany. At the end of the war they
were captured by U.S. troops, microfilmed and brought to the West. There is no
reason to believe that the situation in the Western Province, which the
documents cover, was radically different from the situation in the U.S.S.R. in
general so Getty's comments probably have wide application.



In Russian the term chistka means clearing out or sweeping out. Proverka means
verification. The former refers to the removal of dead wood from the party
apparatus, the latter to the verification of party documentation. It is of the
first importance to understand that a purge refers only to measures taken
against party members. "No political or nonpolitical trial was ever called a
purge, and under no circumstances were operations, arrests or terror involving
nonparty citizens referred to as purges. A party member of the time

[herr7]

THE PURGES: A DEFINITION

For his primary source of information on the purges Getty draws on
the "Smolensk Archive". These, thousands of pages, of documents were looted by
the Wehrmacht in 1941 and transported to Germany. At the end of the war they
were captured by U.S. troops, microfilmed and brought to the West. There is no
reason to believe that the situation in the Western Province, which the
documents cover, was radically different from the situation in the U.S.S.R. in
general so Getty's comments probably have wide application.



In Russian the term chistka means clearing out or sweeping out. Proverka means
verification. The former refers to the removal of dead wood from the party
apparatus, the latter to the verification of party documentation. It is of the
first importance to understand that a purge refers only to measures taken
against party members. "No political or nonpolitical trial was ever called a
purge, and under no circumstances were operations, arrests or terror involving
nonparty citizens referred to as purges. A party member of the time would have
been mystified by such a label." The mid-1930s "show trials" and the mass
arrests and police terror of the Ezhovshchina (discussed later) were not
referred to as purges in the Soviet Union. (Page 38)

Let us be absolutely clear what Getty is saying. He is saying that a precise
meaning is attached to the term purge, which should not be confused with
general party matters or events which took place entirely outside the party.
This is important, because in a review of Getty's work, in Ph.D. format, the
U.S. group Progressive Labor carry on using purge to cover all aspects of
repression in the U.S.S.R. and imply that Getty is also using it in this way.
By so doing they are able to dramatically lower the number of Soviet citizens
who were repressed in order to glorify Stalin's regime. ** This is just the
type of non-objective assessment that we need to reject. Getty is not saying
that many people were not condemned in many serious negations of socialist
democracy: simply that this was nothing to do with the chistka's. A purge, in
Getty's precise terms, is a "membership-accounting operation" (Page 41)

Purges of the party took place in 1919/21/24/25 but Getty concentrates on the
major membership screenings of 1933/35.



THE 1933 CHISTKA

What were the criteria used for excluding people from the party? The hiding of
non-peasant or proletarian social origins, if discovered, meant inevitable
expulsion. This did not mean that such elements were completely barred from the
party and even from a career within it. There was an attempt made to integrate
former enemies. (Page 44) The concealing of background was the offence.

Not surprisingly, party members were also expelled for consistent drunkenness,
corruption, abusing a position of authority, sexual crimes and theft. (Page 41)

The above categories were reasonably objective, clearly such offences were
incompatible with party membership. However, concepts such
as "bureaucratism", "shirkers", "self-seekers", and "weaklings" were much more
ambiguous. There was only a thin line between being a "bureaucrat" who
administered party directives with excessive vigour, or a "weakling" who failed
to apply party directives rigorously enough. . In effect, such categories gave
a green light for arbitrary denunciations. (Page 42)

A distinction was made between class enemies and those who led "rotten", for
example drunken, personal lives inappropriate to a Communist. The former could
not be reformed, the latter could. As always in the purges there was a tension
between the concern to expel degenerate elements and the use of excessively
prying intimate questions which could themselves disrupt party life.
Eventually, questions regarding housing, companions and personal possessions
were disallowed. (Page 44)

Expulsion from the party was not irrevocable. There was an elaborate appeals
procedure for those purged which extended from local level to Moscow. In fact,
the records show, many party members succeeded in having their membership
restored. Sometimes the expulsion was rescinded but with a warning as to future
conduct. (Page 43)

Non-party people were not generally admitted to purge committees, but allowed
to participate in various open meetings not directly concerned with the purges.
An intense struggle took place between the party centre and the regions. This
struggle was complex. The centre was eager to encourage mass participation in
order to attack, what they saw as indolent and incompetent local and regional
centres, from below whilst the latter wished to protect their "own people".
Furthermore, support existed for some local and regional bureaucrats in the
centre which further eroded central control. In short, the documents present a
picture of the C.PS.U. as far from the monolithic bloc which it pretended to be
and which was accepted by Western researchers.

