kiedys zadal Hitler

[robisc]

Jestem zwolennikiem wprowadzenia euro, bo moze to byc w sumie najlepsza rzecz
jaka nas spotka w UE, ale ten ton nie podoba mi sie absolutnie.

KE żąda od Polski terminu wprowadzenia euro

Komisja Europejska wezwała nowy polski rząd do ustalenia daty wprowadzenia
euro. Unijny komisarz do spraw polityki gospodarczej Joaquin Alumnia
podkreślił, że Polska powinna też obniżyć deficyt budżetowy.

Według raportu komisji, Polska jest jedynym z 10 nowych państw Unii, które nie
przedstawiło terminu wprowadzenia euro. Komisja uważa, że polski plan dojścia
do euro powinien zostać szybko opracowany.


Komisarz Alumnia nie chciał oceniać deklaracji prezydenta-elekta Lecha
Kaczyńskiego, który chce w sprawie wejścia do unii walutowej zorganizować
referendum. Alumnia przypominał też, że Polska, ratyfikując w referendum
traktat akcesyjny, przyjęła wszystkie warunki członkostwa, w tym i euro. Do
ustalenia pozostaje jedynie data rezygnacji ze złotego. Komisarz zaniepokojony
też jest zapowiedzią nowej minister finansów zwiększenia deficytu budżetowego.

www.bankier.pl/wiadomosci/article.html?article_id=1358874

dobre...a podobno nie ma za co nas ganic!

[robisc]

07:06 04.11.2005 Nr 2886, kolumna 1
UE | Kraje Dziesiątki niechętne nowej walucie
Boimy się euro
Tomasz Goss-Strzelecki

Rośnie niechęć mieszkańców nowych państw Unii Europejskiej wobec planów zamiany
ich walut na euro. Taki wniosek zawiera raport, który opublikuje dziś Komisja
Europejska.

Dane są alarmujące. Aż 46% obywateli państw Dziesiątki boi się negatywnych
konsekwencji wprowadzenia wspólnej waluty. To o 5 pkt proc. więcej niż rok temu.
Równocześnie o 6 pkt proc., do 38%, spadł odsetek osób, które liczą, że zamiana
lokalnych walut na euro będzie korzystna.

Komisja Europejska tłumaczy, że niechęć do euro wzrosła po fiasku referendów w
sprawie unijnej konstytucji i w wyniku sporów Wielkiej Brytanii, Francji i
państw Europy Wschodniej o podział unijnej pomocy. Istotne znaczenie ma też
mizerny wzrost gospodarczy w strefie euro, nawet kilkakrotnie słabszy od
notowanego w poszczególnych krajach nowej Dziesiątki. Unijni urzędnicy zalecą
rządom tych państw przeprowadzenie kampanii informacyjnej, która ma poprawić
wizerunek euro w oczach społeczeństwa.

Komisja alarmuje też, że kraje, które chcą przyjąć euro w pierwszej kolejności,
czyli Estonia, Litwa i Słowenia (w 2007 r.) oraz Łotwa, Cypr i Malta (2008 r.),
spóźniają się z przygotowaniami. Nie opracowały np. technicznych procedur
wprowadzenia wspólnej waluty do obrotu. Trzem największym nowym krajom Unii -
czyli Polsce, Węgrom i Czechom - Bruksela nie ma czego wytknąć, ponieważ euro
planują przyjąć dopiero po 2010 r.

Bloomberg

[abram777]

Unijni urzędnicy zalecą
> rządom tych państw przeprowadzenie kampanii informacyjnej, która ma poprawić
> wizerunek euro w oczach społeczeństwa.

A więc dla społeczeństwa wcale nie jest oczywiste, że ludność skorzysta na wprowadzeniu EU i trzeba zaprządz propagandę.
Doświadczenia wielu narodów mówią, że zwykły obywatel wiele traci na wprowadzeniu nowej waluty, choćby poporzez zaokrąglanie wszystkich przeliczeń w górę. Drożeje wszystko i to znacznie. Ale najlepiej niech wypowiedzą się Polacy mieszkający lub przebywających tam, gdzie obowiązuje już wspólna waluta.

p. Klaus

[pepe49]

P. Klaus jest zdecydowanie przeciwko wprowadzeniu euro. Czytałeś kiedyś wątek z
jego wypowiedzi z Cato Institute, bodajże z Wash P.?

