gelatik_
12.07.02, 02:22
The Death of bin Ladenism
By AMIR TAHERI
ARIS — Osama bin Laden is dead. The news first came from sources in Afghanistan
and Pakistan almost six months ago: the fugitive died in December and was
buried in the mountains of southeast Afghanistan. Pakistan's president, Pervez
Musharraf, echoed the information. The remnants of Osama's gang, however, have
mostly stayed silent, either to keep Osama's ghost alive or because they have
no means of communication.
With an ego the size of Mount Everest, Osama bin Laden would not have, could
not have, remained silent for so long if he were still alive. He always liked
to take credit even for things he had nothing to do with. Would he remain
silent for nine months and not trumpet his own survival?
Even if he is still in the world, bin Ladenism has left for good. Mr. bin Laden
was the public face of a brand of politics that committed suicide in New York
and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001, killing thousands of innocent people in the
process.
What were the key elements of that politics?
The first was a cynical misinterpretation of Islam that began decades ago with
such anti-Western ideologues as Maulana Maudoodi of Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb of
Egypt. Although Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb were not serious thinkers, they could
at least offer a coherent ideology based on a narrow reading of Islamic texts.
Their ideas about Western barbarism and Muslim revival, distilled down to bin
Ladenism, became mere slogans designed to incite zealots to murder.
People like Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb could catch the ball and run largely
because most Muslim intellectuals of their generation (and later) had no
interest in continuing the work of Muslim philosophers. Our intellectuals were
too busy learning Western ideologies of one kind or another — and they left the
newly urbanized Muslim masses to the half-baked ideas of men like Mr. Maudoodi
and Mr. Qutb and eventually Mr. bin Laden.
Now, however, many Muslim intellectuals are returning home, so to speak. They
are rediscovering the philosophical heritage of Islam and the challenges of
Muslim political thought. And Maudoodi-Qutbism is now being seen as a pseudo-
Islamic version of Western fascism.
The second element that made Mr. bin Laden possible was easy money, largely
from wealthy individuals in the Persian Gulf area who believed that they were
buying a place in the hereafter while protecting themselves against political
opposition in this world. Some paid because they believed they were helping
poor and oppressed Muslims. Others paid so militants would go and spend their
energies far away from home.
That easy money is no longer available, at least not in large quantities. Many
donors have realized they were financing terrorists. Some have been forced to
choose between the West, where they have the bulk of their wealth, and the
troglodyte mujahedeen of the Hindu Kush.
The third element that made bin Ladenist terror possible was the encouraging,
or at least complacent, attitude of several governments. The Taliban in
Afghanistan began by hosting Mr. bin Laden and ended up becoming his life-and-
death buddies. The Pakistanis were also supportive because they wanted to
dominate Afghanistan and make life hard for the Indians by sending holy
warriors to Kashmir. The Sudanese government was sympathetic, if not actually
supportive, and offered at least a safe haven. This was also the case in Yemen,
where in November 2000 I accidentally ran into a crowd of Qaeda militants who
had flown in from Pakistan for a gathering.
We now know that Qaeda cells operated, often quite openly, in Muslim countries
from Indonesia and Malaysia to Morocco and Tunisia, without being bothered by
anyone. The fall of the Taliban means the gang no longer has a secure base. All
the other countries are also closed, and in some cases even hostile.
The fourth element was the mistaken practice of many Western powers that
sheltered the terrorists in the name of freedom of expression and dissent. We
now know that London was a critical haven for Al Qaeda. The murder of the
Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud was planned in London. Qaeda
militants operated in Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Spain and Italy
without significant restraint.
The fifth element that made bin Ladenism possible was the West's, especially
America's, perceived weakness if not actual cowardice. A joke going around
militant Islamist circles until last year was that the only thing the Americans
would do if attacked was to sue. That perception no longer exists. The
Americans, supported by one of the largest coalitions in history, have shown
they will use force against their enemies even if that means a long and
difficult war.
The sixth element of bin Ladenism was the illusion in most Western nations that
they could somehow remain unaffected by the violence unleashed by fanatical
terrorists against so many Muslim nations from Indonesia to Algeria.
Mr. bin Laden could survive and prosper only in a world in which these elements
existed. That world is gone. Mr. bin Laden's ghost may linger on — perhaps
because Washington and Islamabad will find it useful. President Bush's party
has a crucial election to win and Pervez Musharraf is keen to keep Pakistan in
the limelight as long as possible.
But the truth is that Osama bin Laden is dead.