The previous "open door" recruitment policy led to the chistka of 1933.
Categories to be purged ranged from "class aliens" to "moral degenerates", but
they reveal an explicit concern to rid the party of politically unreliable
members.

Officially, the purge was supposed to last from June 1st 1933 to November 1st a
period of five months. In fact, it did mot end until December 26th 1935 and
even by then had only been completed in the main areas and not even begun in
some minor ones. "It seems that the chistka fell victim to desultory conduct,
apathy or even sabotage at the hands of local secretaries." Page 53)



This is an incredible contrast to the "totalitarian" thesis which we have been
fed by Western commentators. It appears that around 18% of the party were
expelled, the great majority of whom had joined since 1929. It appears, then,
that the purge was not directed against old oppositionists. (Page 53) In
addition the party lost 15% of its members during 1933/34 because people had
either moved to another region or simply left without informing the party
apparatus. (Page 55)

The 1933 purge having failed the central apparatus decided in 1935 to verify
party documents.





THE 1935 PROVERKA

It was difficult for Moscow even to obtain a reply from many local bodies.
(Page 53) By May 1935 the Central Committee had given up on them and planned
a "coordinated national verification of party documents" which investigations
had shown were in an absolute shambles with tens of thousands of cards
unaccounted for. The C.C. also blamed itself for handing out blank cards. No
one had been allowed to join the party since January 1933 and this was extended
until November 1936. Ezhov and Malenkov were put in charge of the verification
with the forlorn hope that order would be restored in two to three months.
(Pages 58/61)

Once again, the party centre found that administrators did not want to allocate
any but the most junior figures to the task and were concerned not to lose
competent administrators whose credentials were dubious. Some areas were
ordered to repeat rushed verifications and the C.C. finally started removing
local level administrators who were less than enthusiastic about the proverka.
(Page 66) The C.C. used the mass membership in order to sandwich local
leaderships from above and below. (Pages 75/7) All of the C.C.s tactics appear
to have been unable to overcome the reluctance of the party machine. The
proverka ran six months rather than three, was still incomplete and had a
national attrition rate of 9.1% mainly for personal reasons. "If the proverka
was to be placed in the context of party purges after 1917, it would rank as
one of the mildest, even with the addition of figures resulting from its sister
operation, the 1936 Exchange of Party Documents".

[herr7]

THE 1935 PROVERKA

It was difficult for Moscow even to obtain a reply from many local bodies.
(Page 53) By May 1935 the Central Committee had given up on them and planned
a "coordinated national verification of party documents" which investigations
had shown were in an absolute shambles with tens of thousands of cards
unaccounted for. The C.C. also blamed itself for handing out blank cards. No
one had been allowed to join the party since January 1933 and this was extended
until November 1936. Ezhov and Malenkov were put in charge of the verification
with the forlorn hope that order would be restored in two to three months.
(Pages 58/61)

Once again, the party centre found that administrators did not want to allocate
any but the most junior figures to the task and were concerned not to lose
competent administrators whose credentials were dubious. Some areas were
ordered to repeat rushed verifications and the C.C. finally started removing
local level administrators who were less than enthusiastic about the proverka.
(Page 66) The C.C. used the mass membership in order to sandwich local
leaderships from above and below. (Pages 75/7) All of the C.C.s tactics appear
to have been unable to overcome the reluctance of the party machine. The
proverka ran six months rather than three, was still incomplete and had a
national attrition rate of 9.1% mainly for personal reasons. "If the proverka
was to be placed in the context of party purges after 1917, it would rank as
one of the mildest, even with the addition of figures resulting from its sister
operation, the 1936 Exchange of Party Documents".



THE EXCHANGE OF PARTY DOCUMENTS: 1936

Just as the inadequacies of the 1933 chistka led to the 1935 proverka the 1936
exchange was a recognition of the deficiencies of the proverka.

"The goal was for each member to have a clean, unerased, unaltered and
uniformly filled in party card that corresponded to an accurate record in the
organisations files." No one who did not already have a valid card could obtain
one in the exchange. The aim was to remove passive members. Once again the
operation overran its allotted time with, it appears, less than 2% of members
being removed. (Pages 88/91) Once again the party apparatus proved to be an
unwieldy and incompetent machine.

Chistka and proverka were organisational methods to deal with what were
essentially political problems: the extremely low cultural and political level
of the great majority of party cadre. However, there was a concern within the
party to emphasise political education.