Klaus z Kaczyńskim są postrachem w Brukseli

[wislok1]

Kiedyś w niemieckiej telewizji był reportaż z Pragi. Mówili o Klausie jak
Wyborcza o Rydzyku.

Czechy zdecydowanie wyraziły RADOŚĆ ze ...

[wislok1]

...zwycięstwa Kaczyńskiego.
Klaus już wysłał zaproszenie

Jak p. Klaus argumentuje przeciw euro

[pepe49]

www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj24n1-2/cj24n1-2-16.pdf
Oczywiście należałoby przeczytać wszystko stąd:
www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj24n1-2/cj24n1-2.html
i tu:
www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v26n1/money.pdf
Wyszukiwarka cat.org Klaus i euro i wyrzuci więcej.
Może ktoś poczyta i potłumaczy? Robi?

[bush_w_wodzie]

robisc napisał:

> Jestem zwolennikiem wprowadzenia euro, bo moze to byc w sumie najlepsza rzecz
> jaka nas spotka w UE, ale ten ton nie podoba mi sie absolutnie.
>

czy ja wiem. tak to juz jest ze jesli sie podpisuje jakas umowe to potem druga
strona ma prawo wymagac jej dotrzymania. porownanie z hitlerem jest chyba bardzo
nieadekwatne w tym kontekscie

[hopp]

- czy Polska wstępowała dobrowolnie do Rzeszy?

- czy korzystała z fuduszy wypracowywanych przez podatników niemieckich?

- czy Bruksela już zaczęła bombardować nasze tory i mosty?

- czy są jakieś szczyty głupoty niezdobyte jeszcze przez rodaków?

[robisc]

czy to oznacza, ze wciaz niepodlegle panstwo ma uznawac bezzasadne "zadania" KE?
mamy przyjac euro, OK; traktay nie precyzuje jednak kiedy, wiec mamy prawo
suwerennie te date okreslic, czy to sie KE podoba, czy nie; a z argiemntem o
"pomocy" niemieckiego podatnika, w swietle ostatnich doniesien Rzepy, to bym na
razie mocno nie szarzowal

artykuł p. Klausa

[pepe49]

Jeden z wskazywanych linkami artykułów. Co prawda kiedyś jako pieniądz
funkcjonowało tylko złoto i było dobrze. Potem waluta się znowu (od muszelek)
zróżnicowała (pojedyńcze banki), teraz państwowe banki, ale czy euro zmieni
cokolwiek, oprócz tego, że zamiast wielu banków psujących walutę w różnych
krajach, będzie jeden bank psujący walutę w tych samych krajach?

Może ktoś szybki w tłumaczeniu przetłumaczyć tekst?


