political sociologist

[Gość: sic]

December 14, 2001

The Arrogance of Occupation


By: Lev Grinberg *

This last month has been marked by a dramatic change in the US and European
attitudes towards the Israeli occupation. The US first, and subsequently the
EU, have adopted the Israeli view that the core of the problem is Yasser
Arafat. Bombing Arafat helicopters, confining him to the besieged city of
Ramallah, and the recent occupation of parts of the city, have nothing to do
with Israeli security or "the struggle against terror". The Israeli Government
targeted Arafat, and succeeded to convince first the Israeli public and now the
international community that this policy is legitimate.

Present Israeli action against Arafat was preceded by the construction of an
arrogant and paternalist discourse on the "character of Arafat". We, Israelis,
are at liberty to dismiss one leader and appoint another in his place. This
arrogance, in relation to Arafat, highlights the underlying dimension of the
failed Oslo peace process and the Camp David Summit. The discourse labeling
Arafat as the essence of the Palestinian problem did not achieve predominance
by virtue of the campaign waged by the settlers' leaders in the occupied
territories and the extreme right. Rather, it is the discourse of former Prime
Minister Ehud Barak and his foreign minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, developed after
the Camp David Summit aiming to hide their resounding failure. The over-
simplified reduction of the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the
character of Arafat, and hence the self-evident magic-wand solution
of "removing the obstacle", was constructed by the leaders of the "Left",
following their need to explain away the fiasco of their term of office.

The arrogant discourse is reflected in the urge to enthrone in Arafat's place
an alternative, more "obliging" leader, and in the paternalistic argument
that "we know what is better for the Palestinians". In effect, each wing of
Israel's political spectrum opts for a leader who would best serve its
respective purposes. The "moderates" in the Government prefer a moderate,
dressed in a business suit who would consent to deal in a rational Western
manner, and the "extremists" fancy a Hamas type who could legitimize an open
and sanguineous war against "the Palestinian evil". The two camps share the
same discourse that the burden for resolving the crisis is on Arafat's
shoulders, while simultaneously avoiding Israel's own responsibility. In fact
the Government is fighting Arafat and his forces, preventing him and the
Palestinian authorities from succeeding in any possible effective struggle
against extremist Islam, because Palestinian extremism and terror facilitates
hiding the core problem of occupation.

Arrogance and paternalism is the underlying effect of occupation, which is not
peculiar to the Israeli situation. European settlers that occupied regions
inhabited by non-Europeans have developed similar discourses. The local
inhabitants were classified as inferior and primitive, and deserving no
individual rights, certainly no collective right to their homeland. Such has
been the state of affairs in Israel \ Palestine since the onset of the
colonization, and the Oslo peace accords introduced no fundamental change. The
land belongs to us, Israelis, we are its masters, and the Palestinians must
accept whatever we are benevolent enough to offer them. The indignation of
the "Left" towards the Palestinians following Camp David is over their
ingratitude and their refusal to accept Barak's "generous" offer. The support
of the US for the Israeli attitude caused despair among the Palestinians.

The Oslo accords were shaped according to the hegemonic arrogance of
occupation. Having been initially "granted" Jericho and Gaza, Arafat was
placed "on probation". If he passed the test, he would be awarded additional
territory; if not, the process would be halted, as Rabin proclaimed (Netanyahu
was more direct, as in the slogan he coined: "If they provide results, they'll
get more, if they don't, they won't!"). Resumption of the Oslo process depended
upon Arafat's "good conduct", his grades to be determined by Israel. Arafat was
expected to deliver what the Israeli army had failed to: security to the
Israelis. However, he wasn't entitled to protect the security or independence
of his people. Hence Arafat's authority was not derived from the Palestinian
people and their legitimate rights, rather from Israel's consent to his
presence; hence it is also feasible to expel him.

What did Israel undertake in return? Merely to vacate the larger Palestinian
towns (and some land in their vicinity, as Israel found fit) thus, allowing
Arafat to appoint governors and policemen, but not enabling territorial
contiguity or sovereignty. Israel did not take upon itself relinquishment of
military control, the creation of a Palestinian state, the granting of economic
independence, withdrawal to 1967 borders, and certainly not the resolution of
volatile issues such as Jerusalem or the Palestinian refugees. Israel did not
even halt or slow down its colonization drive in the occupied territories. The
entire agreement rested upon Israeli goodwill. Thus, the second indispensable
pre- condition for the success of the Oslo accords was Rabin's retention of
power. Rabin's assassination and Arafat's failure to provide for Israel's
security rendered the Oslo accords doomed.

Ariel Sharon is completing now the historical project that he started in 1982
with the occupation of Lebanon. He is working with the same logic based on
military power used to destroy the legitimate representation of the Palestinian
people. In the case of Lebanon, he was stopped by the international community
that prevented him from entering the besieged Beirut. However, he succeeded to
enthrone Bashir Jumayel as president of Lebanon. As will be recalled, Jumayel
was assassinated within days after his appointment, while the Israeli army was
drawn into the 18-year occupation and fight against Lebanese militias that
ended in Israel's forcible removal from Lebanon.

The Palestinians learned well the lessons of Lebanon, and are weary of the Oslo
accords that they regard as an alibi for continued occupation. Arafat did not
instigate the Intifada, although he may endeavor to lead it so as to retain his
status as the leader of the people for whom he is accountable. Unless we, the
Israelis, cast off our arrogant mode of thinking, and our position as an
occupying power, the present cycle of bloodshed can only intensify, with Arafat
and even more so, in his absence. Europe, that has witnessed the arrogance of
colonialism as a dominant power, should not return now to adopt similar
attitudes even when their source is the Jewish State. International
intervention to stop Sharon is urgently needed for the sake of the Palestinians
and the Israelis as well.

* Lev Grinberg is a political sociologist, and the Director of the Humphrey
Institute for Social Research at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.