PARTY WORK - PARTY METHODS

The hectic pace of day to day party work had meant that political education had
tended to be neglected. Zhdanov emphasised that this had led to a bureaucratic
type of work in the party with too many decisions being made by narrowly based
leadership bodies. The party personnel, particularily at local level, were, or
had become, economic administrators rather than genuine Communist cadre. Before
his death Kirov had asserted that "nine-tenths" of the party's problems could
be solved by mass education. There is no doubt that Stalin endorsed these views
in a number of major public speeches between 1934/5. Zhdanov was awarded the
Order of Lenin and this could hardly have been done without senior leadership
approval. (Pages 98/104)

Despite its knowledge of the abysmal quality of much of the cadre the party
leadership tended to rely solely on repression unaccompanied by mass education.
Zhdanov complained that such methods "had nothing in common with Leninist
leadership". (Page 106) On the other hand, reflecting a tension within the
party leadership, Ezhov was a strong defender of the 1935 proverka and 1936
Exchange. A significant campaign which took place to restore expelled cadres to
party membership may also be indicative of inner-party conflict.



THE OPPOSITION

A year after the shooting of Kirov Stalin decided to use the event to finish
off the various remnants of opposition and had the N.K.V.D. forge the necessary
evidence. Trotskyists were a special target because of Trotsky's communications
with Soviet oppositionists (via his son Leon Sedov) and his success in
organising a clandestine "united oppositional bloc" in 1932.

This was no more than a communication bloc, but The regime was only too happy
to define the call for a political revolution to remove the bureaucratic elite
as "terrorist" activity. The N.K.V.D. had infiltrated the organisation, and
Stalin and Ezhov used it as "evidence" to finally rid themselves of Zinoviev
and Kamenev. The 1936 show trials, with their absurd charges, ritual
denunciations and death sentences, appear to have been meant as a final warning
to oppositionists, and especially ex-Trotskyists. (Page 119/23)

This was reinforced with further trials in January 1937 of Piatakov and Radek,
ex-Trotskyists who had held top positions in the Soviet government only months
before. (Page 133) It is indicative of Getty's iconoclastic approach that he
argues that this shows "radical antibureaucratic forces had won the upper hand
in Moscow." (Page 133)

In fact, there appears to have been an attempt by sections of the bureaucracy,
for example Molotov, to engage grass roots support in order to better pursue
bureaucratic infighting. (Page 135) The arguments however, appear to have been
contained mainly within the Communist Party apparatus unlike in the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China where mass protest was protracted and
public.

The party leadership used the mass support tactic in the local party committee
membership elections of 1937.



THE 1937 ELECTIONS

"Between March 6 and 25, numerous articles in Pravda put forth the
slogan "Under the Banner of Self-Criticism and Connection to the Masses!" as
the focus for the local party elections. (Page 153) The top apparatus clearly
hinted that if rank and file party members attacked the middle layers of the
apparatus they would be protected against any adverse reactions. Some local
secretaries were removed by party activists but simply seem to have secured
other administrative jobs. (Page 153)



THE EZHOVSHCHINA

The Ezhovshchina, named after the head of the N.K.V.D. Ezhov, was a massive
terror operation mounted against the Soviet people which reached its zenith in
1937. No accusation was too absurd, or conversation too trivial, to result in
arrest and imprisonment. As Getty says, "Stalin used police repression
of "enemies of the people" to settle old scores and to destroy anyone he
chose." This is also true of other top leadership figures. (Page 172) The
Ezhovshchina built on its own momentum with endless "chains" of denunciations.
Todays denouncers became tomorrows denounced. Some people denounced dozens of
others in an attempt to make the Ezhovshchina appear absurd. (Page 173) The
Machiavellian nature of Soviet political life at this time is illustrated by a
quote from a local party official, later arrested,

"We endeavoured to expel as many people from the party as possible. We expelled
when there were no grounds for expulsion. We had one aim in view - to increase
the number of embittered people and thus increase the number of our allies."
(Page 177)

It is often suggested that the purpose of the Ezhovshchina was to remove
the "Old Bolsheviks" who had connections with 1917 in order for Stalin to build
an apparatus composed of personnel completely dependent on him for its
positions.