THE FUTURE OF THE EURO: AN
OUTSIDER’S VIEW
Va´clav Klaus
My perspective on the European Monetary Union and the future
of the euro is based on a special combination of three elements: (1)
my strong belief in the standard economic argumentation summarized
in the well-known theory of optimum currency areas, (2) my
citizenship in a small Central European country that has just joined
the European Union and will at some point be a member of the
EMU, and (3) my current political role that forces me to reveal my
position on my country’s EMU membership.
Basic Arguments
I am convinced that the driving force behind European monetary
unification has been strictly political, not economic. This often-used
argument can be supported by my own experience based on numerous
explicit conversations about it with key European political leaders.
The economic arguments have been marginalized or taken only
very superficially. The political ambition has been quite dominant.
The euro has always been considered to be a useful instrument for the
creation of the European political union.
Many statements of that kind can be quoted. European President
Romano Prodi, in an interview on CNN (January 1, 2002), explicitly
stated: “The introduction of the euro is not economic at all. It is a
completely political step. . . . The historical significance of the euro is
to construct a bipolar economy in the world.” Two years before that,
in the Financial Times (April 9,1999), he said: “The two pillars of the
national state are the sword and the currency and we changed that.”
Cato Journal, Vol. 24, Nos. 1–2 (Spring/Summer 2004). Copyright © Cato
Institute. All
rights reserved.
Va´clav Klaus is President of the Czech Republic. This article is an updated
version of his
closing address at the Cato Institute’s 21st Annual Monetary Conference,
cosponsored with The
Economist, November 20, 2003.
171
Gerhard Schröeder, in March 1998, still an opposition leader, said
that “the Euro is a sick premature infant, the result of an over-hasty
monetary union.” After eight months as a German Chancellor, he
made a different statement: “Our future begins on January 1, 1999.
The euro is Europe’s key to the 21st century. The era of solo national
fiscal and economic policy is over.” Spanish Prime Minister Felipé
Gonzales said in May 1998: “The single currency is a decision of an
essentially political character. . . .We need a united Europe. We must
never forget that the euro is an instrument for this project.” I can
quote indefinitely but the words will be almost the same.
I believe that the largest part of the positive economic impact of
European integration (as well as of EU enlargement) has come
through the liberalization of trade and investment and has been already
obtained. The marginal contribution of further economic or
noneconomic unification will be close to zero, if not negative. Because
of that, the birth of the euro and the enlargement of the EU in May
2004 do not represent any breakthroughs. I agree with Patrick Minford
(2002: 36) that “trade patterns are determined by comparative
advantage, not by monetary factors.” I also agree with him that the
role of the exchange rate risk as a factor determining foreign investment
and the cost of capital is relatively small (Minford 2002: 29–32).
Trade does not need to have the same currency on both sides of the
transaction.
To look at the economic performance of the eurozone in the first
years of the euro’s existence, even the pro-European activists must
admit that the overall expectations of an economic boost and the
claims that the introduction of the euro would speed up economic
growth have not been fulfilled. This is not a surprise for me and, to be
fair, not everyone had such expectations. Rudiger Dornbusch, always
sharp and consistent, whom we miss very much, wrote in 1996 that
the “EMU moved from an improbable and bad idea to a bad idea that
is about to come true.” Many of us knew then and know now that the
formation of a regional common currency is neither a necessary, nor
a sufficient condition for healthy economic growth. It seems, on the
contrary, that Europeans have imprisoned themselves in a rigid monetary
arrangement that has led to a loss of a nonnegligible part of their
originally existing flexibility.
When we look at the current European monetary and overall
economic problems we have to—at least analytically—differentiate
two issues: (1) the impact of a monetary union upon nonidentical
countries, but countries that are at a similar level of economic development,
and (2) the impact of entry into a monetary union of a
country that is at a different level of economic development than the
CATO JOURNAL
172
dominant part of the union and is undergoing dynamic structural
changes in an effort to catch up with its more developed partners.
Costs and Benefits of a Monetary Union among
Similar but Nonidentical Countries
The conditions formulated four decades ago by Robert Mundell
(1961), as regards the optimum currency area, are widely recognized.
Their fulfillment guarantees a favorable balance between costs and
benefits of a monetary union, their nonfulfillment does not. They
include—
• the sufficient extent of labor mobility among parts of the monetary
union;
• the lowest possible degree of a wage rigidity inside individual
countries;
• similar endowments for factors of production and a symmetry of
exogenous shocks and impulses;
• the existence of an adequate fiscal compensation mechanism.
These conditions are currently not fulfilled in Europe. Labor mobility
is very low in the EMU compared with other monetary unions,
and the required downward wage and price flexibility is almost nonexistent.
The rigidities of the European labor market are well known
and well documented (see Heckman 2003).
When labor markets do not function well, flexible exchange rates
are all important. The asymmetric shocks and impulses appear again
and again, which is not surprising because the eurozone countries are
different. The size of fiscal transfers at the EMU level is, however,
very small. There exists some international solidarity among EU
members but its level cannot be compared with the solidarity in
national states.
The assumed benefits of monetary unification—the reduction of
transactions costs and exchange risk—will in reality be rather small.
With the current level of financial and banking sophistication, transactions
costs are saved only in tourist transactions, not in other fields.
I agree with Irish economist A. Coughlan (2003: 16) that “the
economic advantages of being able to travel within the eurozone
without having to change currency, and of being able to compare
prices more easily between eurozone countries, are small compared
to the economic disadvantages.” I especially agree with his argument
AN OUTSIDER’S VIEW
173
(which I myself use quite often) that “people may be on holidays in
other eurozone countries for 2–3 weeks a year, but they had to be
working for the remaining 48–49 weeks at home.” The above-average
benefits can be gained exclusively by the permanently traveling EU
politicians and their bureaucrats.
We should not forget that to adopt the euro does not mean to adopt
a world cur

dok. artykułu

[pepe49]

