Nuclear Posture Review - backup

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1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

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Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy
has been reduced significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and
should be taken at this time. The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons,
which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack
on the United States, our allies, and partners. [...]

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in
fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and
continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and
mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring
non-nuclear attacks – conventional, biological, or chemical – has declined
significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. [...]

Accordingly, among the key conclusions of the NPR:
• The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the
objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our
allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.
• The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies
and partners.
• The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with
their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.


Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have reduced
operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 75 percent, but both
still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence. The
Administration is committed to working with Russia to preserve stability at
significantly reduced force levels.

New START.
The next step in this process is to replace the now-expired 1991 START I Treaty
with another verifiable agreement, New START. An early task for the NPR was to
develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations and to consider how U.S.
forces could be structured in light of the reductions required by the new agreement.

The NPR reached the following conclusions:
• Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic delivery
vehicles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers – by approximately
50 percent from the START I level, and reducing accountable strategic warheads
by approximately 30 percent from the Moscow Treaty level.
• Building on NPR analysis, the United States agreed with Russia to New START
limits of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery
vehicles, and a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers.
• The U.S. nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will
be maintained under New START.
• All U.S. ICBMs will be “de-MIRVed” to a single warhead each to increase stability.
• Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and
reassurance goals will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses
and preserving options for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in
conventional roles.

Maximizing Presidential decision time.
The NPR concluded that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces – with
heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant
number of SSBNs at sea at any given time – should be maintained for the present.
[...] Key steps include:
• Continuing the practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs so
that, in the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the
missile would land in the open ocean, and asking Russia to re-confirm its
commitment to this practice.
• Further strengthening the U.S. command and control system to maximize
Presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis.
• Exploring new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and further
reduce any incentives for prompt launch.

Reinforcing strategic stability.
Given that Russia and China are currently modernizing their nuclear capabilities
– and that both are claiming U.S. missile defense and conventionally-armed
missile programs are destabilizing – maintaining strategic stability with the
two countries will be an important challenge in the years ahead. [...]

A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States to explain that
our missile defences and any future U.S. conventionally-armed long-range
ballistic missile systems are designed to address newly emerging regional
threats, and are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. For
its part, Russia could explain its modernization programs, clarify its current
military doctrine (especially the extent to which it places importance on
nuclear weapons), and discuss steps it could take to allay concerns in the West
about its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, such as further consolidating its
non-strategic systems in a small number of secure facilities deep within Russia.

With China, the purpose of a dialogue on strategic stability is to provide a
venue and mechanism for each side to communicate its views about the other’s
strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic
capabilities. The goal of such a dialogue is to enhance confidence, improve
transparency, and reduce mistrust. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review Report, “maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China
relationship is as important to this Administration as maintaining strategic
stability with other major powers.” [...]


Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners

The United States is fully committed to strengthening bilateral and regional
security ties and working with allies and partners to adapt these relationships
to 21st century challenges. Such security relationships are critical in
deterring potential threats, and can also serve our non-proliferation goals – by
demonstrating to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear weapons will
only undermine their goal of achieving military or political advantages, and by
reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests
can be protected without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. [...]

In Europe, forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons have been reduced dramatically
since the end of the Cold War, but a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons
remain. Although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO members is at an
historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique
nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in
nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to
allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. [...]

In Asia and the Middle East – where there are no multilateral alliance
structures analogous to NATO – the United States has maintained extended
deterrence through bilateral alliances and security relationships and through
its forward military presence and security guarantees. When the Cold War ended,
the United States withdrew its forward deployed nuclear weapons from the Pacific
region, including removing nuclear weapons from naval surface vessels and
general purpose

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Although nuclear weapons have proved to be a key component of U.S. assurances to
allies and partners, the United States has relied increasingly on non-nuclear
elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S.
conventional presence and effective theatre ballistic missile defenses. As the
role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national security strategy, these
non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. [...]

Non-strategic nuclear weapons.
The United States has reduced non-strategic (or “tactical”) nuclear weapons
dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Today, it keeps only a limited
number of forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, plus a small number of
nuclear weapons stored in the United States for possible overseas deployment in
support of extended deterrence to allies and partners worldwide. Russia
maintains a much larger force of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a significant
number of which are deployed near the territories of several North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.

The NPR concluded that the United States will:
• Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical
fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and proceed with full scope life extension
for the B-61 bomb including enhancing safety, security, and use control.
• Retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).
• Continue to maintain and develop long-range strike capabilities that
supplement U.S. forward military presence and strengthen regional deterrence.
• Continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners
to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended
deterrent. No changes in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made
without close consultations with our allies and partners. [...]

Looking Ahead: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons

Pursuing the recommendations of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review will strengthen
the security of the United States and its allies and partners and bring us
significant steps closer to the President’s vision of a world without nuclear
weapons.

The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give
up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and
insecurity are very demanding. Among those conditions are success in halting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, much greater transparency into the programs
and capabilities of key countries of concern, verification methods and
technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations,
enforcement measures strong and credible enough to deter such violations, and
ultimately the resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival states to
acquire and maintain nuclear weapons. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today.

But we can – and must – work actively to create those conditions. We can take
the practical steps identified in the 2010 NPR that will not only move us toward
the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide but will, in
their own right, reinvigorate the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, erect
higher barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials by
terrorist groups, and strengthen U.S. and international security.



Pełny raport na temat nowego Nuclear Posture Review do jakiego udalo mi sie
dotrzec ma 72 strony, a to jest tylko streszczenie.

Systemy obrony antybalistycznej - backup3

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Zwracam uwage na ten fragment:

Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and
reassurance goals will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses
and preserving options for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in
conventional roles.

Pozwole sobie przetlumaczyc:

Wzrost roli amerykanskich systemow nienuklearnych w regionalnym odstraszaniu i
zabezpieczaniu bedzie umozliwoiny przez zniesienie ograniczen w systemach obrony
antyrakietowej i zachowaniu opcji uzycia ciezkich bombowców i nienuklearnych
pociskow rakietowych dalekiego zasiegu.