Gość: 1981
IP: *.HAWI.splitrock.net
14.07.01, 21:09
http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf/16c6b2fc83775317852564a400054b28/22e2c6a3562ddd
7b8525677600551a34?OpenDocument
Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Descision to Introduce Martial Law in
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981
By Mark Kramer
The behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the Polish crisis of 1980-81
remains a source of great controversy.
On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt that the
Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in 1980-81.1
The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combat-ready troops around
Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long series of
conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed Polish
officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led invasion, and
made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and multilateral
channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to fear that the
Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law. Whether Soviet
leaders actually intended to invade is a very different matter. All the latest
evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet officials were extremely
reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland. Nevertheless, it is important
to bear in mind that this new evidence, persuasive though it seems in
retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In 1980-81, Polish leaders were not
privy to the internal deliberations of the Soviet Politburo and could never be
fully certain about Soviet intentions. Hence, they may have genuinely believed
that an invasion would occur if a solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial
law) did not materialize. Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have wanted to
create that impression—even if they did not intend to follow up on it—because
they believed it would induce the Polish authorities to take action.2 In that
respect, the declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that
he introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and
the "lesser of two evils."3
On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises serious doubts
about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically about his position
in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. First-hand accounts and
newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981 (and perhaps earlier),
Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without external (i.e., Soviet)
military assistance or at least a solid guarantee that Soviet troops would move
in if the martial law operation failed. The documents also suggest that Soviet
leaders by then were unwilling to provide direct military support to
Jaruzelski, telling him that it would be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops
into Poland and that he must instead proceed with martial law on his own.
Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet military assistance, as revealed in the
latest evidence, nearly caused him to postpone the whole operation in the hope
that he would then be given a concrete external assurance.
The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in December
1981 was first propounded in September 1992 by a retired Soviet officer, Army-
General Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as Chief of Staff
and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. In that capacity, he
played a key role vis-a-vis Poland in 1980-81. Looking back on the Polish
crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed martial law to forestall
a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that, rather than trying to stave
off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did just the opposite in December
1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of military assistance [from the USSR]
if the situation in Poland becomes critical."4 The Soviet Politburo, according
to Gribkov, promptly turned down the Polish leader's requests, informing him
that "Soviet troops will not be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after
this decision was conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to
reconsider and warned them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland
will be lost to the Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-
minute pleas for a Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the
nervousness and diffidence that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their
ability to carry out the plans for martial law."5
Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been gaining a
favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even among some of
his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were willing to accept
Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of two evils" in
December 1981.6 Confronted by Gribkov's revelations, Jaruzelski strenuously
denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military guarantee and argued that
Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet military pressure and
intervention in 1981.7 An acrimonious standoff between the two men ensued.
Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to bear out
Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence includes
Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and secret records
of meetings and conversations. Until recently, the new evidence was very strong—
strong enough to raise serious doubts about Jaruzelski's self-exculpatory
claims—but it was not yet conclusive. That changed in November 1997, when I
obtained a document that provides much clearer evidence about Jaruzelski's
behavior in the lead-up to martial law. Combined with all the previous
disclosures, this document (which I have translated and annotated below) offers
powerful confirmation of Gribkov's article.
Before turning to this new document, it is worth reviewing the other evidence
that corroborates Gribkov's account. Some of the evidence has come from
unexpected sources, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of the
Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) during the Polish crisis.
Gorbachev was and is an admirer and close friend of Jaruzelski and has
described him as "a true hero" who in 1981 "had no choice" and "acted
correctly."8 In an interview in late 1992, Gorbachev affirmed that he "always
had complete trust in Jaruzelski" and had "talked to him more openly and
honestly than I did with some members of the CPSU Politburo."9 Gorbachev also
has insisted that Jaruzelski's reputation will be secure as "a Polish patriot
and a man of great honor" who "saved his country."10 Hence, Gorbachev has no
reason to say anything that would impugn Jaruzelski's honesty. Nor does
Gorbachev have any reason to defend the reputation of those on the Soviet
Politburo in 1981 who may have wanted to dispatch Soviet military forces to
Poland unless Jaruzelski imposed martial law. If anything, Gorbachev might have
been expected to go out of his way to substantiate Jaruzelski's claims about
what happened in December 1981.
Yet in several interviews with Polish journalists in October and November 1992,
Gorbachev averred that the CPSU Politburo made no threat of military
intervention in December 1981, contrary to the assertions in Jaruzelski's
memoirs. Gorbachev also recalled that shortly before martial law was
introduced, a top Polish official (who Gorbachev deduced was Jaruzelski) had
placed an urgent phone call to Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU
Politburo and CPSU Secretariat who chaired the Politburo's special commission
on the Polish crisis. Gorbachev maintained that Suslov had informed the Polish
leader that Soviet troops would continue to protect Poland against external
threats, but would not be used against internal dangers.11