We should not forget that to adopt the euro does not mean to adopt
a world currency but only a regional one where the exchange risk
basically remains. It does not mean, of course, that I would suggest to
create a world currency along the lines of recent suggestions of Mundell.
The costs of monetary unification are important. They include the
loss of an independent monetary policy, which mostly means the loss
of interest rate setting power, and the loss of exchange rate movements.
When I say this, it is not an advocacy of the policy of competitive
devaluations. I do not, however, believe that the European
economies have sufficient alternative flexibility to avoid problems
resulting from such a rigid structure. To eliminate two important
policy variables-interest rates and exchange rates-means either to
rely on a textbook level of perfect microflexibility or to be prepared
for large fluctuations of the real economy, or to expect the acceleration
of fiscal transfers inside the monetary union.
Such perfect microflexibility does not exist. The sluggishness of
domestic prices and wages forces the exchange rate to be the shock
absorber, which is not the same as competitive devaluation. It is
easier, says President Robert McTeer of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, “for your exchange rate to adjust to your economy and policies
than for your economy and policies to adjust to a predetermined
exchange rate” (McTeer 2002). Coughlan’s arguments seem to be
persuasive: “1993-99 was the only period in the history of the Irish
state that it pursued an independent currency policy and allowed the
exchange rate to float. . . . The intelligent use of an independent currency
is the principal reason for the Irish economic boom, which has
attracted such international attention in recent years” (Coughlan
2003: 16).
I would like to mention two other phenomena, which I put on the
side of costs. First, a single currency (without fiscal unification) creates
an environment for fiscal irresponsibility. We can even talk-
together with Anthony de Jasay-about fiscal free-riding: “Each
member state of the eurozone is caught between two alternatives-to
engage in fiscal free-riding or to be the victim of free-riding by the
others” (de Jasay 2003: 2). In the same spirit, Peter Kenen (1996)
rightly asked whether the currency domain can be bigger than the
fiscal domain. I do not think it can. When a country has its own
CATO JOURNAL
174
currency, fiscal irresponsibility carries its own punishment. Such punishment
does not, however, exist in the current eurozone. The fiscal
deficits in some of those countries after the establishment of the euro
seem to support this argument.
Second, European monetary unification is the Trojan horse for
overall harmonization of economic rules, policies, and laws in the EU.
I am convinced that any eurozone problem will be in the future
interpreted as a consequence of the lack of harmonization (of nominal
unification) and will lead to another wave of a creeping harmonization.
Hans Eichel, the German minister of finance, made it quite
clear: “The currency union will fall apart if we don’t follow through
with the consequence of such a union. I am convinced we will need
a common tax system” (The Sunday Times, December 23, 2001).
Such an unnecessary and counterproductive harmonization (and centralization),
which tries to eliminate comparative advantages of individual
countries, is one of the most worrisome elements of the whole
European integration process.
Comparing the above-mentioned costs and benefits, I am afraid
that it is not true that the costs of the European monetary unification
do not exceed the benefits. They do. Sluggish economic growth in
Europe since the introduction of the euro is not a proof of that, but
it is not an accident either.
Costs and Benefits of Entry into a Monetary Union
of a Transition Country that Needs Real, Not Only
Nominal, Convergence
Eight Central and East European countries became EU members
in May 2004, and in their accession treaties with the EU, signed in
April 2003 in Athens, they promised to enter the eurozone.
Many people in these countries look forward to it. They expect to
gain from euro stability, from decreasing the exchange rate risk, and
from a credible monetary policy. I am struck that they do not see the
other side of such an arrangement because it is more than evident
that the transition countries need maximum flexibility and should not
introduce any artificial rigidities. They should not for political reasons
take actions against their own economic interests.
The main costs for them will be the loss of an independent monetary
policy that should be-for the countries in transition, for the
countries undergoing radical structural changes, and for the countries
at a lower level of economic development-visibly different from the
policy of developed and more stable EU member countries of
AN OUTSIDER’S VIEW
175
Western Europe. It makes no economic sense for them to have the
same interest rate as Germany or France (not to open another topic-
the fact that ECB is not subject to any democratic control and has a
deflationary bias in its policy).
Once the transition countries join the EMU they will lose the
possibility of nominal exchange rate movements to adjust the real
exchange rate. Moreover, they must comply with the inflation and
interest rate targets of the Maastricht Treaty and with the Stability
and Growth Pact conditions concerning budget deficits. There is an
additional danger that there will be a very high risk of fixing the
exchange rates away from long-term equilibrium because the convergence
process will not be-in the moment of their entry into the
eurozone-completed. The result will be the insufficient final exchange
rates realignment (the problem we see with current eurozone
members as well).
I repeat that I am not an advocate of misusing the exchange rate
movements for competitiveness reasons. I myself at the end of 1990
radically devalued the Czechoslovak crown (but not in an attempt to
gain competitive advantage) and immediately after that introduced a
fixed exchange rate regime. I was afraid of setting an unsuitable
exchange rate level, but the belief in the use of the exchange rate as
an anchor for stabilizing inflation was then overwhelming. I was aware
of creating a dangerous rigidity that would constrain future responses
to internal and external pressures and impulses and tried to find an
optimal moment for abandoning such an arrangement. I have to
admit, however, that I did not find it (the floating of the Czech crown
in the spring 1997 came too late).
But such an exchange rate-based stabilization of inflation is not our
current task. The rate of inflation is very low and we need flexibility
in nominal variables, not their rigidity. One clever Czech economist,
then deputy minister of finance, Miroslav Koudelka, made 35 years
ago a point that I still remember: “When everything is frozen, you
may go skating but you cannot run a rational economic policy.” It was
an argument used in the Czechoslovak economic reform debates in
the 1960s and I believe it is valid now as well.
Rigidities of a monetary union and a growing implicit macroeconomic
disequilibrium will block real convergence and will create
“transfer economies” like East Germany after reunification (Sinn and
Westermann 2001). These economies, however, will be forced to exist
without adequate fiscal transfers because they are not available in the
contemporary EU.
My conclusion is that there is no need for these economies to rush
into the eurozone.
CATO JOURNAL
176
The Future of the Euro
The euro is here and is here to stay. I do not expect its end even if
I know that it is relatively easy to dismantle a monetary union. My
own e

