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Nuclear Posture Review - backup

09.04.10, 15:10
1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
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    • bmc3i Re: Nuclear Posture Review - backup2 09.04.10, 15:10
      Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

      The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy
      has been reduced significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and
      should be taken at this time. The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons,
      which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack
      on the United States, our allies, and partners. [...]

      Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in
      fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and
      continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and
      mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring
      non-nuclear attacks – conventional, biological, or chemical – has declined
      significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear
      weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. [...]

      Accordingly, among the key conclusions of the NPR:
      • The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and
      reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the
      objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our
      allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.
      • The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
      circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies
      and partners.
      • The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
      non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with
      their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

      Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels

      Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have reduced
      operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 75 percent, but both
      still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence. The
      Administration is committed to working with Russia to preserve stability at
      significantly reduced force levels.

      New START.
      The next step in this process is to replace the now-expired 1991 START I Treaty
      with another verifiable agreement, New START. An early task for the NPR was to
      develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations and to consider how U.S.
      forces could be structured in light of the reductions required by the new agreement.

      The NPR reached the following conclusions:
      • Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic delivery
      vehicles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
      ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers – by approximately
      50 percent from the START I level, and reducing accountable strategic warheads
      by approximately 30 percent from the Moscow Treaty level.
      • Building on NPR analysis, the United States agreed with Russia to New START
      limits of 1,550 accountable strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery
      vehicles, and a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers.
      • The U.S. nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will
      be maintained under New START.
      • All U.S. ICBMs will be “de-MIRVed” to a single warhead each to increase stability.
      • Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and
      reassurance goals will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses
      and preserving options for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in
      conventional roles.

      Maximizing Presidential decision time.
      The NPR concluded that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces – with
      heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant
      number of SSBNs at sea at any given time – should be maintained for the present.
      [...] Key steps include:
      • Continuing the practice of “open-ocean targeting” of all ICBMs and SLBMs so
      that, in the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the
      missile would land in the open ocean, and asking Russia to re-confirm its
      commitment to this practice.
      • Further strengthening the U.S. command and control system to maximize
      Presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis.
      • Exploring new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and further
      reduce any incentives for prompt launch.

      Reinforcing strategic stability.
      Given that Russia and China are currently modernizing their nuclear capabilities
      – and that both are claiming U.S. missile defense and conventionally-armed
      missile programs are destabilizing – maintaining strategic stability with the
      two countries will be an important challenge in the years ahead. [...]

      A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States to explain that
      our missile defences and any future U.S. conventionally-armed long-range
      ballistic missile systems are designed to address newly emerging regional
      threats, and are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. For
      its part, Russia could explain its modernization programs, clarify its current
      military doctrine (especially the extent to which it places importance on
      nuclear weapons), and discuss steps it could take to allay concerns in the West
      about its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, such as further consolidating its
      non-strategic systems in a small number of secure facilities deep within Russia.

      With China, the purpose of a dialogue on strategic stability is to provide a
      venue and mechanism for each side to communicate its views about the other’s
      strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic
      capabilities. The goal of such a dialogue is to enhance confidence, improve
      transparency, and reduce mistrust. As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile
      Defense Review Report, “maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China
      relationship is as important to this Administration as maintaining strategic
      stability with other major powers.” [...]

      Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners

      The United States is fully committed to strengthening bilateral and regional
      security ties and working with allies and partners to adapt these relationships
      to 21st century challenges. Such security relationships are critical in
      deterring potential threats, and can also serve our non-proliferation goals – by
      demonstrating to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear weapons will
      only undermine their goal of achieving military or political advantages, and by
      reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests
      can be protected without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. [...]

      In Europe, forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons have been reduced dramatically
      since the end of the Cold War, but a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons
      remain. Although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO members is at an
      historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique
      nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in
      nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering
      nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to
      allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. [...]

      In Asia and the Middle East – where there are no multilateral alliance
      structures analogous to NATO – the United States has maintained extended
      deterrence through bilateral alliances and security relationships and through
      its forward military presence and security guarantees. When the Cold War ended,
      the United States withdrew its forward deployed nuclear weapons from the Pacific
      region, including removing nuclear weapons from naval surface vessels and
      general purpose
      • bmc3i Re: Nuclear Posture Review - backup3 09.04.10, 15:11
        Although nuclear weapons have proved to be a key component of U.S. assurances to
        allies and partners, the United States has relied increasingly on non-nuclear
        elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S.
        conventional presence and effective theatre ballistic missile defenses. As the
        role of nuclear weapons is reduced in U.S. national security strategy, these
        non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. [...]

        Non-strategic nuclear weapons.
        The United States has reduced non-strategic (or “tactical”) nuclear weapons
        dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Today, it keeps only a limited
        number of forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe, plus a small number of
        nuclear weapons stored in the United States for possible overseas deployment in
        support of extended deterrence to allies and partners worldwide. Russia
        maintains a much larger force of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a significant
        number of which are deployed near the territories of several North Atlantic
        Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.

        The NPR concluded that the United States will:
        • Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical
        fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and proceed with full scope life extension
        for the B-61 bomb including enhancing safety, security, and use control.
        • Retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).
        • Continue to maintain and develop long-range strike capabilities that
        supplement U.S. forward military presence and strengthen regional deterrence.
        • Continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners
        to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended
        deterrent. No changes in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made
        without close consultations with our allies and partners. [...]

        Looking Ahead: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons

        Pursuing the recommendations of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review will strengthen
        the security of the United States and its allies and partners and bring us
        significant steps closer to the President’s vision of a world without nuclear

        The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give
        up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and
        insecurity are very demanding. Among those conditions are success in halting the
        proliferation of nuclear weapons, much greater transparency into the programs
        and capabilities of key countries of concern, verification methods and
        technologies capable of detecting violations of disarmament obligations,
        enforcement measures strong and credible enough to deter such violations, and
        ultimately the resolution of regional disputes that can motivate rival states to
        acquire and maintain nuclear weapons. Clearly, such conditions do not exist today.

        But we can – and must – work actively to create those conditions. We can take
        the practical steps identified in the 2010 NPR that will not only move us toward
        the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide but will, in
        their own right, reinvigorate the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, erect
        higher barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials by
        terrorist groups, and strengthen U.S. and international security.

        Pełny raport na temat nowego Nuclear Posture Review do jakiego udalo mi sie
        dotrzec ma 72 strony, a to jest tylko streszczenie.
        • bmc3i Systemy obrony antybalistycznej - backup3 09.04.10, 15:11
          Zwracam uwage na ten fragment:

          Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. regional deterrence and
          reassurance goals will be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses
          and preserving options for using heavy bombers and long-range missile systems in
          conventional roles.

          Pozwole sobie przetlumaczyc:

          Wzrost roli amerykanskich systemow nienuklearnych w regionalnym odstraszaniu i
          zabezpieczaniu bedzie umozliwoiny przez zniesienie ograniczen w systemach obrony
          antyrakietowej i zachowaniu opcji uzycia ciezkich bombowców i nienuklearnych
          pociskow rakietowych dalekiego zasiegu.

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