Getty believes that this may be too much of a conspiracy theory. A major aspect
of the Ezhovshchina's focus was the party leadership. In fact, "Old Bolsheviks
fell because of their leadership positions in 1937 and not because of their age
or past experience." (Page 176)

Was the Ezhovshchina an example of Sov

[herr7]

THE EZHOVSHCHINA

The Ezhovshchina, named after the head of the N.K.V.D. Ezhov, was a massive
terror operation mounted against the Soviet people which reached its zenith in
1937. No accusation was too absurd, or conversation too trivial, to result in
arrest and imprisonment. As Getty says, "Stalin used police repression
of "enemies of the people" to settle old scores and to destroy anyone he
chose." This is also true of other top leadership figures. (Page 172) The
Ezhovshchina built on its own momentum with endless "chains" of denunciations.
Todays denouncers became tomorrows denounced. Some people denounced dozens of
others in an attempt to make the Ezhovshchina appear absurd. (Page 173) The
Machiavellian nature of Soviet political life at this time is illustrated by a
quote from a local party official, later arrested,

"We endeavoured to expel as many people from the party as possible. We expelled
when there were no grounds for expulsion. We had one aim in view - to increase
the number of embittered people and thus increase the number of our allies."
(Page 177)

It is often suggested that the purpose of the Ezhovshchina was to remove
the "Old Bolsheviks" who had connections with 1917 in order for Stalin to build
an apparatus composed of personnel completely dependent on him for its
positions.

Getty believes that this may be too much of a conspiracy theory. A major aspect
of the Ezhovshchina's focus was the party leadership. In fact, "Old Bolsheviks
fell because of their leadership positions in 1937 and not because of their age
or past experience." (Page 176)

Was the Ezhovshchina an example of Soviet totalitarianism? Hardly. Many of
those charged could avoid arrest simply by moving. A lot of the warrants
were "just local stuff". People were promoted and then arrested. Ex-detainees
could achieve important posts upon release. The procedures were arbitrary and
reflected the party leadership responding to events rather than initiating
them. (Pages 173/9)

By January 1938 the C.C. were beginning to criticise "excesses" and "false
vigilance" in the Ezhovshchina campaign. In May 1938 Ezhov was appointed
Commissar of Water Transport and he was last seen publicly on January 22nd
1939. All mention of him was eliminated from the Soviet press. (Pages 185/9)



WERE THE PURGES EFFECTIVE?

Stalin and Zhdanov disagreed on the usefulness of the chistka and proverka,
although both admitted that they were beset by substantial problems.

Stalin,

"It cannot be said that the cleansings were not accompanied by grave mistakes.
There were, unfortunately, more mistakes than might have been expected.
Undoubtedly, we shall have no further need to resort to the method of mass
cleanings. Nevertheless, the cleanings of 1933-1936 were unavoidable and the
results, on the whole, were beneficial."



Zhdanov,

"The objectionable feature of the mass purges is that bearing as they do the
character of a campaign, they are attended by many mistakes, primarily by the
infringement of the Leninist principle of an individual approach to people."
(Pages 191/2)



In effect Zhdanov had the last word as provisions for purges were removed from
the party rulebook.



CONCLUSION

Getty's book portrays the U.S.S.R. as far from being a rigidly centralised
state. The "totalitarian" thesis is, simply, untenable. The central Communist
party apparatus experienced major problems in ensuring its directives were
observed in the regional and local areas. The myth of the Bolshevik party as a
monolithic machine is further eroded by the clear evidence, from primary
sources, of substantial and protracted inner-party discussions and
disagreements.

A more objective picture of Joseph Stalin is emerging as a mediator cautiously
responding to party disputes. The "cult of personality" was certainly a useful
device to allow Stalin manoeuvrability, but it was also useful to the party as
a whole in smoothing over profound political disputes. "Zhdanov could press for
the primacy of party work; Ezhov could call for more vigilance; Molotov could
demand faster industrial tempos; Ordzhonikidze could call for moderation; and
all of them could invoke quotations from the great Stalin in support."
Ironically, when Stalin attempted to denounce the personality cult in regard to
a sycophantic book, supposedly about his childhood, his remarks were
suppressed.!

In short, Getty's book is essential reading not only for those interested in
Soviet history of the 1930s but the complex development of that society.





* All page numbers refer to Getty's book.



** PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY, Progressive Labor Magazine, Spring 1981, Vol 14, No
1. Published by P.L.P. G.P.O. Box 808, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11202.

[rp03]

Trudno bagatelizować doświadczenia Zinowiewa i jego przestrogi.
Dają one do myślenia, myślę jednak że Zinowiew idzie zbyt daleko
i jego poglądów nie potwierdza fala imigrantów ciągnących z całego świata do
Rosji 8 -)

Cześć jego mapięci