odcinek ostatni

[pepe49]

CATO JOURNAL
176
The Future of the Euro
The euro is here and is here to stay. I do not expect its end even if
I know that it is relatively easy to dismantle a monetary union. My
own experience with the termination of the Czechoslovak monetary
union in February 1993 suggests that it can be done without serious
costs, smoothly and efficiently.
I expect, however, that to keep the European single currency will
be costly in terms of economic growth and in terms of inevitable
fiscal transfers aiming at compensating the weaker partners. It may
even generate unnecessary tensions among nations. We should be
aware of it.
References
Coughlan, A. (2003) “Some Reasons Why Joining the Euro Has Been a
Mistake for the Republic of Ireland.” The European Journal 10 (8): 16-18.
de Jasay, A. (2003) “Free-Riding on the Euro.” The Library of Economics
and Liberty, September 17 (www.econlib.org/library/columns/y2003/
Jasayeuro.html).
Heckman, J. J. (2003) “Flexibility, Job Creation and Economic Performance.”
Paper presented at the Munich Economic Summit, May 2.
Kenen, P. B. (1996) “Sorting Out Some EMU Issues.” Reprint No. 29,
Princeton University.
McTeer R. (2002) “A Skeptical Texan Wishes the Swooning Euro Well.”
European Affairs 1 (2).
Minford, P. (2002) Should Britain Join the Euro? Occasional Paper 126.
London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Mundell R. (1961) “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” American Economic
Review 51 (3): 657-65
Sinn, H. W., and Westermann, F. (2001) “Two Mezzogiornos.” CESIFO
Working Paper Series No. 378.
AN OUTSIDER’S VIEW
177

[klip-klap]

> Jestem zwolennikiem wprowadzenia euro, bo moze to byc w sumie najlepsza rzecz
> jaka nas spotka w UE, ale ten ton nie podoba mi sie absolutnie.
>

Jako uniosceptyk wiesz, ze KE tylko przypomniala Kaczynskim jaka jest ich rola w
Polsce. KE to jest polski rzad, a Kaczynscy moga byc co najwyzej zarzadcami
prowincji o nazwie "Polska". Jak Kaczory podskocza to im sie zrobi kamapnie jak
Haiderowi, dlatego prezydent jak najszybciej powinien spotkac sie z Klausem i
ustalic taktyke. Tyle przynajmniej zrobic moze.