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July 15, 2003, 9:40 a.m.
Arafat Must Go
The key to Mideast process progress.

By Ami Horowitz



The optimists thought that Fatah, represented by Arafat and
Abbas, had decided to give the roadmap a chance to work, but
instead Arafat is playing a two-headed game. While Abbas is
performing as the peacemaker, his organization has continued
the violence. Despite the "ceasefire" sniper attacks continue
to create an ominous cloud over Israelis. Fatah has taken
credit for several of these shootings. Abbas's true intentions
are irrelevant, he does not have the ability to achieve any of
the goals he set out in Aqaba. Arafat controls the military and
political apparatus and is using the former to engage in
continued acts of terrorism The option of Israel ridding
themselves of Arafat is still a viable option. Arafat has
proven himself time and time again to be, not a statesman, but
a cold-blooded terrorist who once threw a crippled American out
of a boat to drown in his wheelchair and once massacred Israeli
children in their kindergarten. His Fatah organization has
eclipsed Hamas in the number of terror attacks over the past
two years. Now is the time to free ourselves of this most
dangerous of menaces.

The debate raging in Israel over what to do with Arafat is
mostly focused on what the result would be — either politically
or physically — if Arafat left the scene. One thing that's
certain: The era of one man dominating every aspect of
Palestinian society and enjoying a near-total concentration of
power would be over. Though Abbas is the prime minister, it is
doubtful that he would have the ability to lead a Palestinian
Authority without Arafat. When Arafat acceded to the creation
of a prime minister, he denuded the office of any real
authority, leaving Abbas without the ability to carve out a
power base. Abbas is a technocrat whose expertise has been
focused more inward, toward economic development and reform of
the political process. His support comes primarily from the
Palestinian democrats, the Gulf states, and many Western
countries. While support from those quarters is not
unimportant, such backing is not nearly enough to make Abbas a
true player in a post-Arafat world. He is perceived as too
moderate and a figment of the Bush administration (as is shown
clearly by his 2 percent approval rating). He would be unable
to muster the muscle and numbers needed in order to make a
solid play for the Palestinian leadership.

Without Arafat or a real prime minister, the Palestinian
Authority will most likely fall apart. Chaos and violence will
reign, leading up to a new leadership. Such a situation could
have been averted if Arafat had groomed an heir-apparent,
thereby giving the anointed a measure of credibility both
within the Palestinian community and before the world
generally. Unfortunately for the Palestinian people, Arafat's
hubris and megalomania have kept him from preparing such a
protégé.

Two major fault lines will determine what shape a new
Palestinian leadership will take. They are the secular and
religious rift, and the "old Tunisian" elite and young Turks
divide. In almost any scenario, I believe it would leave Israel
in no worse circumstances, and in some ways measurably better
off than they are now.

It's important to understand that even with Arafat in place,
Israel has never had a partner to negotiate with. At times
there were the niceties of diplomatic chatter (such as the
current incarnation of the peace process); at other times there
was a veneer of security cooperation (which was hollow and
ultimately meaningless). In both cases, Arafat was always going
through the motions to seem like a statesman, while in reality
signing documents that would ultimately snuff out the lives of
Israeli civilians. It is quite possible that, in a post-Arafat
world, the radical elements within Palestinian society would
take control of the territories. These organizations fall into
two categories, the Islamist and the secular. The Islamists are
represented, primarily, by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Islamic
Jihad is an operational entity, not a political one. They exist
to run terrorist operations and have no ability to rule. Hamas,
on the other hand, has two arms — the operational end and
the "social" one. In addition to their terrorist operations,
they have an extensive web of social welfare organizations (all
created to service their operations capability) and therefore
would be in a better position to replace Arafat. While they are
a popular and well-funded organization — primarily from an
extensive array of worldwide charities, as well as fiscal
backing from Iran — they would find taking over the territories
a challenging task. They would face difficulty fighting against
both local warlords and the secular radicals. They do not have
full access to the military infrastructure that has been
stockpiled over the last decade by the Palestinian Authority,
and simply do not have the foot soldiers.

The other radical organization is the secular Tanzim. The
Tanzim were created by Arafat as a paramilitary force and an
offshoot of Arafat's Fatah organization. This provided for
Arafat a level of distance, and therefore a degree of
deniability when it came to terrorism, despite Arafat's direct
financing of the organization. They are made up of young
radicals who were led, prior to his arrest, by Marwan
Barghouti. Barghouti has long been a critic of the "Tunisians,"
the Palestinian old guard, and has been on the forefront for
pushing reform among the Palestinian Authority. Along with
coordinating suicide attacks, the Tanzim are also in control of
many of the West Bank and Gaza municipalities, which has given
them experience in the art of governance. As a result of their
relationship with Arafat, they are much closer to the military
infrastructure, which gives them a larger amount of credibility
when it comes to taking control in a post-Arafat Palestine.
Like Hamas, they openly embrace terrorism, and one would hope
that the international community would see them for the
terrorists they are — but probably they won't.

Another scenario would be that the former leaders of the
various security forces would create their own enclaves in
their areas of greatest support, and rule as warlords. The most
prominent of them, although not the only ones, are Mohammed
Dahlan in Gaza, and Jibril Rajoub (who has recently been asked
by Abbas to come back into service) in the West Bank. They are
members of the younger and more moderate guard and — thanks to
their position within the Palestinian Authority security
framework — have access to arms and the thousands of soldiers
necessary to control their particular areas of influence.
Furthermore, their forces have been trained and funded by the
CIA. These two in particular were the golden boys of
Washington, and in some ways Israel. Both are fluent in Hebrew
and are considered moderate forces. Unfortunately, of late they
have become more militant, and Israel has intelligence that
they have at least indirectly participated in the planning of
some of the suicide attacks. Having said that, if they were to
control their areas of influence, they once again could be
moderating forces, especially with the help of Egypt in the
case of Dahlan, and Jordan in the case of Rajoub. In such a
scenario, Israel might be able to strike separate interim deals
with different warlords, allowing the international community
to assist in the development of a longer lasting and more
politically stable "national" government.

Israel cannot be expected to negotiate and strike